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Information for Authors

Gandhi Marg is the quarterly interdisciplinary journal of the Gandhi Peace Foundation published from New Delhi in the months of March, June, September and December every year. Original contributions on themes of national and international importance falling under the broad area of Gandhian Studies are invited from scholars and practitioners. Articles submitted to Gandhi Marg are refereed, normally by members of the Editorial and Advisory Boards. It is presumed that an article submitted to Gandhi Marg is original, and has not been under the consideration of any another journal. In general, the articles should not exceed 8000 words including notes and references.

We also invite provocative and shorter essays (1500-2500 words) for inclusion in the notes and comments section. When an abbreviation is used, it should be spelt out in full the first time. We also accept review articles assessing a number of recent books on a particular subject and book reviews. All articles should have an abstract of not more than 150 words. The name of the author, institutional affiliation and complete address including email and telephone/fax should be supplied. A short biographical statement of the author containing information about the area of specialisation and principal publications is also necessary. British spellings should be used throughout the manuscript. All the authors will be informed about the status of the submissions within three months. No manuscript will be returned unless accompanied by a self addressed and stamped envelope.

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Examples

Books: Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 23.

Articles: Ramashray Roy, "Parameters of Participation", *Gandhi Marg*, 12, 3 (October-December 1990), p. 276.

Chapters within Books: Pearl S. Buck, "A Way of Living", in S. Radhakrishnan, ed., *Mahatma Gandhi: Essays and Reflections* (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1956), p. 51.

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Introduction: the struggle for justice and Africa's rich tradition of non-violence

John S Moolakkattu
Ufo Okeke-Uzodike

WHAT HAS AFRICA to do with non-violence? Judging by the fact that some of the most horrendous African conflicts in history have taken place over the past three decades, many people are likely to be skeptical about the prospects of non-violence on this continent. Yet, many fail to realise that very few inter-state wars have taken place among African countries since independence, making Africa one of the most peaceful regions on that count. This is despite being bequeathed with artificial boundaries and national entities that are often riddled with colonially-created bases for subnational contestations. For instance, African states have seldom resorted to wars aimed at capturing territory and resources. The number of openly secessionist wars is also very few. There are a number of good reasons for this relatively well managed inter-state security environment within the African continent. Pan-Africanism, the formation of the Organisation of African Unity and its successor organisation – the African Union — and the strong desire to maintain the sanctity of the artificial boundaries as bequeathed by colonial powers created a climate in which no African state was prepared or able to play the role of a regional hegemon based on territorial imperialist inclinations.

As such, much of the violence that the continent has witnessed since the post-colonial era has been primarily of an intra-state nature. Indeed, much of the insecurity within Africa is linked directly to

internal disputes that have implications for important human security concerns in the world. For instance, at the end of 2005, 82 percent of all UN peacekeepers worldwide were deployed for various operations in Africa, making the continent the most dangerous region on earth[1]. Yet, in many ways, Africa is a region of paradoxes. It is in Africa that we have some shining examples of willingness by social groups to bury grievances and let go of the past. Africa also has important examples of deliberate efforts by communities to live with their former oppressors in new arrangements that invoke principles of remorse and forgiveness. Nevertheless, an opinion survey of activists and heads of state in Africa found that both groups did not subscribe generally to non-violence as a method of struggle; when they did so, they were not prepared to see it as more than an addendum to violence.[2] The routine use of violence by workers and citizens to express social grievances in post-apartheid South Africa is a staggering phenomenon in a country that takes great pride in its remarkably peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. In this way, Africa is a paradoxical continent indeed.

Gandhi was a product of South Africa where he first launched his satyagraha campaigns before they were tried out in India several years later. He had inspired South African leaders like Albert Luthuli. Although many other African leaders during and immediately after the freedom struggle, particularly in the British colonies, had expressed commitment to non-violence, this often seemed more tactical than principled. One can cite examples of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Kenneth Kaunda. But at the same time, there are criticisms that Gandhi did not extend his struggle to Africans and that he was generally averse to forming united fronts.[3] While he was keen on such fronts in India (linking Muslims and Hindus) and worked tirelessly to realise them, he did not see much prospects for them across countries. In other words, for him, each national question should be addressed by the sufferers themselves rather than outsiders, a spirit that he could justify on the basis of his principle of swadesi or self-reliance.

In this paper we explore the philosophical bases of non-violence in Africa and briefly highlight some of the non-violent struggles, including those led by women. We then examine the transitional justice arrangements made in the post-conflict African states drawing on the restorative justice paradigm. The next section briefly reviews the non-violent legacy of Chief Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela in South Africa, the most prominent legacy on the continent. Then we seek to examine African dispute resolution mechanisms and their potential for addressing some of the contemporary conflicts. We then

proceed to discuss the pan-African roots of non-violence and the crystallisation of some of these aspirations through the African Union before concluding the paper with a very brief summary of the articles contained in this issue.

Philosophical Bases

The popularization in recent years of the African relational worldview most popularly known as "ubuntu" by its well known exponent, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, has spurred a lot of research on how this concept could be applied in various social realms as a guide to social practice.[4] Birgit Brock-Utne writes: "The notion of ubuntu sheds light on the importance of peacemaking through principles of reciprocity and a sense of shared destiny between peoples. It provides a value system for giving and receiving forgiveness. It provides a rationale for sacrificing or letting go of the desire to take revenge for past wrongs."[5] Societies built on a relational worldview tend to see everything through the prism of community rather than as atomised individuals. The concept of "ujama" associated with Julius Nyerere, often translated as African socialism, also represents the same relational worldview, a worldview that has strong similarities with the Gandhian. Along with Abraham Lincoln, Gandhi was one of the major influences on Nyerere. Little wonder that his "ujama" also emphasised values of self-reliance, an attitude that is akin to Gandhi's swaraj and swadesi principles. In ujama, the notion of the self is not an atomised one, but an extended one — one that incorporates the 'other' in the 'self' or denies the very notion of the 'other'.

In this way, Africa's relational worldview base serves to explain its non-violent tradition and its recurrent flirtation with the principle despite what might appear to be justifiable gravitation towards violence. Sutherland and Meyer tell us that African liberation struggles had a cosmopolitan outlook and were largely non-violent.[6] In a similar vein, Alex Waal reminds us that, "it was truly intercontinental in that it had a clear common vision with the civil rights movement in the United States, with the Indian nationalist movement, and shortly thereafter with the European campaign against nuclear weapons (sparked by the French nuclear tests in the Algerian Sahara)".[7]

Non-violent Struggles in West Africa

Beyond South Africa, other parts of Africa have had their own shares of non-violent struggles particularly in the form of peaceful strikes. Consider, for example, the labour strikes in Namibia in

1971-72 against an exploitative contract system foisted by South Africa that eventually led to a general strike that forced the authorities to negotiate, after having failed to intimidate the movement through other means.[8] Of all the non-violent struggles that came to limelight in recent years, the struggle by the Ogoni was particularly noteworthy. It was also a struggle that damaged the image of the Nigerian state, forcing it to make amends for its previous acts of commission and omission. A small minority ethnic group of about 500,000 people living on approximately 404 square miles of oil-rich land east of Port Harcourt in Rivers State, Nigeria, the Ogoni shot into prominence when they started protesting against the environmental devastation of their homeland and their impoverishment following the commencement of oil extraction by multi-national companies (MNCs). The Ogoni leaders prepared an internal self-determination charter known as "The Ogoni Bill of Rights", which was submitted to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the oil companies in 1990. An addendum was added to the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1991 to bring the Ogoni struggle for non-violent change to an international audience, thanks to the role played by its versatile leader Ken Saro-Wiwa.

After receiving no response to their demands for more than two years, on January 4, 1993, under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), approximately 300,000 Ogoni came out in a series of protest rallies against the Nigerian government with the aim of expelling Shell from Ogoniland on the grounds of collusion in the sustained violation of the economic and political rights of their people. In many ways, this was the trigger-start of the uneasy actions that bedeviled the relationship between successive Nigerian governments and MOSOP. The government responded to MOSOP protests with such coercive force that Ogoniland quickly became highly militarised. Peaceful protests were repeatedly, high-handedly, smashed with coercive force by the state, which resulted in further protests and anger. In the increasingly tense environment, four reputedly pro-government Ogoni leaders were murdered on 21 May 1994. Events came to a crescendo when General Sani Abacha's government arrested Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders for inciting the murders and convened a special military trial tribunal. All nine men were hanged on 10 November 1995 despite international interventions and condemnations from around the world. As further protests increased and Ogoni anger boiled, Shell stopped further oil production activities in Ogoniland, making the Ogoni the first

indigenous people to force a transnational oil company to stop operations and leave by peaceful means.

The Ogoni nation was the first to sensitise and draw the international community's attention to the level of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta caused by the multi-national oil companies with the connivance of an insensitive government.[10] The Bill of Rights presented to the Government and people of Nigeria called for political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, particularly the right to control and use a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development. The bill also underlined the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.

The Ogoni campaign "spurred Shell to attend to its operations in the region and its human rights and environmental record world wide"[9]. Beyond Shell, other oil companies have become more sensitive to the imperative of ensuring that their production activities are at least in line with standard best practice expectations. In achieving that, the Ogoni campaign has demonstrated that small communal groups can make a difference in shaping global environmental governance arrangements. Remarkably they did it using non-violence as the guiding principle.

In June 2009, at a federal court in New York, the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation agreed to pay 15.5 million US dollars in an out of court settlement for the hanging of the MOSOP leader and spokesman, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists. It was a sort of partial vindication of justice with lots of implications for similar struggles elsewhere in the world. The formation of MOSOP was aimed at repositioning the nationality question and good governance issues in Africa after the Cold War. Saro-Wiwa was determined to make the Ogoni a model of what an intellectually driven non-violent struggle could become. Consultants were appointed and over 20 position papers commissioned and produced on the techniques of non-violent action.[11]

Struggles by Women

Operating from diverse fields, women of Africa have been a major resource for peace and reconciliation. Historically, for instance, they fought against tax laws of the colonial regimes through peaceful protests that occasionally turned violent.[12] Women have repeatedly come out in large numbers to demand peace and reconciliation in conflict-ridden regions, especially in West Africa. For example, in March 2010, women marched to protest against the killings in Jos, Nigeria.

Operating from East Africa, Wangari Maathai – the academic and environmental activist who won the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize — is one of many women who see their struggle for environmental protection as intimately linked with the struggle to preserve life. In her Nobel address, Maathai argued that although the Green Belt Movement that she spearheaded did not initially address political issues, "It soon became clear that responsible governance of the environment was impossible without democratic space. Therefore, the tree became a symbol for the democratic struggle in Kenya. ... In time, the tree also became a symbol for peace and conflict resolution"[13]

Consider, for example, the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) movement, which is a civil society group that emerged in 2003 and is engaged in non-violent protest against repression and injustice with as many as 75,000 members on its rolls. Despite years of government repression, WOZA practises and teaches non-violent action to win goals that the country had set in 1980; goals that the organization believes have been denied to the Zimbabwean people during the last three decades of rule by Robert Mugabe.[14]

African women have also been willing to pioneer special uses of their femininity as a form of non-violent protest. Nudity as well as the threat of it as a form of protest is often used instrumentally by African women to drive their points home. Forms of this protest have taken place in different parts of Nigeria. The "Aba Women's Riot" of November-December 1929, which was a nationalist protest against rooted and exploitative British rule, is probably the best known example of a public nudity-protest.[15] In the contemporary period, such protests have also taken place in parts of the Niger Delta. Public nakedness amounts to a kind of disempowerment or emasculation of the males against whom it is directed, a sort of public curse, which can entail considerable loss of face for the offenders. It is used in desperate circumstances and the threat of its use is often sufficient to force the male offenders to call for negotiations. Such strategies have been used by the local community in their struggle for survival against MNCs like Shell, Chevron and Mobil in the Niger Delta.[16] However, in the contemporary period, nudity as a form of protest is not exclusive to Africa. For example, in Manipur, India, women resorted to nudity as a form of protest against the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 and the abuse of human rights in 2004, a step that shocked the entire country and drew international attention to the problem.

Another uniquely female form of public non-violent protest was

unleashed on Kenyan men in May of 2009 when ten Kenyan women's associations called on their members to abstain from sex in order to stop the prolonged political wrangling between President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga. Their coalition government was attempting to initiate meaningful political reforms that would prevent new ethnic bloodshed in the country given the backdrop of the unrest that plunged Kenya into turmoil and brought the country to the brink of civil war following the December 2007 presidential elections. More than 1 000 Kenyans lost their lives while tens of thousands other Kenyans were displaced. As one of the protesters noted, "The strike was not about sex. It was rather about governance issues and the anger of Kenyans. There is a severe drought at the moment. There is not enough to eat and food prices are very high, and women and children are among the first to be affected."[17]

Transitional Justice

Since the early 1990s, several Sub-Saharan African countries have attempted to address past human rights abuses by relying on a mix of transitional justice mechanisms such as prosecutions, truth-seeking and reconciliation efforts, reparations, or reforms of the justice and security systems. But lack of political will and the weakness of state institutions have undermined many of these efforts. The most violent conflicts that shook the continent—the collapse of Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and the subsequent eruption of war and foreign occupation in neighbouring DRC—prompted African leaders to seek African solutions to the problems of impunity and corruption that fuelled much of the violence. In its 2000 Constitutive Act, the African Union (AU) committed itself to intervene in member states to protect civilians from war crimes and other mass atrocities, even at the hands of their own governments—an African commitment to the "responsibility to protect" doctrine even before this concept was endorsed by the international community.

In the field of transitional justice, it can be argued that African nations are the initiators of ideas and institutions that are being borrowed and adapted by other nations in a two-way globalization process. One of South Africa's greatest contributions to the world is the example it set in the field of restorative justice. No student of conflict transformation or restorative justice can ignore the country's experience. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (TRC), established under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, was authorized to investigate human rights abuses committed between 1960 and 1994 and to offer amnesty to

individuals in exchange for full disclosure about their past acts. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC's chair, used his position to promote reconciliation as the most important goal of the commission. For Tutu, perpetrators should repent and victims in turn should offer forgiveness. In South Africa, people were asked to surrender their rights and face up to the duties that "ubuntu" required. The individual's right to prosecution was superseded by society's right to live in peace.[18]

Although Tutu's words did not find a receptive audience in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, by 1999 the government had "recognized that some measured use of the restorative justice approach might indeed better serve the country's needs." A traditional method of grassroots level conflict resolution known as "gacaca" was resurrected to deal with the seemingly insurmountable situation. Gacaca was meant to deal with minor offences between families. Rwandans appointed 260,000 gacaca lay judges in October 2001. It had the advantage of involving the entire community in the trial and sentencing process. People were allowed to confront their attackers, narrate their stories, and express pent up emotions, all in a relatively secure environment. Apology was part of the procedure of the traditional gacaca system, and has been maintained as an important ingredient to promote reconciliation. Provision for suitable compensation was also made in the legislation establishing the gacaca courts. This was built on the traditional system in which the wronged was paid restitution by the individual responsible.[19]

The Rwandan transitional justice process had an advantage over the South African model in which compensation was not exacted from the perpetrator, but was paid by the government, whose members came mainly from the victimized population. Sierra Leone added a new dimension to transitional justice in that country. The kingpins charged with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of humanitarian law were tried in a Special Court, and others (both perpetrators and victims) would be heard in a South African style Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Special Court emphasized justice through punishment; the TRC promoted reconciliation through a process of truth telling. Like South Africa, the TRC in Sierra Leone was headed by a religious leader - Dr. Joseph Christian Hamper, Bishop of the United Methodist Church - although only 10 percent of the people are Christians. The vast majority (60%) are Muslim and 30% practise indigenous religions, disproving the notion that truth commissions presuppose the existence of an overwhelmingly Christian environment.[20]

African states have made strong commitments to international justice in order to end leadership impunity and mass atrocity. The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have sought to make accountability mandatory for the worst perpetrators of human rights abuses. Drawing on support for these tribunals, 30 African states ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Three African states—Uganda, the DR Congo, and the Central African Republic—were the first to refer alleged criminal situations to the court. However, ICC investigations in the DR Congo and Sudan have increased tensions between the court and the AU.

Luthuli-Mandela Legacy

There is a strong section of the African National Congress (ANC) that tends to project the violent side of the freedom struggle more than its non-violent tradition. In their bid to do so, they seem to harp on the theme that the shift of the ANC from non-violence to violence had the imprimatur of Chief Albert Luthuli, the then president of ANC. Chief Luthuli was a non-racialist and looked forward to a multi-cultural South Africa the fundamentals of which were laid down in the Freedom Charter.[21] His leadership witnessed several instances of collaboration between a diverse group of South Africans (Africans, Indians, Coloureds and conscientious Whites) against the apartheid regime. The ANC holds to the position that Luthuli had sanctioned the use of violence after the 1960 massacre in Sharpeville. This does not agree with Luthuli's image as a principled non-violent activist. In fact, different views on the selective appropriation of his memory exist.[22] The Nobel peace committee, which selected him for the Nobel prize in 1960 had recognized his firm belief in a principled form of non-violence, which had apparently a Christian stamp like that of Martin Luther King Jr. Both were Christian preachers and they could see the easy resonance between Gandhian non-violence and the teachings of Christ. Mandela, although not committed to non-violence as a principle, played a key role in ensuring that most of the violence that followed the Sharpeville massacre was aimed at sabotage rather than killing of innocent people. His explanation that even Gandhi would have sanctioned violence on certain occasions was certainly a misreading of the latter's ideas.[23] There are people who believe that had the struggle been more non-violent – for example, in the form of mass civil disobedience — the dynamics of non-violent action would have forced the system to collapse much earlier. This is a question that experts in

counterfactuals would be interested in. Possibly, by taking to violence, the space for further mass mobilisation in South Africa was foreclosed with the armed wing no longer in a position to assume leadership of such mass mobilisation attempts. According to Presbey, "Mandela abandoned nonviolence, to a large extent, because he estimated that his fellow South Africans in struggle were not willing to take on the levels of self-suffering that Gandhi explains are part of a nonviolent movement."[24] The ground situation was in favour of violence, particularly among the youth. There were also other rival groups like the Pan African Congress that were contemplating a recourse to violence. "Since violence could not be stopped, it could at least be channelled toward economic targets, and away from the direct targeting of human lives."[25] But the fact remains that the lasting contribution of Mandela lay more in ensuring that the violence that was inflicted was largely a controlled affair, one that allowed some space for a complete return to non-violence in the future. Stephen Zunes tells us that it was largely the non-violent nature of the struggle that made it possible for South Africa to achieve a smooth transition. He says that "the armed struggle was a means of providing moral support for the unarmed resistance, rather than what many had anticipated as an unarmed resistance being used primarily to support the armed struggle."[26]

The "Campaign of Defiance against Unjust Laws" - launched jointly by the African National Congress of South Africa under the leadership of Chief Luthuli and the South African Indian Congress under Manilal Gandhi in the 1950s - was one of the greatest non-violent campaigns in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi. It was the largest mass action by the newly-formed alliance of the two congresses, confronting the apartheid regime which had come to power in 1948 and had enacted a series of racist and repressive laws. Over 8,500 volunteers courted imprisonment by contravening pass laws and curfew regulations, orders segregating whites and non-whites in railway stations and post offices, and other oppressive and humiliating measures. The Campaign generated a mass upsurge for freedom and justice. The membership of the ANC increased from 7,000 to 100,000 during the campaign, and it became a truly national organization of the people. The Campaign also led to the formation of the Coloured People's Congress and the Congress of (White) Democrats, and then a "Congress Alliance" which played a crucial role in promoting multi-racial resistance to apartheid in subsequent years. The Defiance Campaign of 1952 was visited upon by repressive governmental measures, making non-violence equally threatening to the regime as

violence. It was this repressiveness that allowed the ANC under the leadership of Mandela to benefit from both a largely civilian non-violence and an armed insurgency by a small group. Mandela therefore went underground and began to organize "Umkonto we Sizwe," meaning the Spear of the Nation in Xhosa language. As Mandela writes in his *Long Walk to Freedom*:

> .. I saw non-violence on the Gandhian model not as an inviolable principle but as a tactic to be used as the situation demanded. The principle was not so important as the strategy should be used even when it was self-defeating, as Gandhi himself believed. I called for non-violent protest for as long as it was effective. This view prevailed, despite Manilal Gandhi's strong objections[27]

In fact, Mandela writes that he and his supporters had prevailed upon Luthuli to give up non-violence and concur with the establishment of a military movement as a separate one. He writes:

> The Chief initially resisted my arguments. For him, non-violence was not simply a tactic. But we worked on him the whole night, and I think that in his heart he realised we were right. He ultimately agreed that a military campaign was inevitable.[28]

There are many who contest this position that the ANC historians have adopted. There is no evidence to suggest that Chief Luthuli had given up on non-violence of the principled kind. His reference that "the road to freedom is via the cross" and description of the plight of the Blacks in South Africa as a "divine cause" worthy of pursuit suggests that deep-seated Christian and religious principles were at the root of his commitment to non-violence. Mandela, "believed that what mattered most was not whether a movement was strictly non-violent so much as the balance maintained between non-violence and violence."[29]

Traditional African Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

One sphere in which Africa has added to the processes of conflict resolution through non-violent means is to underscore the importance of culture in conflict resolution. It implies trying to find solutions to problems by looking at what one's own culture, battered by the forces of colonialism, may have to offer. While many such cultural aspects may have disappeared altogether from the urban areas, their remnants often exist in the villages. Most of these are built on the foundations of the earlier described relational worldview of "ubuntu". Mention may be made of the "palaver"

system, a traditional African institution of debate and consensus building. In practice, it often entails an extended form of discussion aimed at achieving consensus, restoring harmony and integrating those who have committed crime by subjecting them and their families to a social process in which the losers are always provided with a space to reintegrate themselves with the society through compensatory acts.[30] In other words, unlike the Western individualistic process of meting out punishment to the offender, the "palaver" system is a community-based process in which the ensuing discussions and the burden of compensation are matters of concern for the entire extended family. Its equivalent in Rwanda is traditional "gacaca", a village-based dispute settlement mechanism, which (as we have shown above) has been revived as an alternative to the punishment-based retributive justice system in the post-genocide Rwanda. In Burundi, it is known as "bashinganthaye". In north-central Uganda, it is known as "mato oput". Traditional chiefs act as arbitrators and reconcilers when disputes occur between families and clans. The "mato oput" process ends with the traditional drinking of a bitter herb of the oput tree.[31] Take for instance, Sudan, both southern and western, where community mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution exist. In the conflict-ridden Darfur region, the practice is known as "judiyya" (that is, mediation). Traditionally, it was the task of the elderly — the guardians of the customs – who are also known for their impartiality and concern for peace. In the rural areas of Sudan the elderly are respected and their decisions are seldom contested. Social pressure is often brought to bear on those who refuse to respect "judiyya" rulings.[32] Further, "leadership in precolonial African societies was based on both feminine and masculine principles, not solely on masculine values" and a flexible notion of gender.[33]

This is not to say that African dispute resolution practices are all localized and Africans are not able to take on larger issues affecting the world. Africans have proved that they could even fight against forces of nuclearisation. In the 1950s, Ghanain peace activists travelled to a site in the Sahara desert where the French intended to test their nuclear bomb. The movement against nuclear imperialism that took root in the Pan-African freedom struggle stands as a counter-narrative, a corrective, to the afro-pessimism that has so dominated scholarship on Africa since the 1980s.[34] Thirteen years after it officially opened for signature, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) has finally come into force with the twenty-eighth ratification instrument

deposited by Burundi on 15 July 2009. The decision of South Africa in 1994 to renounce its nuclear weapons programme was an exemplary one for the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation.

Panafricanism and Non-Violence

At the Pan-African conference held in Manchester in 1945, under the outstanding leadership of W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, and Jomo Kenyatta, the conferees pledged the African revolution to Gandhian methods of non-violence. Ghana, the first West African country to be liberated, was liberated on Indian lines. The spirit of Gandhi had triumphed. At the Accra conference of 1958, the Ghanaian governing party, represented by Kojo Botsio, Minister of External Affairs said: "The fact that the peoples of Africa have been able to come together regardless of complexion and outlook establishes, in unmistakable terms, their determination to unite and fight against imperialism and colonialism wherever they may be found in Africa." And: "With the united will of the people behind you the power of the imperialists can be destroyed without the use of violence." Nkrumah, promised "to support every form of non-violent action which our fellow-Africans in colonial territories may find it fit to use in the struggle for their legitimate rights and aspirations."[35]

Obviously those ideas did not find favour with the Egyptians and the Algerians. George Padmore published a book entitled *Pan-Africanism or Communism*? in 1956, which was a diatribe against communism. To him Pan-Africanism provided an "ideological alternative" to communism in the efforts of Africans to liberate themselves from the shackles of imperialism. It had very strong cultural connotations that aimed at insulating Africa from the West and fight against "racial arrogance," "alien domination," and apartheid. Finally, Padmore — who dreamed about the creation of a United States of Africa — subscribed to a Gandhian doctrine of non-violence "as a means of attaining self-determination and racial equality."[36]

Zambia's first president, Kenneth Kaunda, was a proponent of non-violent action, and wrote a book about the predicament of non-violence for independence movements faced with brutal, racist violence. Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, was also an enthusiast of non-violence, as were other leaders of Pan-Africanist movements which adopted various non-violent techniques even as they also flirted with violence when they deemed it necessary. Nyerere was awarded the first Gandhi Peace Prize in 1995, most coveted of Indian prizes, a sure testimony to the Gandhian values that he upheld in his life. His views on education and development

stressed basic needs satisfaction and self-reliance. The amassing of wealth should not be at the expense of human dignity and social inequality "for the purpose of all social, economic and political activity must be man."[37] Nkrumah described his positive action as "a civil disobedience campaign of agitation, propaganda and as a last resort the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principles of absolute non-violence."[38]

African Union as a Force for Peace?

The African Union (AU) has indeed taken several steps with regard to democracy promotion, including the adoption in 2007 of an 'African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance', which explicitly referred to the causal link between unconstitutional changes of government and 'insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa". The Charter not only confirms the general norms of multi-party democracy, separation of powers, and the rule of law but also makes it mandatory to invite external observers to elections. With regard to 'unconstitutional changes of government', it specifies mandatory penalties for illegitimate usurpers of power. Other states were prohibited not only from supporting unconstitutional changes of government, but also from offering asylum to the usurpers. Africa has also shown some remarkable experiments in constitutional engineering both at the country level and at the continent level. The Constitution of South Africa is an example of a synthesis of some of the best constitutional principles found anywhere in the world, and a base for building a multi-cultural society. With its Peace and Security Council supported by an Early Warning System, Panel of the Wise, Peer Review Mechanism and a Standby Force, the AU has created a continent-wide security community with a network of regional economic communities (like the Southern African Development Community and the Economic Community of West African States) constituting its components.[39] It has created a sub-regional road to continental governance in which sub-regions not only contribute to continental security governance but also act as the conduits through which continental governance policies are implemented sub-regionally. Besides providing peacekeeping forces and playing the role of a junior partner of the UN, the AU has intervened decisively in recent years in instances of unconstitutional changes in government. Franke calls it a case of "multi-layered security community" that "combines the strengths of constructivist thinking on security cooperation inherent in the security community terminology with the descriptive power of public administration concepts such as multilevel governance (MLG) and polycentric governance (PCG)."[40]

In sum, Africa shows to the world some of the best examples of reconciliation and restorative justice, building on the relational worldview held by most of its peoples even though a lingering tendency to engage in violence continues to persist. The articles in this special issue deal with the different aspects of non-violence and non-violent conflict transformation in Africa.

The first article by Ramchandra Pradhan examines the contributions of Gandhi and the transformation that he underwent in South Africa. His focus is on the evolution of Gandhi's faith during his South African days through an integral and dialectical process of 'inner illumination' and outer challenges through which he developed his basic ideas like swaraj, swadeshi and practices like ashram living, prayer and abiding faith in God. The second article by Paddy Kearney examines the significant contributions of Dennis Hurley whose fight against the apartheid regime is no less significant than that of other stalwarts like Bishop Desmond Tutu. He is not very well known in India and this article by Kearney seeks to address this gap. Kearney tells us that Dennis Hurley saw in the Roman Catholic community of Sant'Egidio, a laymen's organisation that brought about a settlement to civil conflict in Mozambique, a strong Gandhian flavour and a way forward for the Roman Catholic Church in its quest for justice and peace.

The third article by Jessie Lazar Knott looks at the African concept of "ubuntu", relates it to contemporary discourses relevant to the concept, and seeks to construct a strong civil society based on African social justice practices revolving around that concept. The fourth article by Jesse McConnell adopts the nuanced argument that restorative justice was chosen to achieve reconciliation in South Africa and re-build community in anticipation of retributive justice (built on the rights of individuals) in the future.

The fifth article by Suzanne Francis examines a major challenge to nation-building that emerged in post-apartheid South Africa. She argues that the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal has been systematically transformed more by the efforts of the political parties involved in violence than by relying on the national institutional approaches to conflict transformation. The secrets of the past were buried into the future to pave the way for participating in governance. The article by Chris Isike and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike examines the extent to which women's insights could be used in peace building in the context of KwaZulu-Natal. They contend that the absence of an African feminist perspective rooted in African culture has had deleterious effects on post-colonial African societies. Drawing on the "moral imagination" model of J.P. Lederach, the authors look for empirical support for

their model and argue that greater participation of women in politics and attention to their perspectives on conflict can have positive spin offs in the direction of peace.

The article by Sylvester Bongani Maphosa examines the methodology of peace building from below adopted by a Burundian non-governmental organization and assesses the extent to which it has been successful in doing so using a reflective peace practice matrix. The final article by Stephen Zunes, one of the contemporary chroniclers of non-violent action, overviews the Sahrawi struggle against Moroccan occupation and profiles the prominent non-violent resistance leader Aminatou Haidar, particularly her month-long hunger strike in late 2009 in response to her forced exile from her homeland.

What links most of these articles is an underlying spirit to fight evil by tapping on the good not only in oneself but also in those against whom one is waging the struggle. Similarly, there is a plea to rely on forms of conflict transformation that are rooted in African worldview and social practices. It is hoped that these articles will generate further discussions on the question of violence and non-violence in Africa, and add to the study and research on historical and emerging movements for peaceful change on the continent.

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Evolution of Gandhi's Faith : South African Contributions

Ram Chandra Pradhan

ABSTRACT

Every branch of social science has tried to appropriate Gandhi within the narrow confines of its own discipline. As a result, the symbiotic relationship between his life, thought and work has been undermined, creating the problem of 'broken totality' as one scholar puts it. The present paper has emerged out of my larger study to restore such symbiosis. It traces the process of the evolution of Gandhi's faith during his South African days. Working through an integral and dialectical process of 'inner illumination' and outer challenges, he developed his basic ideas like swaraj and swadeshi, and also his major instrumentalities like ashram living, prayer and abiding faith in God. The basic contours of his faith emerged out of fiery ordeals he went through during his South African sojourn. This explains the centrality of South African contributions in turning his personality from Mohan to Mahatma.

> It is the faith that steers us through stormy seas, faith that moves mountains and faith that jumps across the ocean. That faith is nothing but a living, wide-awake consciousness of God within. He who has achieved that faith wants nothing. Bodily diseased, he is spiritually healthy; physically poor, he rolls in spiritual riches.
>
> M.K. Gandhi

IT GOES WITHOUT saying that Gandhi was essentially a man of faith. For it was his undying faith that turned out to be the mainspring and substratum of his actions all through his life including those related to the secular field. It was again his fathomless faith which gave him a rare sense of fearlessness which inspired the life and thinking of his countless followers. It was once again his faith which

worked as a loom on which he tried to weave out a social fabric of secular, united and independent India free from the narrow gaze of region, religion, caste and creed. In the process, it took him to Noakhali, Calcutta, Bihar and Delhi to wage a single- handed and last-ditch battle for a free and united India even in the worst days of communal frenzy. Not only that, it was his abiding faith in truth, non-violence and purity of means which endowed him with a rare knack to take momentous decisions based on his 'inner voice'. Many of his followers like Jawaharlal Nehru and others were baffled as they could not find any objective and scientific way to judge the veracity or otherwise of Gandhi's 'inner voice'. But Gandhi found his 'inner voice' as the most effective medium for comprehension of truth. He strongly believed that the 'inner voice' of a purified soul was as much based on human rationality as on inner 'revelation'. In fact, it was the highest meeting point of 'Reason' and 'Revelation'. He always gave wide space to human rationality in his thought-processes, as he believed that even scriptural commands would have to be tested on the touchstone of human rationality. At the same time, he regarded the 'inner voice' as nothing less than the 'voice of God'. Thus, in his schemes of things, the 'inner voice' played as much a role as reasoning, if not more. And that is why during his 21 days fast in 1932 and his fast unto death in 1948 he insisted that they were taken on the promptings of God or 'still small voice'. In a word, the role of faith in Gandhi's life could hardly be overemphasized.

In this regard, another point that needs to be underlined is that unlike many Sidha-Purusas (one who is a self-realized soul from birth) such as Ramkrishna Paramahansa, Raman Maharishi and others, Gandhi was a spiritual commoner. And that is why he always claimed and remained as an ardent Sadhaka (spiritual seeker). In fact, his faith evolved through many agni-parikshas (fiery ordeals). He was never a social and religious recluse. He was very much of the world and remained in the thick of the earthly battle till the end of his life. For him both sacred and secular were to form a continuum rather than being in any kind of dichotomous relationship. It is through innumerable spiritual and secular struggles that he built up his faith, virtually brick by brick. Hence he presents himself as a role-model for every seeker who has the will and determination to go through the fiery ordeals to reach out to the desired spiritual destination.

It is rather strange that most of the social scientists have concentrated their attention on his secular ideas like Satyagraha, Swaraj, his theory of state, his vision of the ideal society etc., or on his role in South African struggle and Indian national movement. But the entire process, methods and evolution of his faith have not been

given the importance they deserve in any serious discussion of his life, thought and work. In this paper I seek to go into the process of the evolution of his faith. However, in view of paucity of space and scope, I would be concentrating on how his faith evolved during the long sojourn of 21 years in South Africa. I would also discuss the various methods and means he employed to deepen and sustain his faith. So far as the evolution of his faith is concerned, it is his South African sojourn, which played the most crucial role in the entire process. It hardly needs to be emphasized that when Gandhi sailed for South Africa in 1893, he had nothing in his mind other than a better career prospect. But by the time he returned to India in early part of 1915, there was a total metamorphosis in his persona, thought processes and his secular and spiritual aspirations. In a word, it was South Africa which had turned out to be his both tapobhumi (the land of penance) and prayogbhumi (the land of experiments). In fact, it was his South African sojourn which has transformed him from Mohan to Mahatma.

IN VIEW OF the above, it would be of interest to explain what went into such a metamorphosis of his entire worldly and spiritual life. In this paper, I seek to trace that process using relevant material from diverse sources. However, it also needs to be underlined that when he went to South Africa, he did have a cultural baggage with him derived from his family, the cultural environment of Saurashtra, and his short sojourn in England (1888-91). All this also had its own contribution in the making of his faith. Hence this paper would be divided in two parts. Part I would examine the nature and structure of his cultural background prior to his arrival in South Africa. In part II the main focus would be to examine the entire process of how he built up his faith virtually brick by brick during his South African sojourn. Towards the end we would be making some remarks, how the faith which he built up in South Africa sustained him throughout his life.

Gandhi's formative years (1869-1888) : He himself has adequately described the major influences of his early life, which impacted his personality and his faith[1]. Besides, a number of scholars including Rudolphs, Erickson, Basham and Raj Mohan Gandhi have also dealt with these early experiences and influences[2]. He was born in a Moth Bania family with a Jain sensibility towards non-violence. Both his parents were deeply religious and endowed with spiritual bent of mind. His father, Karam Chand Gandhi, belonged to the religious

sect of Vallabhacharya which was primarily based on Krishnabhakti. And his mother, Putalibai, has the background of Pranami sect, which being non-idolatrous and syncretic in nature, tried to draw from the best elements of Hinduism and Islam. The senior Gandhi visited temples and was quite fond of listening to religious discourses. Besides, he had also imbibed religious liberalism. And he had friends from Islamic and Zoroastrian faith. Jain monks were no stranger to his household and they left their own spiritual impact. Towards the end of his life, Karamchand Gandhi turned to the Bhagavad Gita and the *Ramcharitmanas* of Tulsidas. Putalibai also visited temples and observed many religious rituals, including *chaturmas* during rainy reasons. She even offered prayers before she ate her meals. Not only that, she fasted frequently and would even take many vows and stick to them with an iron will. In a word, the overall environment of Gandhi's household was liberal and was not marked by any kind of orthodoxy and ritualism. It was not surprising, therefore, that the junior Gandhi imbibed cultural liberalism and religious pluralism. And he was not fascinated by the ritual-ridden temples and their hypocritical priesthood. Another source of religious and spiritual influence would be located in Rambhabai – a childhood nurse of the younger Gandhi. It was she who impressed upon the younger Gandhi to resort to *Ramnam*, whenever and wherever he was gripped by fear–which he was temperamentally prone to in his early life. This left a life-long impact on his personality and psyche. And it was not for nothing that *Ramnam* turned out to be the greatest source of his strength till the end of his life. Thus, it is clear that his family and social surroundings went a long way to build up the religious and spiritual psyche of the younger Gandhi. But it is equally clear that the message he received from them was more ethical and mystical rather than ritualistic and dogmatic.

Religious and ethical social atmosphere prevailing in and around Porbandar had its own contribution in the making of his psychological and spiritual life. Gandhi has told us that two dramas, viz., *Shravan Kumar* and *Satyavadi Harischandra,* which were being staged in Porbandar, had great influence on him. While the former inculcated in him a deep sense of service, the latter inspired him to lead a life of truthfulness. They had left an everlasting impact on his personality, as he retained these two values of service-spirit and truthfulness all through his life. And his commitment to truthfulness could be gauged by the simple fact that in his later life he even equated Truth to God. Perhaps, Jainism, a popular religion in that part of India, with its natural emphasis on ahimsa must have also had an abiding impact on his personality and his firm commitment to the cult of ahimsa. But he

was more interested in the spirit, rather than the form of non-violence. Similarly, he was never fascinated by the formal *bhakti*. And a rigid social system always repelled him. And which is why he never took to the *Manusmriti* and the *Bhagavad Purana*, with their emphasis on an atrophied and hierarchical social system and formalistic *bhakti* respectively. Not only that, in his later life, he waged a relentless battle against untouchability and even gave a new interpretation of *bhakti* based on his study of the *Bhagavad Gita*. In his new interpretation of *bhakti* he underlined the spirit of surrender of one's own will and merging it with that of God. Thus, even in his younger days, he was eclectic in his approach and had a mind of his own.

Another incident which left an everlasting mark on his personality was his inappropriate behaviour when he had left his father to his uncle's care and went to his wife's chamber gripped by an uncontrollable sexual desire. His father died, while the younger Gandhi was indulging in the act of sexual gratification. That incident recoiled on his psyche creating a deep scar, a sense of shame and remorse. Perhaps, that also had its impact when he took to *brahmacharya* in 1906 in the wake of the Zulu rebellion. In his later life, *bhahmacharya* became one of the major components of his faith. From the experiences his family he developed another trait: an immense amount of sanctity attached to vows and persistence to adhere to them. He would not swerve under pressure or even persuasion, once he had taken a vow. The same trait of persistence and tenacity was demonstrated by him in the course of his several fasts, when he completed the ordeal at the great risk of his life. Besides, once he had taken a decision, it was not his style to go back on it. For instance, once he decided to go for higher education in London, he overcame all obstacles on the way, including the social boycott by his caste men. Thus, in his very early life he developed an uncanny knack of mobilizing all his inner resource to face difficult situations, as he was never prone to passing the buck of his moral responsibility to anyone else. He had a deep sense of moral commitment that he alone should bear the consequences of his action. His ability to stick to a vow is also demonstrated by the fact that at the time of his departure for London, at the insistence of his mother he took three vows of not touching wine, women and meat. And he stuck to them despite many temptations. In a word, his truthfulness, tenacity of purpose, courage of conviction, indomitable will and service-spirit -all these virtuous traits were present even in the formative phase of his life. In his later life, they grew up in their full strength, though their nascent presence could be traced even to his younger days.

Gandhi in London and Back to India (1888-1893)

New Depth and Dimensions to his Faith: Gandhi had sailed for London on 4 September 1888 and stayed there till mid-1891, when he completed his legal studies. True, for a while he was fascinated by the British way of life and even took to it in terms of dress, dance, elocution and all other forms of mannerisms. But true to his nature, even in those days, he stuck to the vows he had taken in the presence of his mother, in respect of wine, women and meat. His vegetarianism drove him to the membership of the London Vegetarian Society. His contact with the vegetarian society influenced him not only in terms of his diet but also in respect of moral and ethical side of his life. That was because some of the leading lights of these groups, namely, Arnold F. Hills, Josiah Oldfield, Henry Salt, Edward Carpenter and others were more than just being vegetarians. They belonged to a group which came to be known as the 'Other West'[3]. They were not only convinced of the bane of the industrial society, but also underlined the form of simple living, manual labour, rural living and moral life. All these ideas must have their imperceptible impact on the receptive and impressionable mind of young Gandhi. And they must have contributed a great deal in strengthening his cultural roots and idealism. On this score, providence had kept something still more important for him in its store. Soon he came into contact with some theosophists, who successfully persuaded him to read the *Bhagavad Gita* and the *Light of Asia*. It was through these contacts that he was able to meet Annie Besant and Madama Blavatsky – the two leading lights of theosophy. He was greatly impressed by their deep and abiding interest in Indian culture, their tolerant and syncretic approach to religion and their assertion that truthfulness and ethical living was the essence of religion. But he did not join them as their occult practice and secret doctrine repelled him. But perhaps these new contacts further strengthened some of the conclusions he had already reached in respect of religion and spirituality particularly his equal respect for all religions.

It was during the same period that he came in contact with the churchmen, who got him interested in Christianity and its main scripture, Holy Bible. His reading of the New Testament particularly of the Sermon on the Mount made tremendous impact on his thought process and personality. He himself recorded its impact: "The verse 'I say unto you that ye resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other. And if any man takes away thy coat, let him have thy cloak too' greatly gripped me". And there was no doubt that the life of Jesus Christ remained a model for him

and the Sermon on the Mount continued to inspire him throughout his life.

But he had hardly any stomach for a sectarian and dogmatic doctrine. Consequently, he refused to go along with any of these groups. He always wanted the window of his spiritual faith to be kept open but simultaneously he tried to keep his cultural roots intact. In a way, all these diverse contacts and influences during his London days only strengthened his resolve to stick to his syncretic approach and eclectic method in the pursuit of religious and spiritual matters. It is of interest to note that as soon as he got his degree in June 1891, he immediately sailed for India and made no attempt to find any excuse for his overstay as many other Indians did. But when he was back to India in July 1891, his primary objective was to become a successful lawyer. To that end, he tried his hands both at Rajkot and Bombay, but without much success.

But amidst these hectic secular activities, the process of the enrichment of his spiritual life and embellishment of his syncretic faith did not come to a dead stop. In fact, it gathered momentum during his stay in Bombay. And it was there that he came into contact with Raichand Bhai, a Jain jeweller, and a man of deep religious and spiritual sensibility. Though he was a practising Jain, he was well-versed in Hindu religious scriptures. And it was he who inspired the young Gandhi to pursue moksha, as the ultimate purpose of human life. It was not for nothing that in his later life Gandhi acknowledged the contributions of Raichand Bhai in igniting in him the fire of spiritual inquisitiveness. Not only that, he even went to the extent of equating him to Ruskin and Tolstoy- two other thinkers who had impacted his life deeply. Thus, one can fairly conclude that during his two years stay in India (1888-93), though he was primarily interested in his legal career, his spiritual life was greatly enriched by his close association with Raichand Bhai.

Gandhi's South Africa Sojourn: The Birth of a New Mahatma

Undoubtedly, it was Gandhi's twenty years long stay in South Africa which transformed his personality, his thought process, his life-style and, finally, made him a man of deep faith and firm action. But it hardly needs to be emphasized that his transformation did come through a slow and painful process, making Gandhi to go though several *agniparikshas*. Though, it is a matter of credit for him that out of these several *agniparikshas* he came out purer, nobler and even stronger.

Diverse intellectual and spiritual influences

In any case, spirituality had taken hold of his inner life and it was with such a mindset that he opened a new correspondence in 1894, listing and raising twenty-seven questions covering the entire realm of religion and spirituality[4]. In that letter he not only put questions regarding Hinduism and Christianity, but also raised a moral question of how to make a choice between one's life and non-violence, if one came to that pass. Here, Gandhi was working as a spiritual seeker, rather than a moral giver. And Raichand Bhai did not disappoint him either. He wrote back three letters to Gandhi between October 1894 and the early part of 1896. The quintessence of Raichand's answer to Gandhi's questions was as follows:

1. The spirit and the matter are entirely two different things – the former being the eternal and the latter being the transient.
2. The transmigration of human beings is primarily because of their being imprisoned in body, which is always in the grip of passions on account of its material and worldly seeking.
3. But the spirit does have the innate potentiality to liberate itself from bondage of body and attain *moksha*.
4. And the royal road to *moksha* is knowledge and action and, thus, always within the purview of human *purusartha*.
5. Perhaps because of his Jainism, Raichand Bhai ruled out the idea of God as the creator of universe and dispenser of justice on the day of judgment–one of the basic beliefs of the Semitic religious tradition.
6. However, he left untouched the idea of Vedantic Impersonal Absolute.
7. He looked at all the scriptures as man-made and as such being imperfect and infallible.
8. He refused to entertain the idea of superiority of one religion over the other. Instead, he suggested a practical test: that religion is the best, which helps the spirit to attain its natural state of divinity. But he did assert that Christianity failed to attain the height of the Aryan religion as it did not believe in the eternity of human soul and that its bondage or liberation was not based on the law of karma.
9. On the issue of the choice between self-preservation and non-violence, Raichand refused to make any exception to the royal rule of non-violence.
10. In his last letter written in the early part of 1896, Raichand underlined the significance of the Aryan *aachar* (practice) which primarily comprises the practice of virtues like 'mercy, truthfulness and forgiveness'.

The real significance of Gandhi-Raichand correspondence is that it brought out Gandhi's inquisitiveness regarding some of the most

fundamental questions of human existence. Besides, though Gandhi might not have taken every word of Raichand as gospel truth, it did leave a lasting impression on the nature and structure of his faith, which he was trying to build up almost brick by brick.

It was with such liberal inquisitive mindset that Gandhi was soon attracted towards a new movement inside Christianity, which sought to give equal respect to all religions. In fact, 'The Perfect Way' penned by one of the leading lights of this group, Maitland, revalidated some of the basic formulations of Raichand Bhai as conveyed to Gandhi. Like Raichand Bhai, Maitland too maintained that every individual is a potential Christ and he could take himself to the highest point of purification by freeing his spirit from the contaminating power of materialism. It was during the same period that Tolstoy was also working in the same direction as evidenced in his book *The Kingdom of God is Within You*. Tolstoy rejected supernatural and miraculous aspects of *New Testament* as well as externalities of the church rituals. In turn, he also underlined the inner perfection of man and, as such, he averred that man's salvation was in his own hands. He further asserted that human redemption was impossible without self-renunciation, self-suffering and in exceptional cases even without supreme sacrifice. Earlier Gandhi had been equally impressed by Ruskin book *Unto to the Last* which he subsequently translated as *Sarvodaya*. Similarly, Thoreau's theory and practice of 'Civil Disobedience' had a similar impact on Gandhi's emotional and intellectual life[5]. All these influences made their contributions to reinforce Gandhi's faith. But he refused to go whole hog with any of these groups. By temperament he was both syncretic in his religious sensibility and eclectic in his methods. He was working as a seeker of truth and was always more than willing to pick up spiritual gems from different sources. Besides, he was too deep-rooted in Hindu-traditions to be swept off his feet by any strong sectarian currents. It fact, he was continuously enriching himself by his deeper probe into the Hindu tradition. Thus, in March 1905, he delivered four lectures on Hinduism in Johannesburg in which he summed up the four of its basic tenets[6]. They were:

(i) Hinduism reposes its faith in the existence of all powerful, all pervading *Nirgun* Brahman in whom the entire cosmos in grounded.
(ii) Human soul (*Atma*) is also of the same genre as that of the Brahman and, thus, as pure and eternal as the latter.
(iii) *Moksha* was the ultimate goal of human existence.
(iv) And means to achieve moksha primarily comprises (a) performance of good deeds; (b) practice of compassion and (c) cultivation of truthfulness.

It is evident that religion and spirituality had taken deep and firm roots in his personality, but for him moral and ethical action constituted the core of religion. This is also evident by the way he summarized William, MacIntyre Salter's *Ethical Teachings* in which he asserted that ethical action is the heart of religion and ethical ideas are totally useless unless they are put to suitable action. In summarizing Salter's book, Gandhi was reaffirming his own ideas about religion and spirituality[7]. By now it was clear that in respect of moral action there was no watertight compartment between secular and spiritual field.

Gandhi's action – packed life in South Africa

But the most important background for understanding some of the basic elements of his faith could be located in Gandhi's struggle in South Africa. This was the most momentous phase of his life. He formulated new ideas; experimented with them; had founded Phoenix settlement, taken the vow of Brahmacharya (1906) and formulated and experimented with his new found theory of satyagraha (1907). Thus, when he had sailed for South Africa in April 1893, he had no idea of the storms ahead. But once he reached there he could see for himself the pitiable condition of the Indian community. They were being treated as less than human beings. Soon he had a series of bitter experiences of a personal kind. He was asked to take off his turban while appearing in a magistrate's court, which he refused and walked out of the court. But the worst was yet to come. At Petermaritzburg Station on his way to Pretoria, he was asked to shift to the van-compartment as a white passenger was not willing to travel with a coloured man in the same compartment. He faced such a fate despite having a first class ticket. Ultimately, he was pushed out and had to spend the entire night in the waiting room debating about his future course of action. According to his own admission, it was this experience which went a long way to change the course of his life, as he decided to stay back and face the situation. But that was not to be the end of the road. On his onward journey, he received blows at the hands of the train conductor who wanted him to vacate his seat to be used by a white passenger for smoking. Ultimately, he was allowed to retain his seat. In a way, this was the beginning of a journey on the long road of non-violent resistance. This marked also his freedom from fear which held him in good stead all through his life. Another concrete result of this bitter experience was that on reaching Pretoria, he called a meeting of the Indian community and delivered a stirring speech. He called the Indian community to organize themselves and offered his services to that end. His faith in non-violent resistance

was soon tested when he refused to take legal action after being kicked by a guard near President Krugger's house[8].

However, subsequently, he came back to Durban and made preparations for going back to India. But his destiny willed him otherwise. He chanced upon a news item about a new law which sought to disfranchise the Indians. In his own farewell meeting, he called upon his compatriots to resist it with all their might. On their request, he extended his stay and even drafted a petition and sent it to the Speaker of the Assembly and also to the British Secretary of State[9]. Consequently, the British government vetoed Natal's Bill to disfranchise the Indians. But the Natal government took to another route and imposed a poll tax of three pounds a year on the members of the Indian community. Again, he sent a protest petition. Meanwhile, he had come to the conclusion that he would have to stay in South Africa at least for a few years. Hence, he decided to travel to India and bring back his family from there. He sailed from Durban for Bombay in June 1896. On reaching India he travelled to various parts of the country apprising the people of the condition of the Indian community in South Africa[10]. He even wrote and circulated a pamphlet, 'The grievances of the British Indians in South Africa'. As a result, he became a target of the South African Whites. Consequently, when he reached Durban in December 1899, he was encircled and beaten blue by a group of the white settlers. But once again he refused to be a party to the prosecution of his white perpetrators.

But despite all these bitter experiences, his loyalty to the British Empire remained intact. When the Boer war broke out in 1899, he set up an Indian Ambulance Corps and supported the British. Subsequently, in 1901 he decided to come back to India for good. He set up a home in Bombay and decided to start his legal practice. But once again his fate willed him otherwise and he had to go back to South Africa on being requested by the members of the Indian community. He set up his new home at Johannesburg and turned into a legal luminary. Meanwhile, he continued with his social work. And during the Zulu rebellion he set up an Ambulance Corps and served every victim of the war.

However, in August 1906, an ordinance was promulgated to restrict the entry of Indians in Transvaal. It made registration compulsory by giving thumb impression and even fingerprints. On September 11, 1906 in a mass meeting held at Johannesburg, Transvaal, Indian immigrants under Gandhi's leadership took a collective vow to oppose the proposed law irrespective of the costs and consequences[11]. That was the beginning of Satyagraha in South Africa, though during those days it was described as 'passive resistance'.

Gandhi decided to go over to London to persuade the imperial authorities to withhold their assent as he had failed to persuade the Transvaal authorities. He had temporary success at London as the assent to the Bill was withheld. However, the Bill was made an Act in March 1907 as Transvaal had been granted self-government in December, 1906. Gandhi organized a 'Passive Resistance Association', which succeeded in its mission to some extent. A number of people were arrested including Gandhi in January 1908 and was awarded two months imprisonment. Soon a compromise was reached with General Smuts. Accordingly, Indians were allowed to register themselves voluntarily. Gandhi continued to work for voluntary registration despite being opposed and beaten by a Pathan compatriot. But General Smuts went back on his words. The agitation followed. Gandhi was arrested in September 1908 and again in January 1909. Altogether he suffered imprisonment for five months and could be released only in May 1909. He led a delegation to London in June 1909 and stayed there till middle of November 1909, pleading with authorities for the righteousness of the cause of the British Indians. He failed in his mission. Greatly disillusioned, he sailed from London for South Africa on 13 November, reaching there on 22 November 1909. He wrote *Hind Swaraj* on his way back to South Africa.

Another background to faith which deserves to be noted is that during his London sojourn in 1909 he held long and detailed discussion on the methods to be used in the cause of Indian independence. It is also worth noting that the partition of Bengal had led to the emergence of armed revolutionary movement in India. The issue of the violent means for obtaining Indian Home Rule was greatly impacting the minds of the Indian revolutionaries residing in London and other parts of Europe. They were convinced that violence alone could help India to attain her independence. Gandhi had held long and detailed discussions with them in which he insisted on the use of non-violence as the only way to free India from the British clutches. In the course of this discussion, he had also tried to impress on their minds about the malaise of modern civilization and his alternative views on Swaraj. He summarized some of his views in *Hind Swaraj*.

Returning to South Africa he revived his movement. There was a wave of sympathy inside India for the South African Indian community. Coronation of George V was to take place in India during 1911. All this must have made some impact on the response of the British to the ongoing Indian struggle in South Africa. Thus, in early 1911, the South African government made a declaration that Indians would not be discriminated against and educational test and not the racial factor would be the deciding factor in employment. Prisoners

were also released. Consequently, Satyagraha was suspended. But this proved to be the lull before the storm. Soon the government not only refused to take back the 3 pound tax, but even declared that Indian marriages not performed with Christian rituals and not registered in the court would be considered as invalid. This infuriated the Indian community, particularly the women, who joined the movement in a big way. During September 1913, the final phase of Satyagraha started. The first batch led by Kasturba crossed Transvaal and was arrested and awarded imprisonment. Then, from Tolstoy Farm satyagrahis crossed from Transvaal to Natal, and in sympathy, Indian workers struck work. The men were jailed and government turned out the strikers' families from the tenements. This was a very challenging moment for the satyagrahis: thousands of workers were thrown out on the streets without any support. Gandhi thought of the only possibility: let the government house and feed these men, as it is they who had thrown them out on the streets. Gandhi arranged a big march, led by himself and some other co-workers like Polak. Gandhi and some of his co-workers were arrested, but the struggle continued. The government even forced the workers to work in the mines threatening flogging if they refused to do so. That greatly infuriated public opinion back home in India. Gokhale sent two well known Christian missionaries, C.F. Andrews and W.W. Pearson, to South Africa. Their presence gave a new sanctity to the Indian struggle. General Smuts appointed a commission to look into the grievances. Meanwhile, Gandhi and others were released. General Smuts was faced with a serious situation when the workers of South African Railways comprising white men went on a strike. Gandhi, as was his nature, never tried to take advantage of the opponent's woes and he suspended the movement. That led to a provisional agreement between Gandhi and General Smuts. In June 1914, the union legislature by a declaration took back the 3 pound tax and also revalidated all the marriages. Gandhi called it the Magna-Charta of liberty. With this settlement, Gandhi sailed for London on 18 July 1914, and stayed there for a few months before sailing for India in December, 1915 to a hero's welcome.

Gandhi's Ways and Means to Deepen his Faith : South African experiments

It was in South African that he evolved and experimented some of the ways and means to strengthen and sustain his faith. Some of them were:

Ashram Living

Both Phoenix settlement (1904) and Tolstoy Farm were early experiments in ashram living. Phoenix settlement was earlier raised to accommodate the families of satyagrahis and it is there that Gandhi also lived with his family. But, Tolstoy Farm (1910) was raised on an entirely different footing: it was entirely based on the principle of self-reliance. Tolstoy Farm provided Gandhi with a new opportunity to experiment and develop some of his basic ideas and contours of his life's philosophy. Rural life, simplicity, bread labour, self-discipline, and self-reliance had to be internalized and integrated in his inner life. It also provided him with a rare opportunity to test his own tenacity as well as the real practicability of some of his basic ideas. Penance, flesh-mortification as an effective means to spiritually influence others was being tested here. He undertook his first fast when there was an act of sexual aberration on the part of some young children[12].

Vows: He inherited the practice of vow-taking from his mother and also from the wider Indian social environment. As we have seen, he took three vows of not touching wine, women and meat during his stay at London. Subsequently, during his South Africa days he took two other vows of Brahmcharya (celibacy) and Aparigraha (non-possession). The basic idea behind it was to strengthen his will to stick to a position once it is taken after diligent deliberation. It was a strategy of gradual climb on the ladder of sanyas step by step, instead of taking a plunge for sanyas in one go. This way he could gradually consolidate and stick to his position irrespective of costs and consequences.

Prayers: Prayers both private and public were very central to Gandhi's faith. For him, prayer was the 'essence of religion' and 'the core of human life'. He favoured prayers both in the morning as well as in the evening, before going to bed. But he never favoured prayer to any personal God for any material and worldly things. In fact, he believed that a prayer is actually offered to one's own higher self as every human being is a spark of the divine. Thus, his method of praying was in consonance with his faith in *advaitic* God and man's eternal soul, both being of the same element. He was firmly of the opinion that prayers along with other spiritual sadhana could enable one to 'listen to his' inner voice which was no other than God's voice. He even went to the extent of taking the 'inner voice' as the final arbiter of his decisions. But the call of the 'still small voice' could be taken only at the stage of the highest purification; otherwise it would amount to fraudulent behavior. Community prayer was another

method to strengthen the faith of his own as well as that of his followers. It was started in South Africa during Phoenix and Tolstoy Farm days.

Ramnam: For Gandhi, Ramnam was another royal help which he found handy to strengthen and deepen his faith. It also became a source of solace in the moments of despair and that of fighting zeal in those of high action. This was part of his basic belief that a spiritually awakened person must perform all his actions with God as a witness. And, therefore, he must surrender all his actions along with their fruits to the Almighty. He took the name of Ram as the name of God from among His myriad names all of which, according to him, were equally valid. His Ram was of Nirakar nature and not a Dasarathi Ram.

Brahmacharya: It was during 1906 during the days of Zulu rebellion in South Africa that the idea of *brahmacharya* gripped him. Soon he took a vow of celibacy as he came to believe that it meant great 'physical, mental and moral power'. And he was ever convinced that every passive resister must be empowered by it. He himself stuck to it all through his life.

Fasting : Fasting was another method which Gandhi used to deepen his faith as well as to test its veracity. In the course of his life he undertook 18 fasts for various purposes and believed in their purifying power. Some of them were undertaken to enhance his own moral and spiritual power, some to atone for the sin of others, and some to fight an act of injustice committed either by the government or the people.

To sum up, in the building up his abiding faith, he liberally drew from myriad sources: his family, his social environment, his social and religious contacts, and his book-reading both of secular and scriptural nature, intellectual and social movement and some of the leading lights of his day- Ruskin, Thoreau, Tolstoy, Raichand Bhai and many others. And in the entire process, his South African sojourn played the most crucial role. It was in South Africa that Gandhi's personality went through a real metamorphosis. From an ordinary person looking for better prospects, he turned into a renunciator with all the trappings of a Mahatma. He founded Phoenix settlement and Tolstoy Farm which became the training ground for some of his basic ideas including Brahmacharya, Satyagraha, ahimsa, truth etc. He learnt the art of being an exemplar, developed the capacity to influence other people, and enunciated the principle of inclusive secular civic nationalism. Moreover, some of other ideas like his abhorrence for untouchability, his undying faith in Hindu-Muslim unity, the principle of equal respect for all religions (sarvadharma

sambhava) and his experiment in taking women as equal partners in the struggle against oppression were all evolved and were experimented there. In a word, South Africa turned to be the real prayogabhumi (land of experiments) of Gandhi's basic ideas and ideals. Above all, his own life, his struggles, his sadhana and his ethical action and moral living provided the life-force of his faith. And it was for his faith that he lived and died.

> *I do not believe in the exclusive divinity of the Vedas. I believe the Bible, the Koran and the Zend Avesta, to be as much divinely inspired as the Vedas. … I decline to be bound by any interpretation, however learned it may be, if it is repugnant to reason or moral sense.*
>
> *M.K. Gandhi*

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Gandhi's Influence on a Catholic Archbishop

Paddy Kearney

ABSTRACT

As a schoolboy Denis Hurley regarded Mahatma Gandhi as a troublemaker who was doing great damage to the British Empire. Later on, as Archbishop of Durban, he described Gandhi as one of the greatest souls since Francis of Assisi in the 13th century. This article examines how Hurley moved from his negative early attitude, through reading Indian Opinion, meeting the Gandhi family, as well as studying Gandhi's life and writings. It also traces some of the Gandhian influences on his own life and witness.

COUNTLESS PEOPLE HAVE been influenced by Mahatma Gandhi, amongst them many famous political and religious leaders. If one thinks about South African leaders, it is well known that Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu regard Gandhi as a significant influence in their lives, so too was the case with their fellow Nobel laureate, the late Chief Albert Luthuli. But little has been written about Gandhi's influence on the late Denis Hurley, renowned former Catholic Archbishop of Durban.[1]

Born in Cape Town in 1915 of Irish parents, Hurley became at 31, the youngest Catholic bishop in the world and later came to be regarded, along with Desmond Tutu, as one of the South African state's "most wanted" political opponents.[2] Consecrated bishop one year before the National Party came to power in 1948 (mandated by a majority of the white electorate to implement a radical programme of racial segregation), Hurley retired as archbishop in 1992. This was just two years before the Nationalists ceased to be the ruling party, when the country's first democratically elected government came to

power and apartheid was systematically dismembered. Hurley had been one of the foremost opponents of apartheid throughout his episcopate.

Hurley also played a major role in renewing the Catholic Church during and after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) which brought together the church's 2,500 bishops for one of the most ground-breaking events in Catholic history.[3]

Hurley's inspiring life as a courageous opponent of apartheid for over 50 years and as a champion of the reforms and spirit of Vatican II make him one of the most significant religious leaders South Africa has produced. This article will attempt to show the ways in which Gandhian thinking helped to shape his life and witness.

Tall, handsome and physically impressive, Hurley was a brilliant analyst and an eloquent speaker, years ahead of his time not only in relation to South Africa's racial problems but also the reforms needed to bring the Catholic Church into the twentieth century. His outspoken views on taboo subjects such as birth control, married priests and the ordination of women – and perhaps even his political activism - are thought to have prevented his being chosen as a cardinal, though many regarded him as eminently qualified for that office, one commentator describing him as "the best Cardinal Africa never had."[4]

As a young matriculant in the early 1930s, Hurley shared the typical racial prejudices of young white people of the day.[5] He was a solid supporter of the British Empire and thought Gandhi was spoiling things by his opposition to British rule in India. "Mahatma Gandhi appeared a troublesome person to me. Though of Irish descent I was . . . thoroughly steeped in the belief of the civilizing force of the British Empire, as it was taught to us at school. I resented the words and actions of a person who appeared determined to disrupt the great empire."[6] Gradually, however, Hurley's attitudes would change as he opened himself to new ideas and admitted the inadequacies of his earlier thought. He was always a keen learner, even in old age.

By 1969, when asked to participate in a symposium at the University of the Witwatersrand to mark the centenary of Gandhi's birth, it was clear from his address that he had learnt much more about the Mahatma.[7] What he had read and heard about Gandhi "led to one of those cultural shocks we experience from time to time and which are truly gifts from God. Gandhi appeared to me now as the greatest soul the world had seen since Francis of Assisi in the thirteenth century."[8]

How had such a dramatic change taken place in Hurley's thinking? He describes how, after seven years of studying philosophy and theology in Rome in preparation for ordination to the Catholic

priesthood in 1939, he had become "much less Empire minded" especially because he had witnessed the extension of another empire – the Italian – through the conquest of Ethiopia and Albania.[9] During these studies he also had many conversations with highly intelligent young black theological students from other countries.[10] This was a new experience for him because his schooling had been entirely with other white boys and his contact with black people had been restricted to those with little or no formal schooling who served white society in menial roles.

During his studies in Rome, Hurley was strongly attracted to the Church's social teaching, though initially only in an academic and cerebral way. The official Church was nervous of anything that smacked of activism or revolution, a nervousness he seemed to reflect. When he returned to South Africa in July 1940 and received his first assignment as a young priest, it was to the Emmanuel Cathedral in Durban. There he became increasingly uneasy about the segregation which dominated the South African scene, even within the Church. "My imperial instincts" he said, "evaporated as colonial empires themselves evaporated after World War II."[11] While on the staff of the Cathedral he was nevertheless still a cautious young man, in keeping with the priestly discipline he had learnt in Rome. Though excited by attending a meeting at Natal University (now known as the University of KwaZulu-Natal) about the establishment of black trade unions, he accepted the advice of older priests that this was not the sort of thing with which a priest should involve himself.[12]

A few years later, however, as the 29 year old superior of St Joseph's Scholasticate, a house of studies for future priests, he felt sufficiently free to play an active role in the Pietermaritzburg Parliamentary Debating Society and to enjoy discussions with its wide range of members including some atheists and communists. His fellow staff members at St Joseph's were young South African priests who were growing in their concern about the country's racial policy. Hurley also enjoyed discussing with them the changes that would have to take place in South Africa; with their help he introduced a course on social justice so that their students would become acquainted with these questions. But, by his own admission, the discussion and the training were still largely theoretical. The staff were all white and, with one exception, so were the students. There was little, if any, exposure to educated black opinion.[13]

In the late 1940s Hurley began to read *Indian Opinion*, a newspaper founded by Mahatma Gandhi, and came "to know and love" its editor, Manilal Gandhi (son of the Mahatma) and his daughter, Ela.[14] These experiences exposed him to many socio-political issues of the time.

He paid a number of visits to the Gandhi home at the Phoenix Settlement outside Durban for discussions with Manilal and his wife Sushila. Ela Gandhi recalls that there was a "very warm relationship" between her parents and Denis Hurley. They "revered him deeply" and would always invite him to sit at the main table when there were important Gandhian events. "Although we are Hindus, we always felt very close to Fr. Hurley and had no hesitation in inviting him to minister at our family functions."[15]

Appointed a bishop at the extraordinarily young age of 31, Hurley continued the discussions on social issues he had begun at St Joseph's, by organising a three-day conference for all the priests of the Natal Vicariate in 1948. This was the year the National Party came to power and began to implement hard-line racial segregation. The priests' conference discussed these issues, though still in a remote and theoretical way. Nevertheless their conclusions would later be useful to Hurley when he drafted the first ever joint statement by the bishops concerning race discrimination.[16]

When appointed Archbishop of Durban in 1951 and president of the Bishops' Conference in June 1952 (a position he held until early 1961), Hurley persuaded the bishops to issue a joint statement on human rights and race relations, despite the strong opposition of the papal representative, Archbishop Martin Lucas, and the latter's confidential plea to him not to publicly criticise the government. The 1952 statement was important because it broke the bishops' long-standing silence on key racial issues, yet Hurley later acknowledged that it was "horribly patronising" towards black people. In this statement, and for many years after, the bishops favoured the idea of a qualified franchise: black people should only be given the vote if they were property owners and had reached a certain educational level. Such limited access to voting rights was not acceptable in progressive black circles, because it would still exclude the overwhelming majority of black people from full democratic participation. Moreover it was out of line with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.[17]

In their desire for gradual evolution, the Catholic bishops were not at that early stage in sympathy with – nor even had any contact with - the African National Congress (ANC), which wanted to force the pace of change through civil disobedience. It is a great pity that the bishops regarded the ANC-organised defiance campaign as Marxist and Communist-inspired. The result was that they declined to participate.[18] If they and the leaders of other churches had backed this Defiance Campaign of the 1950s, change might have come much sooner and the history of South Africa been very different. But Hurley's

reading of *Indian Opinion* had still not entirely convinced him of the crucial importance of civil disobedience. That would come later.

The Catholic bishops' eyes began to be opened by the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which directly threatened the mission schools—the Church's main instrument for passing on the Catholic faith to young people. In a test of strength with the formidable Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, Minister of Bantu Education, Hurley and his colleagues decided not to hand over their schools to government, but to embark on an ambitious fundraising drive that would finance the schools after the withdrawal of government subsidies.[19] Hurley led the Church through these difficult years, his confidence increased not only by high office but by a successful "Marian Congress" to mark the centenary of a Catholic presence in the province then known as Natal, a kind of "coming-out party" for the Catholic Church in South Africa.[20] The large outdoor rallies, services and processions which formed part of this Congress were a dramatic change for a Church that had previously kept a low profile to avoid stirring up anxiety about the *Roomse gevaar* (Roman danger). This was one of the three great dangers that Afrikaners feared would overwhelm them, the others being the *swart gevaar* (black danger) and the *rooi gevaar* (red, or communist danger).

Despite the fact that in the 1950s Hurley led the Catholic Church out of the shadows of public life, he remained under the influence of the South African Institute of Race Relations' moderate approach.[21] This assumed that whites would act more justly towards blacks if they had the facts at their disposal. The bishops apparently gave little or no thought to how blacks could achieve their own liberation.

Nevertheless, after their first joint statement about apartheid and race relations, Hurley was frequently asked to speak or to offer prayers at protest meetings. What struck the young Ela Gandhi was that, like her grandfather, he always expressed concern not only about the victims of injustice but also about the perpetrators and would publicly pray for a change of heart on their part. "When listening to his prayers", she said. "I was often reminded of my grandfather who always spoke of the separation of the deed from the doer. Sometimes, it was difficult to love the perpetrators of apartheid, while hating apartheid, yet Archbishop Hurley in his simple, truthful style, brought that message home very clearly. It remained in my consciousness throughout the dark days of apartheid."[22]

The Second Vatican Council (1962 – 1965) was a major landmark in Hurley's life. He was a significant role player even before it started, having been chosen by Pope John XXIII as one of the 100-member Central Preparatory Commission that paved the way for this assembly

of the world's 2,500 Catholic bishops, the first in nearly a hundred years. Hurley revelled in the debates and discussions, but above all in the open and positive atmosphere of informal lectures and seminars in which leading theologians updated the bishops. This was not part of the official programme but organised by the bishops themselves in various national, continental and language groupings. Hurley called it "the greatest-ever experiment in adult education".[23] Despite coming from a remote and little-known diocese, he came to be regarded as one of a small group of bishops who shaped the Council and were responsible for its success. Vatican II's major documents gave new impetus to his views on Church reform and social justice, making him both a "father" and a "son" of this momentous event.

Hurley devoted the immediate post-Vatican II years to intense implementation of the Council decrees (about such matters as social justice, ecumenism, the central role of laypeople in the church, a new liturgy in the vernacular and the question of religious freedom) in his own diocese and in South Africa generally.[24] He became more determined than ever in his opposition to apartheid, despite the South African government's attempts to market their policy as an acceptable form of partition. There were in fact no black people in South Africa, they claimed: instead all blacks were citizens of one or other homeland, the only places where they would have political rights. Behind this sleight of hand was the stark reality, only too clear to people like Hurley: the majority of black people had never lived in the homelands, nor had any desire to do so. They would have starved were it not for their employment in South Africa's urban areas. Moreover, their labour was essential to the South African economy.[25]

Hurley's exposure of the fallacy of separate development brought him into direct public conflict with his colleague, the Archbishop of Bloemfontein, William Patrick Whelan, and, less publicly, with Archbishop Joseph McGeogh, the pope's diplomatic representative in South Africa. Both Whelan and McGeogh thought that separate development was not without Christian justification, a view Hurley vigorously opposed in his 1964 presidential address to the SAIRR.[26]

When Pope Paul VI's controversial encyclical banning artificial birth control, *Humanae Vitae,* was published in 1968, Hurley publicly stated that he did not agree, a remarkably brave step for an archbishop, but in keeping with the episcopal motto he had chosen in 1947: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom."[27] In the late 1960s he was involved in a fascinating private correspondence with Paul VI, urging him with surprising frankness to involve his brother bishops in a more collegial resolution of this issue. Sadly, the Pope did not accept this advice.[28]

While Hurley was engaged in this high-level international debate within the Catholic Church, back in South Africa he involved himself in the issue of forced removals, especially with the community of Limehill in Natal.[29] The government was pressing ahead vigorously with apartheid policy, moving an estimated four million people to consolidate the homeland areas and abolish "black spots", where relatively small numbers of black people were living, surrounded by white communities. Hurley took up the cause of these and other people who were forcibly removed, assisting them with erecting tents on the day of the move, and repeatedly challenging the government about the unhealthy conditions at Limehill, conditions which led to the early deaths of many children. He visited several cemeteries and took down the names and ages of young children who had died since their families had been forced to move. These lists he gave to the media to publish, thereby refuting the government claim that all was well in the resettlement areas.

On several occasions Hurley met Nobel laureate, Chief Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC who was living under a banning order restricting him to the rural village of Groutville. The two leaders had a high regard for each other and found they shared a common commitment to non-violence.

It was in the first few years after the Second Vatican Council, that Hurley had another great encounter with the life and ideals of Gandhi which he had first read about in *Indian Opinion*. In preparation for an address to a centenary celebration of Gandhi's birth held at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg in 1969, he made a careful study of several books about the Mahatma.[30]

From this centenary address, it is clear that the more Hurley reflected on Gandhi's life and thought, the greater was his admiration. He was most impressed that for Gandhi, truth was not simply to be spoken about but to be lived. As a result, the religious truth "that illuminated his [Gandhi's] mind was lived out in political activity as honestly and courageously as in any other facet of his life."[31] He was also struck that when Gandhi disagreed with someone, he did not want to prove that person wrong or rejoice in humiliating them but to present the truth in such a way that they would be won over by it. Hurley saw this as similar to the view of the French writer Jean Guitton: "In the struggle for truth, there are no victors or vanquished, for he who is vanquished by the truth is, in truth, the victor."[32]

Gandhi knew that intellectual persuasion was not an adequate strategy for an oppressed person to change the mind and heart of an oppressor but the voluntary acceptance of suffering on the part of the person resisting oppression could make the difference. In his 1969

Gandhi centenary address, Hurley quoted the famous passage from Gandhi's letter to the British Viceroy of India on the eve of the 1930 Salt March:

> . . . my ambition is no less than to convert the British people through non-violence and thus make them see the wrong they have done to India. I do not seek to harm your people. I want to serve them even as I serve my own. I believe that I have always served them. I served them up to 1919 blindly. But when my eyes were opened, and I conceived [the idea of] non-cooperation, the object still was to serve them. I employed the same weapon that I have in all humility successfully used against the dearest members of my family. If I have equal love for your people with mine, it will not long remain hidden. It will be acknowledged by them even as members of my family acknowledged it after they had tried me for several years. If people join me [in the Salt March], as I believe they will, the sufferings they will undergo, unless the British nation sooner retraced their steps, will be enough to melt the stoniest hearts.[33]

Hurley saw this as Gandhi's "superhuman resolve": only a man of Gandhi's extraordinary simplicity could make a statement like that; but more important - could mean it and live up to it:

"The object of Satyagraha was not to achieve the physical elimination or moral breakdown of an adversary but, through suffering at his hands, to initiate those psychological processes which could make it possible for minds and hearts to melt."[34]

This is what Hurley called Gandhi's "extraordinary regard for the purifying role of suffering – both that suffering that others inflicted on him and that suffering he inflicted on himself in the form of voluntary poverty, celibacy, protracted fasting and other bodily austerities not easily understood in this age"[35] but which were not unknown to Hurley who was himself bound by religious vows of poverty, chastity and obedience from the age of seventeen. As Hurley put it, "Gandhi's immense capacity for self-discipline helps to explain the extent and intensity of his accomplishments in politics, in writing, in his struggle against the caste system and in the practical education and training that he endeavoured to promote among the humble and poor".[36] In some ways Hurley could have been describing his own life.

"Only by ridding himself of all possessions and of selfish longings and by making a friend of privation could he rid himself of the fear of

pain and privation which makes it difficult to live the truth. But suffering for Gandhi was not an end in itself. Its purpose was above all to prepare the sufferers themselves and the ones they were trying to influence for a meeting of minds and hearts."[37]

Hurley's reflections on Gandhi's life and writings and the great boost that the Second Vatican Council gave to his views on social justice, prepared him to adopt a rather different attitude to political developments in South Africa towards the end of the 1960s when Black Consciousness, similar to the Black Power movement in the United States, began to win the support of Africans.[38] Hurley regarded it as one of the most important political changes in South Africa's history, giving black people self-confidence, restoring their pride, and helping them realise that only they had the power to change their situation. He saw that, once these new attitudes became entrenched in a large number of black people, there would be no stopping their forward movement to freedom.

Early in the 1970s, workers began to stand up for their rights, starting with the landmark Durban strikes of 1973.[39] Hurley, who had several seminal discussions with workers and trade unionists, realised that more was needed from the Church than attitude change among whites, important as that was. Impressed by the power of unionised workers to effect change in a disciplined, non-violent way, he publicly backed their cause, which made white capitalists highly suspicious of him.His views on worker rights and trade unionists were a major factor in his being regarded as a communist, though this was not in any way an accurate perception of his views.

At the same time, he backed important initiatives that white people could undertake, most notably conscientious objection to military service in the apartheid army. Hurley's strong support for those who declared such objection and faced the consequences which might include prison sentences of two or three years, highlighted objection as a significant contribution to peacemaking.[40] He urged the churches to adopt conscientious objection to service in the apartheid army as a policy - and earned himself sack-loads of hate mail from conservative whites.

To Hurley, apartheid was a form of organised evil, which he believed could only be overcome by organised good. Thus, in the 1970s, he established organisations that would help to bring about change. He founded Diakonia (1976), an ecumenical agency promoting joint action for justice and peace by many churches working together in the Greater Durban Area; initiated the Human Awareness Programme (1977) which strengthened civil society efforts to bring an end to apartheid; and supported the establishment in 1979 of PACSA

(the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness), with a programme similar to that of Diakonia.[41]

Through his contacts with leaders of other churches and other faiths, his ecumenical commitment grew. He saw clearly that a divided church and divided religious faiths would have little to offer to a divided South Africa. If, however, they would work closely together this could make a huge impact on apartheid. The dynamic ecumenical movement in KwaZulu-Natal even now owes much to his pioneering efforts. Bishop Louis Sibiya of the Evangelical Lutheran Church spoke for many religious leaders of all faiths when he said quite simply: "He loved us and we loved him".[42]

As president of the Bishops' Conference for a second period—from 1981 to 1987—Hurley was once again in the national limelight. During these years, his leadership was key to major reports published by the Conference highlighting the situation in Namibia (then called South-West Africa); focussing also on the problem of forced removals and on the extensive use of violence by the police in black townships of the Vaal Triangle in what was then the Transvaal province. In addition, he led the bishops in outspoken and practical support to trade unions in their struggle for worker rights.

As a result of comments he made at the launch of the report on Namibia, he was charged with libelling the police anti-insurgency unit known as *Koevoet* (crowbar). As the court case approached, a message came from South Africa's most noteworthy prisoner – Nelson Mandela - who said "Archbishop Hurley is often in my thoughts, especially now. I would like him to know that."[43] Only days before the case came to court in 1985, the charges were dropped. The government had realised they were taking on a formidable opponent, with widespread local and international support, whose prosecution would only serve to draw attention to the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the gross human rights abuses of which its security forces were guilty.[44]

It is interesting to note that at the media conference that followed the withdrawal of the charges, Hurley showed the true Gandhian spirit when he expressed "the hope that the aborted trial may be used by God in hastening the day when the horror of Namibia may come to an end, when the good name of the security forces so grievously tarnished, when the designation of 'policeman' so sadly disgraced, will be reinstated and rehabilitated and when freedom and peace will come to a country subjected to the distress and cruelty of a war for which South Africa is mainly responsible. May God grant the grace of repentance to the offending party and the grace of forgiveness to the offended, that reconciliation may result and peace

and friendship come into their own."[45]

In 1989 there was a second defiance campaign. Unlike the earlier one of the 1950s, this enjoyed considerable support from leaders of various faith communities. Hurley himself led the great "Freedom March" by an estimated 20,000 people in Durban on 22 September 1989 from Emmanuel Cathedral to the Durban City Hall.[46]

1990 was a momentous year for South Africa, with the unbanning of the liberation movements—the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)—and the release of Nelson Mandela after 27 years of imprisonment, events that gave Hurley great joy: decades of struggle for racial justice in South Africa had not been in vain. In 1994 came the first democratic elections and the installation of Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa, an event that Hurley described as a highlight of his life second only to the Second Vatican Council.

When Hurley retired as Archbishop of Durban in 1992, he returned to the place where his priestly ministry had begun in 1940, and took up the task of parish priest of Emmanuel Cathedral – the first time he had been a parish priest though he had been a bishop for 45 years.[47] Already nearly eighty, during nine years of 'retirement' in this demanding post, in addition to being Chancellor of the University of Natal, he was for several years an active Patron of Jubilee 2000, a campaign to have the debt of poor nations cancelled and to counter economic globalisation. His support for Jubilee 2000 was a return to Hurley's early interest in economic justice expressed in his dissertation on "Economic Domination through Credit Control" at the Gregorian University in the late 1930s.

During the last years of the 1990s, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provided opportunities for individuals and communities who had suffered gross human rights violations, to tell their stories in public hearings presided over by members of the Commission. Hurley was not directly involved in the process though he recognised its great importance. His overall conclusion about the work of the TRC was that it was rather more successful in the first of its aims, namely to expose the truth, than in the second, to promote reconciliation.[48] The latter task was left to civil society and faith-based organisations to take up, though without the extensive state funding available to the TRC.

During these years as a parish priest, Hurley reflected on Gandhi's spirituality and was profoundly impressed about how holistic it was:

"All too often the pious even the saintly person pursues a path of spiritual perfection that brings results merely in the field of personal holiness, albeit a personal holiness that is deeply marked by the love

and service of others. In that sense it is social, but social has broader dimensions: the political, the economic and the cultural."[49] Gandhi's spirituality embraced all these dimensions. His was the sort of mind that saw with startling clarity that if you wanted to be true to yourself and true to the people you loved you had to put that love into practice to change political, economic and cultural factors hurting the people, stifling their freedom and impeding their growth and progress. Gandhi's love was total and integral. In that sense his morality was total and integral."

In these last years of his ministry, under Gandhi's influence, Hurley's enthusiasm for ecumenism became broader and stronger than ever. He noticed that among the various aspects of Gandhi's legacy there were two powerful messages about religion: first, that it is of the utmost importance in how human society is governed, and second, that all the major religions have something to offer in how society should be governed. He realised that in the great struggle to ensure that moral values would be observed not only in private domestic life but also in social and political life, each major world religion would not on its own be able to supply the needs of the world. "The great religions of the world will have to work together. They will all be sitting at Gandhi's feet, cherishing their dearest beliefs as Gandhi cherished his, but finding common cause in the grave need to give the world the moral guidance so necessary for its survival and development."[50]

In the last years of his life, as South Africa took rapid strides towards democracy, it was ironic that the Catholic Church was retreating from many of the progressive positions of Vatican II. This was a painful experience for Hurley, yet he remained a man of hope, sustained especially by his frequent meetings with the Rome-based lay Community of Sant'Egidio, which he regarded as an embodiment of the vision and ideals of Vatican II.[51]

The Community derives its name from a church in the Trastavere area of Rome, which they made their headquarters. Founded by a group of young lay people inspired by the Second Vatican Council, the Community believes that it is only possible to understand the Christian message by serving the poor. This they do through their voluntary work with the homeless, the elderly, gypsies, refugees, the elderly, people living with AIDS and many others – work that would have found much resonance with Gandhi.

The members of the Community of Sant'Egidio work and lead normal family lives. Within these constraints, they give part of each day to serving and befriending the poor. Central to their community life is daily communal prayer. Hurley was particularly impressed that

their efforts to promote justice and peace stemmed from their friendship with marginalised communities and countries and were linked to ongoing welfare and development work. He greatly admired their contribution to the Mozambican peace accord and a number of other peace efforts in Africa.

Less than a week before his sudden death on 13 February 2004, Hurley attended one of Sant'Egidio's assemblies, at which cardinals and bishops, as well as laymen and women, met for several days with leaders of other churches and faiths to discuss efforts to promote peace. He was comforted by the realisation that the values of Vatican II were alive and well. In the Sant'Egidio gatherings, he tasted what the Church of the future might be like – a Church more in tune with the great social concerns of Mahatma Gandhi.

Hurley returned from Rome in February 2004 unusually happy: despite his disappointments with the official Church, it seemed as if his life was ending on a high note – there was hope for the future.[52] He had said to one of his hosts at Sant'Egidio that he would have liked to start his life all over again, because there were some things that he was only beginning to understand. One of those was the centrality of love in the life of a believer which would surely have embraced not only the person and domestic but also the political, economic and cultural dimensions of life as practised by Gandhi himself.

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Umntu Ngumntu Ngobuntu Wabantu[1]

Jessie Lazar Knott

ABSTRACT

In Africa, under colonialism, colonial subjects were not granted full citizenship and were not seen to be legitimate participants of 'civil society' in the Western sense. Nevertheless, in the decades following World War II, powerful liberation movements eventually forced colonial powers to grant independence. Many of these liberation movements took power of newly independent states and struggled to transcend a history where citizenship had been denied. A common pattern was for these new states to demobilise the grass roots and to discourage an independent civil society.

This paper examines the dynamics around the establishment of a civil society through and after independence in 'post'-Colonial Africa, intimating that no 'post'-conflict society will exist legitimately, globally, unless the African social justice practices constituted by uBuntu energise all spaces of power.

IN JUNE 2007, ADEBAYO Adedeji wrote an article for *The Mail and Guardian* entitled 'Bringing the people back in'. In it he stated:

> Africa's ever-recurring armed conflicts and civil wars and the new waves of globalisation in the post-Cold War era have accentuated the marginalisation of a continent so severely that it is now at the periphery of the periphery of the world. The failure to deconstruct and reconstruct Africa's inherited colonial economy has exacerbated centuries-old dependence and dispossession. The optimism heralded by the era of political independence since the halcyon days of the 1960s has long since evaporated, even as one sub-Saharan country after another presently celebrates its golden jubilee. Africa's most serious mistake has been the separation of politics from economics. In doing so, the discipline

> of economics has been severed from its origins of political philosophy and ethics has been robbed of its human dimension […] convey[ing] a heartless message: that people are irrelevant.[2]

What is highlighted here is how through allowing economic discourses to become the dominant ones, they have become the determining factors to *life*, rather than *life*, or self-determination, stipulating the form these discourses and their practices take in order to support *life's* evolution. By *life* I mean the fundamental right of all sentient beings to be and become themselves in line with who and what *they* determine that concept of 'self' to – in all truth – be. Were this conception of 'self' to be recognised and acknowledged as the centre, and so primacy of systems, structures and institutions, then we would have become evolved beings existing in an evolved society that has finally come to understand power and actively chooses to enable the constant empowerment of its citizens so that we may evolve as a species. In this light, Fukuyama's meaningless declaration of 'the end of history' re South Africa's liberation from apartheid, might gain some legitimacy in that it would be the end of '*his* story' of modernism, and the beginning of 'our-story' of mutual respect – the foundations for *experiencing* wholeness and well-being – the enabling principles of democracy – as a reality.

That we Africans are described as being at the 'periphery of the periphery of the world' is quite clearly indicative of how 'the world' values us, and how we in turn, value ourselves by our complicity in maintaining and perpetuating this status quo for as long as we have, and daily continue to do so. In addition, it is clearly evident that 'the efforts' or 'attempts' to counteract this contemptuous treatment have brought about 'change', but that until complete transformation – in all its profound etymological glory – occurs, through willful intent focused into collective action, creating a nuclear reaction at the level of the deep structure, we are passive victims doomed to the eternal role of stage-hands and gimps in the drama of life. Or to be succinct, in the words of Fanon, "we need not think that [we can ever] jump ahead; [we are] in fact beginning at the end. [We are] already senile before [we have] come to know the petulance, the fearlessness or the will to succeed of youth".[3] We have died, without ever truly living.

It is not only Africa's failure to deconstruct its "inherited colonial economy" that impedes its citizens so tragically, but its failure to deconstruct the entire *idea* of colonialism and all its symbolic manifestations: the organisation and structure of power, its institutionalisation, and how these apparatuses fragment resistance. Mamdani suggests that a way through this hegemonic impasse is to

first contextualise discourses of 'rights' and 'culture' in an effort to illuminate the faultline that exists in their (mis)conceptualisation, as until this is done, the structural legacy will persist and be continuously reproduced by the dialectic of state *reform* and popular resistance.[4]

These discourses of 'rights' and 'culture' are pitted against each other in what Mamdani calls "a paralysis of perspective" between the theoretical positions of 'modernists' and 'communitarians'. The former posit a rights-oriented-liberal solution of grounding politics in 'civil*ised* society', which is seen as a marginalised construct in contemporary Africa. The latter defends 'culture' and seeks to place Africanist 'communities' at the centre of politics. Mamdani calls for a "creative synthesis that transcends both positions" as they are a dichotomy[5] rather than a conflicting and so oppositional binary, each to a certain degree acknowledging that "the core legacy […] was forged through the colonial experience".[6]

The colonial 'experience' can be described as the most tragic 'developmental' intervention in Africa's history, for her people. A period when the 'great' European 'powers' - Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Portugal - driven by the narcissistic desire to expand their own image, put their own dominant ideas of a belief in their racial superiority into practice in a brutal display of power relations. These dehumanising, demoralising power relations existed in tandem with, and were justified by, an arrogantly patronising display of condescension all in the name of 'civilising' the 'natives'. Victor Hugo put it like this:

> Man's destiny lies in the South. […] In the nineteenth century, the White made a man of the Black; in the twentieth century, Europe will make a world of Africa. To fashion a new Africa, to make the old Africa amenable to civilization – that is the problem. And Europe will solve it. […] Go forward nations grasp this land! Take it! From whom? From no one. Take this land from God! God gives the earth to men. God offers Africa to Europe. Take it! […] Pour out everything you have in this Africa, and at the same stroke solve your own social questions! Change your proletarians into property-owners! Go on, do it! Grow, cultivate, colonise, multiply![7]

What is highlighted in this speech – presented at a banquet commemorating the abolition of slavery – is how colonial expansion followed an economic objective: the continual growth of production and the accumulation of capital constantly require new outlets. Couched in the humanitarian-religious discourses of 'universal' values – 'civilisation', 'moral well-being', 'social progress' – meddling in the histories and existence of so-called 'lesser' beings and plunder, became

legitimated in order to sway public opinion, and garner its support.

In a 'post'-apartheid context, whereby 1994 finally saw the 'official' end to colonialism and its mandated policies of racial segregation the *idea* pervasively lingers in that its institutional legacy remains intact. Mamdani states that "[p]recisely because deracialisation has marked the limits of post-colonial reform, the 'nonracial' legacy […] needs to be brought out into the open so that it may be the focus of a public discussion".[8] He further highlights that apartheid was not unique to South Africa but a "generic form of the African colonial state [for a]s a form of rule, apartheid is what Smuts called 'institutional segregation', the British termed 'indirect rule', and the French [Italian and Portuguese] 'association'. It is this common state form that [he calls] decentralised despoticism [… because] although the bifurcated state created with colonialism was deracialised after independence, it was not democratised".[9] Sadly, like its 52 predecessors, South Africa settled for democratic transition rather than radical deconstruction and has embraced the neo-liberal, and so neo-colonial orthodoxy, infusing Fanon's perceptive words in the 60s about the 'transitional' process with prophecy:

> The fight for democracy against the oppression of [hu]mankind will slowly leave the confusion of neo-liberal universalism to emerge, sometimes laboriously as a claim to nationhood. It so happens that the unpreparedness of the educated classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of people, their laziness, and let be said, their cowardice at the decisive moment of the struggle will give rise to tragic mishaps.[10]

By the 'bifurcated' state, Mamdani means that its nature, as invented by Europeans, was constructed and organised around the urban-rural dualism born of the Africa of labour reserves. What exist now, are two geographically different conceptions of space giving rise to different forms of interrelations and values dominated by a single despotic authority.[11] Efforts to counteract this hegemony have meant that present-day African urbanites communicate in the language of contemporary *civil society* with its focus on 'rights', their assertion and protection, and as a result organise and mobilise themselves around the principle of differentiation in order to directly challenge power, how it is conceived and articulated. *Abantu baselaleni* ('rural peoples') are rooted in the power of community, and cultural validation of tradition in order to function as a unit grounded in the land.

In light of the liberation struggles that threw off the yoke of racial colonial legacy, the communitarian, Africanist perspective of civil society has echoes of discourses of socialism, in that it speaks the

language of 'agendas' grounded in 'ideology' apropos contextual, discursive analysis. It arrives at its premise through analogy that civil society exists as a mature concept and construct in Africa as in Europe, and that the struggle between it and the state, is fuelled by the same energy that drove the liberation struggles: democracy for all, in all spaces and places.[12]

To contextualise this premise requires a brief historical analysis of how the concept of civil society was revived in the post-Cold War era. The late 1980s signaled a paradigmatic shift from the state-centric to the society-centric with the Eastern European uprisings. The violence of capturing state power was rejected in favour of un-armed, peaceful protest in order to declare sovereignty of self in relationship to the despotism of state power. Despite different geo-economic contexts the analogy to southern Europe, Latin America and South Africa in order to constitute new and stable democracies is valid. In fact, its revival could be sourced in South Africa with the 1973 Durban strikes, and 1976 Soweto Uprisings.[13]

Kaldor suggests "what is new about the concept of civil society since 1989 is globalization".[14] All these movements shared more than a desire for self-determination, they were internationally supported, and not bound by territorial state boundaries. This created a deeper, and broader understanding of the concept in that the binary between 'civil' and 'uncivil' society was shed, as well as that between the supposedly 'democratic' West, and 'undemocratic' East and South.[15] Thus it took on the characteristics of a vehicle for greater emancipation through the principle of inclusivity and naked, honest expression.

The implications of this on experienced reality are profound, for as Kaldor states, "a new form of politics, which we call 'civil society', is both an outcome and an agent of global interconnectedness".[16] This "politics" is undefined beyond its characteristics of being a dynamic interaction, and so force, giving voice to legitimate self-determined conceptions of that 'self'. As a result, this "politics" provides a platform of expression for ideas, fears, exploitative experiences, desires, needs, and policies to be amplified, discussed, and grappled with.

Consequently, Cohen and Arato are emphatic that the discourse of civil society in its current conceptualisation has a very precise focus, and so important role to play regarding its potential to illuminate a way out of the current impasse between theoretical debates in political theory. These debates are all dialectically interconnected, and yet "a distinct set of antinomies, [has led] to a standoff and increasing sterility," due to years of going round in circles.[17] Civil society's non-class-based forms of collective action and struggle grounded in and

linked to "the legal, associational, and public institutions of society [that are] differentiated not only from the state, but also from the capitalist market economy" are imperative to understanding what is at stake within global transitions towards greater democracy.[18] In addition the intimate narratives of the indigenous actors in their chaotic, anarchic, heterogeneity, and their relationship to these global shifts are grounded in and express the truth of actual experience, and as a result open up possibilities for how praxes can - and should – become grounded in so doing resolving the theoretical dead-end.

Briefly, the debates are between the models[19]:

Elite vs. Participatory Democracy
Rights-oriented Liberalism vs. Communitarianism
Neo-liberal vs. Welfarist.

All these theoretical positions, and their discourses directly impact Africa with reference to deconstructing the *idea* of colonialism and reconstituting herself in her own image, not just the modernist-communitarian dichotomy put forward by Mamdani, as a result of the reality of globalisation. Contrary to conventional forms of analysis it becomes necessary to approach the deadlock by regarding them as *spaces of power*, for within their construction are *how* advocators of the positions identify, and organise themselves, resulting in their reality as an experienced phenomenon by means of their modus operandi. Central then is how power is conceived, defined by Greenstein "as a set of practices and discourses that govern the interactions between social actors".[20] By social actors are meant sentient beings choosing to be and become themselves in line with who and what *they* determine, and are conscious, of that concept of 'self' to – in all truth – be. "The identities and interests of these actors are *shaped* in relation to contests over [ideas], agendas, [projections], strategies, meanings, [values] and resources. Power thus has [many] dimensions".[21] Close observation of the actors, will clarify these dimensions, and the form of pattern their constant re-enactments take, illuminating the interests they as actors, ultimately serve. And which, whose and what interests *are* being served are the critical questions to be asked by every individual in relationship to the whole. For the purposes of this paper, which are the dynamics surrounding the establishment of civil society in 'post'-colonial Africa, Greenstein provides a framework, highlighting three dimensions of particular importance. These are:

social power – access to resources and control over their allocation
institutional power – strategies employed by groups and institutions in

exercising administrative and legal authority
discursive power – shaping social, political and cultural agendas through contestations over meanings.[22]

Greenstein states that scholarly literature on transitions to democracy in a 'post'-colonial and 'post'-apartheid context focus on the *social dimension* of power, insufficiently examining the *institutional dimension* and ignoring the *discursive dimension* altogether. As a result, how power is used and operates, realistically, is incompletely understood, as it is their *dynamic interaction*, which clarifies meaning and makes sense. The effect is to divorce the concepts of state and civil society from their human dimension – individuals choosing to act on decisions – and to regard them as "actors operating on behalf of other social forces," abstractly regarded from the theoretical basis of class, race or other positions, or alternatively, as reflective surfaces robotically mirroring the conflicts and interests of the economy and society at large.[23] Therefore, so long as the interaction of the *discursive* dimension in relationship to other dimensions is undermined in value by analyses, the extent to which social actors become conscious of actively shaping and creating rather than merely reflecting social interests and identities is undermined. This unconsciousness will rob the dimension of its force (willful intent, and so responsibility), and the structural legacy will persist and be continuously reproduced by the dialectic of state *reform* and popular resistance.

This framework serves to radically open up and challenge established norms of politics, state and institutional organisation and operation. Gideon Baker innovatively explores how this challenge may manifest in his work dealing with visions of civil society, democratic transitions, political theory and practice in Eastern Europe and Latin America.[24] His examination highlights how rights-oriented liberalism, communitarian and left theoretical positions conceive of civil society as a *tool* serving to counter-balance state power. The implication is that civil society is an a-political construct empowered only to the extent that it influences public policies. His empirical observations however have illuminated how civil society is "a democratic end in itself, as a space for the realisation of that elusive promise of democracy – self-government".[25] Baker draws on the theories and practices of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, and carves open a window of perception that offers a different gaze from the inherently oppressive and exclusive focus on capturing state power, towards the creative act of "counter-public spheres, where democratic practices of communal organisation prevail"[26] Similarly, Noél Mostert acknowledges the humanistic and democratic

institutional values of the Bantu peoples of pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa at length in his detailed, epic, histography *Frontiers.*[27]

These *decentralised* and *self-determining* democratic practices resonate with Foucault's notions of power, which are derived from an "autonomous, non-centralised kind of theoretical production" that is linked to "particular, local, and regional knowledge" of an academic and popular nature.[28] Drawing on this as well as the works of Arendt and Havel, Baker's model of civil society pulls together the pursuit of establishing "an autonomous private sphere", with the idea of active citizenship, grounded in a model of decentralised government.[29] What this model doesn't clarify, which is fundamental to the post-colonial African bifurcated state, is *how* the state may be reconstructed and constituted to allow self-rule in civil society within a globalised paradigm. However, three challenging and crucial questions highly relevant to Africa are raised:

> How will autonomous forms of self-rule found in civil society be merged and transcended in order to create a macro-political democratic order without compromising the vital life force, which are its micro-political foundations? Related, is how will this self-rule challenge global powers from a local position, without constructing a counter-power that resurrects the same forms of oppression that created the desire for self-rule in the first place?
> How will civil society transcend its conception as an independent form of freedom and self-rule that is beyond state borders in order to link it to the state, without becoming relegated to a mere interest group that seeks to constrain power and gain rights, thus serving to entrench the state's authority and supremacy?
> How will the diversity of interests and identities be recognised and acknowledged, without projecting a chaotic cacophony of disparate voices on the one hand, and without marginalising any voice from another, on the other. In other words how will diversity be recognised without excluding unity?

Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau forcefully address these challenges in their advocation of a framework for *radical democratic citizenship*. In Mouffe's analysis, this is viewed as "an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent […] while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty".[30] Her argument is that the realisation of the concept of radical democracy is contingent on "a collective form of identification among the democratic demands found in a variety of movements: women, workers, black, gay, ecological, as well as in several other 'new social movements'. Through a common identification with a radical democratic interpretation of the principles

of liberty and equality, this conception of citizenship aims at constructing a 'we', a chain of equivalence among their demands so as to articulate them through the principle of democratic equivalence"[31].

Thus equal gravity is not granted to all social interests by this form of governance, but to those that enhance and magnify specific values centered on the pursuit of liberty and equality, their realisation and respect. Social actors are therefore democratic only to the extent they align themselves with integrity in pursuit of these goals. This supports the heterogeneity of the concept in that it is a space of power where diverse and multifaceted actors dynamically interact, and that this interaction is reliant on a modification of identity from image, to articulation, and through action in a constant process of coming into being and passing away. This elevates the operative function of social actors to becoming conscious of the interests being served and the manner with which alliances are formed within the diverse spaces of power, and realms of authority from civil society to institutions and the sate.

How alliances are being formed therefore becomes the critical focal point. Present African reality at a continental level is quite clearly subject to the neo-liberal orthodoxy, and it's economic discourses of 'compromise' and 'trade-offs'. Visions, goals and agendas become compromised and traded off if they do not comply and bend to the authority of the market, validated and mandated by the state. Those areas of public interest and value, no matter their urgency of need to be addressed, such as the environment, water, violence against women and children, health-care and education, HIV/AIDS (to name a scanty few), that are supposedly *not* compatible with market supremacy, are dismissed to the arena of a lofty overall progressive agenda, the mechanical stuck record of state- and business-centered PR[32]-rhetoric. A simple truth is that they *are* compatible, to each other *and* economic health, and one of the most important requirements of those social actors committed to the realisation of radical democracy is to empirically demonstrate the relations and interactions that *link* the theory to praxis, the ideas to reality.

This is emphasised by Laclau, who contributes the following elaboration, "social and political demands are *discrete* in the sense that each of them does not *necessarily* involve the others", however the view that "they can be politically met only through a gradualist process of isolating and dealing with them one by one" is odious (author's emphasis).[33] His argument is that *universality* as a discourse of democracy and emancipation is the *effect* to the cause of the process of dynamic interaction between social actors and their demands. What

becomes critical at this level then, is *how* discursive power is engaged "providing that element of universality which makes possible the establishment of equivalential links" through meaning making.[34] Radical democratic discourses are able to link these particular demands in a universal pattern by what he terms "hegemonic articulation".[35] This departs from the liberal meta-narratives of the past, which proclaimed universal validity by forcing particularities to conform within the boundaries of the narrative, to show how universality can *only* emerge "through an equivalence between particularities, and such equivalences are always contingent and context-dependent".[36] In other words, there is no inherent logic that always unites political and social demands out of context. In other words, social actors are shaping and creating their experienced reality through their choice of response, to experienced reality. This choice is indicative of how they value themselves, to a degree of equivalence in relationship to other social actors – that are a part of different spaces of power. As a result there is no valid universal logic of emancipation – whether it is conceived of as radical democracy, or socialism – that can determine the correct balance apart from the particular, contextual, historical, circumstantial, reality of the actors themselves. At its simplest level, dimensions of power are meaningless and empty without human, or self-determination articulating their meaning as a result of how they are experienced.

Mouffe and Laclau's radical democratic framework with its edgy grounding on the *multiplicity* of social demands and the *contingent* and *context-specific* nature of realistically progressive articulation is validated and supported by David Harvey. He further elaborates not on the need for "dispersed, autonomous, localised and essentially communitarian solutions", but a greater "complexity of politics that recognises how environmental and social justice must be sought by a rational ordering of activities at different scales", so that "the realities of global power politics" are confronted, and "the hegemonic powers of capitalism" are displaced.[37] This implies widening the concept of community to the global level, because of the neo-liberal orthodoxy being the vehicle of globalisation.

Greenstein succinctly asks "to what extent can we use the focus on articulation of diverse elements in order to produce a contingent unity in civil society, in order to understand the nature of the state as well?"[38] He engages in the works of Joel Migdal who draws from Pierre Bourdieu, to define the state as 'a field of power' that projects an image "of a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory" as well as an actuality of "the practices of its multiple parts".[39] Its practices

therefore either reinforce or undermine what it projects of itself making it a "contradictory entity that acts against itself, […] a heap of loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the official state borders and often promoting conflicting sets of rules with one another and with 'official' laws".[40] The balance between the united image and fragmented practices varies from one state to another, specifically in post-colonial Africa. That it is more tangible and moderately more organised than civil society means nothing, as it will only ever possess integrity when it succeeds in drawing together its disparate parts – including civil society – in a hegemonic articulation of interest in the pursuit of liberty and equality.

Critically, can these ideas of contingency and context-specificity in pursuit of a radical democratic framework developed in the context of Europe and its relation to its historically specific realities be valid for and applied to Africa? Would their application by mere nature of their European 'origins' simply be a form of neo-colonialism? How will they serve the interests of deconstructing the colonial legacy so that Africa may reconstitute herself?

To go back to Mamdani's proposal for a creative synthesis between the liberal-communitarian dichotomy, we can turn to Partha Chatterjee who suggests that the term *civil society* is valid and applicable because a post-colonial reality exists in a colonially constituted paradigm. Albeit that pre- and post-colonial societies organised themselves according to different cultural norms, and values, the dynamic encapsulated by the term is important "precisely to identify these marks of difference, to understand their significance, to appreciate how by the continued invocation of a 'pure' model of origin – the institutions of modernity as they were meant to be – a normative discourse can still continue to energise and shape the evolving forms of social institutions in the non-Western world".[41]

In addition she puts forward the notion of *political society* to recognise and acknowledge the vast range of institutions and their practices that act as a go-between between people and the state in 'post'-colonial societies, but are not contained within the liberal conception of civil*ized* society. 'Post'-colonial political society is characterised by four features:

> How it mobilises itself, is by and large *illegal* – squatting, using public property, civil disobedience, refusing to pay taxes, illegal service connections, etc.
> The language of *rights* is synonymous with basic need and welfare provision, the deprivation of which negates the right to *life*.

Demands to these rights are seen as a *collective* and *community* social interest, not an individual's.

Agencies of the state and NGOs do not treat these beings as citizens of a lawfully constituted civil society, but often as criminals, and the degree to which they are rendered visible depends entirely on the degree of force they use to protest.

In my view the notion of civili*zed* society is a meaningless and racist idea that buys into the illusion of superiority, which has been the source of our barbaric history to begin with. Relative to how the term *civil society* has been conceived and elaborated upon in this paper so far, I regard it to originate in non-Western liberation struggles from Western attempts to supposedly 'civilise'. Struggles and resistance movements that have and are capable of exerting profound pressure on state and non-state actors, so that the fundamental right to *life* and self-determination of that *life,* can be respected. This right is not an institutionally mandated, performative act granted to one by the authority of some contrived state apparatus known as a legal system. It is already a given, and is either respected or not, by the dynamic interaction of all social actors, in all spaces of power, in relationship to each other. It is the very humanity – or lack of – of the diverse social actors, which energise spaces, or fields with power creating experienced reality. And so in this light, with reference to the applicability of the concept of civil society to post-colonial Africa, vis-à-vis the call for and need to deconstruct the colonial legacy and reconstitute herself, is not a rose by any other name, still a rose?

The biggest irony is that the framework for radical democracy, supposedly originating in Europe, has been around for aeons. For the Bantu peoples of sub-Saharan Africa it is contained within the episteme upon which their societies flourished in pre-colonial times known as the African Justice System, or *uBuntu namBheko*: the literal translation being *humanitarian respect for all is one*[42]. Their triune conception of reality is dependent on the dynamic interaction between three conceptions and spaces of power:

uBuntu – in the Nguni languages, *–mntu* means a person, a different noun article will differentiate between singular and plural but there is no differentiation between genders. Contained in the signifier is an entire philosophical theory of humanity.

umBheko – this is a fusion of meanings signifying respect, contained within the synthesis are recognition and acknowledgement.

uXolo – this means peace, apology and the active signification of responsibility, i.e. the ability to respond.

Energy, life force, or power flows between these three spaces of meaning and forms the framework, or episteme based upon which individuals moderate their behaviour, restrain themselves, and conduct their relationships to all things. Energy and power, its movement and flow are what life is all about, therefore, as a human (*umuntu*) one is both a source and a channel of this energy and power. One's thoughts, words and deeds are how energy and power are channeled in the fundamental dance of life. Because you are life, and you *effect* life, you are one at the macro-conception with all of life, and at a more contained level, or layer, with all people. So what I am, you are, what he, she, and (pertinent to Mouffe's need to construct a 'we') I are we. This signifies what Laclau presented as "equivalential links", for while there is autonomy of the individual and their desires, what Laclau referred to as *discretion,* this is always in relationship to the collective 'we''s desires.

This flow of energy is contingent on respect (*umbheko*). If the flow of energy is not respected, if the humanity of one is not respected, if a person's desires, and experiences, their sentience of being are not recognised and acknowledged – all in all respected, then none are respected. Without respect, then *uBuntu* (humanity) is undermined and compromised.

Where there is respect, there is peace (*uxolo*) and harmony. Where there is peace and harmony it means that people, from the individual to the collective have assumed the ability to respond, and allowed energy, power and life force to move fluidly from themselves and amongst each other and all other layers and spaces of power, for themselves. *uXolo* also means apology, and so it signifies the ability to ask forgiveness if one's thoughts, words or actions have created harm, for harm of one is harm of all.

Where there is fluidity of movement, a cycle and season of *inyala* (sufficiency and abundance) is experienced. Where there is abundance, justice has been served. Where there is no abundance, it means that an individual compromised their conception of 'self', and what it means to be that 'self': *ndigumnyala* (I am sufficient unto myself). This compromise would be indicative of the conditions of injustice, for the consequences of not adhering to the triune ontological epistemology means, that in not serving the interests of sufficiency, insufficiency has been created, where there is insufficiency social justice has not been served.



When all are one, there is hegemonic articulation. *uBuntu* is never forced on individuals, for that would be to disrespect the individual's ability to assume the ability to respond and define *self*, as a result it is not a meta-narrative, nor a normative discourse, but an ontological episteme. Like the framework of radical democracy provided by Mouffe and Laclau, *inyala – abundance* and *sufficiency* – universality of democracy and emancipation *emerge* "through an equivalence between particularities, and such equivalences are always contingent and context-dependent." Thus, an Africanist perspective implies a culture of rights, and these rights serve the interests of liberty and equality, for are not space and freedom the pre-requisites to meeting basic material needs?

A state should be afraid of its people, and not its people afraid of the state. People should determine the economic forces to support the balance of the interconnected earth-system and all it's constituent parts, not be at the mercy of the assumed authority and whimsy of those who fail to acknowledge themselves as a part of the whole. As a result, and relative to the untenable suffering experienced by the majority of peoples on the African continent because of the colonial legacy and its institutional and symbolic manifestation vis-à-vis how power has become constructed and articulated by that legacy, its deconstruction is a matter of urgency and an imperative. The resistance movements and politics of civil society becomes the vehicle through which power can mobilise and focus itself as a dynamic force, to add the element of air to those choked by centuries of abuse. The degree of power of that force is directly proportional to its collective consciousness, which relies on the time and speed equivalencies between associational groups, sectors and individuals become understood. It is the responsibility of every civilian individual within collectives and communities, to rouse themselves from their stupor, dig deep into their collective memory and re-member what it means

to be *umuntu nabantu ngobuntu zabantu*, (a person and people are humane citizens of humanity in *isiXhosa*) for restorative justice needs to be served in Africa.

> The living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people; it is the coherent, enlightened action of men and women. The collective building up of a destiny is the assumption of responsibility on the historical scale. Otherwise there is anarchy, repression and the resurgence of tribal parties and federalism. The national government, if it wants to be national, ought to govern by the people and for the people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts. No leader, however valuable he may be, can substitute himself for the popular will; and the national government, before concerning itself about international prestige, ought first to give back their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human things, and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign [wo/]men dwell therein.[43]

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Justice on Trial

Restorative justice and establishing a culture of human rights in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Jesse McConnell

ABSTRACT

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established as South Africa's vanguard institution through its transition into democracy. It was mandated with establishing a 'new culture of human rights' within a discourse of national reconciliation. In order to do so, it was provided certain mechanisms such as truth telling, forgiveness, and reconciliation. This choice has fallen under criticism as being subversive to the establishment of a retributively protected culture of human rights. This paper seeks to argue that within the framework of the TRC and its mandate, restorative justice was the necessary form of justice because of its transformative power and holistic scope in progressing towards a culture of individually protected human rights. This will be argued through an understanding of the theoretical context in which restorative justice was placed, namely the discourses of an African humanism (ubuntu) and a moral/religious voice (Christianity). I argue that restorative justice was the necessary and foundational moment of justice in establishing a just culture of human rights in which individual rights can be retributively protected.

Introduction

THERE HAS BEEN A prolific amount of papers written, books published, and arguments debated concerning the successes and failures of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It may seem to be of little urgency then that another paper be written concerning the theoretical premises and objectives of the TRC.

However, my desire is to trace an ontological understanding of justice in order for a critique of justice in the TRC to be better equipped to look beyond the polarised debate between retribution and reconciliation, and view justice as it was implicated in the work of the TRC, and as an integral component to the notion of democratic consolidation, the rule of law, and the establishment of a culture of human rights.

The debate around justice in the TRC has been polarised around the appropriation of a punitive form of justice against a restorative understanding of justice as reconciliation. Arguments have specifically become polarised around the implication of restorative justice towards human rights. And both sides are polarised by a reluctance—or failure—to engage in debate about the Commission through the terminology of the Commission itself. We have instead embarked on a mission to extricate ourselves from our own failure to envision the achievement of what the Commission was based on—a conception of justice grounded in restoration and reconciliation—and we are instead focused on the shortcomings that lay outside its parameters of intent. Graeme Simpson exhorts this discussion by stating, 'if there is a more meaningful debate intrinsic to the TRC process, then it is most appropriately framed as a debate between restorative and punitive systems of justice, rather than between incompatible "justice" and "reconciliation" models.'[1] The debate around justice in the TRC has been polarised around the appropriation of a punitive form of justice against a restorative understanding of justice as reconciliation. This is the primarily location that I hope this particular debate to occur, that is, surrounding justice, rather than the shortcomings of the TRC after its appointed period of operation in securing victim reparations or granting amnesty to unrepentant offenders. It is an attempt to explore the concepts of justice at work in the arguments for and against the understanding of justice in the TRC, specifically as it set out to establish a 'new culture of human rights' in South Africa.

Justice: An ontology

But before I discuss restorative justice as it was implicated in the TRC, I would like to say a few words about the ontology of justice that have not yet been incorporated into this paper. John de Gruchy has stated that restorative justice is seen as 'an attempt to recover certain neglected dimensions [of the established criminal justice system] that make for a *more complete understanding of justice*' (emphasis added).[2] This 'complete understanding of justice' is what is often the centre of the debate surrounding justice in the TRC. This has become focal because the debate has failed to extract the ontology of justice

from its more common applications through law and legal systems.

The majority of criticisms pointed at the TRC's failure to uphold justice have been focused on a retributive form of justice that is contingent on the application of law and the appropriation of judgement. Jacques Derrida, in an article entitled 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', argues that justice exists apart from law—before law—and is therefore fundamentally not contingent upon law. Rather, justice is bound to a performative force of power that makes justice in itself just, and serves to institute law in a foundational moment of violence, an act that cannot be judged as just or unjust by society for there is not yet a justly established law from which to cast judgement. This performative power of justice is what Derrida has called its 'mystical authority', where 'a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act.'[3] Justice is therefore anterior to law, and the two are certainly not the same. Derrida states 'Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable…that is to say of moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule.'[4]

We are therefore compelled towards the ontology of justice beyond the achievements of law if we are to attempt to criticise an act as being an abrogation of justice.

Paul Tillich stresses the fundamental dignity of justice in his ontological analysis of love, power, and justice. He begins his analysis with the need for an ontological approach to these subjects, for ontology is, he argues, the ultimate question of being. He proceeds to deconstruct conceptions of love, power, and justice to their very root of being, and states: 'Love, power, and justice are metaphysically speaking as old as being itself. They precede everything that is, and they cannot be derived from anything that is. They have ontological dignity.'[5]

According to Tillich, love is fundamentally the reunion of the estranged,[6] presupposing a separation of what was once united. Power is the interaction of being with being, a process necessary to actualise love. Justice, then, is the form of power that preserves the being of love. He claims that everything that has being has an intrinsic claim to justice, and 'the intrinsic claim in everything that is cannot be violated without violating the violator.'[7] Essentially, Tillich states that 'love is the ultimate principle of justice. Love reunites; justice preserves what is to be united.'[8] This act is a form of justice that he calls *creative* for it moves beyond retributive or distributive justice, which seeks to reward, positively or negatively, in proportion to one's acts or position in society. Creative justice, on the other hand, is eminent in love

through its inherent need to reunite what has been estranged. Creative justice is able to accept as just one who is unjust that unity may be restored in a foundational moment of justice. Even as Tillich has argued for justice's preserving power, so too has Plato argued for the same position of justice as the uniting function in the individual person and in the social group.[9]

If we are able to understand the ontological meaning of justice as *that which preserves reunion* and as existent *anterior* to law, we will be equipped to analyse the context that surrounded the *form* of justice in the TRC. We may now provide linguistic meaning to the ontology of justice in the form of creative or restorative justice, and pursue greater depth to our theoretical analysis of the form that justice took in the TRC.

Justice: An achievement?

In order to begin to explore the debate surrounding the justice of the TRC, we should consider the understanding of justice first put forward by the TRC itself. The Postamble of South Africa's Interim Constitution establishes 'a commitment that included the strengthening of the restorative dimensions of justice.'[10] The TRC Report defines *restorative* justice as a process that (i) redefines crime as a shift from an offence against the state to an injury towards another human being; (ii) is based on reparation rather than retribution in order to *heal* and *restore* all the parties involved, included victims, offenders, families, and communities; (iii) it encourages all the parties involved in the crime to be involved in the process of restorative justice rather than place full responsibility in state judicial proceedings; and finally (iv) it supports a criminal justice system that holds offenders accountable in overcoming injustice (emphasis added).[11] Former archbishop and Chairman of the TRC Desmond Tutu describes restorative justice as *another kind of justice*, one in which

> the central concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he has injured by his offence.[12]

Howard Zehr offers an understanding of crime—the fundamental starting point of a retributive understanding of justice—through the lens of restorative justice: 'Crime then is at its core a violation of a person by another person. . . . It is a violation of the *just* relationship that should exist between individuals' (emphasis added).[13] As such,

a restorative lens views the individual people involved in the crime and recognises the interpersonal dimensions of crime. Crime is to Zehr, ultimately 'a violation of people and relationships.'[14]

The understanding of the *ontological* assumptions of restorative justice is essential towards differentiating it from a retributive model of justice. Moreover, this understanding is perhaps even more important towards understanding the *epistemological* assumptions of restorative justice, which would no doubt shape our critique of justice within the context of the TRC. For if crime is understood as an injury to another person, and injustice as the loss of just relationship between people, then justice must be defined in light of these understandings. 'If crime is injury,' Zehr states, 'justice will repair injuries and promote healing' and therefore '*true* justice would aim to provide a context in which the process [of healing] can begin.'[15]

The goals of restorative justice then are essentially two-fold: restitution and reconciliation. It seeks restitution and healing for the victims of crime, which includes a sense of recovery from the past and hope for the future. And secondly, restorative justice seeks the reconciliation, or healing, of relationships between the victim and the offender.[16] As complete reconciliation may seem unrealistic in many cases, reconciliation should be viewed rather as a process on a continuum away from hostility in what may be better described as *transformative* justice,[17] which requires a complete break and shift away from the past in order to forbid the crime's recurrence.

Ubuntu

Insofar as one considers the tenets of restorative justice in light of the TRC, one should concomitantly consider the cultural concept of *ubuntu* as a means of contextualising the appeal of restorative justice in South Africa's democratic transition. Such was the prominence of *ubuntu* in the minds of the writers of the interim Constitution of National Unity and Reconciliation that it was enumerated and predicated in the process of dispensing with the injustices of the apartheid era,

> which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for *ubuntu* but not for victimisation.[18]

Therefore, the most urgent need that the TRC was built to address was a *restoration of community* in South Africa. *Ubuntu* was a significant

discourse among many people in South Africa, and espoused the communal premises that the TRC's goal of national reconciliation required.

The concept of u*buntu* is roughly translated as 'humanness' and can be located within a discourse of African humanism that is decidedly contrary to a Western vision of individualism. *Ubuntu* 'embodies a different ethic of "being there for each other"' and 'does not require specific contexts for implementation.'[19] It understands the self as a part of a greater whole that is the community. It states that *I am because we are*,[20] rather than the Western axiom *I think therefore I am*, and is therefore inextricably bound into a shared identity with others and cannot stand in isolation. Tutu further elaborates on the community of the individual with addressing an African version of *Weltanschauung* in which 'a person is not basically an independent, solitary entity', but rather 'a person is human precisely in being enveloped in the community of other human beings, in being caught up in the bundle of life. To be…is to participate.'[21]

Conceptually *ubuntu* is difficult to transcribe into Western terminology or understanding, but may find closest meaning within the realm of the *community*. It might find similar location within the postmodern discourse and Jean-François Lyotard's 'other', arguing that individual existence is dependent upon the community of *Homo sapiens* of which we are part. He suggests this as a different cause for meaning behind a portion of the Hebrew Decalogue:

> Thou shalt not kill thy fellow human being: To kill a human being is…to kill the human community present in him as both capacity and promise. And you also kill it in yourself. To banish the stranger is to banish the community, and you banish yourself from the community thereby.[22]

Therefore, what is more is that, in what Leonhard Praeg describes as an *immanent* understanding of law and justice, the individual forgoes a certain level of autonomy in 'a rhetoric of solidarity and loyalty that reach back to the traditional *I am because we are* through a history of slavery and oppression [that] interact with Western conventions of understanding justice.'[23] The *because* in the above statement presents an imperative that seeks to rescind a linear *if-then* perception of logic or justice in the determinance of the self in favour of a circular relationship between the *I* and *we*.[24] John Mbiti presents this dichotomy by adding to the above maxim so that the complete phrase states 'I am *because* we are, and *since* we are, *therefore* I am' (emphasis added).[25]

This elaboration on the theme of *ubuntu* is illustrative of the ultimate goal of justice within this African discourse of justice: that is,

we are individual persons by the *imperative pursuit of community* that resides in the 'since we are' portion of Mbiti's statement. This is the pursuit of an *ubuntu* justice, a restorative justice. It is the foundational act of community formation as a part of a protracted struggle to effectively establish a culture of human rights where a notion of individual rights had not previously existed. But when a culture that recognises individual rights has not previously existed, such a culture requires a premise of *communal* justice. Restorative justice offered a viable epistemology, while *ubuntu* provided an ontology with societal footing for legitimacy.

Forgiveness

The need to forgive is an epistemological necessity in the *imperative pursuit of community* that *ubuntu* espouses. Within this framework justice is essentially a 'reciprocal ethical imperative'[26] and is 'an obligation that is always ethical because it holds that justice does not reside in obedience to a transcendental Law but rather in the re-enactment of the social bond.'[27] As noted above, an *immanent* understanding of the relationship between an individual and the law would understand that 'the individual's first obligation is towards an *other*' and is pursuant of 'the solidarity of "the people".'[28] As such, an *ubuntu* justice is gratuitous in its need to forgive rather than pay retribution, and is unabashedly partial in its meting out of justice in the 're-enactment of the social bond'. The vision that a dividing line should separate the legal from the political is to claim that a judge give no thought to the social outcome of his or her decision. Such a partiality should instead be viewed as a preferable starting point from which 'law's highest purpose is to serve societal ends,'[29] particularly when a society is in democratic transition, attempting to construct a culture of human rights where individuals are seen as autonomously and inherently possessing certain rights within the greater community of their existence. Restorative justice is no longer symbolized in the blindfolded Greek goddess wielding scale and sword as her apparatuses of justice. Instead, her eyes are opened and fixed on the injured community and her intent is not the astringent separating power of the sword but the unifying potential of the social bond. It is this unconditional yet contingent nature of forgiveness that inspires criticism towards it, and apprehensively looks upon forgiveness as a saccharine negation of justice to mask political expediency.

Forgiveness is an innately cumbersome term within a political debate, much less a political act. In a discussion of the emergence of

forgiveness as a nationally recognised 'phenomenon' during South Africa's transition, Frost[30] makes reference to the enormity of Nelson Mandela's act of forgiving the former apartheid regime not only for the injustices inflicted upon the majority of people in South Africa, but for the countless injustices upon himself, not the least of which included incarceration for two and a half decades on Roben Island. Such an act of forgiveness would seem unspeakable and even cry 'unjust' for those caught in the struggle against apartheid. But forgiveness flies in the face of injustice. As Praeg states,

> the unspeakable horror of apartheid is counteracted by an equally unspeakable, that is, unrepresentable act of forgiveness…. A forgiveness that is powerful enough to challenge, and through this to transcend such a horror [as apartheid], cannot be represented because it cannot be understood.'[31]

And from the incomprehensibility of such outlandish forgiveness flows its very power to heal. Within its power to heal, forgiveness is inextricably bound to truth. Forgiveness is still unconditional and without demands of recompense, yet it is contingent upon the disclosure of truth in order to be justly appropriated. Justice, as the *maintenance of right*, is therefore fundamentally reliant on truth as its facilitator. Richard Goldstone, a South African Constitutional Court Judge and former prosecutor of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, commented that 'fundamental to all forms of justice is official acknowledgement of what happened, whether by criminal process or by truth commission.'[32] There is particular necessity for *transitional* justice (such as the example in the TRC) to extort the truth about the past where a former regime has marginalized truth and erected justice behind a veil of the ruling minority. Justice must, in a sense, 'come out of the closet'[33] by extricating itself through truth and guarding itself from exacting retribution. Instead of retribution, forgiveness was chosen as the *modus operandi* to subvert the evil of apartheid by risking grace to its perpetrators.

The grace of forgiveness is often quite contested for fear that accountability is lost and justice seemingly abandoned. But for a country in transition in which the past must be reckoned with but not at the expense of the future, forgiveness has greater *transformative* value than vengeance. John de Gruchy speaks of the formidable strength of forgiveness to reconcile the past to the present: 'Properly understood, forgiveness does not mean excusing those who oppress and victimise. Forgiveness understood can never replace justice…. The TRC has demonstrated that…forgiveness does not exclude the need

for moral accountability.'[34] Moreover, de Gruchy argues that not only does forgiveness not replace justice, 'it goes beyond justice'[35] in moral courage to seek redemption rather than retribution by seeing the past through the embers of a dying fire that truth has famed into flame while holding firmly onto the hope of the future.

The notion of forgiveness is in itself an act of grace, providing another frequently contentious term often demeaned as sacerdotal and precarious by TRC critics when used in political and social dialogue. Grace is problematic and politically risky because, argues Robin Peterson,[36] it requires a response. 'Grace spurned, grace abused, has consequences.' This is the risk in what Dietrich Bonhoeffer called *cheap grace*, meaning 'grace as a doctrine, a principle, a system. It means forgiveness of sins proclaimed as a general truth…'[37] How then, can such a risk be worth taking, especially given what is at stake in a legal and political proceeding such as the TRC in nation-building. Peterson's response is that within such a risk, 'it is clear that its power to save, to transform, remains enormous.'[38] He further explains the union of forgiveness and grace in an understanding of justice: 'It is grace, then, which offers a way out of the implacable inevitability of a justice understood as an exacting of vengeance in retribution, but does so by recasting justice in the form of a restitution which arises out of a response to forgiveness.'[39]

Grace offers a radical break from the skewed ethics that were at work in the apartheid state. Moreover, only through such a *moral* mechanism as grace could reconciliation occur in an *immoral* crime such as apartheid. Arguments often arise about the amalgamation of moral proclivities with political or legal processes. This, however, would seem to be a naïve denial of the enormously powerful social dynamic of religion that has proven to hold sway with people involved even in what is projected to be an amoral process. De Gruchy argues for the necessity of a moral space in democratic transformation that 'can only be achieved in a society committed to the development of a *moral culture*, a society striving to uphold *moral values* and constantly seeking to achieve, elusive as it is, an ever broadening *moral consensus*' (emphasis added).[40]

A Moral Voice

The role—and need—of the TRC as a moral voice is one that is often overshadowed in the debate around its existence. The implication of Christianity as a religious discourse and as an institute of ethics that would offer a moral framework to the TRC (this is evident particularly from the presence of Desmond Tutu and his continual bathing of the hearings and processes in Christian rhetoric) is important in viewing

Christianity's own historical tendency to compromise itself in the legitimation of a political system. This was the case in the rise of Nazi Germany, and more recently, in the ideological sustenance of the apartheid state. Certainly Christianity as a single religious system cannot be considered the singular source from which to find a 'moral consensus'[41] for South Africa, but in the case of the TRC, Christianity functioned as a contributing discourse, in much the same way as *ubuntu* did, through its appeal to a concern for community.

The tenets of reconciliation, forgiveness and grace, to name a few, are among the principles of the TRC and are fundamental to Christianity. This is not to suggest that they are not therefore fundamental to other religious formations as well, but rather to illustrate why the moral component of the TRC was often seen to be affiliated to the Christian tradition. But regardless of the impact of Christianity specifically, a moral voice was needed to expunge the legacy of the past from the growth of the present. And a moral voice had to be legitimated and informed by a religious force that espoused similar convictions while holding sway among the majority of South Africans.

The moral justification for seeking the truth in the TRC process, de Gruchy argues, was 'to build a humane, just, caring, reconciling society.'[42] If the TRC was intended to be a moral voice in the reconciliation process, then its spoken words were truth in the form of individual's stories and testimonies of their own experiences. It was a truth spoken not for its own sake, but for the sake of redemption and the reconciliation of polarised societies. It was in this arena for truth telling, specifically the Human Rights Violations hearings, that Richard Wilson says 'suffering was lifted out of the mundane world of individuals and their profane everyday pain, and was made sacred.'[43] Neither the empirical content of the stories told nor the evidential support of the truth were the primary goals. Rather, the goal was the rendering of the harrowing experiences of individuals in the anti-apartheid struggle. In this way, restorative justice and truth were perhaps the *most just* mechanisms to achieve justice in the post-apartheid South Africa. By giving voices to the victims of apartheid—those living and those buried in its past—their memory became alive again as individuals within a community. This was a process of *accountability* that unearthed the memories of lives and stories given to the fight against apartheid that had been buried under impunity. This was perhaps the most plausible measure of justice to exact on a former regime in extricating the current regime from the vices of the former.

As a facilitator to truth, the TRC was compelled to adopt a moral

position. Indeed, its very nature was ineluctably morally positioned. Such a stance would immediately skew a judicial process of justice, but was ethically imperative to the role of the TRC in community building in South Africa. Richard Wilson argues for the essential need of a moral position to be taken in a newly formed government in the wake of transition:

> An appropriate moral response is necessary in order to generate the moral context for democratic constitutionalism. The legitimisation of the state, and especially the law, cannot just be left to the rational and impartial functioning of the law in a society so ravaged by conflict. The state cannot maintain a position of neutrality on the past if it wants to be an efficacious arbiter of conflict in the present, and the TRC was the institution that forcefully articulated a moral position.[44]

The moral positioning of the TRC spoke a voice of legitimation for the post-apartheid state in establishing itself vis-à-vis the past regime. This was done through its restorative version of justice that purported reconciliation rather than retribution in securing a *moral* breach with the past. It is therefore appropriate to view the moral position taken by the TRC as not only a necessary articulation against a past immorality that perpetuated violence and social segregation within an unjust state, but also as a declaration towards a *morally informed* vision of the future that continues to fight injustice and strive for greater equity and social justice, and the establishment of a *just* culture of human rights in South Africa.

The discussion of morality that has been set in motion by the TRC must continue to instigate response socially, academically, and politically. It is crucial in this young millennium and at the beginning of South Africa's second decade of democracy that as a nation we not lose vision of the struggle to extricate ourselves from a diabolical legacy of injustice, but rather that the ethical and moral imperatives that have so shaped this country's transition not be lost to the dappled pages of a forgettable past. For all the shortcomings of the TRC in achieving reconciliation, we must approach reconciliation and restorative justice as harbingers to the *establishment* of justice and a culture that recognises and respects human rights.

Justice: An abrogation?

The re-conception of justice in a restorative dimension framed by an African humanism of *ubuntu* is especially problematised in a discourse of human rights and the just retribution of its violators. This arena provides a point of contention between competing paradigms for the way in which human rights are *ontologically*

understood and *epistemologically* respected. *Ubuntu* creates the problem of institutionalising an African philosophy of justice conceived of outside the parameters of the modern state and conception of justice, bringing to bear a value and religiously laden set of precepts, the likes of which are anathematised from the modern system of justice. Contention then arises in an arena in which a deeper understanding of the cultural and ideological context out of which emerges the formulation of a humanness that is perceived to threaten and undermine the tenets of the dominant Western discourse. Richard Wilson highlights the apprehension in an international community about a potentially subversive conception of justice oriented towards human rights:

> In an international context where the jurisdiction of human rights institutions is intensifying and broadening, it is misguided to delegitimize human rights at the national level by detaching them from a retributive understanding of justice and attaching them to a religious notion of reconciliation-forgiveness, a regrettable amnesty law and an elite project of nation-building.[45]

It is a false perception and a red herring to view the TRC as an attempt to undermine a retributive justice system towards human rights violations. The Human Rights Violations Committee within the TRC was established to form 'as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed'[46] from 1960 to 1994. Its mandate towards human rights was specific to a period of time and ultimately designed to establish a *picture*—a revelation of the truth—of the human rights violations that occurred under apartheid. An attempt to judicially try such abuses that were situated within an unjust system would be *ex post facto* and itself problematic when such crimes were committed in a culture devoid of any just notion of human rights. 'The Truth Commission was not a court of law which could try people for their offences', states Stephen Ellis, 'and nor, as it was at pains to point out in its final report, did its mandate permit it to address all of the many injustices perpetrated by apartheid.'[47] Restorative, rather than retributive, justice was necessary to first institute a *culture* of human rights before the *individual's* rights could be retributively protected. Therefore truth was instituted to reveal the realities of past abuses and attempt to dispense with the heinous crimes of apartheid.

Moreover, to categorically state that human rights are *delegitimized* by a detachment from retributive justice and an

attachment to a *religious notion of reconciliation-forgiveness* unnecessarily polarises the religious/moral and the political/legal facets of transitional justice. These need to be understood rather as sequential, not mutually exclusive. Moreover, even greater contention has been appropriated toward the Christian discourse manifested in the TRC, which certainly has not been without problems or critics. The problem in the argument is that the issue is not the actual content of Christian influence or the terminology it uses or its awkwardness in a political institution. Rather the point of contention is simply with its presence. Wilson states the following of Christianity in the TRC: 'The TRC's use of Christian discourses on forgiveness often swayed religiously-inclined individuals and, for some, the act of testifying in public created a loyalty to the TRC's version of national reconciliation.'[48] Wilson adopts a tone of suspicion towards what he views as Christianity's effect on people to bear an individual ability to offer forgiveness to whole families or communities, a consequence he states 'provoked anger in some, but compliant acceptance among just as many others.'[49] But Christianity was employed as a legitimate discourse in promoting national and communal levels of reconciliation. It derived social and political legitimacy through its appeal to restorative principles brought to bear in creating a new sense of community and national identity.

The Moral Problem

The tendency to marginalize the influence that religion exercises in any society seems obtuse even in the most 'secular' environment. To be insistently dismissive of religious or specifically Christian ethical imperatives made manifest in a political institution is to respond benightedly to greater socio-religious dynamics at work in culture and politics. Apartheid was not just a political system. It was a cultural structure built upon political and economic pylons and ideologically sustained by religious institutions. Why then should one scoff now at religiously laden definitions and meanings of concepts such as reconciliation and forgiveness, when for so long it was religiously laden meanings of race and separation that legitimised apartheid in the hearts of its adherents?

Wilson continues to argue that the religious-redemptive approach to national reconciliation was essentially adopted because other forms of intellectual or legal versions (we are to assume the higher versions) were too abstract and cerebral for the general public to transpose into a discourse for national reconciliation. 'The religious-redemptive approach', Wilson states 'was the only one with any purchase in society,

and the one which supporters gravitated towards and opponents resisted. It was the only version of reconciliation with any pretensions to reshaping popular legal and political consciousness.'[50] It might be stated then that the religious-redemptive discourse of reconciliation held sway in the institutionalisation of the TRC in the broader transition process to posit a 'new culture of human rights'. What has become characteristic of the criticism of the TRC and its religious-redemptive discourse is a false conception that it has informed the understanding of issues of human rights in a potentially bleak manner, threatening impunity instead of the possibility for punitive measures in future human rights violations.

A fear of impunity seems to pervade much of the discourse away from reconciliation and restorative justice in the TRC. Wilson expresses this quite explicitly by naming reconciliation 'the Trojan horse used to smuggle an unpleasant aspect of the past (that is, impunity) into the present political order, to transform political compromises into transcendental moral principles.'[51] The ubiquitous presence of *ubuntu* in the TRC discourse juxtaposed to the history of apartheid must again be brought to bear. Apartheid created and sustained an unjust culture of impunity. It was, fundamentally, a 'crime against humanity' within which *specific* human rights abuses were exculpated by the *general* impunity for human rights abuses. To suggest that the employment of *ubuntu* would lead towards a culture of impunity is to establish the *ubuntu* discourse as a straw man in defence of a dominant discourse reluctant to create space for an African humanism perceived to be antagonistic to justice.

The Reconciliation Problem

It may be granted that the TRC's failure to adequately define reconciliation at the outset of its mission was perhaps a major fault in dispersing a clear understanding of a crucial element of the TRC. Instead of offering a clear definition of reconciliation, the most that its proponents could do, particularly Desmond Tutu, is offer elaborate *descriptions* of what was hoped reconciliation would achieve. In fact, Wynand Malan, a Commissioner on the TRC, attempted to dislocate reconciliation from its morally loaded meanings that he felt Tutu was especially guilty of promoting, and place it in a more impartial position to view all as equal: 'Reconciliation shouldn't be based on repentance and remorse…it is just a capacity to coexist as individuals. It shouldn't be based upon Christian ideas.'[52] This is an unfortunate rendering of reconciliation. It neglects its deeper and richer meaning that is more cogently scribed in the religious canons to which it bears no qualms about claiming ties. A moral understanding of reconciliation is put at

odds with a competing paradigm that is uncomfortable with the religious undertow put forth by the implicit moral meanings of reconciliation and would prefer that such projections *shouldn't* be required by reconciliation.

The drab version of reconciliation as simply 'the capacity to coexist' that Malan presents above is indicative of a form of justice different to that of the restorative vision associated with reconciliation. The understanding of reconciliation must be shaped in view of the form of justice that is sought by the process of reconciliation, one that is foundational to *establishing* justice. Botman and Peterson describe reconciliation as possessing of greater force and potential than simple co-existence: 'Reconciliation builds the *foundation of commonality* which *makes it possible for justice* to be done in the spirit of openness and acceptance of the other and in the interests of our common future' (emphasis added).[53]

The Ubuntu Problem

Contending for a voice in this dialogue is the basis of *ubuntu* on which the ethical tenets of the TRC were located. As a concept that lies outside of a Western discourse of the individual, *ubuntu* is an anomaly to the Western individuality and is placated by a hegemonic discourse that refuses to conform to its communality. To Wilson, *ubuntu* is the following:

> an ideological concept with multiple meanings which conjoins human rights, restorative justice, reconciliation and nation-building within the populist language of pan-Africanism. In post-apartheid South Africa, it became the Africanist wrapping used to sell a reconciliatory version of human rights talk to black South Africans. *Ubuntu* belies the claim that human rights would have no culturalist or ethnic dimensions.[54]

There is perhaps no fundamental disagreement more poignantly illustrated in the TRC justice discourse than this moment of apparent conflagration between two different discourses. The dominant discourse of justice within academia is an individual-focused Western retributive version that falls short of coming to terms with the concept of *ubuntu.* Even this proposed dichotomy between a retributive conception of justice and a restorative form of justice that appeals to an 'African' humanist discourse is problematic. Wilson expresses concern for the polarisation of retributive and restorative justice as an act that closes the option to a middle road: 'the pursuit of legal retribution as a possible route to reconciliation in itself.'[55] Within this concern there appears

to exist a greater apprehension over the apparent amalgamation of human rights with *ubuntu*: 'By combining human rights and *ubuntu*, human rights come to express *compromised justice* and the state's abrogation of the right to due process' (emphasis added).[56] This contention arises out of the postscript of South Africa's interim Constitution which sought to establish 'a new culture of human rights'. It seems peculiar that the attempt to create *a new culture of human rights* is viewed askance, even in the aftermath of a regime that provided no respect for human rights and was labelled by the United Nations as case of a 'crime against humanity'. And the stringent accusation that human rights is now located in an understanding of *ubuntu* points to a terribly opaque vision of the discourse divergence that demands conformity to a hegemonic discourse of individualism and denies the creation of a *new* culture of human rights placed firmly in the discourse that served the process of reconciliation in South Africa's transition to democracy. Wilson states the following:

> The appropriation of human rights by nation-building discourse and their identification with forgiveness, reconciliation and restorative justice deems social stability to be a higher social good than the individual right to retributive justice and to pursue perpetrators through the courts.[57]

One should not be concerned with the possibility of a 'third way'. Rather, what must be realised is the necessary sequence of justice in transition in South Africa: that restorative justice was the necessary predicate to retributive justice. Moreover, the threat of impunity towards human rights caused by a diluted retribution based on the misrepresentation of *ubuntu* as inherently flaccid towards human rights violations fails to identify the intended purpose of *ubuntu* and reconciliation within the TRC. A South African Human Rights Commission has been established since the formation of the TRC and is responsible to pursue—judicially and retributively—the *current* violation of human rights, occurring since the closure of the TRC, upon the foundations of communality established by restorative justice.

Conclusion

South Africa's TRC has been implicated in a debate that has accused it of abrogating justice and undermining a future culture of human rights by its decision to employ restorative, rather than retributive, justice. I have attempted to argue that restorative and retributive justice have been unnecessarily polarised from a potentially greater understanding of transitional justice in which each notion is not exclusive of the other,

but rather that they occur sequentially. In South Africa's experience, we emerged from a culture that espoused no concept of individual human rights, much less a greater notion of community and nationhood. It was therefore fundamental to the establishment of a culture of human rights that a sense of community and national identity be created and affirmed at all levels of society. Restorative justice was the chosen mechanism to usher in reconciliation in a manner that would establish the possibility of retributive justice as the means of protecting individuals' rights. After the walls of apartheid were torn down, South Africa needed to understand community before it could establish a culture of individual human rights. Apartheid brutally demonstrated that without community first there could be no individual. And without reconciliation there could be no justice.

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Political Violence and Conflict Transformation: The ANC-IFP Peace Process in KwaZulu-Natal

Suzanne Francis

ABSTRACT

This study explores two separate processes of conflict transformation of an unofficial civil war that ravaged the Province of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. The first of these processes – a national institutional approach to peace-making – which included a National Peace Accord and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission failed. The reasons for this failure are twofold. First, the failure is located in a lack of understanding and the denial of the root causes of political violence. Second, shifting institutional spaces and the growing political capital of one of the parties to the conflict enabled that party to direct the frameworks through which peace was discussed, to the detriment of the other party. The second process of conflict transformation, a party-political process, has transformed conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. This came about because of an urgent need – by both parties - to govern. It was brought about by forced elite circulation and replacement and a secret amnesty where the parties to the conflict have hidden each other's secrets. This has implications for substantive conflict resolution, in a fragile peace.

Introduction

FOR ALMOST TWO DECADES, an unofficial civil war ravaged the Province of KwaZulu-Natal[1] and parts of the Reef in the Province of Gauteng in what became known as black-on-black violence. It is estimated that approximately 20,000 people died, tens of thousands more were injured, and hundreds of thousands were displaced, rendered homeless and transformed into political refugees as a

consequence of a conflict involving the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In this paper I examine the national institutional attempts at peace making that included the ANC and the IFP, and I show why they failed to transform the ANC-IFP conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. I claim that the failure of these processes lay in a flawed understanding of the root causes of political violence which included a misunderstanding of the strategy of the ANC. I show how conflict has subsequently been transformed in KwaZulu-Natal, through a party-initiated process that included hiding each other's secrets. The implications of this include the institution of a culture of peace in the province, but one that is threatened by the specific nature of the process that was followed.

The Growth of Liberation Movements and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal

KwaZulu-Natal is one of nine provinces in South Africa. Unlike other provinces, it is home to two alternative black-based political parties – the IFP and the ANC. In 1975, the IFP[2] was re-launched[3] in the KwaZulu homeland[4] as a liberation movement and represented an African cross class alliance of interrelated value systems. These comprised cultural communitarians, cosmopolitan modernisers and pragmatic political pluralists[5] across the class divide who had felt the full impact of land alienation and joblessness and who also sought to harness and modernise the institution of the chieftaincy. They opted for a particular form of resistance to the apartheid state, rooted in earlier methods of *hambe kahle*[6] non-violent protest politics. The IFP presented an alternative discourse and method of politics to black South Africans to that of the ANC. The ANC, formed in 1912[7] developed by the 1950s into a cross-class alliance of Africanists and communists who married African nationalist and class theories in an indigenous elaboration of a two-stage revolutionary project.[8] In 1960 the ANC-South African Communist Party (SACP) alliance established Umkhonto we Sizwe[9] (MK) and launched an armed struggle against the apartheid state in South Africa. In 1978, after many years of obstacles in mounting an armed struggle, the internal struggle intensified following the ANC's return from a visit to Vietnam and the launch of a people's war.[10]

In the early years following the IFP re-launch, the ANC and IFP were to exist in a harmonious relationship. This changed in 1980, however, at a famous meeting in London when the IFP rejected ANC overtures to become an internal surrogate movement for the ANC and the ANC's armed struggle. By the mid 1980s the growth of an ANC alliance in the form of the United Democratic Front (UDF)[11]

and a policy of creating ungovernable state institutions placed the ANC and IFP in tension with each another. The IFP located in the institutions of the KwaZulu homeland felt the full brunt of this policy. From 1985 a virtual, but unofficial, civil war ravaged the province as violent clashes between supporters of both movements killed an estimated 20,000 people and created hundreds of thousands of political refugees. People lost their homes, businesses, family members and communities became fractured shells of desolation and destruction. In addition, targeted assassinations of political office bearers took place and the province became militarized. By 1990, when apartheid legislation was repealed in South Africa and the ANC was unbanned, the province was a place of destruction and fear. In the period 1990 to the first multi-racial democratic election in 1994 political violence took on a new momentum in KwaZulu-Natal. Violence became more professionalised and targeted. The ANC established self-defence units (SDUs) within communities and the IFP response was self-protection units (SPUs). The relationship of the ANC and IFP was at an all time low. Ordinary people lived in fear of their lives, not from the apartheid state but from black-based liberation movements, now political parties.

The Failure of Institutionalized Approaches to Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation

Despite many formal institutional processes of reconciliation and peace-making in South Africa, all failed to bring an end to political violence between the ANC and IFP in KwaZulu-Natal. Two key institutional attempts are noteworthy. The first was the National Peace Accord signed in 1991 by 26 political parties and organisations[12] (including the ANC and IFP) who committed themselves to codes of conduct which it was supposed would promote "peace, harmony and prosperity in violence-stricken communities"[13]. Five working groups[14] were created to address aspects of the process and the violence, which comprised three members each from the National Party (NP)[15], the IFP and the ANC/SACP alliance and 1 religious leader and 1 member of the business community. The reports of these working groups were to make up the agreement. The main objective of the Accord was to address the causes of political violence, and formal institutions were established through which communication would be channelled, violence would be investigated and socio-economic reconstruction in violence-torn areas would be fulfilled. These institutions comprised the National Peace Secretariat, the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation and the National Peace Committee respectively.

There were serious problems with the implementation of the

National Peace Accord. Provisions were included in the agreement to prohibit political parties from operating private armies and a requirement was instituted that SDUs be transformed into voluntary associations or SPUs to prevent crime and the unlawful violation of rights.[16] This clause provided justification for the continued existence of paramilitary structures. In addition, MK the ANC's armed wing remained off the agenda. The Peace Accord stated that the agreement did not "detract from the validity of bilateral agreements reached between any of the signatories"[17]. The ANC interpreted this clause to mean that since the legality of MK had been recognised in the previous bilateral DF Malan Accord by the National Party, MK was not part of the agreement that comprised the Peace Accord. Hence, as Jeffrey claims, "other signatories were prohibited by the agreement from having private armies, but the ANC was not"[18]. In addition, SDUs continued to operate in both KwaZulu-Natal and on the Reef. This indicated two key challenges to peace-making. The first was that conflict could not be transformed if agreements were not able to evolve and to move beyond previous agreements made in a different or earlier context. The second challenge was that between the ending of apartheid in 1990 and the first election in 1994 there was no clear sense of order or authority. Certainly, the ANC possessed the symbolic moral legitimacy in relation to the NP regime that provided the political capital that enabled it to push the boundaries and to set some of the terms that the NP government agreed to.[19] But in this context many of the meanings ascribed to roles became inverted. Armed struggle comrades in the 1990-1994 period became at once both protectors of order and participants in war. Moreover, de facto moral authority came to rest with the ANC and the moral high ground possessed meant that the organisation often saw itself as both outside of the terms of agreements that were forged and an arbiter on the terms set for others.

The Goldstone Commission, established to investigate the causes of violence claimed, in its second interim report, that rivalry between the ANC and the IFP was a root cause of violence.[20] The ANC and IFP provided lengthy submissions to the commission. The ANC blamed violence on a third force attempt to maintain white domination through an alliance between the IFP and the security forces that aimed to weaken the ANC. The IFP claimed that MK and ANC aligned SDUs had a clear role in fermenting violence and were using the Transkei as a military base from which to smuggle weapons and to launch attacks on IFP supporters in KwaZulu-Natal. In explaining violence the ANC continually pointed to the carrying of traditional weapons by IFP supporters. Yet, by the early 1990s firearms played a much

more significant role in conflict. Moreover, it was clear that ordinary people were not the only ones being killed. By 1992 some 253 IFP political office bearers across KwaZulu-Natal had been singled out and individually assassinated. In its third report, the Goldstone Commission stated that, "it was not its function to investigate incidents where the cause of violence (in this instance, political rivalry between the two organisations) was known"[21]. However, while the violence was clearly taking place in the context of party political rivalry it was "relatively inarticulate in that no organized participant had an acknowledged paramilitary strategy"[22] in the post-1990 period. In the majority of deaths, perpetrators were not known. Nor was it known what strategies and tactics and underlying objectives were at the root cause of such violence.

The ANC and IFP reacted to many of the findings of the Goldstone Commission with hostility. Despite claims by the commission that its role was not to investigate incidents where it claimed the cause of violence was known, it actually proceeded to do so in a number of cases.[23] In its investigation of conflict in Bruntville, the commission laid some of the blame upon supporters of the ANC. Nelson Mandela, ANC President, rejected the findings and said that Judge Goldstone, "had made a fundamental error"[24] and that ANC-IFP rivalry was not the cause of violence. Instead, the concept of a third force was again raised by the ANC and as such, "the rivalry had been fostered and manipulated by the South African government and its security forces"[25]. Other conference attendees claimed that the findings in the report "raised serious concerns about the future credibility of the… commission"[26]. Although a signatory to the National Peace Accord, the ANC was not prepared to acknowledge the findings of the very institution that had been vested with the power to investigate violence when those findings were not in its favour. Instead it sought to undermine the credibility of the commission. The fourth Goldstone Commission report concluded that there had been a hit squad operating within the KwaZulu police force (which was under the jurisdiction of the IFP in the homeland) that was responsible for the assassination of 9 people. In this case, the ANC welcomed the findings and claimed that the third force claims had been proven. This, however, hardly demonstrated the root cause or circumstance of the deaths of more than 16,000 people.

Whereas the ANC sought to undermine the commission when the findings were not in its favour and to claim it was vindicated when they were in its favour, the IFP took a different approach. The IFP accepted that the IFP was involved in the violence in the form of "self-defence, retaliation and to pre-empt any further attacks"[27]. IFP

President, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said "let us be man enough to accept our part in the violence and look to the future because we owe it to the present generation, and to future generations"[28]. However, the commission ignored virtually all of the requests for investigations that were put forward by the IFP. The commission did not investigate claims about the role of MK and the SDUs in political violence or the assassination of IFP leaders. Instead, Goldstone recommended a mass education drive to promote political tolerance, an end to verbal attacks by the ANC and IFP on each other and the withdrawal of rifles issued to traditional leaders by the KwaZulu Government in which the IFP was located.[29] It is hardly surprising that the IFP viewed these recommendations and the failure to investigate the complaints brought to its attention as evidence of political bias. This was all the more so since the response of Judge Goldstone to the IFP submission on violence by MK and the SDUs and the assassination of IFP leaders was to claim that the matter was closed since, "he had been assured by the ANC Southern Natal Chairperson… that the ANC had changed its policies with regard to violence as a political tool"[30]. To willingly accept the claims of one of the parties without any investigation, when the commission was mandated to investigate the causes of violence, made a mockery of the impartiality and process of that very investigation and demonstrated the power of political capital that the ANC now possessed.

The provisions of the National Peace Accord were incorporated in 1992 into legislation[31] that established instruments of conflict transformation in the form of dispute resolution committees within communities throughout South Africa. These peace committees, as they became widely known, had three functions. "As peace keepers they monitored the activities of the police and political role players; as peace makers they provided forums for political negotiations and mediated agreements between disputing parties; and as peace builders they had to attempt transforming societal conditions as well as attitudes to resolving conflict"[32] at the community level. A total of 254 peace committees functioned in areas that were violence hot spots across South Africa. However, after the 1994 elections, while violence still continued in KwaZulu-Natal, they disappeared. The immediate reason for this was that the new government stopped funding the work of the committees which led to their demise. However, this decision was rooted in a number of factors which provides insight into how the ANC viewed the main objectives of them.

First, the ANC no longer needed the peace committees to attain their political goals after the first multi-racial democratic elections in 1994. The ANC became the unrivalled party in power in the national

parliament, constitutional principles that were to bind the final constitution-making body had already been finalised and the transfer of power was complete. The peace structures were now considered to be a necessity of the past, a set of institutions that had smoothed the way for the attainment of the ANC's vision of the new state form and the position of the ANC within it by sufficiently addressing conflict to enable the negotiation process to keep moving. The negotiation process for a new South Africa was now concluded. Second, the peace committees were now in tension with the ANC because they promoted a nation building mission that included other political party and civil society viewpoints. They promoted the legitimacy of other political parties at the grassroots community level in forums in which disputes were mediated. In so doing they indirectly sanctioned the importance of other political parties as political forces in South Africa in competition with the ANC. Third, the peace committees were formed in a context where there was an absence of legitimate government institutions in which, and through which, conflict could be processed and resolved.[33] From 1994, the new democratic parliamentary institutions were now the legitimate authority within South Africa. The peace committees had served the purpose of providing channels for expression and communication when no alternatives existed. Now, parliament was to assume that role. These three factors provide insight into the way in which conflict transformation was viewed by the ANC. First, conflict transformation was not viewed *per se* as the main goal by the ANC but rather as a means to another end, that of attaining power. Second, it was assumed that in attaining power, violence would dissipate. The ANC could only reasonably have assumed that violence would dissipate if they themselves were one of the protagonists in conflict. Indeed, the peace committees were originally founded upon a lack of a shared and full understanding of the strategies and tactics of the protagonists of political violence. Their demise signified this. In KwaZulu-Natal, political violence continued unabated despite the National Peace Accord. Indeed, "two years after the signing of the NPA, political violence was the cause of even more deaths than before"[34]. Violence continued into the new political dispensation, despite new political institutions.

The second institutional approach to conflict transformation and reconciliation in South Africa was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission[35]. Truth commissions are often viewed as an instrument to promote peace through justice and reconciliation.[36] In states undergoing transitions to democracy, truth commissions can be a vital instrument in minimising the possibility of a return to violent conflict through a collective process of reconciliation and nation-building. In

states where there was some degree of continuity with the institutions of the past, truth commissions can be one way of showing that the new state is different and is committed to respecting and protecting it's citizens. One of the key reasons for introducing a truth commission in South Africa was a lack of faith in the justice system; a belief that crimes against humanity could not be given back to the same criminal justice system. The mandate of the South African Truth Commission was broad and was vested in three interrelated committees. These comprised a Human Rights Violation Committee which considered testimonies on human rights violations from victims and families of victims, a Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation which considered questions of compensation for victims and their families, and a Committee on Amnesty which provided amnesty from further prosecution to perpetrators who provided full disclosure of their actions. The truth commission heard thousands of testimonies across South Africa from both victims and perpetrators of violence. Loved ones of victims told their stories of loss, had these officially recorded for the first time and received reparations. Perpetrators disclosed their acts of violence and were provided with amnesty from further prosecution. Features of the process could be said to have contributed to nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa. First, the amnesty provisions of the commission were very specific. Acts of violence had to be committed prior to May 1994, the perpetrator had to show that the act was political and to provide full disclosure of their role in the act or acts of violence. In this way acts of violence were individualised and the state was decontaminated and legitimised. Secondly, the benevolence and compassion shown to survivors who gave testimony was often the first time that their suffering was acknowledged by the state. Telling a story and having that story officially recorded in a respectful manner demonstrated that the new state is different from the old.

Although widely regarded as a major feature of nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission failed to promote reconciliation by revealing "truths" about violence between the ANC and IFP in KwaZulu-Natal. The reasons for this are located within the way in which the question of political violence was framed by the commission. First, there was no framework through which to discuss the conflict between the ANC and IFP. The emphasis of the commission was upon individual submissions and experiences – those of perpetrator (acting as agents of the state) and victim (activists from liberation movements) – which led to the individualising of responsibility and subsequent decontamination of the state. However, in the case of KwaZulu-Natal

both the ANC and IFP claimed they were liberation movements. In this context, it is difficult to establish a perpetrator and a victim in the way in which these terms were framed by the commission. Moreover, the emphasis upon "the individual" meant that there was no space in which to reveal or to discuss the systematic strategies of these liberation movements to one another. The IFP, as a consequence, chose not to actively participate[37] in the activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In response, the ANC claimed that, "it had always seen the struggle in South Africa as one between the forces of democracy on the one hand, and the system of white minority rule in all its manifestations on the other"[38], effectively reiterating the framework which had been established.

Second, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission chose not to probe the unofficial war between the ANC and the IFP. Hence, the picture, and patterns of, political violence has never been revealed. The IFP was never officially probed about its role in the violence, nor was the ANC probed on its military activities in KwaZulu-Natal, particularly on the role of MK in KwaZulu-Natal or on strategies of violence towards the IFP. For example, by 1995, 420 IFP office bearers had been assassinated and 14,000 IFP supporters killed. These were never investigated. As a consequence of non-participation, very few IFP victims of violence appealed to the TRC and thousands of violations were not reported. Moreover, the Deputy-Chairperson of the commission – Dr. Alex Boraine – admitted that during the period of operation of the commission violence was still a key feature in KwaZulu-Natal. Because of this the commission chose not to subpoena key political figures to testify on KwaZulu-Natal[39] and so the conflict was never probed. Instead of providing information on strategies of violence, the ANC sought to invoke just war theory in justifying why its testimony to the commission was very limited. In so doing the ANC collapsed the distinction between the justice *of* war and justice *in* war which the commission sought to probe. Thus by omission, the commission was unable to probe violence between the ANC and IFP in KwaZulu-Natal.

Third, the capacity of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate covert violence was very limited. Given that the conflict was one which did not fit the neat pattern of apartheid forces versus liberation movements and was a much more complex conflict in which the main victims of violence were poor black South Africans, no party wished to lose any moral high ground and admit fully to their role. Despite participating in the commission, the ANC did not provide any information on its strategy of violence towards the IFP. Responsibility for acts of violence was denied, covert acts of

increasingly militarised and professional violence was blamed on a supposed third force or renegade foot soldiers that provided no link to any chain of command or overall strategy. In its period of operation the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's comprehension of covert violence (whether state led or liberation movement led) was extremely weak.[40] The only – and few - details of SDU activity was, for example, revealed through individual amnesty hearings. Yet the entire context of violence in KwaZulu-Natal was one in which the strategies, tactics and acts of political violence were covert, a factor which also enabled their denial.

The commission only investigated crimes against humanity committed in the period before May 1994 and which were illegal under the already wide latitude of apartheid laws. Thus the routine nature of conditions associated with political violence, and in which violence was rooted, went unprobed. The routine nature of fear and how that contributed to hardened political camps was never considered. The way in which propaganda contributed to conflict and violence was omitted. In KwaZulu-Natal the way in which territory was claimed as a liberated zone producing hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrant labourers in hostels that were cut off from food supplies for fear of venturing on to the streets were very much a part of the context of violence, but did not constitute any gross violation under the Act. Thus the commission could not capture the sheer extent and horror of the ANC-IFP conflict or the overwhelming fear and routine violence experienced by ordinary black South Africans.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission failed, as a legitimate institutional approach, to contribute to conflict transformation in the ANC-IFP conflict in KwaZulu-Natal because it's approach was fundamentally in tension with that conflict.

The Underlying Reasons for the Failure in KwaZulu-Natal of Institutionalized Approaches to Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation

The failure of these institutionalized approaches to peace-making and reconciliation was twofold. First, it was located in a failure to understand and to acknowledge the root causes of political violence. Second, it was as a consequence of the specific form of political violence and the strategies that underpinned that violence. It is to an understanding of that violence and the implications that it had for peace-making that I now turn. This new interpretation of political violence is a product of extensive interviews with office bearers in the ANC and IFP, a factor that has not been part of any previous analysis.

The mass violence that began in the mid-1980s in KwaZulu-Natal and extended to the Reef, producing the overwhelming majority of casualties in the 1990-1994 period, had several salient characteristics. Firstly, the sheer intensity of the violence is horrifying. In the 1984-1991 period it was estimated that approximately 11,000 people were killed in the Natal Midlands, coastal areas of Northern and Southern Natal and the Witwatersrand townships.[41] Secondly, the violence became diffused through other conflicts that made it incoherent.[42] These include conflicts over the regulation of, and access to, resources and services[43], inter-generational conflict[44], clan or tribal conflicts over succession rights, vendetta type local rivalries and crime. Third, violence took place in shifting institutional spaces and shifting control over those institutions.

Many academic explanations have been proffered for the violence. Of the three most common, the first is that the legacy of apartheid is to blame, producing high unemployment, contributing to brutal and deprived conditions of existence in rapidly expanding informal settlements and hostels and dehumanising black males and leaving them powerless.[45] The second explanation is that a "third force" of renegade security force elements was responsible for stoking conflict within ANC-IFP black communities by attacking one side or another until retributory violence took on a momentum of its own[46]. The third, and most common explanation is that the violence is a product of turf rivalries between the ANC and the IFP.[47] Within this third explanation, the majority of analysts seek to attribute "blame", to the IFP, sometimes uncritically adopting the ANC version of the violence[48], in class-based analyses, as if the "fault" was simply self evident because of its ambiguous struggle credentials emanating from their location in the homeland. Other less biased accounts have sometimes adopted uncritically the terminology that ascribes blame to Inkatha such as "powerful Inkatha warlords pitted against progressive youth" without providing justification for the terms used.[49] Yet the term "warlord" is inappropriate in the South African context for two reasons. The first is because of the ideological and collective ties that bound individuals so described to political parties over and above private interests. Reno, for example, suggests that apart from a weak state, the defining feature of warlord politics is the primacy of individual interests and the absence of collective interests.[50] In the context of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, conservatism was an ideological position strongly supported by segments of the community in which individuals so described resided. The second reason is that individuals described did not necessarily rely on (or in some cases solely on) the use of force and fear as their basis of authority. In some cases their

ability to address acute community needs, such as housing, water and security against anarchy for the community, provided a basis of legitimate support.[51] This goes beyond the feudalistic relationship that is a characteristic of a leader-follower warlord relationship because, although there is evidence of patronage relationships, it is so in the climate of hardening ideological ties, rather than personal ones. The term warlord in the context of KwaZulu-Natal may best therefore be understood as a political slogan and cliché used to discredit rivals.

A more useful explanation for the political violence is that the breakdown of political institutions as regulating mechanisms, enabled emerging competing interests in opposition politics (and other non-political areas), autonomy in the self regulation of force, at the same time as social and political cohesion broke down and new parallel structures of authority emerged. However, this needs to be understood within the context of the strategic attempt by the ANC alliance from 1981 to "create a state outside of the state" underscored by a plan of creating ungovernability from 1984 and Inkatha's location in the homeland structures. Political strategy from 1981 within the ANC was focused upon the merging of state, party, civil society and military structures to create a new state that existed outside of the existing state institutions.[52] This was the essence of the people's war. At least four characteristics of internal ANC work are evident. The first was the creation of structures – a permanent network of ANC clusters within KwaZulu-Natal. The second was to influence, infiltrate and harness the mobilising power of legal internal organisations such as civics. The third was to orchestrate the collapse of state structures. In KwaZulu-Natal, this also involved the creation of new institutional structures alongside a policy of ungovernability towards state institutions. In the early 1980s antagonism was soon created within the ANC between a new emerging internal political elite and those in exile, over the relationship of the movement to the IFP[53]. It is in this context that the historic London meeting between the ANC and Inkatha took place. Unwilling to become a recruiting agency for the armed struggle but needing official recognition from the ANC, the IFP was placed in an ambiguous position. In KwaZulu-Natal ANC elites claimed that the ANC leadership in exile, by having any form of relationship with the IFP, was compromising the political space of residents' associations that challenged the legitimacy of the institutions in which the IFP was located[54]. This created a clash of "institutions" which was overlaid by increasingly populist rhetoric condemning privilege of all types in a climate in which structures were unable to regulate competition and the boundaries of the legitimate were

extended. In the KwaZulu homeland it was not easy to create ungovernable structures because the IFP was located within these institutions and commanded considerable support from the black population. As such, the ANC propaganda campaign focused, very successfully, upon attempts to portray the IFP as a stooge of apartheid. Whereas the policy of ungovernability was openly known, the merging of civic structures with MK to create a state outside of a state to launch a military assault on the IFP in the homeland institutions was a covert policy and only implemented in KwaZulu. From the early 1980s an extensive patchwork of militarised civic structures were created that sought to collapse the institutions in which the IFP was located, through propaganda, mass action and also through military means. Political violence during the transition period from 1990-1994 took on a new form of professionalism that sets it apart from the violence earlier.[55] Jeffrey notes that more than 80% of post-1990 killings involved the use of firearms rather than pangas, knobkerries or necklacing.[56] This suggests a proliferation of sophisticated military weaponry and tuition in their use.[57] ANC-SACP[58] Operation Vula, using MK to create "the objective conditions" for an armed insurrection, was the basis upon which SDUs integrated with MK and were established throughout KwaZulu-Natal. A number of structures that became SDUs predate[59] the ANC guidelines[60] for their establishment and the MK conference in Venda[61]. Although the ANC leadership distanced itself from Operation Vula (after it was uncovered), the establishment of internal combat groups inside KwaZulu-Natal and the large scale smuggling of military hardware from the Transkei and frontline states added a new dimension to the violence that wracked the province during the transition period. Evidence from interviews suggests that in KwaZulu-Natal, arms smuggling and training continued as late as 1993[62]. According to one ANC office bearer, 'there were three levels of SDU training. [First]… there was internal training under communities or training depots. There were four [of these] in the Natal Midlands… one in Willowfontein with a proper arsenal and MK staff… one in Dambuza with an arsenal behind Table Mountain… one in the Estcourt area staffed by MK… and another in the Richmond area. [Second] … those who showed promise in the training depots were sent to the Transkei to be trained further by MK and the Transkei Defence Force. [The third level] … people were taken out of the country… The peak [of] training would have been 1992, but we got weapons even in 1993'[63]. This was a people's war in KwaZulu-Natal against the IFP located in the homeland structures, that offered an alternative vision of a future democratic South Africa, not the white minority government. The SDUs, despite their name, came to be used

in turf battles against rivals, towards the destabilisation of areas and to continue the revolutionary option, even when national imperatives had changed. This must also be viewed in the context of changing institutional power and political spaces. SDUs also became regarded in KwaZulu-Natal as part of MK's structure and while some individuals became part of the National Peacekeeping Force, others were later integrated into the VIP Protection Unit and South African National Defence Force, subsequently deployed to KwaZulu-Natal ahead of the 1994 elections. Self Protection Units (SPUs) were the IFP's response to the increasing violence from 1991. Individuals were sent to camps for training and armed with weaponry. Alongside this, the IFP also secured a military arsenal from freelance members of the SADF, as insurance against an ANC assault on the KwaZulu homeland.[64] As one IFP MPP argued, 'there was the perception that the IFP was up against a highly organised, highly effective military force, operating with impunity. There were arms caches all over the place and there were MK commandos directing events… Mlaba camp was a response to both this and the integration of MK into the Defence Force, of a need to somehow balance out the ANC in military matters'[65]. Another confirmed this perception, 'In the Midlands there had been the slaughter of the IFP… We needed to somehow protect communities'[66].

Each party used the available institutional spaces in the militarisation of units. While the KwaZulu Government budget funded the IFP's SPUs and the arms were secured through state structures, the ANC's internal operations took place in the context of shifting institutional control in their favour.

A failure to admit to and to understand the reality of the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal meant that conflict transformation attempts – which focused upon a very different understanding of strategy and objectives – failed. Denialism of the strategies employed meant that the frameworks of conflict transformation were not equipped to deal with the reality of the conflict. Peace committees existed alongside increasingly militarised ideologically aligned merged MK and civic institutions. A peace accord was signed while combatants continued to be trained and deployed. The mandate of the truth commission provided no framework to address this war – a war of two competing movements. These institutional approaches were doomed to failure.

The question is why was this not understood in the post-1990 period? Simply put, gaining control of the intellectual space was also very much a part of this war. The transition period from 1990-1994 was also a terrain of struggle. The question of the new form of the state, the new economic order and the powers and functions of the

state form were all to be negotiated. The ANC emerged in 1990 with a powerful sense of symbolic legitimacy and moved quickly to close down the residual moral and public institutional spaces of its fiercest competitors. The residual moral space of the IFP was based upon their anti-apartheid, anti-sanctions stance and refusal to take independence for KwaZulu, and their claims to represent a significant and authentic constituency. The IFP was denied legitimacy on the basis of three interlinking factors: the IFP's relationship to the institutions of the KwaZulu homeland, the support base of the IFP in rural and peri-urban areas and the IFP's conception of tradition and status of traditional leaders. Based on a particular discourse of peasant collective consciousness, the ANC sought to set aside the 'centrality of community'[67] and shared 'peasant discourse'[68] that validated traditional leadership in KwaZulu. Instead, the claim was that such elites derived their legitimacy purely from the apartheid state and Inkatha's "manipulation of ethnicity". In this view modernity (repackaged as democratisation) would sweep aside any residual ethnic attachments (as they were defined), as individuals would come to legitimise more "modern democratic" institutions whose authority was derived from "procedures" rather than "myths". As such, Inkatha was treated as devoid of legitimacy, as a homeland party that had positioned itself to manipulate ethnicity in order to build coalitions across class lines, and in the process had hindered the democratisation of the state. Such views parallel Weberian models of the traditional / modern dichotomy and were articulated by the Left as well as the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. Central to the people's war was an essential propaganda campaign bolstered by people sympathetic to the revolutionary alliance. These comprised, unconsciously, a range of non-governmental organisations and academics which gave credibility to the ANC theory of a third force.[69] Most literature in this period relies heavily upon "independent sources" that witnessed violence or, who were quoted in newspaper articles as witnessing violence, whose own ideological preferences are not interrogated. With the merging of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) with civic movements in KwaZulu-Natal as part of a concerted strategy, many independent sources within the civics in the province were not ideologically independent. A case in point is Levine's account of violence in the Natal midlands[70] where the eye-witness accounts of violence between the ANC-UDF and IFP were provided by people who were ANC and UDF affiliated, and so was the key author. Part of the problem is that the predominant form of analysis was class-based analysis that developed out of the sub-discipline of area studies. Within the social sciences and development studies, class-based

analysis became the hegemonic analytical framework through which colonialism, oppression and struggle politics was discussed. Other frameworks were sidelined. The dominant intellectual analysis was thus closer to the rhetoric of the ANC during the 1980s and early 1990s than it was to the IFP rhetoric. Hence, the activist-type discourse employed by the ANC became the dominant discourse in both struggle politics and within intellectual analysis.[71]

As a consequence, the IFP became treated as a security problem rather than a credible party. The erosion of the moral space of the IFP ensured that the party's capacity to respond to institutional manoeuvres by the ANC was significantly limited and its federal alternative state form was ignored. As Barber argues, 'nobody even bothers to try to understand Inkatha[s]… position anymore… Safer to diagnose [Buthelezi] as mad, or megalomaniac or both, and watch as his turf is forcibly cleared… Too bad he got in the way'[72]. The peace process that followed the ending of apartheid was thus not one that was inclusive of a sufficient range of discourses and perspectives to be successful.

By late 1992 the ANC had secured significant control over the institutional process; the parameters of the final form of the state had been set, the institutional spaces in which the IFP and NP were located were delegitimised, and mass action was secured as the legitimate public institutional space to drive negotiations. This was also to legitimise new transitional institutional spaces in which the ANC had made inroads. While the IFP were housed in the institutions of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly these spaces were delegitimised. Through the regulation of moral, public and institutional spaces, the ANC leadership ensured a two-sided negotiating table with the NP that neutralised the power of other parties. From 1992 onwards the key institutional spaces of the state became regulated by the ANC. These included the frameworks established in the National Peace Accord and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Because the negotiation period was a terrain of struggle, the true extent and strategy behind political violence would never be known. Whereas the extent of IFP involvement in violence was in the public domain, that of the ANC was not. The ANC did not seek reconciliatory strategies through which its militarised strategies in KwaZulu-Natal would become known. The party needed to govern and to do so effectively meant retaining a moral high ground. Conflict transformation in KwaZulu-Natal was only to come much later and in a manner that enabled the strategy and tactics of the ANC in this earlier period to remain plausibly denied.

Conflict Transformation by Political Parties

In the first multi-racial democratic election in 1994 the ANC won an overwhelming majority of seats in the national parliament and the IFP won a majority in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. The ANC in power had a very different set of priorities than the ANC during the struggle and negotiation period. The first of these was to make peace with the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal so that provincial political issues did not dominate the national agenda. However, conflict transformation in the post-1994 period was not to come easily nor could it occur in a manner that was to reveal the ANC's previous strategy towards the IFP. The ANC thus embarked on an ambitious strategy to sideline its militant core in the province so that it could "provincialise" the province. The foot soldiers in the province who had carried out the strategy of the ANC were not to be persuaded so easily that peace was a necessity. The provincial ANC was divided into three regions. The Midlands Region Chairperson Harry Gwala was the frontrunner for the position of ANC provincial leader. Gwala's 'unreconstructed Stalinism, populist rhetoric and straightforward advocacy of direct paramilitary action in the struggle against the IFP made him extremely popular with the youthful "comrades" in the ANC'[73] in his leadership of the Natal Midlands region. Key members of the Natal Midlands rejected negotiations and peace-making. Gwala argued 'the key element is the struggle itself and negotiations must be subjected to the struggle'[74]. Gwala was vocal in his opposition to the entire negotiating process. He said, "…we find agreement unacceptable,… We are already setting down the rule of surrender… Where do we draw the line?"[75] In fact, elements in the Natal midlands did draw the line. Under Gwala's leadership, four senior post-1990 ANC provincial leaders developed significant semi-autonomous power bases which later led to violent confrontations on Gwala's death. This elite "Midlands Club" was not averse to forming temporary alliances with one another or with elites in other regions to the detriment of one another. Such alliances had taken on new twists during the negotiation period when the "hawks" continued with paramilitary activities, and the "doves" were later to reject their own leader in the region wide leadership contest. In the post-Operation Vula[76] period at least two leaders within the midlands were to integrate MK soldiers into Transkei trained SDU's in a scheme which involved gun-running, the establishment of four large hi-tech arms caches in the midlands, systematic assassination of IFP leaders and the creation of personal fiefdoms[77]. In addition, these hawks established alliances with other hawks in Northern Natal[78]. Returning exiles and Robben Islanders

who now sought détente so that they could govern did not fit easily into the already established power structures in this region, and an uneasy relationship ensued.

In the region of Southern Natal, older ANC leaders from the 1950s had played a part in the merging of MK and civic structures. These members of 'Izingwevu'[79] rejected the "cabal" leadership of the street militants that had emerged through the civics formed an important elite constituency. Alongside them, another emerged in the 1990s; a younger generation of Southern Natal leaders out of the conflict at Ngoye[80] and student politics in the 1980s. This group saw themselves as the intellectual wing of the fiercely Africanist nationalist movement, based neither on the trade unions nor the armed struggle, that challenged Inkatha's claims to represent Zulus. Alongside these groups a number of returnees from exile joined internal leadership in key positions. As one MPP articulated, "We had no Kings here. There was no senior ANC leadership here"[81]. Another MPP contended that in parts of Southern Natal a leadership vacuum existed that enabled returnees to slot easily into local structures alongside civic and UDF leaders. Certainly in Southern Natal, the most senior figures that emerged had strong links with exile and Robben Island which served to impart the imperatives of diplomacy to the region more easily than the midlands. This is not to say that paramilitary action and intransigence towards the IFP[82] did not play a part in this region, which had the most successfully developed ANC underground structures and was essential in the implementation of the Green Book[83], but the political elite here acquiesced to the overall imperative of negotiations. This took place alongside civic action, street militancy and covert paramilitary assaults.

Northern Natal, the largest territorial ANC region, was the least organised and contained the least ANC support in the province. ANC organisers here had to compete directly with the IFP in rural territory in which they had overwhelming support. It was in this region that the ANC achieved its diplomatic coup. The Northern Natal regional leadership was replaced by the deployed senior exile leader Jacob Zuma in 1993 in an attempt to "provincialise" the province and sideline the hardliners.

As the national political context changed and the ANC imperatives – predominantly of the exile elite – turned to questions of governance there was a concerted attempt to rein in this militant core of essentially internal elites so that provincial dynamics no longer drove national imperatives (as they had done through the century) and the essentially exile elite could take power smoothly without challenge. This accounted for the most crucial circulation in the provincial legislature

in the ANC. Instead, the ANC at the national level sidelined Gwala by parachuting Jacob Zuma into the region. This was effectively a coup that deposed the relatively weak Northern Natal leadership which supported Gwala and imposed Zuma. Zuma was born in the Northern Natal region at Nkandla, although he was essentially an exile figure and in fact served the ANC through its Southern Natal branch. The *coup de grace* in sidelining Gwala was the election of Jacob Zuma as ANC leader for the province. Harry Gwala's death in 1995 and his lieutenant's - Sifiso Nkabinde - expulsion in 1997[84] represent the breaking of the power not only of the midlands leadership, but more importantly, this particular formerly internally-based midlands leadership and the beginning of a process in which the provincial ANC would be pacified and provincialised in its relationship with the IFP.

The choice of Zuma as peacemaker represents a number of factors. Firstly, Zuma's exile status provided the social and political capital for his acceptance as provincial leader by the Southern Natal region of the ANC, whose political elite were almost entirely from exile. Secondly, with both his urban and rural credentials, Zuma was accepted by the IFP as a candidate not only of sufficient seniority to satisfy their need for demonstrable respect but someone who understood the more traditional elements of the party and had been delegated to make peace – something Gwala would not do. Thirdly, it required someone who possessed sufficient political capital to break the historic hold on power that the midlands had in the region and to enable those from exile to return to positions of power in Southern Natal and the Natal Midlands in a coup over the internal ANC. Fourthly, it was a priority among the returning ANC to break the power of the SACP by incorporating them into the ANC without conflict through the method of appeasement. Zuma did not renew his SACP membership in 1992 when ANC members were instructed to declare joint affiliations, but it was well known in the movement that he had been members of both organisations. His provincial candidacy was thus acceptable to both parties. Finally, and most importantly, in 1994 Zuma understood and practised the prevailing methods of political culture in the ANC, particularly in terms of political etiquette and the language of respect for hierarchical distinctions. His social and political capital made him trusted. The sidelining and provincialising of the most militant ANC members in the province was thus complete by the end of 1997 in a top-down manner through enforced elite circulation.

The removal of the militant ANC core in the province was insufficient (although it certainly helped) to restructure the

relationships of ANC and IFP party members and supporters towards one another. In 1996, in the run up to the local government elections violence escalated throughout KwaZulu-Natal. Massacres in Mandini and the Midlands[85] and gun battles between parliamentary members took place[86]. Although the IFP was the party in power in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, both parties were forced to work alongside one another in the legislature and the legislative committees. It is in this context, of a province sliding into anarchy that the IFP would be unable to govern provincially and the ANC nationally that in May 1996 the parties began their own process of détente.

The first step in the peace process was a formal acknowledgement that both parties made to recognize the right of the other to exist and to publicly denounce violence. This was entrenched in a formal agreement and supported by the creation of a number of committees made up of ANC and IFP parliamentarians[87] whose role was to ensure that the agreement was held to.[88] The process that followed had a number of specific elements to it. First, the committees were made up only of ANC and IFP senior office bearers, unlike the previous attempts at a peace process. This enabled both parties to talk openly to one another about specific incidents of violence that were not in the public domain and without concern for other parties or conflicts. Indeed, it allowed those who had been "hurt by the conflict to talk to one another in the face"[89] without onlookers passing judgment. Second, the discussions of the committees remained secret allowing both sides to talk with a degree of honesty. The secrecy of the discussions meant that there was no need for any propaganda front or claims of any third force as the main perpetrator in the violence. It also meant that no party had anything to fear from an impending final report or a set of findings handed down by an arbiter. Instead, the focus was on dialogue and seeking common solutions. Third, the balance of power in the discussions was one which was equal. Unlike the previous attempt at a peace process, the frameworks through which discussions took place were determined only by the ANC and the IFP with, for the first time, the IFP at the negotiating table as an equal. This created a new air of respect and inclusivity that had been absent from previous discussions between the parties. Fourth, progress was urgent. Both parties had proven that they commanded significant support among the South African electorate, and while still in fierce competition, were thrust together with a mutual problem that faced both themselves and their supporters. If they could not protect their supporters when they were in power they would not be able to do so if they ever lost that power. Fifth, the parties had

only themselves to provide a solution to the violence. There was no-one else to blame if a plan to combat political violence was not found.

As a consequence of this closed-door process the outcome was one that was radically different from all previous attempts at conflict transformation. The peace process was not a quick fix solution, but it did lay the groundwork for a series of initiatives which were to stem the violence and to institute a culture of peace. First, one of the key initiatives that came out of the talks were public commitments to peace staged in areas that had been wracked by violence or which had been created as no-go areas for one of the parties. These comprised delegations from both parties campaigning arm-in-arm whereby formerly strong-arm men transformed into messengers of peace and attempted to persuade their supporters to do the same.[90] Second, both parties drew a line under the violence. Although the full extent of the militarized strategy of the ANC will never be known, in accepting that they were both bound together by the threat of public knowledge an unofficial amnesty was granted by both parties to one another. Both agreed to effectively hide each other's secrets, something that the ANC had much more to lose from disclosure than the IFP whose role was effectively known. Third, being bound together in this way meant that the peace process has kept evolving and whenever a flashpoint arises (as in the 2004 and 2009 elections) both parties recognize the urgency of resolution and work quickly to reconstitute these committees, appear in public to denounce violence and manage the conflict. Fourth, one of the strategies to address the impact of violence was the establishment of social development programmes for victims. In 1997 IFP Premier Frank Mdlalose and ANC Provincial Leader Jacob Zuma set up the Peace and Reconstruction Foundation in KwaZulu-Natal for the re-building of homes and schools that were destroyed in violence and to establish sports facilities for youth.[91] In addition, through the Provincial Ministry of Housing, homes have been rebuilt and many of the hostels in which labourers reside have been and are being upgraded.[92] Through these strategies it is affirmed that peace is linked to greater prosperity within communities.

Through a separate peace process that focused only on the KwaZulu-Natal conflict the parties were able to transform that conflict. However this is a very specific form of conflict transformation in which the secrets of the past are to be buried into the future.

Conclusion – What Does the Future Hold?

The conflict in KwaZulu-Natal has been systematically transformed by the efforts of the political parties involved in violence. This was not the result of national institutional approaches to conflict transformation, which ultimately failed because of a lack of understanding of, and denial of, the strategies of violence. A new look at, and analysis of, this violence explains this failure. These failures need to be understood further in the context of shifting institutional legitimacy and a growth in the political capital of the ANC, which ultimately enabled one of the parties to the conflict to direct the frameworks of peacemaking in its favour.

Rather, conflict transformation in KwaZulu-Natal came about because of a specific need to govern, through forced elite circulation and replacement and by way of a secret amnesty. Whether this will result in substantive conflict resolution is another matter. Two factors, related to the form of the conflict and also the process of peace-making will continue to have an impact. In the politics of denialism of the strategies and violence of the past these will be difficult to address. First, there has been a lack of a comprehensive process of demilitarization in KwaZulu-Natal. In 2005 a gun amnesty was declared which did not realize the substantial submission of weapons.93 Large caches of weapons exist throughout the province as a lingering sore of the strategies of violence "that never were". Second, the propaganda campaign towards the IFP is not reversible and is a painful reminder of the legacy of the strategy of violence directed against the organisation. This speaks immediately to the success of the people's war. The remnants of the intellectual part of this war exist in academic analyses and successive newspaper reports that are written during every election campaign. These are the consequences of a secret amnesty and they remain a lingering sore – for one of the partners - in a fragile peace.

Notes and References

1. The Province of KwaZulu-Natal was formed in 1994 out of the former territories of the KwaZulu Homeland and the Natal Provincial Administration (Natal).
2. The Inkatha Freedom Party was called Inkatha Yenkululenko ye Sizwe (Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement) from 1975 until 1991 when it was re-named the Inkatha Freedom Party. For heuristic purposes the term IFP has been used throughout this paper.

3. In 1928 Inkatha ka Zulu was formed by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu but ceased to be an effective organization by 1933. See Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation. Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu nationalism 1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993), pp. 249-271.
4. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was established in 1972 out of the Zululand Territorial Authority 1970. The specific apartheid acts which provided for homelands were the Republic of South Africa, *Black (Bantu) Authorities Act* [Act No.68 of 1951] and the Republic of South Africa, *Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act* [Act No.46 of 1959] in which individuals that were categorized under the Republic of South Africa, *Population Registration Act* [Act No. 30 of 1950] as 'native' were also classified by 'ethnic group' and later assigned to a designated homeland by way of their ethnic categorization. The Republic of South Africa, *Urban Bantu Councils Act* [Act No.79 of 1961] provided for homeland rule of community councils in the townships.
5. For further discussion of the ideological basis of the IFP see Suzanne Francis, "The IFP campaign: Indlovu ayisindwa kwabapaphambili!", in Roger Southall & John Daniel, *Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections* (Auckland Park: Johannesburg, 2009) pp. 147-161.
6. Literally translated as "go slowly".
7. Originally the ANC was the South African Native National Congress and then changed its name to the African National Congress. For heuristic reasons the term ANC is used throughout this paper.
8. See Colin Bundy, "Around Which Corner? Revolutionary Theory and Contemporary South Africa", *Transformation*, 8 (1989), pp. 1-23 and David Everatt, "Alliance Politics of a Special Type: the Roots of the ANC/SACP Alliance 1950-1954", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18, 1 (1991), pp. 19-39.
9. Literally translated as "Spear of the Nation".
10. See Anthea Jeffrey, *People's War. New Light on the Struggle for South Africa* (Cape Town: Johnathan Ball, 2009).
11. The UDF was an umbrella body for a wide range of civic groups, trade unions, rent payers associations, church groups and others within a tradition of community based popular politics whose common interest was the ending of apartheid.
12. Only the Pan Africanist Congress and conservative white groups did not participate.
13. Paul Lusaka, "The Future of the National Peace Accord Structures", *African Defence Review*, 19 (1994).
14. These comprised Group 1 – Code of conduct for political parties; Group 2 – Code of conduct for security forces; Group 3 – Socio-economic development; Group 4 – Implementation and monitoring; Group 5 – Process, secretariat and media.
15. The NP was the party that introduced apartheid in 1949 and then

repealed apartheid legislation and unbanned the ANC in 1990.

16. *National Peace Accord* (14 September 1991), Clause 3.7.1.
17. Cited in Anthea Jeffrey, *People's War, op.cit.*, p. 289.
18. Ibid, p. 289.
19. Suzanne Francis, "The KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature: Political Elite Formation and Change 1994-2004", *Unpublished PhD Dissertation* (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2008).
20. Richard Goldstone, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding Public Violence and Intimidation, Second Interim Report* (29 April 1992).
21. Anthea Jeffrey, *People's War,* op.cit., p. 370.
22. Alexander Johnston, "Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal", in William Gutteridge & Jack Spence, ed., *Violence in Southern Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 84.
23. For example, the Goldstone Commission investigated conflict in Bruntville in the period 21 January 1991 to 21 July 1992; training of IFP supporters in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia in 1986; and the Shell House shootings on protesting IFP supporters from the ANC Head Office.
24. Nelson Mandela, *Opening Address to ANC National Policy Conference* (May 1992).
25. *Ibid.*
26. Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story. Sixteen Years of Conflict* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997), p. 704.
27. Mangosuthu Buthelezi cited in Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story, ibid*, p. 711.
28. *Ibid*, p. 711.
29. Richard Goldstone, *Final Report of the Goldstone Commission* (22 April 1994).
30. Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story, op.cit.*, p. 712.
31. *The Internal Peace Institutions Act* [Act 29 of 1992].
32. Suzanne Nosel & Marion Shaer, "Groundswell at the Grassroots: The Challenge Posed by the Peace Accord Dispute Resolution Committees", *Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference of the South African Association of Conflict Intervention* (Port Elizabeth, 25-28 November 1992), p. 2.
33. See Adam Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).
34. Peter Gastrow, *Bargaining for Peace* (Washington: United States Institute for Peace), p. 57.
35. See Republic of South Africa, *The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act* [Act 95-34, 26 July 1995] which created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
36. Donna Pankhurst, "Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies: Conceptualising Reconciliation, Justice and Peace", *Third World Quarterly*, 20, 1 (1999), p. 239.
37. The decision was taken by a resolution of the highest decision-making body – the National Council - of the IFP at an annual general

meeting in July 1995.

38. Cited in Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story, op.cit.*, p. 582.
39. Alex Boraine, *A Country Unmasked* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 152-3.
40. Richard A. Wilson, *The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter 3.
41. Figures of the South African Institute for International Relations reported in *The Natal Mercury* (10 September 1991). However, other sources put this figure higher. See, for example, Alexander Johnston, "South Africa: The Election and the Transition Process – five contradictions in search of a resolution", *Third World Quarterly*, 15, 2, (1994), p. 188.
42. Alexander Johnston, *ibid,* p. 188-9.
43. Such as minibus taxi wars and access to basic services, such as water supplied through standpipes.
44. See, for example, Anthony Minaar, "Mayhem in the Midlands: Battle for Bruntville", *Indicator South Africa*, 9, 3, (1992), pp.60-64 where conflict between youth and their parents escalated into a hostel versus civic structure conflict, and then ANC-IFP conflict as those involved turned to political parties for assistance.
45. See, for example, Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, "South Africa: Political Violence and Reconstruction", *Review of African Political Economy*, 53 (1992), pp.43-59 and Mike Morris & Doug Hindson, "The Disintegration of Apartheid: From Violence to Reconstruction", in Glenn Moss, & Ingrid Obery, eds., *South African Review 6* (Johnannesburg: Ravan Press), pp. 152-70.
46. See, for example, Mervyn E. Bennun, "Understanding the Nightmare: Politics and Violence in South Africa", in *Negotiating Justice: A New Constitution for South Africa* (Exeter, Exeter University Press, 1995), pp.26-61 and Rok Ajulu, "A Rejoinder to Morris and Hindson", *Review of African Political Economy*, 55 (1992), pp. 67-83.
47. See, for example, Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story, op.cit.*, where the perceptions of both organisations are recorded and Alexander Johnston, "Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal", op.cit., pp.78-107 in which he argues that although the political violence is inarticulate, it is located within ANC-IFP competition over territory, tradition and the constitutional framework.
48. Many such analysts are politically aligned, as are many of the interviewed witnesses. In some cases the analysts have failed to acknowledge both their own affiliation and the affiliation of their eyewitnesses, which in some cases have turned out to be individuals holding political positions. An example of this is Lou Levine, ed., *Faith in Turmoil. The Seven Days War* (Pietermaritzburg: PACSA, 1999) whereby a substantial number of the interviewees were UDF and ANC affiliated, some had gone on to hold political office, the independent scholarly contribution to the volume is from a self-

professed UDF supporter and none of the interviewees were IFP affiliated.

49. This is true for both IFP and ANC individuals, although this author argues that IFP individuals have been so branded because they were identifiable by way of their presence in the institutions of the homeland. Conversely, if analysts were to use the same framework and apply it to the 'non-visible institutions' created from 1981 they would also be forced to so brand many of the ANC leaders, SDU leaders and heads of 'peoples committees'.
50. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1998), pp. 2-3.
51. Analysis of personal interviews with ANC and IFP members of the Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal.
52. Suzanne Francis, "The KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature", *op.cit*.
53. Inkatha was resurrected with the knowledge and encouragement of the ANC in exile. This fact was only belatedly admitted at the Kabwe Conference in 1985.
54. Personal Interviews with ANC Members of the Provincial Legislature.
55. This remains undocumented and unanalysed although specific cases can be found in Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story, op.cit.*
56. Specific cases can be found in Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story, op.cit.*
57. It does not suggest, contrary to popular wisdom, a third force, given that high levels of violence in Natal and on the Reef were not replicated in areas where the ANC contended with other political forces. These areas include the Eastern Cape where the ANC contended with the National Forum and other Black Consciousness organizations.
58. Although Oliver Tambo headed Operation Vula, the command structures comprised layers of command and operational structures. The first layer comprised the Presidents Committee: Siphiwe Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils, Joe Slovo, Archie Abrahams and Ivan Pillay. Below that comprised the Vula Head Committee – Siphiwe Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, Chris Hani and Janet Love – who commanded twelve regional committees. When the operation was uncovered in 1990, the Durban Political Committee headed by Billy Nair and Pravin Gordhan was fully formed.
59. For example, the Richmond SDU was formed by 1989 out of Operation Vula. Information obtained from a Personal Interview with an ANC MPP [Interviewee Number 94].
60. ANC, *For the Sake of our Lives! Guidelines for the Creation of the People's Self-Defense Units*, (April 1991). The document discussed the establishment of a people's militia in which armed SDUs would merge with MK.
61. The MK Conference in Venda in December 1991 formalized the role of MK and elaborated that SDUs would be assisted by MK in arming

themselves, weapon usage, intelligence gathering and ambushes.

62. The Golela incident in 1993 in which two individuals were caught smuggling weapons through the Swaziland border for the ANC in Natal provides evidence of this. The ANC Midlands and Northern Natal regions clashed with the ANC national leadership after the national leadership disowned the mission.
63. Personal Interview with an ANC Member of the Provincial Legislature [Interviewee Number 94].
64. A Personal Interview with an IFP Member of the Provincial Legislature revealed that the IFP believed that the ANC through their dominance of the Transitional Executive Council and integration of MK into the National Peacekeeping Force would pursue the overthrow of the KwaZulu homeland in a fashion mirroring the events in Bophuthatswana (one of the few homelands not sympathetic to the ANC). Such IFP perceptions were based upon an ANC/SACP authored document 'Prepare the Anvil for the Coming Hammer' which discusses a covert plan to ensure the destruction of the KwaZulu homeland while distancing the ANC from it. Although this document was presented to the Goldstone Commission, no investigation was ever initiated and the reasons for lack thereof were never provided.
65. Personal Interview with an IFP Member of the Provincial Legislature [Interviewee Number 46].
66. Personal Interview with an IFP Member of the Provincial Legislature [Interviewee Number 28].
67. See Terence Ranger, "Peasant Consciousness: Culture and Conflict in Zimbabwe", in T. Shanin, ed., *Peasants and Peasant Societies* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1988), pp. 312-315.
68. *Ibid*, pp.312-315.
69. Anthea Jeffrey, *People's War, op.cit*., pp. 505-509.
70. Lou Levine, *op.cit.*
71. Examples of this work include John Saul, "South Africa Between Barbarism and Structural Reform", *New Left Review*, 188 (1991), pp.3-44 and Robert Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa 1975-1990* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
72. Simon Barber cited in Heribert Adam., Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert & Kogila Moodley, *Comrades in Business* (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 1997), p. 136.
73. Alexander Johnston, "The Political World of KwaZulu-Natal", in R.W. Johnson, & Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., *Launching Democracy in South Africa. The First Open Election. April 1994* (London, Yale University Press, 1996), p. 180.
74. Harry Gwala, "Negotiations as presented by Joe Slovo", *African Communist*, (Fourth Quarter, 1992), p. 27.
75. Harry Gwala cited in Rich Mkhondo, *Reporting South Africa* (London, James Currey, 1993), p. 162.

76. The objective was to launch a full scale armed insurrection in South Africa through the use of MK structures and SDUs. In Natal these structures were fully formed when the operation was discovered by police in 1990.
77. Personal Interview with an ANC Member of the Provincial Legislature [Interviewee Number 94].
78. Personal Interview with an MPP [Interviewee Number 124].
79. The meaning of this term may be translated in this context as "an older and more respected, higher court or assembly of leaders".
80. The conflict at Ngoye occurred in the context of an ANC/UDF national schools boycott which had reached parts of KwaZulu. At the University of Zululand Ngoye campus in October 1983 a commemoration of Zulu King Cetshwayo in which Inkatha President Buthelezi was to speak was disrupted by students. In armed clashes five people died and hundreds of thousands of rands worth of property was destroyed. The Middleton Commission, set up to investigate the incident, rejected claims by students that they were protecting themselves against Inkatha impis and found that some students were intent upon confrontation with Inkatha. It further found that there was substantial coercion and intimidation from a small group of students to persuade others to join in. See the Republic of South Africa, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Violence which occurred on 29 October 1983 at the University of Zululand* (Volume 1, February 1985).
81. Personal Interview with an ANC Member of the Provincial Legislature
82. For example, at the funeral vigil for Chris Hani, Jeff Radebe, "told the angry crowd that the ANC should not only rid itself of white supremacists, but should also focus on the IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi". Cited in Anthea Jeffrey, *The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997) p. 382.
83. See African National Congress – South African Communist Party, *Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission* (Commonly known as the Green Book) *to the ANC National Executive Committee* (August 1979).
84. Sifiso Nkabinde was later assassinated after joining a new political party – the United Democratic Movement – and becoming provincial chairperson.
85. Anthea Jeffrey, People's War, op.cit., p. 665.
86. Personal Observation.
87. There was a 3-a-side committee and a 10-a-side committee established that included senior IFP and ANC office bearers and also included some of the members of the legislature who had been directly involved in the violence.
88. Personal Interviews with ANC and IFP Members of the Provincial Legislature.

89. Personal Interview with a member of the 10-a-side committee.
90. For example, rallies were held throughout the KwaZulu-Natal midlands in the period up to the local government elections where senior provincial office bearers from both parties addressed the crowds. Personal Observation.
91. *Sunday Tribune* (10 December 1997).
92. See Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal, *Minutes of the Portfolio Committee on Housing* (April 1998 – June 2005).
93. Mark Shaw, "South Africa: Crime in Transition", *Institute for Security Studies*, 17 (March 1997).

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Moral Imagination, *Ubuntu* and African Women: Towards Feminizing Politics and Peace-Building in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa)

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ABSTRACT

Globally, studies based on the notion that women are disposed to bringing different positive values into politics contend that women can be the missing link between governance, peace and development. Although this notion of women as 'political cleaners' and studies that validate it are essentially contested, they remain useful as empirical evidence in building towards a theory of feminist politics that will inform the practice of that politics. Therefore, using the Moral Imagination and its relational nexus with Ubuntu, this paper attempts to develop an African feminist ideology of politics and peace-building upon which more women can be mainstreamed into politics in the specific case of KwaZulu-Natal — South Africa's most populous and politically volatile province.

Introduction

GLOBALLY, STUDIES HAVE shown that women can be the missing link between governance, peace and development given the different values that women often bring into politics[1]. For example, a number of studies such as Dollar *et al* and Swammy *et al* indicate that women display a higher level of ethical behaviour, discipline and empathy to community needs compared to men[2]. And according to Adjibolosoo,

these values are consistent with positive human factor characteristics and dimensions which are necessary and sufficient factors for good governance and development anywhere[3]. Indeed, the behavioural notions of women as more caring, responsible, honest, transparent and, as such, more trustworthy than their male counterparts in public office were empirically validated by Dollar *et al* in their seminal study aimed at determining whether women were the fairer sex in terms of corruption in public governance. Using levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and civil liberties as controls, they found that "at the country level, higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption"[4]. Based on their findings in this regard, they went on to conclude that

> ….there may be extremely important spin-offs stemming from increasing female representation: if women are less likely than men to behave opportunistically, then bringing more women into government may have significant benefits for society in general[5].

In Africa, a 2007 World Bank study revealed that women politicians in Uganda were generally less corrupt than men. These notions and findings were re-echoed and further validated by a cohort of 185 rural women in KwaZulu-Natal who were earlier surveyed in a previous study[6]. When asked why they thought more women should be in politics, a majority (72%) of respondents in the study areas of Richmond, Shobashobane and Nongoma answered: "because women were less prone to corruption than men". They believed that women were in a better moral position to change the extant mode of politics in the region which is corruption-driven. According to them, this would have positive implications for peace-building in this most politically violent province of South Africa.

Although these notions of women as 'political cleaners'[7] have been variously challenged (even by feminist scholars themselves[8]) along with the empirical studies that validate them as such, they remain useful as empirical evidence in building towards a theory of feminist politics that will inform the practice of that politics. This is the main focus of this paper. It attempts to develop an African feminist ideology of politics and peace-building upon which more women can be mainstreamed into politics in the specific case of KwaZulu-Natal. As shown in table 1 below, KwaZulu-Natal province, like a good number of others across the country, has surpassed the 30% critical mass threshold of women's representation in politics recommended by the

United Nations[9]. However, there are profound challenges around the quality of women's representation in governance at the provincial level. For example, poverty, disease (HIV/AIDS) and unemployment remain feminized; rural women who are the majority in the province remain disconnected from governance and development planning; and politics is still largely perceived as the exclusive preserve of males[10]. Apart from structural and institutional constraints which impede the quality of women's political representation and participation[11], a deeply-rooted culture of neo-African patriarchy[12] which governs social relations between men and women at the informal level contribute to the ineffectiveness of women politicians in resolving socio-economic challenges in KwaZulu-Natal[13].

Table 1: KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Assembly election results by gender and party, 2009

Party	**Women**	**Total seats**	**% of women**
ANC	26	53	49
IFP	2	18	11.1
DA	1	7	14.3
ACDP	1	1	100
MF	1	2	50
COPE	-	1	-
TOTAL	31	80	38.75

Source: Isike, 2009, PhD thesis.

Therefore, if an increase in the number of women in politics does not automatically translate to qualitative change and development for women and society in general, where should we be looking for answers? Should we not be refocusing the investigation on the intervening variables that produce female politicians, and on the socio-cultural climate under which specific female politicians operate? For instance, in KwaZulu-Natal, politically outspoken women politicians are still ridiculed, taunted as prostitutes and their abilities to cope with their multiple roles as politicians, wives and mothers are

constantly called to question[14]. As MEC Johnson noted, such attitudes impact on the effectiveness of women's political representation in the province. Accordingly, if we are to find answers to questions on the essence of mainstreaming women into politics, we must refocus on the socio-cultural variables that produce and sustain (or even militate against) women's existence in politics.

In this light, this paper revisits and appropriates behavioural perspectives from the school of thought that women represent different values from men which can be used to redefine politics to realize the utilitarian goal of ensuring greatest happiness for the greatest number and, *ipso facto*, prevent conflict. Essentially, we contend that although conflict, which is generically conceptualized as the break down of relationships, affects women and men disproportionately; women tend to be agents of peace because of their natural (motherhood) and social make-up which values relationships, interconnectedness and empowerment. From these values springs forth empathy, cooperation, tolerance and love which are necessary requirements for good governance, amicable resolution of conflict when they occur, and for sustaining peace. In other words, based on the relational ethic of care, motherhood and womanhood, women have the potential to prevent conflict, enable development and transcend the cycle of violence which fans the embers of conflict to make peace when politics fails to prevent violent conflict *ab initio*. Therefore, the challenge is to feminize politics in such a way that enables women to bring in their womanhood/femininity into the fray. Given the links between political ideology and gender equality[15], we contend that the absence of an African feminist ideology and base from which women's power should flow is a significant intervening variable that needs scholarly attention. In our opinion, the absence of an African feminist base and ideology that is rooted in African cultural realities has compromised women's political participation in post-colonial African societies. In discussing some of these African cultural realities in the context of gender relations, which in the case of the Zulu nation, was rooted in a worldview defined by *Ubuntu*, this paper utilizes John Lederach's Moral Imagination model of peace-building and a survey of the lived experiences of 185 rural women to illuminate the continuing relevance of African women to politics and peace-building in KwaZulu-Natal.

Theoretical Considerations for Feminizing Peace-Building: The Moral Imagination Model of Peace Building

According to John Lederach, moral imagination is "the capacity to imagine something rooted in the challenges of the real world yet

capable of giving birth to that which does not yet exist; the potential to find a way to transcend and to move beyond what exists while still living in it"[16]. In reference to peace building, Lederach contends that it is the capacity to imagine and generate constructive responses and initiatives that, while rooted in the day-to-day challenges of violence, transcends and ultimately breaks the grips of those destructive patterns and cycles within which conflict is perpetuated[17]. Viewed this way, the moral imagination has two qualities, transcendence and creativity, as it implies a break from orthodox wisdom and convention that governs social, political and economic relations between people, communities and states, in order to discover new grounds and ways of doing things which is rooted in the human capacity to rise above the ordinary. Therefore, it is the capacity to perceive things beyond and at a deeper level than what initially meets the ordinary eye, leading to a critical turning point that will make the difference between violent protracted conflict and sustainable peace[18]. Of the four stories Lederach used to illustrate the moral imagination in action leading to the critical turning points that made the difference between conflict and peace, the one of the peace meeting between the Konkombas and the Dagombas in Northern Ghana is particularly poignant. This is reproduced in box 1 below:

Box 1: On Touching the Moral Imagination: A Story from Ghana

"I call you father because I do not wish to disrespect you"

During the 1990s, northern Ghana faced the rising escalation of ethnic conflict mixed with the ever-present tense undertone of Muslim-Christian relationship. In the broader West African region, Liberia had collapsed into chaotic, violent internal warfare, spilling refugees into neighbouring countries. The chaos seemed simultaneously endemic and contagious. Within a short period of time, Sierra Leone descended into cycles of bloodletting and cruelty that were unprecedented for the sub-region. Nigeria, the largest and most powerful regional country, walked a fine line that barely seemed to avoid the wildfires of full-blown civil war. In such a context, the rise of inter-communal violence, and even sporadic massacres had all the signs of a parallel disaster in the northern communities of Ghana.

These were not historically isolated cycles of violence. The roots of the conflicts between several of the groups, particularly the Konkombas and Dagombas, could be easily traced back

to the era of slavery. The Dagombas, a group with a sustained and powerful tradition of chieftaincy, have a social and leadership structure that loaned itself to negotiation with European slave traders. They were the most powerful and dominant group in the north of the country; their allies to the south were the people of the equally strong Ashanti Empire. Chiefly groups retained royalty, culminating in the paramount chief, whereas groups in Ghana referred to as nonchiefly no longer had or were not accorded a chiefly political structure.

The Konkombas, on the other hand, were more dispersed. Principally agriculturalists, "yam growers," as they at times were denigrated and stereotyped the Konkombas did not organize around the same social and royal features. They were a nonchiefly tribe, not necessarily by their choice. High chieftaincy in this part of the world brought benefits and a comparative sense of importance that translated into superiority. For example, the chiefly groups gained advantage from collaboration with the slave trade; the nonchiefly were fated to live the great travesty of dehumanization and exploitation incarnated in this trafficking of men, women, and children. Following the period of the slave trade, the chiefly groups again benefited during the period of colonization. They received recognition and their traditional power and sense of superiority were further ingrained. The seeds of division sown during the period of slavery flourished in the period of colonial rule.

In subsequent centuries their conflicts were played out over control of land and resources. The arrival of religiously based missionary movements added more layers of division to their relationships. While some groups remained animists, the Konkombas followed Christianity, and most Dagombas, including the powerful royal houses and paramount chieftaincy, became Muslim. One unexpected result was that the Christian missions, with their emphasis on education, provided schools that gave access and entry to rising social status for the Konkombas. This would eventually have an impact on the communities and politics.

As Ghana gained independence, the country moved toward democracy based on elections. Politicians with aspirations for votes understood the existing divisions and fears and often exacerbated them in order to get the support of their respective communities during election campaigns.

Electoral periods became regular cycles of repeated and ever-greater violence. Even little events, like a dispute between two people in a market over a purchase, could spark escalation of violence, as was the case with the Guinea Fowl War.

In 1995 the cycle threatened to explode again. A dispute over land claimed by both groups in a small town in the north suddenly exploded into overt violence during the electoral campaign. The killing sprees spread rapidly, spilled well beyond the locale of the original dispute, and threatened the stability of the whole northern region. The images of recent chaotic collapse in Sierra Leone and Liberia were fresh in the minds of many people. This cycle of inter-communal violence in Ghana appeared on the verge of creating yet another destructive full-blown civil war. In response, a consortium of nongovernmental organizations working in the northern region of Ghana began to push for a peace building effort. A small team of African mediators, led initially by Hizkias Assefa and Emmanuel Bombande, began the process of creating space for dialogue between the representatives of the two ethnic groups. Eventually this process would find a way to avoid the escalation of violence to civil war and would even create an infrastructure for dealing with the common recurrence of crises that in the past had translated into deadly fighting. But it was not a smooth road.

In one of their early encounters those involved in the mediation observed a story that created a transformation in the process and in the relationship between these two groups and therefore changed the fundamental direction of the conflict. In the first face-to-face meeting of the two groups, the Dagomba paramount chief arrived in full regalia and with his entourage. There were designated persons who carried his staff and sat at his feet. In the opening moments of the meeting he assumed a sharp attitude of superiority. Taking the role of the paramount, he wasted no time in denigrating and verbally attacking the Kokombas. Given the traditions and rights afforded the highest chiefs, little could be done except to let the chief speak.

"Look at them," he said, addressing himself more to the mediators than to the Kokombas. "Who are they even that I should be in this room with them? They do not even have a chief. Who am I to talk to? They are a people with nothing who have just come from the fields and now attack us in our

own villages. They could have at least brought an old man. But look! They are just boys born yesterday."

The atmosphere was devastating. Making matters worse, the mediators felt in a very difficult bind. Culturally, when facing a chief, there was nothing they could do to control the process. You simply cannot tell a chief to watch his mouth or follow ground rules, particularly in the presence of his entourage and his enemies. It appeared as if the whole endeavour may have been misconceived and was reaching a breaking point.

The Konkomba spokesman asked to respond. Fearing the worst, the mediators provided him space to speak. The young man turned and addressed himself to the chief of the enemy tribe.

> You are perfectly right, Father, we do not have a chief. We have not had one for years. You will not even recognise the man we have chosen to be our chief. And this has been our problem. The reason we react, the reason our people go on rampages and fights resulting in all these killings and destruction arises from this fact. We do not have what you have. It really is not about the town, or the land, or that market guinea fowl. I beg you, listen to my words, Father. I am calling you father because we do not wish to disrespect you. You are a great chief. But what is left for us? Do we have no other means but this violence to receive in return the one thing we seek, to be respected and to establish our own chief who could indeed speak with you, rather than having a young boy do it on our behalf?

The attitude, tone of voice, and use of the word father spoken by the young Konkomba man apparently so affected the chief that he sat for a moment without response. When finally he spoke, he did so with a changed voice, addressing himself directly to the young man rather than to the mediators.

> I had come to put your people in your place. But now I feel only shame. Though I insulted

your people, you still called me Father. It is you who speaks with wisdom, and me who has not seen the truth. What you have said is true. We who are chiefly have always looked down on you because you have no chief, but we have not understood the denigration you suffered. I beg you, my son, to forgive me.

At this point the younger Konkomba man stood, walked to the chief, then knelt and gripped his lower leg, a sign of deep respect. He vocalized a single and audible "Na-a" a word of affirmation and acceptance.

Those attending the session reported that the room was electrified, charged with high feeling and emotion. It was by no means the end of the problems or disagreements, but something happened in that moment that created an impact on everything that followed. The possibility of change away from century-long cycles of violence began and perhaps the seeds that avoided what could have been a full-blown Ghanaian civil war were planted in that moment.

This possibility of change continues. In March 2002, the king of the Dagombas, Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, was killed in an internal feud between the two clans of the Dagombas, the Abudu and Andani families. As long-time adversaries of the Dagombas, the Konkombas could have been expected to take advantage of the internal strife among the Dagombas. On the contrary, they met at a grand Durban of all their youths and elders and issued an official declaration on Ghana television. First they expressed solidarity with the Dagombas in the time of their grief and loss. Then they pleaded with the Dagombas to work together in finding a long-term solution to their internal chieftaincy dispute. They declared that Konkombas would not allow any of their tribesmen to undermine the Dagombas because of the internal difficulty they were experiencing. They concluded by suggesting that Konkombas who took advantage of the internal strife within the Dagombas to create a situation that may lead to violence would be isolated and handed over to the police.

Reproduced from Lederach (2005: 7 - 10)

According to Lederach, the moral of this story and the three others he tells in his book is that it was neither the technical expertise of the

international peace mediators nor the nature and design of the peace process that made the difference. It was not the local or national political power, exigencies, the fears of a broader war, nor the influence and pressure from the international community that created the shift. Neither was it political, economic or military power. Rather, what created a turning point that was critical to breaking the age-long violence between the Dagombas and Konkombas was the appearance of the moral imagination displayed by the young spokesman of the Konkombas[19]. His attitude and tone in addressing the Dagomba Chief, calling him "father", his gesture of kneeling before the chief and grabbing his lower leg (a deep sign of respect in Ghanaian culture), were characteristic of the moral imagination, the capacity to rise beyond violence by taking personal responsibility, acknowledging relational mutuality and in the process giving birth to something new. As Lederach himself sums the story, "the possibility of change away from century-long cycles of violence began and perhaps the seeds that avoided what could have been a full-blown civil war were planted in that moment of the serendipitous appearance of the moral imagination"[20].

Exploring the nexus between the moral imagination and peace building further, Lederach contends that there are four elements or disciplines that, when held together and practiced, form the moral imagination that makes peace building possible, and each of which requires imagination. These are relationship, paradoxical curiosity, creativity and risk. Combined, the presence or practice of these elements make the moral imagination and peace building possible as shown in Lederach's case studies where the peace processes were defined by the capacity of actors to imagine themselves in a relationship, a willingness to embrace complexity and not frame their challenge as a dualistic polarity between "evil and good", "us and them" which drive the cycles of violence, acts of enormous creativity that spring forth new possibilities, and lastly, a willingness to risk, to step into the unknown, the mystery that peace is. All of these were present in the story of the Konkombas and Dagombas and they led to complex initiatives of peace building defined by critical moments that created and then sustained constructive change[21]. However, in the light of its significance to this paper, we shall dwell on the element of relationships and its nexus to feminising the peace process. According to Lederach, relationships remain central to peace building because it is both the context in which cycles of violence happen and the generative energy from which transcendence of those same cycles burst forth. He argues that the centrality of relationships provides the context and potential for breaking violence, "for it brings people

into the pregnant moments of the moral imagination: the space of recognition that ultimately the quality of our life is dependent on the quality of life of others"[22]

Clearly then, relationships are central to the notion of the moral imagination as it oils the ever-evolving web of social interactions. In the process, it fosters inclusivity and interconnectedness as all members of society see themselves as part of the web and plays his/her role based on a moral understanding of their personal responsibility and, thus, acknowledging the relational mutuality or interdependency of the human existence. This is why Lederach concludes that peace building requires a vision that understands that in the absence of the capacity to imagine the canvassing of mutual relationships, which situates oneself as part of a historic and ever-evolving web, peace will collapse. It is in this light that masculine social constructionists contend that masculinity is an obstacle to peace as it is based in part on the rejection of feminine ideologies which prioritise relationships, collaboration, sharing and mutual empowerment as opposed to masculine ideologies that promote independence, individualism and aggression[23]. However, masculinity itself thrives in relationships even though they are relationships that breed conflict. For example, military camps provide traditional masculine communities, where men find brotherhood, comradeship and a sense of connection with themselves, which, unfortunately, perpetuates violence and war as such camps also become centres where men are socialised to love through action (war) and protection of others, especially women, thus making men prone to war as a method of conflict resolution[24]. In this way, men are socialised to see fighting for their nations as acts of devotion, loyalty and love which they must seek and appropriate within masculine worldview that prioritises power, domination, zero-sum competition and aggression before, during and after conflict.

The Moral Imagination and Ubuntu

The moral imagination resonates well with the African social ideology of communalism or *ubuntu* which is rooted in the web of human relationship within which people reinforce and validate one another. It is well known that across pre-colonial Africa, the dominant cultural worldview that defined social, economic and political existence was underpinned by a communal ideology that was rooted in *ubuntu*[25]. The meaning and practice of *ubuntu* in Southern Africa can be inferred from a Zulu maxim: *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,* which literarily translates to "a person is a person because of other people." This underscores the collectivism and agency of people as the means and end of development. *Ubuntu* captures the human essence of the African

personality (male or female) and traditional society built around familyhood and which, according to Julius Nyerere, was an attitude of mind that was not taught but lived[26]. In conceptualising *ubuntu*, Bishop Tutu observes:

> a person with *ubuntu* is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are[27].

Clearly, this was a worldview that valued and maintained relationships. It was not one that ill-treated, neglected or humiliated women since an injury to one was seen as an injury to all. Men did not need to feel threatened by women as each complemented the other in ways that allowed them to function cohesively as a social unit. Indeed, men and women co-existed in these societies, not as equals though, but as complementary subjects living in a mutual world of responsibility sharing, where differences were appreciated and celebrated[28]. Masculinities were understood in ways that regarded and respected women, where it was a virtue to protect women, not just in ways that perhaps suggested that they were weaker beings needing men's protection, but out of consideration that women were equally deserving of deference and honour with natural abilities and powers to produce economically and reproduce existentially.

The Moral Imagination, Women and Peace-Building

Lederach's model of the utility of the moral imagination for peace building within a web of human relationships relates to this study in three significant ways. First, it means that women and men exist in an interconnected social reality where they are meant to complement each other. This means that relationships should not be perceived as feminine; rather, it should be seen as human because both men and women are existentially connected and both have need, and yearn, for connection with others in the bid for survival and self-actualisation. According to Gagnon, for men, the problem is not that they reject connection; the problem is that men reject feminine forms of connection. Therefore, the challenge is for men to deconstruct and transform masculine relational ideologies, which breed conflict and war, into more inclusive foundations that would be more conducive

to peace building. This leads us to the second point of connection between the moral imagination model and calls for feminising peace building in Africa, namely, that men can and should morally imagine and recreate a society that promotes peaceful relations within itself and with others outside it.

Therefore, because they remain critical to the success of gender equality efforts, men have the challenge of transcending the orthodox wisdom and convention of patriarchy that governs gender relations in post-colonial Africa, to create new forms of relationships that are conducive to peaceful co-existence and holistic development. Indeed, as Gagnon argues, peaceful relationships, starting from those between men and women, are necessary for negotiating mutually amicable resolution to conflicts even though as a result of social construction of masculinity, men have learnt to reject the essential value of relationships. In his words, "while masculine construction may be a cause of war and a deterrent to peace, it also holds the potential for transformation as the very qualities that would be necessary to pursue such ideal change are often associated with constructions of masculinity – courage, fortitude, resolution and the drive for success – and peace would not be possible without them"[29].

Third, women generally are richly endowed with the moral capacity to embrace curiosity and complexity as they are wont to rise above the historic traps of dualistic divisions which drive the cycles of violence and, in this way, transcend orthodox gender stereotypes and the oppressive relations they spew. This is possible because women are more relational than men and, as such, view the same phenomenon differently. For instance, women have the capacity to imagine themselves in a web of relationships even with their enemies[30]. And as we shall show in the next sections, African women generally had and still have the capacity to perceive things beyond and at a deeper level than what initially meets the ordinary eye, leading to a critical turning point that will make the difference between violent protracted conflict and sustainable peace. The question we now address is what was the situation of pre-colonial Zulu women in this regard?

Women, Politics and Peace-Building in Pre-Colonial Zulu Kingdom

Contrary to widespread Eurocentric views which stereotyped the Zulu society as deeply patriarchal[31], women were central figures as they held responsible leadership positions of influence and demonstrated leadership in political, religious, economic, and military spheres. According to Weir, "this separation of women's leadership into spheres is rather artificial because in reality, their leadership roles involved all these activities in one way or another"[32]. She contends

that, politically, Zulu royal women such as Mnkabayi, Mawa, Langazana and Nandi exerted enormous influence in political groups irrespective of how they have been caricatured by Eurocentric writings such as those of Lugg and Hanretta[33]. Apart from the powerful roles played by Mnkabayi at different periods of the history of the Zulu Kingdom, several key women continued to exercise political influence until after King Mpande's reign when the political significance and influence of key Zulu women in politics, ritual and religion seemed to have started declining[34]. However, throughout the pre-colonial period, women's leadership in Zulu society was closely linked with religion as women participated and were at the forefront of various rituals that were central in Zulu cultural worldview and social milieu[35]. These rituals include rainmaking, administering ritual medicine, death and mourning rituals, the first fruit ceremony, and custodianship of sacred objects and norms. And contrary to Gluckman's claim that only men could possess ancestral shades (spirits), women did also become ancestral spirits[36], and the possession of spiritual powers including divination was widespread and not concentrated on chiefly women[37]. According to her, "the special and very close contact with the spirits is reserved in this society for women only – women who are thought of as marginal, and can thus fulfil the important social role of forming the bridge between the two worlds"[38]

Economically, Zulu women owned cattle, a phenomenon which was very central in economic and ritual life among Southern Africa's pre-industrial farming societies[39]. According to official reports, the categories of women who owned cattle include female chiefs, elder female relations of a chief (male and female), female *Isanusi* (witch doctor) and female heirs of religious leaders[40]. Women's ability to inherit and own cattle bestowed other economic advantages such as woman-to-woman marriages which were appropriated to advance their economic positions. Although, according to Weir, evidence of woman-to-woman marriage among the pre-colonial Zulu is scant, the existence of the practice is another indicator of the powerful positions certain women (an elite class) had, and suggests that a wider interpretation of inheritance is also necessary[41].

Militarily, women held positions of influence in the *amakhanda* (Zulu military kraals) ranging from leadership, spying, war purification rituals and combat[42]. Other roles include mat carrying in times of war and protecting the King. According to evidence from the *James Stuart Archives* (Volumes 1 – 5), King Shaka had a female *ibutho* (regiment), which together with other female members of the Kingdom's army constituted an estimated 40% of the total size of the regular armed forces with some of them such as Machibise and Ma

Nthatis, who were not Shaka's relatives, emerging as strong army commanders[43]. Weir also records that according to one of James Stuart informants called Ngidi, "Tshaka used to go out to war with the *amakosikazi* as well as girls. They cut shields (*izihlangu*) and carried assegais, and had to fight when required to do so"[44]. According to her, there were girls who fought like men, earned and wore the *iziqu* (medicine worn by warriors who had killed in combat), which was evidence of having killed an opponent[45].

In tying this to the moral imagination, the crux of our argument here is that women's existence and power in pre-colonial African societies was based on an ethic of care that was rooted in their motherhood and their nature, which was tolerant of difference, collaborative, non-violent and, as such, peaceful[46]. Their peace activism and agency was in itself rooted in a broader communal ideology defined by *ubuntu* which operated on the basis of the mutuality of human interests through a web of relationships where everyone played their part for the good of the collective and the validation of the personal. In these societies, women never saw or placed themselves in a dichotomous relationship with men; rather, as Amadiume espoused, gender relations were fluid, dynamic and complementary in difference[47]. For example, their femininity was the basis of their recognition and automatic participation in public affairs and, as such, women were not ashamed to be women. Indeed, motherhood qualities of care and nurturing and women's positive dispositions towards collaboration, interconnectedness and peace did not imply weakness. Rather, they portray strength, as they are consistent with the affective and relational foundation of people's existence which was rooted in *ubuntu*. They are also consistent with Lederach's story of the Konkomba spokesman who invoked the moral imagination by transcending the conventional to turn around a protracted conflict towards sustainable peace.

The question then is how did Zulu women progressively lose the value of their womanhood, their political, economic and military positions such that today they need affirmative action and political quotas to be part of the political class? Nzegwu contends that the answer lies substantially in the colonial interregnum during which different African societies experienced significant disruptions of its pre-colonial socio-cultural order[48]. As aforementioned, a new order of gender relations was wrought by the capitalist mode of production and the complementary extractive ideologies favoured by the European colonial authorities[49]. In South Africa, for example, the migrant labour system was an important factor in shaping gender relations, political resistance and the struggle for nations in the late

twentieth century, and these remain dominant in perceptions and attitudes of men towards women. Also, the modern state system, which essentially replaced the pre-colonial systems of political administration, did not have any express provisions for women's participation in politics. The confirmatory action provisions of the pre-colonial order, which allowed for women's political input, had been eroded and women simply lost out to the new economically driven imperatives of the colonizing powers. The subsequent colonization of Africa, along which came the Western version of Christianity, eroded the countervailing systems of the village community as "elite African men manipulated the new and borrowed patriarchies to forge a most formidable 'masculine imperialism', yet unknown in Africa"[50].

In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), "the entrenching of the tradition of male authority and female dependence is even now potentially a stumbling block to efforts by both feminists and democrats to transform the state, especially at the local level and in the rural areas where traditional (male) leadership is still strong"[51]. These new patriarchal power relations often play out at informal levels of interaction between men and women in KZN and they resonate in the sexist attitudes that underlie the labelling and stigmatization of active women politicians as "rebels". Such attitudes impact negatively on women's performance in parliament as they strive to conform expectedly to societal norms that reinforce their dependence. However, the good news is that in spite of the eroding influence of colonialism, the feminine values that defined womanhood in pre-colonial African societies — including that of the Zulus — are still latent. And they can be positively harnessed to change the extant militarist tone of politics and, *ipso facto,* transform conflict. Indeed, African women were and continue to be an embodiment of the ethic of care and the moral imagination which are very critical to changing the face and essence of politics to be more human-centred. This is expected to have some positive significance for conflict prevention, resolution and peace building in the continent if properly appropriated.

Presentation and Analysis of Findings on Women, Politics and Peace-Building in KwaZulu-Natal

What then is the present state of affairs of women, politics, and peace-building in KwaZulu-Natal? To answer that question, the following question was posed to the 185 women who participated in the KwaZulu-Natal survey: "Will increased political representation of women both in government and decision-making points of the peace machinery enhance the peace process?" To determine their perception

on the subject, a number of questions were asked around the nature of women's political representation and their involvement in peace-building at the community levels.

Nature of women's involvement in politics

Our findings from the study areas show that women's direct involvement in governance is relatively high at the community/grass roots and local government (municipal) levels. For example, of the 149 women who responded to the question on their involvement in community decision-making, 86 (58%) indicated positively that they were directly involved in decision-making processes in their communities.

Although this figure of women involved in decision-making is only representative of the study areas, it is indicative of the potential involvement of women in governance across KwaZulu-Natal where women constitute 38% of the provincial parliament and 29% of the cabinet.

In terms of perception on the level of women's political participation, the 63 (42%) who were not directly involved in decision-making processes in their communities felt that generally, women's participation in community decision-making was non-existent or low. Their perceptions ranged from "not involved" (17) to "insignificantly involved" (43).

When asked to comment on women's general political participation in the province, less than half (50) representing 46% of the 108 who responded to this question, felt women were marginalised in the province's politics. A total of 42 (38%) felt women were not marginalised while 17 (16%) were not sure.

One issue that emerged from our primary data in KwaZulu-Natal is the stigmatization of women politicians as 'cultural deviants'. Based on the dominant understanding of neo-African patriarchy, women are culturally expected in Zulu gender discourses to be demure, non-confrontational, non-assertive and non-expressive in their relations with men in both the public and private spaces; but especially in the public space where they are ideally expected to be invisible[52]. This partially explains the labelling of women who rise above these expectations as 'cultural deviants' who have forgotten their place. The popular thinking therefore is that women should not be involved in politics, and when they are, they should remain invisible and serve the men to whom they owe their political ascension in the first place. According to Minister Johnson, these kinds of perceptions, attitudes of mind and the subtle defiance that follow it frequently affected women's productivity on the job. She contended that:

Figure 1: involvement in community decision-making (n=149)



Figure 2: Respondents' perceptions of women's participation level in community decision-making across areas surveyed (n=146)



Figure 3: perceptions on women's political marginalisation in KZN (n=108)



> Innuendoes targeted at undermining our morality and self-confidence are usually used by our male colleagues both in parliament and in the cabinet to reinforce their superiority even though on the outside they all tend to express belief in the political empowerment of women as a panacea to poverty alleviation[53]

These are deep-seated, informal level sources and modes of marginalizing women in politics that will require more than formal legislation to change. To redress them effectively, they will require substantial reorientation and attitudinal change in both men and women. Certainly, apart from being sources of political marginalization of women, they are also sources of domestic and other gender-based violence such as rape and passion killing which plague KwaZulu-Natal in particular and the South African society in general. Indeed, beyond posting commendable statistics on women in governance in Africa, South Africa and, in this case, KwaZulu-Natal need to find more successful ways of translating the growing and laudable female representation in political organs and institutions throughout the state into more effective gains on issues of most concern to women. Suffice it to say that apart from legislation, the attitudes that inform the marginalization of women in both the public and private spaces require

a deeper understanding and re-orientation of authentic African patriarchy and the masculinities it spews.

Nature of Women's Involvement in Peace Building

Women in Richmond, Shobashobane and Nongoma are marginalised in the post-conflict peace processes of their various communities. As many as 101 (70%) of the 144 women who responded to questions on the nature of women's involvement in peace processes said they were excluded from the peace processes that followed the cessation of violence at different times in their communities.

Figure 4:
Involvement in government-initiated peace process (n=144)



However, the remaining 43 women who were part of the peace processes in their various communities attended peace meetings regularly and were never late or absent for once, to underscore their commitment to peace. Of these 43, 19 indicated that their presence in the peace processes actually made a difference in terms of conflict resolution. For example, Ms Zulu stated that she was "very vocal during the peace process and my views were taken into account. For example, I made some recommendations on the kind of persons to be drafted into the mediation meetings and these recommendations were taken and used as part of the criteria"[54].

Figure 5:
General impact on government-initiated peace process (n=43)



As a part of the peace process, did your presence make a difference in resolution of conflict?

Although the cell sizes in figure 6 are too small to make any meaningful analysis of how women specifically impacted positively on the conflict, they do serve as indicators of the values and contributions women can bring and make if they form a critical mass in peace-building processes. For instance, women engaged in direct mediation talks with warring factions that yielded dividends in terms of all parties to conflict agreeing to back down completely from violence and engage in peace-making through dialogue. See Figure 6 below which shows the responses of 12 of these women who were able to measure their impact in the peace processes they were part of.

Although they could not specifically measure how their contributions specifically led to the resolution of the conflict, the other 24 women were very positive that their involvement was instrumental to the general peace-building effort and to the present state of peace being enjoyed in their communities. According to Mr. Nyembe, "women were the only visible agitators for peace during the conflict in this area. They organised very strongly for peace and their persistence was rewarded with a seat in the peace meetings during which their voices were loud enough to make us men stay the course for peace"[55].

Figure 6:
Specific impact on government-initiated peace process (n=12)



How did your presence make a difference?

Perceptions on Women's Political Representation and Peace-Building Nexus

To gauge their perceptions on women's political participation and its effect on peace building, respondents were asked, "Will increased

Figure 7: **Perceptions on political participation and peace building (n=147)**



More women in politics would cause lasting peace in community

Figure 8: **Women's impact on service delivery and good governance (n=134)**



political representation of women both in government and decision-making structures enhance the outcome of a peace process?" The popular perception was that more women in politics would enhance the outcome of a peace process. For instance, a significant majority (106 women, representing 72.2% of the 147 who responded to the question) believe that more women in politics would ensure lasting peace in their communities and in the wider KZN province. Of this number, 21 (14.2%) said more women in politics would not lead to peace and the remaining 20 (13.6%) were not sure.

Quality of Women's Representation in Politics

In terms of the quality of women's representation in politics, 70 (52.4%) of the 134 respondents agreed that the few women in politics in their communities and those representing them at provincial and national levels have made significant differences in terms of good governance and service delivery. Across the three study areas, names that came out more frequently in relation to good leadership and tangible service

delivery than others include the Mayor of Zululand, Zanele Magwaza (82%), Mrs. Nelisiwe Nyembe (68%), Mrs. Dorah Moniza Cele (62%), the Mayor of Pietermaritzburg, Zanele Hlatshwayo (54%), and Mrs. Zanele Sithole (50%). However, of the 134 respondents, 37 (27.6%) felt that women in governance at various levels (municipal, provincial and national) have not made any difference in governance and service delivery. The remaining 27 (20%) did not know whether or not these women's participation in governance have made any difference in service delivery. More than half of these 27 women blamed their ignorance on this question on the fact that they do not know which women represent them; so they could not comment on their effectiveness.

Discussion and conclusion

Conflict remains endemic in KwaZulu-Natal. Although wide-scale armed violence abated significantly between 2002 and 2009, the socio-economic effects of past armed conflicts linger on and exacerbate poverty in a province bedevilled by vast human security vulnerabilities. Findings from our survey reveal that women disproportionately share the burden of armed and social forms of conflict in the province but are marginalised in post-conflict reconstruction and transformation processes. This is antithetical to the positive contributions they make towards peaceful resolutions during conflict, and their efforts towards community building and development as shown in the high level and quality of women's representation in community politics. When compared with the percentage of women's representation (38%) at the provincial parliament, women's direct involvement in governance is higher (58%) at the community/grassroots level in the study areas combined. A plausible reason for this is that quotas are not required in the communities to mainstream women into the public space, whereas at the provincial level, the political party quota system is the main instrument of gender mainstreaming in politics. For example, as shown in Figure 1, of the 149 women who responded to the question on their involvement in community decision-making, 86 (58%) said they were involved in the decision-making processes of their communities. Indeed, women's high participation in politics at the rural level is indicative of the fact that traditionally women are recognised and accepted as active participants in the political processes of their communities. In this way, women's participation at community levels of governance becomes more effective in addressing the concerns of women compared to their representation at the provincial level as these women know and choose those they feel will best represent

their interests as women. By implication, women could articulate their interests and set their own agendas when allowed to. As Figure 8 shows, 70 (52%) of the 134 women who responded to the question were sure, and cited examples, of women in their communities who made a difference in governance and service delivery when they held office, and of those who still hold public office. A total of 27 (20%) of the 134 answered "don't know" with a few more, approximately half that number, adding that they did not know because they have been politically apathetic, and that while they were sure women could make a difference in governance, they were not sure in this case because they had not been paying attention. By implication, therefore, "don't know" in their case does not necessarily mean women in community governance have not made a difference in terms of service delivery and governance.

However, despite the relatively high level of women's involvement in decision-making at the community level, only 27 (18%) of the 146 women who responded to the question on the level of women's participation in community decision-making, agreed that women were equally involved as men. Also, 10 (6.8%) of them indicated that women were very involved. Though implying a contradiction, what came out from a further probing of this issue was that these women still saw their participation as an instrument of legitimising male hegemony. For example, as one of them said in a focus group discussion, "we always end up choosing from the few men who attend the community meetings to fill leadership positions"[56]. According to another group led by Nelly Ntombela in Maye, Nongoma, women constitute the majority in the registered list of voters from the area, they tend to attend meetings more than men, and yet do not hold leadership positions in the community because "we tend to always appoint men, instead of ourselves, to ward executive positions at the party level because, somehow, we believe men are better leaders"[57]. This is a form of women's marginalisation in politics, which in this case, is perpetuated by women themselves. It also leaves a question mark on the effectiveness of numbers (critical mass) as opposed to quality (critical acts) because despite the fact that women are usually the majority in community meetings, they either do not hold real power or are still suffering from age-long socialisation that women are not capable leaders. For example, when asked if more women in politics would bring lasting peace in KZN, approximately 14.2% (21) of the women said "no"[58]. The reasons for this answer ranged from "we women are petty and can stir a quarrel from very little things", (4) "women are better suited for the private sphere" (12) to "women can be as corrupt as men" (5). According to Emmerencia Zulu, who is also

former councillor in Zululand district municipality, "we women do not have faith in ourselves due to lack of knowledge and capability to act and this is a result of a deep culture of patriarchy. That's why we give our chances to our men"[59]. Although only 15% of the study sample felt that more women in politics would not bring lasting peace in their communities, it is still a cause for concern because there could be more women out there who strongly feel the same way. By expressing such sentiments, they could act as spoilers to gender balancing in politics.

However, this study did not discountenance the fact that this kind of thinking could be the long-term result of the masculinisation of society and politics which has successfully socialised women into thinking and feeling incapable of effective politicking. These feelings are not helped by a dominant culture of neo-patriarchy which tends to undermine the effectiveness of women's representation in politics at the provincial level as our interview with the KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Public Works, Mrs. Lydia Johnson shows. According to her, men use non-verbal communicative methods like expressing doubt on women's technical ability to carry out a task or simply ignoring them when they make contributions to certain debates in council to undermine the women in ways aimed at deflating their confidence[60]. She contends that such a stifling socio-cultural climate is not conducive to effective participation of women in politics.

On a positive note, respondents generally used the good performance of the few women mentioned to justify the need for more women in politics and the effect this would have on lasting peace in their communities and in the province as a whole. However, beyond a descriptive value, how much do these data tell us about the factors that impact on the perception that more women in politics would qualitatively change the character of politics and enhance peace building? In other words, what explanatory variables determine the predictors of women (respondents) who are likely or unlikely to hold such an opinion? These are questions that this paper does not address but remain worthwhile for further research if we are to fully grasp the essence of feminizing politics and peace-building in Africa. Meanwhile, the crux of our analysis is that the relational values that women generally represent and can bring to politics, if given space to choose their own representatives, are necessary requirements for amicable resolution of conflict and for sustaining peace in KwaZulu-Natal. In this regard, a second challenge for further research is how to reinvent the positive aspects of pre-colonial gender relations which valued women as different but complementary partners with men in enabling societal progress. This reinvention should also involve

modernizing them within the global realities of the 21st century but without necessarily westernizing them.

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3. Adjibolosoo, S, *The Human Factor in Developing Africa*, (Wesport: Praeger, 1995); Also, in a public lecture hosted by the School of Politics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg on the Human Factor and Good Governance, the guest speaker, Prof Senyo Adjibolosoo argued: "personal growth in positive human factor qualities such as integrity, accountability, responsibility, commitment, selflessness and truthfulness create a fertile environment for good governance" (10 July, 2009).
4. Dollar et al, op. cit. p.426
5. Ibid, p.427
6. Isike conducted a survey of 325 rural women between 2005 and 2007 (185 in KZN in South Africa and 140 in the Niger-Delta of Nigeria) with similar characteristics: bio-data, rural location, experience of armed conflict and poverty.
7. Anne Marie Goetz used this phrase in the title of her article which critically engaged with perceptions and studies that profile women as less corrupt than men in which she questioned the efficacy of instrumentalizing women as agents of anti-corruption. According to her, "investing in the myth of women's incorruptible nature instead of investigation of the reasons for that behaviour will postpone the institutional reform necessary for a transformation of public

institutions in the interests of gender and social equity" (Goetz, A.M, "Political Cleaners: How women are the new anti-corruption face. Does the evidence wash?" *Development and Change,* 38,1, (2003), p.17.

8. For more critical positions on the efficacy of profiling women as better leaders than men see Gokcekus, O and Mukherjee, R "Public sector corruption and gender: perception of public officials from six Developing and Transition countries" (World Bank Mimeo, 2002). Also, others have also argued in the critical mass *versus* critical acts debate that more women in politics does not automatically translate to meeting the yearnings, aspirations and development needs of the teeming number of women, especially those in rural Africa, who remain poor, illiterate, excluded, oppressed and constantly abused. For example, see Grey, S, "Does Size Matter?" *Parliamentary Affairs*, 1,19, (2002), p.295-99; Childs, S, *New Labour's Women MP's: Women Representing Women* (New York: Routledge, 2004) and Krook, M, *Politicizing Representation: Campaigns for Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide*, Ph.D. Diss. Columbia University (2005)
9. See UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000
10. See Isike and Uzodike "Marginalizing women in politics: trends from KwaZulu-Natal", paper presented at the Social Science Conference, convened by the African Institute of South Africa (AISA), Human Science Research Council (HSRC) & Social Sciences Network of South Africa (SSNSA) in Johannesburg, 27-30 September, 2006
11. See Goetz, A.M and Hassim, S "In and against the party: women's representation and constituency building in Uganda and South Africa" In Molyneux, M and Razavi, S (eds.) *Gender Justice, Development and Rights*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Molyneux, M and Razavi, S (eds.) *Gender Justice, Development and Rights*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mohanty, C.T (2003) "'Under Western Eyes' Revisited: Feminist Solidarity through Anti-capitalist Struggle" *Signs,* 28, 2, (2003), 499 – 539 and Childs, op. cit.
12. We have argued elsewhere that like femininities and masculinities, patriarchy is not monolithic as they are constantly changing. In Africa, we can distinguish between two broad types of patriarchies on a time-line basis; pre-colonial and colonial African patriarchies. For us, the difference between both patriarchies is that the pre-colonial showed better regard for women than the colonial form which was the height of the commoditisation of women occasioned by deliberate cultural denigration and capitalist exploitation of the continent's resources (Isike and Uzodike, op. cit.). The patriarchies that came with colonialism were new to the region as compared to the pre-colonial forms of African patriarchies — hence the label "neo-African patriarchies".
13. Isike, C "Feminising the peace process: a comparative analysis of women and conflict in the Niger-Delta (Nigeria) and KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa)", PhD thesis, 2009

14. Interviews with Mrs Lydia Johnson, Public Works MEC, October 2007 and Heads, Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Housing, Community Safety and Liaison, and Public Works (October 2007).
15. See Gordon, A *Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy: Gender and Development in Africa,* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996); Molyneux & Razavi, op. cit. and Childs op. cit. For example, Childs argues that distinct party ideologies often create different opportunities for women to pursue feminist policy concerns. According to her, "right-wing parties tend to favour more traditional roles for women, while left-wing parties are often more open to new and even multiple gender roles" (ibid. p.16)
16. Lederach, J *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (Oxford: University Press, 2005), p. 27 - 29
17. Ibid, p. 29.
18. Ibid, p.19 – 27.
19. Ibid, p.19
20. Ibid, p.10 and 19
21. Ibid, p.40
22. Ibid, p.35
23. Gagnon, J, "Men 'O' War: examining the role of masculine social construction as an obstacle to peace"(2003) www.gseweb.harvard.edu. Accessed 14/5/05 p.5 - 9
24. ibid, p.6
25. This worldview of communalism has been variously conceptualized as *Negritude* (Sekou Toure), Humanism (Kenneth Kaunda), *Ujamaa* (Julius Nyerere) and African Socialism (Kwame Nkrumah).
26. Nyerere, J, "'Ujamaa': the basis of African Socialism". In Nnoli, N (ed.) *Government and Politics in Africa: A Reader*, (Harare: AAPS Books, 2000), p.151 - 158
27. Tutu, D, *No Future without Forgiveness* (London: Pinter, 1999), p.35
28. See Amadiume, I, *Re-inventing Africa: Matriarchy, Religion and Culture* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1997).
29. Gagnon, op. cit. p. 7
30. See Lederach, op. cit. p. 34.
31. For example see Gluckman, M, *Order and Rebellion in tribal Africa* (London: Cohen and West, 1963); Lugg, H, *A Guide to Zulu Social System* (Durban: University of Natal Press, 1978) and Wright, J, "Control of women's labour in the Zulu Kingdom" In: Peires, J (ed.), *Before and after Shaka: Papers in Nguni History*, (Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 82–99, 1981).
32. Weir, J, "Chiefly Women and Women's Leadership in Pre-colonial Southern Africa" In Gasa, N (ed.) *Women in South African* History (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007), P. 7.
33. They have been variously caricatured as opportunists who used

their royal connections to appropriate power and benefits for themselves, and whose activism was the exception rather than the norm (see Lugg, op. cit and Hanretta, S, "Women, marginality and the Zulu state: Women's institutions and power in the early nineteenth century" *Journal of African History* 39, (1985), 389 – 415). However, according to Afro-centric works like those of Weir op. cit, Nandi (Shaka's mother), was more than a romantic figure who exercised considerable influence in the political affairs of the Kingdom before and during Shaka's reign.

34. Weir, op. cit. p.7
35. Weir, J "I shall need to use her to rule': The power of 'royal' Zulu women in pre-colonial Zululand," *South African Historical Journal* , 43 (2000), p.3 - 23.
36. Weir, 2007, op. cit, p.10.
37. See Ngubane, H, *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine*. (London: Academic Press, 1977).
38. Ngubane, op. cit, p.142.
39. Weir, 2007, op. cit, p.5
40. See ibid, p.6.
41. Ibid, p.8
42. Ibid, p.12
43. The *James Stuart Archives* is an extensive compilation of oral histories with statements from numerous informants collected between 1890 and 1920 by James Stuart, a colonial administrator. Although John Wright notes that the majority of the informants were African males connected to chiefly families in both Natal colony and the Zulu kingdom, they still provide much useful information on leading women (Weir, 2007, op. cit).
44. Ibid, p.14
45. Ibid, p.14 – 15
46. This is not to say that all women are necessarily pacifists as there are also records not only of women who have taken decisions to go to war but also where women actively participated as combatants. Even pre-colonial African history shows records of women regents waging war. However, as Nodding explained, "women's acceptance of war does not seem to emerge from seeing striving as a virtue but rather from a desire to remain in positive relation with those who worship striving" (Noddings in Soest, 1995: 168).
47. Amadiume, op. cit
48. Nzeogwu, N, "African women and the fire dance"(2000) available online in http://www.westafricareview.com/vol2.1/nzegwu2 Accessed 14/08/07
49. Gordon, op. cit
50. Campbell, H. (2003) *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the PatriarchalModel of Liberation* (Claremont: David Philips Publishers,

2003), p. 283.

51. Robinson, 1995: 9, quoted in Bentley, K – "Who will woo her on 14th April? Targeting the female electorate" Election Synopsis, 1, 2 (2004)
52. Wood, K and Jewkes, R, Violence, rape and sexual coercion: everyday love in a South African Township, *Gender and Development* 5, 2, (1997), p.12 - 35
53. Interview with Ms Lydia Johnson, KwaZulu-Natal MEC (Minister) for Public Works in Pietermaritzburg, October 3 2007.
54. Interview with Ms Emerencia Zulu, a School teacher, in Nongoma, August 5 2006. She declined to give details of the recommendations she made as, according to her, there were security issues which still need to be out of the public domain for the sake of maintaining the peace.
55. Interview with Mr Nyembe in Nongoma, August 5, 2006
56. Focus Group Discussion with 10 women in Dabhasi, Nongoma, Northern area of KwaZulu-Natal, September 8, 2006
57. Focus Group Discussion with 5 women in Maye, Nongoma, Northern area of KwaZulu-Natal, September 9, 2006
58. As shown in figure 7, 72.2% said "yes" and 13.6% answered "don't know".
59. Interview with Ms Zulu, op. cit
60. Interview with MEC Johnson, op cit

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Analyzing programme strategies using the reflective peace practice matrix and the seven functions of civil society in peacebuilding: Reflections on a case study from Burundi

Sylvester Bongani Maphosa

ABSTRACT

A wide range of actors have become involved in peacebuilding work and with this contemporary flood, there are multiple and varied initiatives. Many actors make invaluable contributions to the transformation of war-affected communities but not all peacebuilding programmes may be positive. This article considers the peacebuilding strategies of one non-governmental organization in Burundi building peace from below in terms of effectiveness and relevance. It presents the conceptual framework and the principles that underpin a strategic peacebuilding practice highlighting three important aspects – the descriptive element of the dimensions that interact, the outcome-oriented element (i.e., results of the undertaking), and the process-oriented dimension (i.e., the dynamics of change). The approach of the discussion taken is one of learning rather measuring peacebuilding objectives, to improve the quality of programmes and inform the design of more strategic approaches by tracking the relevant effects of the programmes.

Introduction

OVER THE PAST decade the proportion of civil society organisations (CSOs) working in Burundi, and most of them dedicated to peace

and reconciliation, has been accelerating. While Burundi's peace is holding, and the country making huge steps forward, durable peace still inconsistently remains fragile. Consequently, concern about the practice and strategies of peacebuilding by civil society actors has grown reasonably significantly, especially in Africa, where many states are trying to build a peace culture against a milieu of limited capacity, and many researchers seeking to document African peacebuilding experience.

Peacebuilding: the road to a strategic approach

Peacebuilding is a more complex undertaking requiring multiple processes and a broad range of actors at all social, political, and economic levels. There is no single project or actor that can do everything. According to Chigas & Woodrow, "peace requires that many people work at many levels in different ways, and, with all this work, you cannot tell who is responsible for what …progress toward it [i.e., just and sustainable peace] immeasurable in its multitude of small steps, it appears that anything can qualify as peace practice".[1] Consequently, they suggest that a peacebuilding project is strategic when it responds to: (i) addressing the most important issues and/or factors; (ii) stops destructive dynamics; (iii) uses limited resources effectively; (iv) leverages a relatively small action to a larger effect; (v) results in real, tangible changes (in other words, it is effective); (vi) creates momentum for change; and, (vii) is based on an explicit theory of change (a clear understanding of how change actually comes about in the area of concern).[2]

However, developing real strategies has proven to be a nightmare for many practitioners. The Reflection on Peace Practice (RPP) project of the Collaborative Development Assistance (CDA) raised the following issues:

i. Programmes are often designed without reference to any analysis. There is no clear connection between analysis and the programme choices made;
ii. Organizations tend to rely on the methods or approaches they feel most comfortable with, rather than what may be most needed following the adage that "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail"; and,
iii. Peacebuilding organizations sometimes focus on positive programming, neglecting the difficult work of addressing *what needs to be stopped*[3]

Lisa Schirch asserts that peacebuilding is strategic when resources, actors, and approaches are coordinated to accomplish multiple goals

and address multiple issues for the long-term.[4] Figure 1 provides a synthesis of the main areas and activities in peacebuilding as envisaged by Schirch.[5]

Figure 1: *Categories of peacebuilding*



Schirch maintains that while many actors engage in multiple categories of peacebuilding, the map highlights the unique goals of different approaches to or categories of peacebuilding. She characterises the components of these categories as:

i. Advocating for Change: Advocates and activists seek to gain support for change by increasing a group's power to address issues, and ripen the conditions needed to transform relationships.
ii. Reducing Direct Violence: Interveners seek to reduce direct violence by restraining perpetrators from violence, relieving the immediate suffering of victims of violence, and creating a safe space for peacebuilding activities in other categories that address the root causes of the violence.
iii. Transforming Relationships: Interveners aim to transform destructive relationships with an array of processes that address trauma, transform conflict and restore a sense of justice. These processes give people opportunities to create long-term, sustainable

solutions to address their needs.

iv. Capacity Building: Longer-term peacebuilding efforts enhance existing capacities to meet needs and rights and prevent violence. These activities aim to build just structures that support a sustainable culture of peace.[6]

John Paul Lederach developed a transformation actor-oriented approach that emphasizes the need to reach all levels of society through peacebuilding processes. The model draws attention on the indigenous actors from within the country in conflict and not on external actors.[7] According to Paffenholz, the role of external actors is limited to supporting internal actors by means of empowerment.[8] Two aims can be elicited from Lederach's peacebuilding approach. First, the model aims to identify representative individuals or groups and empower them by means of peacebuilding measures. Second, the model aims to build a long-term infrastructure for peacebuilding through supporting the available peacebuilding potential of the society. Figure 2 demonstrates how Lederach's approach divides the society in the conflict country into three levels which could be approached with different peacebuilding strategies.[9]

Figure 2: *Peacebuilding pyramid*



i. The top-level elite leadership comprises the key political, military, and religious leaders in the conflict. They are the primary representatives of their constituencies and are therefore highly visible.[10] A great deal of attention is paid to their movements, statements and positions. As a result, they are under great pressure to maintain a position of strength in relation to their adversaries and their own constituencies.
ii. The middle-range leadership, including leaders of mid-level NGOs comprises those who function in leadership positions but are not necessarily connected with formal government or major opposition movements.[11] Their status and influence derive from their relationships with others. They serve as an important connection between the top and grassroots levels. They have significant connections and contact to the broader context and yet are not encumbered by the political calculations and survival demands facing the elite and grassroots respectively. Also, because these middle-range leaders have lower visibility, they tend to have greater flexibility of movement and action.
iii. The grassroots leadership level includes those involved in local communities, members of indigenous NGOs carrying out relief projects, health officials, and refugee camp leaders.[12] These people understand intimately the fear and suffering with which much of the population must endure. They also have expert knowledge of local politics and its adversaries.

The model implies that different peacebuilding processes must be adopted at each level of the hierarchy. The various activities must be integrated into a comprehensive peacebuilding framework. Looking at figure 2, annotated on the right are approaches to peacebuilding by different level actors. The approaches at all three levels serve an important systemic function. Maiese asserts that advancing political negotiations among elites, and implementing accords, no doubt plays an integral role in the transition to peace.[13] Likewise, the problem-solving workshops and peace commissions formed by mid-level leaders play a central role in establishing a relationship- and skill-based infrastructure necessary to sustain the peace building process.[14] Lastly, grassroots approaches bring together former enemies at the village level, and are a crucial part of moving toward reconciliation and durable peace. Maiese concludes that together, the three levels and their associated approaches form a comprehensive framework for building peace.[15]

In an attempt to promote integrated approaches to peacebuilding, in both theory and practice, Ricigliano postulates a Networks of Effective Action (NEA). He asserts that the concept of an NEA does not refer to a particular structure, but to a set of practices for how

peacebuilding actors can organize themselves for more effective and integrated collaboration and for greater impact on conflict situations at the programmatic and systemic levels.[16] Ricigliano constructs the rationale for NEA in the context of contemporary shift in the trend of conflict from inter-state to protracted intrastate conflict.[17] Also, careful examination of peacebuilding interventions has documented negative, though unintended, impacts.[18] In addition, numerous breakdowns in peace processes occur due to an inability to control spoilers (e.g. Angola 1992, Rwanda 1994) or an inability to conclude subsequent negotiations called for by, and critical to, an initial accord (e.g., Israel–Palestine 1994; Democratic Republic of Congo 1999; 2008).[19] So Ricigliano suggests that an integrated approach to peacebuilding has the potential to address these trends.

In order to develop a NEA concept, Ricigliano uses a typology that categorises peacebuilding interventions into three types, namely: political, social and structural. Empirical evidence demonstrates that activity in any of the political, social, or structural areas has an impact on activity in the other areas. As a result, sustainable peacebuilding necessitates appropriate and adequate improvements made in all the three areas. There is a danger of any one process getting too far out in front of progress in the other areas. In Zimbabwe, for instance, efforts to push ahead with structural peacebuilding when South Africa provided R300million in December 2008 in agricultural assistance through the Zimbabwe Humanitarian and Development Assistance Framework (ZHDAF) had the outcome effect of undermining progress in the political and social areas. The aid legitimised the illegal regime that was in de facto control of Zimbabwe and violated the September 2008 agreement signed by all parties.[20]

However, it is not always the case; sometimes there may be a silver lining to some of the interventions. Ricigliano invokes the case of Guatemala wherein the structural process (building democratic institutions) and the political process (negotiating a formal cessation of hostilities) had a synergistic effect on each other.[21] In effect, Azpuru asserts that in Guatemala "the process of democratization paved the way for the start of the peace negotiations, and the five years of negotiations themselves advanced the process of democratization".[22] Some studies, for example Feldman & Assaf, demonstrate that a growth in social capital (a social peacebuilding goal) has a large effect on raising household incomes (a structural peacebuilding goal).[23] In Burundi, for instance, progress in building democratic institutions (structural peacebuilding) has been instrumental in breaking down group polarization, stereotypes and propaganda that instigate ethnic conflicts (social peacebuilding).

Put in a few words, Ricigliano observes that while the effectiveness of the integrated approach is supported by evidence from the field, the approach itself is far from being a coherent theory of peacebuilding. The specific interrelationships and relative sequencing of activity between the political, social, and structural fields, as well as the criteria for what constitutes 'sufficient progress' in any one field, are neither known nor knowable. Further research is recommended to develop a mechanism to push the field in the direction of better understanding and using integrated approaches.[24]

The facilitation of social action for psychosocial support in communities torn apart by war is a major responsibility for those engaged in peacebuilding and healing of communities. According to Sliep & Meyer-Weitz "the search for sustainable problem-solving strategies in dislocated communities challenges conventional practice in managing [post-war] psychosocial trauma".[25] Healthy relationships and security of peaceful communities seems to be influenced by the physical and social contexts as well as social cohesion. An improved integrated peacebuilding approach lies in the generation of social capital. Social capital has been defined as the set of norms, values, and relationships shared among individuals and groups that permits and facilitates cooperation among them.

Putnam referred to norms and trust that contribute to the coordination and cooperation of people for mutual benefit.[26] These understandings reflect the relational and material components of social capital also referred to as bonding, bridging and linking social capital which is particularly relevant for the purpose of this article.[27] These three primary functions of social capital are practical in conceptualising the nature of community relationships and mobilising these relationships.

i. Bonding social capital refers to intra-community networks that are inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups that bring integration and cohesion through trust, reciprocal support and a positive identity.[28] Its effects refer to the facilitation of collective problem-solving. Social cohesion on the other hand is the adequacy of the physical and social contexts in a community to facilitate peaceful communities by decreasing polarisation and stereotypes, creating spaces for dialogue and reconciliation, fostering cultural and social compatibility and facilitating acceptance of difference. Bonding social capital is particularly useful in regenerating more positive identities of the self in the case of marginalised voices of the victims of the violent past, such as child soldiers, raped and impregnated women and oppressed ethnic groups. Breaking the silence and isolation that

takes place with these kinds of war problems and creating networks of support is essential in building a lasting positive peace (social peacebuilding). Sliep & Meyer-Weitz put forward that "sharing of similar problems, increasing trust through a support group or friendships and creating a safe place where discussions could take place … the involvement of other members from the community like neighbours and leaders have helped to break the silence around sensitive problems [and enhance structural and political peacebuilding]".[29]

ii. Bridging social capital networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages.[30] Different groups with varying levels of access to material and symbolic power are linked. It brings people in contact with resources and benefits that are accrued from having a wide and varied range of contacts.[31] In dislocated communities there is generally little evidence of trusting and supporting networks amongst different groups, and these would need to be actively facilitated. Thus, Sliep & Meyer-Weitz suggest that small groups can be linked to networks of influence outside of their geographical location.

iii. Linking social capital networks join people across asymmetric power relations and may provisionally be viewed as a form of bridging social capital that specifically concerns power and resources.[32] Middleton et al., maintain that this function "captures a vitally important feature of life in poor [post-conflict and fragile] communities: that their members are usually excluded – by overt discrimination or lack of resources – from the places where major decisions relating to their welfare are made".[33] Linking networks encourage participation and ownership of peacebuilding and community development endeavours.

The shifting trajectories of peacebuilding have resulted in increased space for civil society participation. A key proponent of this shift was John Paul Lederach whose peacebuilding pyramid is discussed above. Many international donors have avowed the importance of non-state actors in peacebuilding mirrored by their adjusted policy frameworks and increased operational support to civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. Examples include the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' *Strategic Framework: Peacebuilding a development perspective* (2004) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation *A Strategy for Peacebuilding* (2005). This growing importance attributed to civil society initiatives affirms the recognition that peacebuilding entails numerous societal reconstruction undertakings that the previously elitist only approach of official diplomacy and technical reconstruction programmes can hardly achieve. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan's 2001 *Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict* and the 2005 UN Security Council Presidential Statement S/

PRST/2005/42 underscored the potential contributions of a vibrant and diverse civil society in conflict prevention as well as in the peaceful settlement of disputes and transition of societies emerging from violent conflict.

This article therefore focused on the role of local strategies and community based initiatives in peacebuilding in Burundi. The study aimed to elicit women and men's perceptions of the effectiveness and relevance of local peacebuilding initiatives and strategies using the RPP matrix and the seven functions of civil society by using a mixed methods case study approach. A diverse and vibrant civil society is key to enduring peacebuilding[34] and in particular the role of grassroots actors has been important in promoting localized peacebuilding initiatives, initiating reconciliation processes, building capacities in peace education, building bridges, trust and interdependence between different groups, and, monitoring government and warring factions against human rights violations and social injustices frequently seen as root causes of violent conflicts.[35] Examples of such civil society actors include AVEGA-AGAHOZO in Rwanda, the Coalition Grassroots Women Organization in Somalia, Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in northern Uganda, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL), the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) of Kenya, and the West African Peace Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). It is envisaged that a better understanding of local civil society peacebuilding initiatives and strategies may inform future approaches and practice to enhance engagement in more durable peacebuilding.

Analyzing CENTRE UBUNTU programme strategies using the RPP matrix and the seven functions of civil society in peace building

The objectives of this exposition were two-fold, viz. (i) To analyse existing CENTRE UBUNTU project strategies and whether they are likely to be effective in promoting enduring peace, and to identify potential future activities that would enhance the effectiveness of the projects using the RPP matrix framework; and, (ii) To assess the relevance of CENTRE UBUNTU peacebuilding strategies using the framework for the analysis of the role of civil society in peacebuilding.

Chigas & Woodrow assert that assessing contribution of civil society actors to enduring peace is complicated because most peacebuilding programmes are isolated endeavours aimed at affecting one and often a small piece of the puzzle and thus no single project can do everything.[36] The viewpoint that indeed peace outcomes are difficult to assess is submitted by Bush (1998) and Menkhaus (2004).[37]

Effectiveness

To explore the effectiveness of CENTRE UBUNTU peacebuilding strategies, I employed the RPP matrix derived and modified from Anderson & Olson, and Chigas & Woodrow.[38] I made use of the focus group and individual in-depth interview transcripts, unobtrusive interviews and personal field observations and including a study of organization documents, examining them to reach conclusions guided by the following questions: Who are key people? Which individuals or groups are addressed in order for peace to come about and how? Which key people are linked to key peacebuilding factors? Who are the hard to reach people? Which broader constituencies in the larger population are important to reach, build support for peace, and to affect public opinion?

The following experiences are cases from CENTRE UBUNTU peacebuilding work in Burundi:

> The organization performs individual and collective (community) trauma healing ventures ***[individual-personal/more people quadrant].*** Also, linking up with War Trauma Foundation of the Netherlands and the School of Psychology and Health of the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa and with four organizations from the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, viz. two organizations from Uvira namely SOS-JED-Jeunesse en Difficulté and Uvira Relief Team plus two organizations from Bukavu namely Love in Action and Restore Hope Centre, thus creating the network called PROJECT COLOMBE ***[This then took the programme into the more people/ socio-political quadrant].*** The organization also works with special groups of people (e.g., child soldiers, demobilized soldiers, IDPs, and returnees) in the reintegration process ***[individual-personal/key people domain].***
>
> There is a training programme for local community counsellors to work with victims and perpetrators haunted by the violent past and committees to replicate the peacebuilding activities with other villages ***[individual-personal/key people].***
>
> Collaboration to strengthen local capacities for peace in the Great Lakes Region working with the Joint Commission for Refugees – JCR (Tanzania, Burundi, DRC and Rwanda); Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace – Burundi, Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Ruyigi, Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Bukavu (DRC) and the Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Uvira (DRC) within a project called Cross Border Peace for Development Programme, in order to prevent violent conflicts and lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development ***[socio-political quadrant].***
>
> Linking up with the UNHCR, the Congregation of the Spiritan

Fathers, Justice and Peace Commission and Caritas of Kigoma Diocese in Tanzania, visits and trainings on *ubuntu* values have been organized in the camps of Burundian Refugees of Mtabila-Muyovozi, in Kasulu, Tanzania ***[more people/socio-political quadrant].***

Work with schools to foster change in attitudes, perceptions, ideas, and relationships with individuals ***[individual-personal/more people quadrant].***

Radio programmes broadcasting peace messages and *ubuntu* values on tolerance, love, and living together to a very broad audience ***[more people/individual-personal level].***

Train prison and police officers on helpful listening, nonviolent communication, and inter-group relationships ***[individual-personal/key people quadrant].***

Publish monthly periodicals on peace education and *ubuntu* values to foster appreciation of the other and culture of peace ***[individual-personal/more people level].***

Capacity building of grassroots communities in self-help schemes to improve livelihoods and also foster inter-group tolerance and mutual relationships ***[individual-personal/more people quadrant].***

Work in service delivery in terms of housing project ***[individual-personal/more people level].***

Responding to the abovementioned guiding questions and outlined programmes I began to plot the programmes in the quadrants of the matrix locating the starting points of the activities on the matrix. As I did this plotting exercise I continually probed myself: Where did the organization begin to work? Was it a training programme for key people or more people? Were it individual and/or community trauma healing? Was it a dialogue? Was it a media effort?

Having plotted the activities on the quadrants, I began to explore for effectiveness guided by the following questions: What linkages have the programme made effectively? How can they be strengthened? What are the gaps? Are there linkages that can be made between individual-personal and socio-political domains and between more people and key people? What can be done within the programme itself? What can be done by networking with other NGOs and/or institutions to make the peacebuilding work more effective? The following display was the result of the exercise.

As Figure 3 and 4 demonstrate, the analysis established that CENTRE UBUNTU was making discernible and noteworthy peacebuilding impact for several reasons. First, efforts on building inter-group relationships and trust across ethnic groups, increasing tolerance through *ubuntu* value and peace education, trauma healing and increasing hope that peace is possible through narrative theatre

are producing remarkable transformations in attitudes, perceptions, trust and relationships with other individuals. These personal changes have translated (and continue to translate) into actions at the socio-political domain evidenced by collective attempts to affect Great Lakes regional dynamics and lay foundations of a peace culture and foster sustainable peace and development. However, on the other hand the analysis as well indicates that the organization is not doing enough to build momentum for significant change as evidenced by programmes that locate within one quadrant (individual-personal/key people). In fact, an evaluation of a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Peace Fund in Nepal found that many good small local initiatives with positive effects on the local level failed to develop influence on the macro level peace process because initiatives were scattered, not coordinated and failed to create a peace movement that could pressure for peace. In addition, the local impact of these initiatives was limited, as it proved extremely hard to mobilize people for a long term culture of peace when they were in need of basic needs.[39] My findings with CENTRE UBUNTU affirm these viewpoints. CENTRE UBUNTU socialization activities to create inter-relationships and build a peace culture in Burundi and the Great Lakes as a whole, are sporadic, haphazard and have not yet spawned that country-wide and requisite coordination to create a critical mass for tangible change at macro level to reach peace writ large. Actually, Chigas & Woodrow assert that any individual project aiming to contribute to peace will have more impact if its effects transfer to other quadrants of the matrix.[40] This analysis established that CENTRE UBUNTU contribution to effective peacebuilding is limited because the more people and key people are not linking. These (i.e., more people and key people linkages) must strategically link if they are to be effective in moving toward peace writ large.[41] The dotted line arrows in the matrix indicate "hope lines", that is, absent discernible effects in the other quadrants and for that reason the activities still constitute part of CENTRE UBUNTU key propositions (i.e., theories of change) for peacebuilding practice.

Figure 3

	More People	Key People
Individual-personal change	The organization performs individual and collective (community) trauma healing ventures ***[individual-personal/more people quadrant]*** Work with schools to foster change in attitudes, perceptions, ideas, and relationships with individuals ***[individual-personal/more people quadrant]*** Radio programmes broadcasting peace messages and *ubuntu* values on tolerance, love, and living together to a very broad audience ***[more people/individual-personal level]*** Publish monthly periodicals on peace education and *ubuntu* values to foster appreciation of the other and culture of peace ***[individual-personal/more people level]*** Capacity building of grassroots communities in self-help schemes to improve livelihoods and also foster inter-group tolerance and mutual relationships	The organization also works with special groups of people (e.g., child soldiers, demobilized soldiers, IDPs, and returnees) in the reintegration process ***[individual-personal/key people domain]*** There is a training programme for local community counsellors to work with victims and perpetrators haunted by the violent past and committees to replicate the peacebuilding activities with other villages ***[individual-personal/key people]*** Train prison and police officers on helpful listening, nonviolent communication, and inter-group relationships ***[individual-personal/key people quadrant]***

	More People	Key People
	[individual-personal/more people quadrant]. Work in service delivery in terms of housing project *[individual-personal/more people level].*	
Socio-political change	Also, linking up with War Trauma Foundation of the Netherlands and the School of Psychology and Health of the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa and with four organizations from the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, viz. two organizations from Uvira namely SOS-JED-Jeunesse en Difficulté and Uvira Relief Team plus two organizations from Bukavu namely Love in Action and Restore Hope Centre, thus creating the network called PROJECT COLOMBE ***[This then took the programme into the more people/ socio-political quadrant]*** Linking up with the UNHCR, the Congregation of the Spiritan Fathers, Justice and Peace Commission and Caritas	Collaboration to strengthen local capacities for peace in the Great Lakes Region working with the Joint Commission for Refugees – JCR (Tanzania, Burundi, DRC and Rwanda); Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace – Burundi, Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Ruyigi, Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Bukavu (DRC) and the Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Uvira (DRC) within a project called Cross Border Peace for Development Programme, in order to prevent violent conflicts and lay the foundations for sustainable peace

	More People	Key People
	of Kigoma Diocese in Tanzania, visits and trainings on *ubuntu* values have been organized in the camps of Burundian Refugees of Mtabila-Muyovozi, in Kasulu, Tanzania ***[more people/socio-political quadrant]***	and development ***[socio-political quadrant]***
	Collaboration to strengthen local capacities for peace in the Great Lakes Region working with the Joint Commission for Refugees – JCR (Tanzania, Burundi, DRC and Rwanda); Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace – Burundi, Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Ruyigi, Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Bukavu (DRC) and the Justice and Peace Commission – Diocese of Uvira (DRC) within a project called Cross Border Peace for Development Programme, in order to prevent violent conflicts and lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development ***[socio-political quadrant]***	



Figure 4: RPP Matrix: Findings on effectiveness

Relevance

To analyse the relevance of CENTRE UBUNTU peacebuilding strategies, I used the framework for the analysis of the role of civil society in peacebuilding derived and modified from Paffenholz & Spurk and the World Bank.[42] The framework is largely structured around seven potential functions of civil society in peacebuilding.

A point of departure here is to appreciate that Burundi is currently in a phase of post-war large scale armed hostilities. However, it is critical to underscore that there is continued violence at the individual and community domains, manifesting itself in the form of alcohol abuse, drug abuse, suicide, depression, internalized oppression, crime, interpersonal violence, domestic violence, and rape, and resource predation (particularly land). To assess the relevance of CENTRE UBUNTU strategies I employed a variety of methodologies applied to explore effectiveness. I then adapted the framework of Paffenholz to identify activities of the organization and assess their relevance.[43]

Figure 5: A comprehensive framework for analysis of CENTRE UBUNTU peacebuilding strategies

Civil society functions in peace building	**Activities by CENTRE UBUNTU**	**Relevance of functions in context**
1. Protection	Reintegration of special groups (child soldiers, demobilized soldiers, returnees). *Ubuntu* value and peace education to respond to household violence, inter-personal violence, internalized oppression, suicide, rape, and crime. Trauma healing.	High
2. Monitoring	Observing and monitoring the socio-political landscape in terms of human rights violation such as in prisons to inform work on advocacy and other stakeholders.	High

3. Advocacy	Articulating interests of specific social groups including marginalized groups for peace and human rights such as the internally displaced persons (IDPs), prisoners, returnees, child soldiers, ex-combatants, and women.	High
4. Socialization	*Ubuntu* value and peace education. Trauma healing and community psychosocial healing. Radio broadcasts.	High
5.Social cohesion	Bonding, bridging, and linking communities with stakeholders through narrative theatre, radio broadcasts, periodicals, capacity building of grassroots communities, shared income generating projects, trauma healing. Bringing adversarial groups to work together such as in Ngozi and Gitega.	High
6. Facilitation	Facilitating between grassroots communities and international and national aid agencies to ensure service delivery and rebuilding of social capital.	High
7. Service delivery	Delivery of economic, social and humanitarian aid to create entry points for other functions such as the housing and goat farming projects in Bujumbura-Rural, Ngozi, and Gitega.	High

Using the data above I then began to plot and construct a graphic representation of the relevance of the organization's peacebuilding work in Burundi, illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6:



As Figure 5 and 6 demonstrate, the analysis established that protection is of high relevance for the current Burundi context even in the absence of direct war. This form of protection is against continued structural violence presently manifesting itself at individual and community levels in the form of alcohol abuse, drug abuse, suicide, depression, internalized oppression, crime, interpersonal violence, household violence, and rape aggravating the deep trauma of the violent past war and massacres. Protection also becomes a key precondition for communities to begin the road to recovery and (re)construction of a culture of peace, trust, and inter-group relationships. High relevance of protection correlates with the

organization's actual high level of activities in this domain such as *ubuntu* value and peace education through narrative theatre, radio broadcasts, monthly periodicals, and reintegration of special groups of people. The high relevance of monitoring does not draw a parallel with the low levels of actual activity performed by CENTRE UBUNTU for this domain.

The relevance of advocacy is always high within any context and CENTRE UBUNTU activity level in this regard is high. However, this advocacy work is still focussed at the personal level and has not fully-blown and translated into public social action. In Somalia the Swedish Life and Peace Institute (LPI) has practiced advocacy with the objective of making international actors aware of the need for a people-based peace process, the special role of women in peacebuilding and the provision of funding for people's involvement. Exploring advocacy work by CENTRE UBUNTU, my study established evidence of how the organisation had articulated the interests of specific social groups, including marginalized groups like prisoners, returnees and former child soldiers. In particular, CENTRE UBUNTU successfully advocated for the recognition of justice and human rights in the treatment of prisoners in six prisons of the country – Ngozi male, Ruyigi, Rumonge, Bubanza, Rutana, and Ngozi female prisons. Through this advocacy work, CENTRE UBUNTU articulated and raised awareness on the importance of making prisons places of good behaviour transformation so that prisoners come out upon release as responsible citizens ready to contribute meaningfully into society. The contact the organization facilitated with prison stakeholders has scaled down the violent conditions under which prisoners have been subjected as discussed earlier above. Prison officials have since set up local working committees including prisoners, to constantly monitor and find ways to improve prison conditions.

Socialization activity levels performed by the organization are very high correlating with the high relevancy of this function in the context of Burundi's torn social fabric. Indeed socialization of the population is a pillar of the organization's vision of rebuilding *ubuntu* value based on justice and to foster a peace culture. However, the outcomes from the socialization process to build a culture of peace through attitude change are shrouded with some quandaries. Like in many post-conflict communities, civil society initiatives supporting attitude change of adversary groups have been implemented as part of fostering a culture of peace. Empirical evidence shows that this function is effective only when it reaches a large number of people as discussed in Anderson & Olson (2003, pp.16-23), Chigas & Woodrow (2007, pp. 38-40), and Kelman (1995,

pp. 19-27).[44] In Somalia, for instance, the work of LPI demonstrated that a long-term engagement in promoting a culture of peace and reconciliation can have a medium to long-term impact on peacebuilding. My findings with CENTRE UBUNTU affirm these viewpoints. CENTRE UBUNTU socialization activities are sporadic, haphazard and have not yet spawned that country-wide and requisite coordination to create a critical mass for tangible change at macro level to reach peace writ large. The numbers reached so far are still small. With continued work and regular follow-ups (i.e., monitoring and evaluation) CENTRE UBUNTU will make possible the transfer of the impact to the larger socio-political level and have discernible effect to build enduring peaceful communities.

Social cohesion is very relevant in Burundi and CENTRE UBUNTU's activities in this regard corresponds this need and slowly transferring to collective attempts at a broader scale to affect the socio-political domain. Supporting social cohesion is an important civil society function in peacebuilding, as bridging social capital is usually destroyed during war and needs to be restored. Reconstructing such cohesion in turn contributes to the alleviation of inter-group violence and uncivil virtues, as well as revitalizing cross-group interactions, interdependency and solidarity. Exploring the peacebuilding effects of community development projects for example, the goat project, housing project, radio programmes, and psychosocial activities through narrative theatre and community healing, in the three study areas of Ruziba, Buhero and Ruhororo, the research identified how these projects helped increase levels of contact, interaction and communication across geographic, religious, ethnic and cultural divides, and how this in turn has led to improved co-operation, unity and interdependence between Hutus, Tutsis and Twa groups.

Local facilitation is highly relevant in all contexts. However, the analysis established medium level activities performed by the organization. There is nevertheless discernible bonding, bridging, and linking of grassroots communities with relevant stakeholders although the scale is still minimal. Service delivery is not particularly a peacebuilding function. However, it has a high relevance when used as an entry point for the other functions. CENTRE UBUNTU embarked on service delivery work at the beginning 2008 motivated by extreme poverty levels in grassroots communities which was a hindrance for their peacebuilding intervention activities. As a result, the current level of activities in this domain is still low.

Factors contributing to effectiveness

a) Organizational and leadership dynamism

The study established that the single most important factor influencing effective performance by CENTRE UBUNTU is the character of organizational model of teamwork embracing an integrated approach in which there is mutual follow-up within and among teams on different levels creating a dynamic network. The coordination team headed by Father Emmanuel Ntakarutimana has a vibrant, proactive and self-motivated leadership style that promotes proximity and direct collaboration with partners, committees, and counsellors working in the field and including the target groups. The approach is simple, useful and practical. The organization views itself as a micro system and component of a broader organisational macro system. Consequently, great emphasis is placed on regular learning and reflection through open and continuous internal and external consultations. Since its inception CENTRE UBUNTU holds internal meetings first day of each week facilitating continuous dialogue, communication, learning, and strategizing. Similar consultations are also held at regular intervals (twice a year) with committees and counsellors and organization team members are always out in the field every month of the year interacting with the community members. This regular interface has contributed to reducing divergent visions.

b) Networks built on personal relationships

CENTRE UBUNTU is networked with several local and international agencies. Such relationships have helped to partnership, circulate ideas, build inspiration, and facilitate cooperation. The activities that are built around these relationships include exchange of information and experience, joint training and joint projects, advocacy, and collaboration on the development of strategic documents such as the on-going preparation of a restorative justice mechanism manuscript for Burundi in collaboration with the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) of South Africa.

c) Participatory approach

The setting up of local committees and local counsellors attest to the participatory methodology. There is a clear assignment of roles and responsibilities which lubricates the attaining of overall goals and grassroots ownership of the peacebuilding initiatives. The multiplier

effect in schools and other villages discussed in Maphosa attest to the operational advantage of the participatory approach.[45]

d) Competence

Fieldwork processes (for instance, psychosocial healing and counselling, training of committees and local counsellors, research, radio programmes and monthly publication, and community mobilization) in all project field sites are directly facilitated by CENTRE UBUNTU team whose abilities, knowledge, expertise, and enthusiasm in the areas of intervention are very effective without external technical support. Thanks to leadership proactive and dynamism for a participatory and consultative ethos mirrored in weekly reflection meetings, periodic workshops, and staff development programmes with consultancy experts in various areas of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Conclusion

In the context of huge needs to rebuilding the social fabric based on *ubuntu* value foundation and limited resources, the reflective and thoughtful peacebuilding work done by CENTRE UBUNTU is indeed laudable and by and large, relevant and regularly appropriate. This analysis has made clear that for peacebuilding practice to be effective, we have to become more strategic and thus become more efficient in our efforts by responding to the abovementioned elements.[46] A way forward to the negative insights such as raised by the appraisal could include exploring questions like: What linkages have been made effectively? What linkages need to be made to make the interventions more effective? How can those linkages be made? Indeed, building up a mechanism of continuous monitoring and evaluation of the key propositions for change and implementation will help to further articulate the ingenious peacebuilding strategies and practice for lasting peace.

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Aminatou Haidar and the Struggle for Western Sahara

Stephen Zunes

ABSTRACT

This article, following a brief overview of the Sahrawi struggle against the Moroccan occupation, profiles the prominent nonviolent resistance leader Aminatou Haidar, often referred to as the Saharan Gandhi, particularly her month-long hunger strike in late 2009 in response to her forced exile from her homeland. Haidar's successful return to Western Sahara and the ongoing nonviolent resistance in that occupied nation belies the notion that all opposition to the US backed regimes in the Arab and Islamic world are violent extremists.

AMINATOU HAIDAR, a 42-year old nonviolent activist from Western Sahara and a key leader in her nation's struggle against the 34-year-old U.S.-backed Moroccan occupation of her country, has often been referred to as "the Saharan Gandhi." She was the winner of the 2008 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award, the 2009 Train Foundation Civil Courage Award, and has been a multiple nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize. Her month-long hunger strike in late 2009 in response to her expulsion from her country almost killed her, but it brought unprecedented international support for her cause and forced the U.S. government – traditionally a strong supporter of Morocco – to pressure the kingdom to allow her to return.

Having one of the most important nationalist struggles of an Arab Muslim country being led by a woman committed to nonviolent action has challenged impressions held by many in the world that those resisting Western-backed regimes in that part of the world are misogynist, violent extremists. Successive administrations in the United States and elsewhere have used this stereotype to justify

military intervention and support for repressive governments and military occupations.

Moroccan Occupation

In 1975, the kingdom of Morocco conquered Western Sahara — on the eve of its anticipated independence from Spain — in defiance of a series of UN Security Council resolutions and a landmark 1975 decision by the International Court of Justice upholding the right of the country's inhabitants to self-determination. With threats of a French and American veto at the UN preventing decisive action by the international community to stop the Moroccan invasion, the nationalist Polisario Front launched an armed struggle against the occupiers. The Polisario established the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in February 1976, which has subsequently been recognized by nearly 80 countries and is a full member state of the African Union. The majority of the indigenous population, known as Sahrawis, went into exile, primarily in Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria.

Thanks in part to U.S. military aid, Morocco eventually was able to take control of most of the territory, including all major towns. It also built, thanks to U.S. assistance, a series of fortified sand berms in the desert that effectively prevented penetration by Polisario forces into Moroccan-controlled territory. In addition, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Morocco moved tens of thousands of settlers into Western Sahara until they were more than twice the population of the remaining indigenous Sahrawis. Yet the Polisario achieved a series of diplomatic victories that generated widespread international support for self-determination and refusal to recognize the Moroccan takeover. In 1991, the Polisario agreed to a ceasefire in return for a Moroccan promise to allow for an internationally supervised referendum on the fate of the territory. Morocco, however, refused to allow the referendum to move forward.

French and American support for the Moroccan government blocked the UN Security Council from providing the necessary diplomatic pressure to move the referendum process forward. The Polisario, meanwhile, recognized its inability to defeat the Moroccans by military means. As a result, the struggle for self-determination shifted to within the Moroccan-occupied territory, where the Sahrawi population has launched a nonviolent resistance campaign against the occupation.

Nonviolent Resistance

Despite the ongoing repression, nonviolent resistance by Sahrawis has continued to grow in Western Sahara. From its beginnings in the

form of hunger strikes by prisoners to its expansion over the last two decades, nonviolent action has become the primary means of resistance by Sahrawis and their allies against Moroccan occupation. Sahrawis from different sectors of society have engaged in protests, strikes, cultural celebrations, and other forms of nonviolent resistance. These acts, which have focused on such issues as educational policy, human rights, the release of political prisoners, and the right to self-determination, have helped to organize Sahrawis, raised the cost of occupation for the Moroccan government, and increased visibility to the Sahrawi cause. They have also helped to build support for the Sahrawi movement among international nongovernmental organizations and solidarity groups as well as among some sympathetic Moroccans.

Western Sahara had seen scattered impromptu acts of open nonviolent resistance ever since the Moroccan conquest. In 1987, for instance, a visit to the occupied territory by a special UN committee sparked protests in the Western Saharan capital of El Aaiún. The success of this major demonstration was all the more remarkable, given that most of the key organizers had been arrested the night before and the city was under a strict curfew. Among the more than 700 people arrested was the 21-year-old Aminatou Haidar.

For four years she was "disappeared," held without charge or trial, and kept in secret detention centers. In these facilities, she and 17 other Sahrawi women jailed with her underwent regular torture and abuse.

Most resistance activity inside the occupied territory remained clandestine until early September 1999, when Sahrawi students organized sit-ins and vigils for more scholarships and transportation subsidies from the Moroccan government. Since an explicit call for independence would have been brutally suppressed immediately, the students hoped to push the boundaries of dissent by taking advantage of their relative intellectual freedom. Former political prisoners seeking compensation and accountability for their state-sponsored disappearances soon joined the nonviolent vigils, along with Sahrawi workers from nearby phosphate mines and a union of unemployed college graduates. The movement was suppressed within a few months. Although the demands of what became known as the first Sahrawi Intifada appeared to be nonpolitical, it served as a test of both the Sahrawi public and the Moroccan government. It paved the way for Sahrawis to press for bolder demands and engage in larger protests in the future that would directly challenge the Moroccan occupation itself.

In 2004, upon the release of the prominent Sahrawi activist

Mohammed Daddach, who had spent nearly thirty years in prison, massive public celebrations took place throughout Western Sahara. Of significance, these protests included the most explicit calls for independence at a public gathering since the Moroccan occupation began. In another unprecedented act of resistance, flags of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic were put up overnight along major streets.

A second Sahrawi intifada, which because known as the "Intifada al-Istiglal" (the Intifada of Independence), began in May 2005. Thousands of Sahrawi demonstrators, led by women and youths, took to the streets of El Aaiún protesting the ongoing Moroccan occupation and calling for independence. The largely nonviolent protests and sit-ins were met by severe repression by Moroccan troops and Moroccan settlers. Within hours, leading Sahrawi activists were kidnapped, including Haidar, who was brutally beaten by Moroccan occupation forces. Sahrawi students at Moroccan universities then organized solidarity demonstrations, hunger strikes, and other forms of nonviolent protests. Sahrawi students at Moroccan universities organized solidarity demonstrations, hunger strikes, and other forms of nonviolent protest. Though mischaracterizing the almost exclusively nonviolent protests as being riots, the Moroccan media were allowed for the first time to cover the demonstrations.

The intifada continued throughout 2005 with spontaneous and planned protests, all of which were met with harsh Moroccan responses. Many of the protests took place during visits by international figures to highlight the poor human rights situation, which had been largely ignored by the international community. The excessive force unleashed against women and the elderly by Moroccan authorities, a particular affront in Islamic societies, resulted in the deaths of at least two nonviolent protestors, and served to broaden support for the movement, even among some Moroccan settlers and ethnic Sahrawis in southern Morocco.[1]

Haidar was released within seven months of her arrest as a result of pressure from Amnesty International and the European parliament. Meanwhile, nonviolent protests have continued, despite ongoing repression by U.S.-supported Moroccan authorities. Despite continued disappearances, killings, beatings, and torture, Haidar has continued to advocate nonviolent action. In addition to organizing efforts at home, she traveled extensively to raise awareness internationally about the ongoing Moroccan occupation and advocate for the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination.

After Moroccan authorities' use of force to break up the large and prolonged demonstrations that began in 2005, the resistance subsequently opted primarily for smaller protests, some of which were

planned and some of which were largely spontaneous. Today, at least one minor public act of protest, symbolic or otherwise, takes place each day somewhere in the occupied territory. The resistance movement is active in every inhabited area of Western Sahara, with the exception of some neighborhoods populated exclusively by Moroccan settlers.

Most nonviolent actions occur in al-Aaiun or in one of the territory's other urban centers. A typical protest begins on a street corner or a plaza when someone unfurls a Sahrawi flag, women start ululating, and people begin chanting pro-independence slogans. Within a few minutes, soldiers and police arrive, and the crowd quickly scatters. Other tactics include leafleting, graffiti (including tagging the homes of collaborators), and cultural celebrations with political overtones. Though Sahrawi protests begin nonviolently, some demonstrators have fought back with violence when attacked by the police. Some resistance leaders have argued the importance of not retaliating against violence with violence, but there appears to be little systematic emphasis on maintaining nonviolent discipline. Demonstrators typically have had minimal or no formal training in strategic nonviolent resistance. Little evidence points to resistance leaders having a coordinated, strategic plan of nonviolent action. The protests that take place appear to be more the result of individual initiative, largely because of the relative newness of the organized internal struggle as well as the level of repression and the lack of resources. Still, the Moroccan government's regular use of violent repression to subdue the Sahrawi-led nonviolent protests suggests that this form of resistance is seen as a threat to Morocco's control over the territory.

El Carcel Negra, Inzigan, Magouna, and other notorious prisons in which hundreds of Sahrawis have spent years in incarceration became educational centers for new activists. Judicial hearings in Moroccan courts have been used as a rare public forum to denounce the occupation. On several occasions, prisoners engaged in noncooperation at their hearings, to protest beatings and other abuses while in custody. Public demonstrations are theoretically legal under Moroccan law if a permit is granted after organizers submit information regarding the day, time, location, and duration of the action. Such permits, while usually granted in Morocco, are denied in Western Sahara.

Moroccan authorities have used a variety of means to repress the human rights and pro-independence movements. Those in custody are routinely beaten and tortured.[2] The Moroccans at one point pursued all participants in the nonviolent struggle, but more recently

have focused on leaders, as well as on raiding offices and confiscating materials. Uniformed soldiers are increasingly being replaced by undercover police. Activism can get one fired from his or her job, which cannot be taken lightly in an area with such high unemployment. Sons and daughters of activists are punished in school. In addition, Moroccan authorities pressure young activists to emigrate and have even allegedly helped facilitate their illegal migration by boat to the nearby Spanish-controlled Canary Islands.

It remains to be seen as to whether a strategy can be developed which could neutralize the primary sources of support for the occupation: the Moroccan settlers, the Moroccan intelligence and military apparatus, the government's economic and ideological motivation and the government's foreign supporters. One major obstacle confronting the Sahrawis is that they are now the minority within their own desired country. This makes certain tactics which have been instrumental in similar struggles more problematic in the occupied Western Sahara. (For example, while a general strike can still have an impact, the large numbers of Moroccan settlers, combined with the minority of indigenous Sahrawis who are anti-independence, could likely fill the breach resulting from the absence of large segments of the Sahrawi workforce.) While this is partly offset by the growing number of pro-independence sentiments among settlers from the southern part of Morocco who are ethnically Sahrawi, it does present some challenges with which the largely nonviolent struggles in other occupied countries such as East Timor, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Kosovo, and the Baltic republics – where the overwhelming majority of the resident population favored independence – did not have to contend.

Haidar's 2009 Hunger Strike

After receiving the Civil Courage Award from the Train Foundation in New York City, Haidar took a flight back home. Like many Western Saharans who travel abroad, she declared Western Sahara as her country of origin on the immigration entry form when she landed at the airport in El Aioun, in the occupied territory. This time, however, Moroccan authorities confiscated her Moroccan passport, held her overnight for interrogation, and — claiming she had renounced her Moroccan citizenship — expelled her to Spain's Canary Islands. It is a direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention for an occupying power to expel anyone from their country of origin as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which grants the right of return to one's country of origin.

Though the Spanish government should have refused to allow

her into the country without a passport, thereby preventing the Moroccans from forcing her into exile, they nevertheless allowed her to disembark at the Lanzarote Airport in the Canary Islands. There, inside the airport, she began a hunger strike which was to last for a month. She was joined by a number of prominent Spanish actors and other celebrities, who successfully pressured the Spanish government to demand her return.

The Washington-based Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, which had awarded Haidar their annual human rights award the previous year, sent its director and senior advocacy director to the Lanzarote to be with Haidar. A number of U.S. members of Congress, ranging from the progressive Senator Patrick Leahy to the right-wing Senator James Inhoff, spoke out for her right to return. For nearly two weeks, the State Department was silent on Haidar's fate. As Haidar's physical well-being came into question during the second week of her hunger strike, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly expressed U.S. concerns about her health situation, but simply called for "a speedy determination of her legal status" rather than calling on Moroccan authorities to live up to their international legal obligations to allow her to return.

Haidar's expulsion was part of a broader Moroccan crackdown that began in October with no apparent objections from the French and American governments, the primary supporters of Morocco. Rather than joining Amnesty International and other human rights groups in condemning the increase in the already-severe repression in the occupied Western Sahara, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in a visit to Morocco early in November, instead chose to offer unconditional praise for the Moroccan government's human rights record. Just days before her arrival, Moroccan authorities arrested seven other nonviolent activists from Western Sahara — Ahmed Alansari, Brahim Dahane, Yahdih Ettarouzi, Saleh Labihi, Dakja Lashgar, Rachid Sghir, and Ali Salem Tamek — on trumped-up charges of high treason. Amnesty International has declared the seven activists (who are currently awaiting trial) prisoners of conscience, and called for their unconditional release. In deciding to ignore the plight of these and other political prisoners held in Moroccan jails, Clinton may have emboldened the Moroccan regime to take the unprecedented action of expelling Haidar.

As Haidar's health deteriorated and she was rushed to the hospital on December 17, key figures in the Obama White House met with three top aides of Morocco's King Mohammed VI and successfully pressured the regime to allow her return. Haidar finally arrived home on December 18 to recover from her hunger strike and was

immediately placed under house arrest by the Moroccans.

The Role of the International Community

Western Sahara remains an occupied territory only because Morocco has refused to abide by a series of UN Security Council resolutions calling on the kingdom to end their occupation and recognize the right of the people of that territory to self-determination. As a result, at least as important as continued nonviolent resistance by the Sahrawis would be nonviolent action by the citizens of France, the United States and other countries challenging their governments to end their support for Morocco. Such campaigns played a major role in forcing the United States, Australia and Great Britain to cease their support for Indonesia's occupation of East Timor.[3] Solidarity networks have emerged in dozens of countries around the world, most notably in Spain and Norway, but have yet to have a major impact on the foreign countries which matter most. India, South Africa and other major countries in the developing world have provided diplomatic support for the Sahrawi cause, yet there is little they can do to counter the veto-wielding permanent Security Council members.

Taking fuller advantage of new communications technologies, the emergence of a better organized, sustained and media-savvy nonviolent resistance movement within the Western Sahara would not only make the country more difficult for the Moroccans to rule on a day-to-day basis, but it would help build the international support that could eventually force governments to push Morocco to stop the repression and accept the right of self-determination The ability of the Sahrawi resistance to raise international awareness that the Moroccan takeover is not a fait accompli and to make it an issue in foreign capitals, primarily through building international solidarity with NGOs and civil society organizations globally could be a major factor in whether nonviolent resistance could succeed in bringing freedom to Western Sahara.

A successful nonviolent independence struggle by an Arab Muslim people under Haidar's leadership could set an important precedent in demonstrating how, against great odds, an outnumbered and outgunned population could win through the power of nonviolence in a part of the world where resistance to autocratic rule and foreign military occupation has often spawned acts of terrorism and other violence. Furthermore, the participatory democratic structure within the Sahrawi resistance movement and the prominence of women in key positions of leadership could help serve as an important model in a region where authoritarian and patriarchal forms of governance have traditionally dominated. The outcome rests not just on the

Sahrawis alone, but on whether the international community determines that such a struggle is worthy of their support.

Notes and References

1. See, for example, Amnesty International USA, "Sahrawi human rights defenders under attack," November 24, 2005.
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I, Surendra Kumar, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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In Memoriam

Remembering Fatima Meer

John S Moolakkattu

ON THE 12TH OF March, Fatima Meer, whose contributions to anti-apartheid struggles and women's rights are widely recognized and admired within South Africa and outside, passed away following a stroke two weeks earlier. In her passing, South Africa lost one of the stalwarts of the country's freedom struggle and a strong advocate of women's rights, and the world, one of its well known civil society activists. Fatima was born in Durban on 12 August 1928, the daughter of Moosa Meer, editor and publisher of *Indian Views* [1914-1965], and Rachel Farrel. Fatima was the second of nine children and their upbringing was more liberal than in most contemporary Muslim families. Her mother was of Jewish and Portuguese origin, who later converted to Islam. Her father was born in Surat, and came from the Sunni Bhora community. Widely read and highly respected for his deep knowledge of Islam, Hinduism and Christianity, Moosa was particularly known for his love of language, secular spirit and opposition to all forms of discrimination. Fatima was educated at Durban Indian Girls' High School and subsequently completed her Bachelor's and Masters degrees in Sociology at the University of Natal. Right from her school days, Fatima was destined to be different. She was an indomitable fighter becoming eventually an anti-apartheid activist and the foremost South African Muslim woman in the country. In 1944 when she was just 16, she succeeded in raising 1000 pounds for famine relief in Bengal. As a teenager she established literacy classes for adult Africans using her father's garage in Durban as the class room. Fatima was at the forefront of the 1946 Indian Passive Resistance Campaign, which was the most dramatic show of militant anti-government action in South African

history after Gandhi's decades earlier. Fatima established the Student Passive Resistance Committee to support the campaign and this brought her into limelight. Still in School, she was selected to share the podium with leaders like Monty Naicker and to head the protest march.

Fatima married her first cousin, Ismail Meer, a lawyer- activist and a very close friend of Nelson Mandela in 1950. Consanguineous marriage was a common practice amongst the small Sunni Bhora community. In 1954 she was one of the first South Africans, and the first woman, to be placed under a banning order of two years, which restricted her travel and prevented her from attending public meetings. She was banned again from 1976 to 1985.

In 1956 Meer started to lecture Sociology at the University of Natal. She was the first black woman to be appointed lecturer at a white South African University. She also had the rare distinction of being the only banned faculty that was ever granted permission to teach at any educational institution. She was also a visiting professor at a number of universities in South Africa, the U.S., India, Mauritius, the Caribbean and Britain and had also received a number of honorary doctorates. She has written over twenty books, and edited almost twenty others. She also wrote the script for *The Making of the Mahatma* (1996), a joint film project of India and South Africa directed by Shyam Benegal

The role that Fatima and her husband played in cementing the relationship between the Indian and African National Congress and with people such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and Chief Albert Luthuli, is often considered significant. Fatima's friendship with Nelson Mandela and his family is also well-known. Mandela used to call her 'Fathu' endearingly. She was a founder-member of the Federation of South African Women, which organized the famous Anti-Pass March on the Union Buildings in Pretoria in 1956. Fatima had a close relationship with Winnie Mandela who was an associate in the Federation; they also served six months in detention together. Mandela had full confidence in Meer's honesty and intellectual ability that he allowed her to write his first authorized biography titled 'Higher than hope', which was translated and published in as many as 13 languages.

In 1976 Fatima was detained without trial for six months after trying to organize a rally with Steve Biko. Soon after her release from prison she survived an assassination attempt. There were two more arson attacks on her Durban home. Despite opposition from some of her family members, she associated herself with the Black

Consciousness movement of Dr. Steve Biko, whose style of resistance had strong Gandhian overtones. Shortly after her release in December 1976 Meer was charged twice for breaking her orders. Personally, this was a difficult period for Meer as her teenage son Rashid was forced into exile for over a decade.

In 1972 Fatima founded the Institute of Black Research which became the leading black-run research institution, publishing house and educational and welfare NGO in the country and the principal channel for her academic and activist pursuits for the next three decades.

In May 1999, Meer helped found the Concerned Citizens' Group (CCG) to persuade Indians not to vote for white parties as many had done in 1994 when the first democratic elections took place. She used to visit frequently the Indian working class townships of Chatsworth and Phoenix and fought for the rights of many who were threatened with eviction. She was also an active participant in marches on the American Consulate during 2001 and 2002 to protest against the oppression of Palestinians and the war in Afghanistan. Meer was also patron and founder member of Jubilee 2000, a forum created to lobby for the cancellation of Third World debt.

An out and out civil society activist, she always valued her freedom and kept herself aloof from centres of power even when she had easy access to them. In 1994 Meer declined a seat in parliament because of her interest in non-governmental work. However, she served the ANC government in a number of advisory capacities such as adviser to the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, member of the National Symbols Commission and the National Anthem Commission, member of the Advisory Panel to the President, member of the Film and Publication Board, and the Board of the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

Fatima admitted two major influences on her life - Gandhi and Albert Luthuli. About Gandhi she said:

> I came to realise that for the Mahatma there was a spiritual centre that informed all that he did. It was this that made him who he was, and I began to explore the implications for my own life. Spirituality gives us direction and purpose in life, steering us in the direction we ought to go. In brief, the Mahatma taught me to get in touch with my soul. Being a Hindu, he also gave me a respect for other religions. This introspection is still a very important dimension of my political engagement. When we lose the ability to continually take stock of our inner resources and identity, we are in danger of losing our humanity. Activism for its own sake, is a dangerous thing. We must

> always ensure that our actions are a consequence of who we are and what we want to do. Too often people lose control of themselves and act against their innermost values. Gandhi would at times withdraw from the political battlefield because he feared the loss of the spiritual centre of what was happening. He was often misunderstood and criticised for this. I sometimes think we could do with a little more Gandhian reflection in our political activism.

She participated in the Defiance Campaign in 1952 and met Chief Albert Luthuli, whom she described as a deeply spiritual man and a man of integrity. She writes:

> The Chief was a sincere Christian. Very ethical, very upright and very honest. He was always in charge of his actions. In this sense there was a Gandhian dimension to him. Giving expression to his faith in his everyday actions, rather than being overtly pious or ritualistic, he reminded me in some ways of my father. He taught me the importance of disciplined politics.

Although I had heard a lot about Fatima Meer and had read some of her works, I could meet her only at the inauguration of the Gandhi-Luthuli Chair in Peace Studies, a Chair named after the two individuals who influenced her most, in September 2008. She was on a wheel chair, having suffered a stroke and the accompanying hardships. I did speak to her briefly. She was not very communicative, a possible sign that she was unhappy with the paraphernalia accompanying the high profile inaugural ceremony. The second time I met her was at a function arranged by the University of KwaZulu-Natal later that year specifically to honour her on her 80th birthday. I used the occasion to have a conversation with her in a more relaxed environment. She invited me to her house. I thought I should do an interview of Meer for Gandhi Marg. She was one of the early subscribers of the Journal. In less than a month I heard that her health had deteriorated, making her memory spasmodic.

It is not easy for a person to combine so many qualities into one, being an academic, freedom fighter, champion of women's rights, educationist and constructive worker. That was Fatima, whom many South Africans call 'Mama Fatima', a true humanist who did not have the speck of prejudice of any kind. She was a tower of strength to all around her because of her fearlessness, indomitable spirit and outspokenness. Hers was a life well-lived, a life devoted to serving the marginalized.

In another two months, South Africa is going to host the FIFA World Cup, an event that the country is looking forward to in its

quest for prestige and global visibility. Fatima was highly critical of the huge investment being made preparing the country for the event at the expense of the poor and the marginalized, which she saw as a clear departure from the values embedded in the Freedom Charter endorsed by the ANC. Her six decades of activism had made her to speak and write forcefully and act on her beliefs. She was opposed to Salman Rushdie's abortive tour to South Africa in 1998 and had also spoken positively about the Islamic revolution in Iran after a visit to that country in 1984. Fatima thought that Mandela, when he was released from prison, was already too old and too tired to lead the country according to the ideals enshrined in the Freedom Charter. He gave a free hand to his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, not the best man for the job, according to her. She was critical of Mbeki's quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe. She was so unhappy at the power struggle between Mbeki and Jacob Zuma and the rising corruption within ANC ranks that she even called for the revival of the Natal Indian Congress started by Gandhi. She was also extremely critical of globalization and was a very strong supporter of the World Social Forum. In a true Nehruvian spirit, she saw all her struggles as part of similar struggles taking place elsewhere in the world. Meer was unhappy with the way in which power has been appropriated by the parties leaving very little space for civil society to spawn leaders. She wanted leaders to emerge from the people, which is not possible in the current electoral arrangement based on the lists prepared by the political parties. She did not buy the argument that economic policies focused on inflation-targeting followed by South Africa during the last fifteen years was good for the country. She was also a constructive worker in the Gandhian sense, establishing several schools and training centres for the welfare of the poor blacks.

Professor Meer, despite poor health, was in the forefront of the struggle against the attempt of the eThekwini Municipality to demolish the Early Morning Market in Durban a year ago and construct a super market evicting hundreds of small traders, many of whom are descendants of the Indentured Indians who came to South Africa in 1860 and for whom the market is a part of their history. Her participation boosted the morale of the activists and made the authorities jittery, leaving the market still intact.

Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, the ANC stalwart who spoke at the funeral, said that Fatima Meer had never received the recognition she deserved for her role in dismantling apartheid. But she had never sought such recognition in the first place. That was Fatima, a true Gandhian activist who tried to put into practice

the principle of *Nishkama Karma* (disinterested service). Ironically, she was granted a state funeral, with some of the very people she had castigated all along in attendance, eulogising her and claiming her as their own.

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Book Reviews

***Bahudha* and the Post 9/11 World,** Balmiki Prasad Singh, Oxford University Press, 2008, 370 pages, Price Rs. 745.

The book has received wide publicity and a lot of positive comments partly because the author who is presently the Governor of Sikkim is well-known in national and international circles, and partly because of its attractive and enticing title. Scholars like T N Madan and Imtiaz Ahmed have made favourable comments on the book.

His holiness the Dalai Lama who has written the Foreword has raised some interesting issues and provided the essence of the book and the Bahudha philosophy in a nutshell. He writes that human beings have several diversities – religious, linguistic, cultural ideological etc., and yet the basic instinct for peace, harmony and happiness are the same. In India the concept of Bahudha or pluralism in modern terms, not only survives but also flourishes. We live in relative harmony despite acute problems in today's complex world. He points out that in today's world people and places are interconnected unlike earlier times when people lived in relative isolation and had virtually no contact with other communities. For this reason we must consider the interests of others and show mutual respect to each other; otherwise there would be conflict, tensions and violence.

The author expands on the philosophy and approach of Bahudha and talks of it being an eternal reality in India. According to him this approach recognizes the pluralistic nature of our societies and stresses that we must not only tolerate the differences of people but also learn from them to live harmoniously. He mentions how Gandhi, who despite being a *sanatani* Hindu, not only respected other religions but was ready to learn from them and imbibe the positive and beneficial aspects of other religions in his own life.

In this respect, an American scholar Gary Weaver who has recently been giving talks in several Indian cities on America's multiculturalism said that USA is not a melting pot now, but is rather like a fine blended tapestry or a carpet with different yarns, colours and designs that remain distinct while contributing to the overall beauty and strength of the product. This is how people belonging to different cultures, religions, races and languages contribute to the dynamism and

vibrancy of his country.

Balmiki Prasad Singh talks of the importance of religion and avers that although fundamentalists are using it to promote hatred and violence, it needs to be emphasized that basically "All faiths have emerged to underpin a moral universe in which love compassion peace and caring guide human conduct."

He also points to the links between fundamentalist movements and social conflict, and suggests that religion should be taken into account in the formulation of public policy. He feels that societies that have been marginalized due to exploitative policies are breeding grounds for fundamentalist and violent movements. According to him, although all religions have fundamentalist elements, it is militant Islam that is creating particular concern in today's world. However, the author feels that fundamentalism cannot satisfy growing human aspirations or meet the challenges of modernization. He also suggests that the *sufi* tradition that is prevalent in India even today is important for maintaining harmony and peace.

The book is divided into five sections and has twelve chapters in all. The section on *Manifestations of Bahudha Approach in India* is perhaps the most significant one since the author elaborates on the approach in several situations right from the Vedic age to the present one. This section is subdivided into *The Pathfinders, The Builders, The Rulers* and *Among People*. Among *The Pathfinders* he includes Mahavira, Buddha and Guru Nanak. Among *The Builders* the author has included Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore and Gandhi and *The Rulers* are Ashoka, Akbar and Jawaharlal Nehru. This section, as are the others, is well written and gives a good, readable and brief account of not only the Vedic age but also of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. The author lucidly explains common elements as well as some significant differences between the three religions. Similarly, his account of the builders and the rulers is clearly and succinctly written. The common thread that runs between these personalities is the Bahudha or the broadminded approach that was followed by all. The book provides, in brief, the story of the bandit turned saint *Angulimal* when he comes into contact with Buddha and gives up his evil ways.

According to Balmiki Prasad Singh, Swami Vivekananda gives a fine exposition of the Bahudha philosophy when the Swami explains that the Vedanta philosophy was not Brahmanical or Buddhist or Christian or Muslim, but was the sum total of all these faiths. Another important aspect of Swami Vivekananda's approach was that religion must serve the poor and that it must try to reduce their poverty, ignorance and disease.

One wonders why the author has excluded another great Indian

philosopher Shankaracharya although he credits him with the revival of Hinduism in the eighth century. Similarly, he has not included any significant ruler from Bengal or South or West India.

Another important chapter in the book is *Education for Harmony.* For the author, education serves two broad functions –individual development and progress of society. He also feels that, "It is the education system that diminishes the distance between various religious groups, enabling people to share a common social space …"

Maria Montessori, the American educationist wrote in 1930 that "Those who want war, prepare young people for war; those who want peace have neglected young children so that they are unable to organize them for peace", an apt quotation in today's violence prone societies. The author also refers to the educationists Cohen and Bloom on skill generation, and to Rabindranath Tagore on the importance of harnessing all resources that would instill in the mind of children a strong desire to know.

The author's basic approach has been to stress the role of education for harmony and broadmindedness. But he also warns that education is not a magic formula for curing the violence and hatred that afflicts the world, but is one of the principal instruments to make an effective contribution in reducing poverty, ignorance and disease and in building a peaceful society.

However the book also quotes the American journalist Robert Kaplan about surprisingly the *dangers of peace* who writes "But it is a truism that bears repeating is that peace as a primary goal is dangerous because it implies that you will sacrifice any principle for the sake of it…"

The author makes interesting observations on several current themes such as terrorism and failed states, post Gandhi era, the UN, future of religion and democracy in the Arab world. The author eulogises the efforts of the Dalai Lama and Nelson Mandela in healing history's wounds. The book concludes with a hymn from the *Rig Veda* that expresses the Bahudha approach admirably. In translation it reads: "Walk together; speak in concord; let our minds comprehend alike, let our efforts be united; let our hearts be in agreement, let our minds be united, that we may all be happy".

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