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Editorial

THE TREATY ON the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons(TPNW), which prohibits the development, testing, production, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons entered into force on the 22nd of January. All have hailed it as a turning point in the history of the movement to eliminate nuclear arms, achieved through the unstinting efforts of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a coalition that won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize and strong support the campaign received from people across the globe especially the "hibakusha" or survivors of the 1945 atomic bombings. Nuclear weapons that were seen by states owning them as a "necessary evil" to maintain the balance of terror have now come to be dubbed as an "absolute evil". It also signals that more than military security linked to the state, it is the security of the people that matters. But nuclear powers and their allies including India have consistently refused to join the treaty and are therefore not bound by it, suggesting that nuclear arms will continue to be around for some more time. Most of them continue to repose confidence in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Is the TPNW then premature? Certainly not! Earlier disarmament experiences suggest that the prohibition norm comes first and destruction will follow later, not the other way around. In the NPT, under Article VI, the nuclear weapon states have a mandatory responsibility to achieve nuclear disarmament, after a number of years. While the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, there is no automatic extension of the special status granted to nuclear weapon states.

A complete prohibition of nuclear weapons may not be to the liking of nuclear states demanding certain prerogatives for themselves. Under articles 2 to 4 the TPNW allows a pathway to the nuclear weapon states to join it even before they have fully dismantled their nuclear weapons. In other words, the treaty is in consonance with the NPT, and does not create a new structure to undermine it.

The UN has banned other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical weapons as well as land mines through a series

of treaties. Only nuclear weapons were left behind. A couple of days before the treaty entered into force, a new president was inaugurated in the United States. President Joe Biden has pledged to reverse the policy of Donald Trump, and return to the nuclear policy of former President Barack Obama. Biden has also agreed to extend the New START treaty for another five years until 2026.

The TPNW campaigners hope the treaty will have the same impact as previous international treaties on landmines and cluster munitions and there will be a change in the behaviour of even countries that did not sign up. We have seen that unilateral disarmament initiatives may not have a cascading effect on other countries. South Africa's and Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, or Libya's dismantlement of its nuclear programme are cases in point. India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear weapon states, but are not bound by any of the obligations that accrue to Nuclear Weapon States such as Chapter VI of the NPT.

This issue of the journal has four main articles, five short essays and two book reviews. *Gandhi's Theory of Trusteeship* by Kazuya Ishii, *Riots and Resistance: Unarmed Insurrection and Lessons for Nonviolent Struggle* by Brian Martin and *India-China Relations: Coexistence through Accommodation* by Josukutty C. A *'Combating' Women in the Armed Forces: Negotiating Inclusion/Exclusion, Gender, Militarism and Security by* Teresa Joseph are the main articles. Shorter articles on *Globalizing our Hearts and A New Yatra for Justice, Peace and Solidarity* by Ananta Kumar Giri, Ambidextrous *Gandhi* by Hari Nair and Swaha Das, *Maoist Strategy and the Problematics of (State) Power* by Chris D. Brown, *The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Significant Step Forward* by *Siby K. Joseph* and the *Impact of Indian Traditions on Gandhi* by B Sambasiva Prasad are also available in this issue. We hope this collection of articles will provide you enough food for thought as we enter the new year and a new decade in the midst of a ferocious pandemic, which is still raging.

JOHN S MOOLAKKATTU
Chief Editor

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Gandhi's Theory of Trusteeship[1]

Kazuya Ishii

ABSTRACT

Gandhi's theory of trusteeship stipulates that the rich should consider their property as what God trusted them to manage for the benefit of the poor. This theory legitimated the positions of the former, as long as they behaved as "trustees". Therefore, Marxists severely condemned it as conservative, while some scholars reevaluated it as consonant with capitalist or mixed economies during the post-Cold War period. However, the theory is observed to have some aspects concessive to socialists, or aspects not really observed in the past evaluations. Here I would trace in what way Gandhi presented this theory from the 1920s to the 1940s, in order to evaluate it as a form of "non-violent" social reform, which was far different from any of existing theories based on capitalism or socialism.

Key words: trusteeship, capitalism, socialism, landlord-tenant relations, capital-labour relations

Introduction

MOHANDAS K. GANDHI'S theory of trusteeship is an idea that wealthy people should consider their property as what God trusted them to manage as "trustees" for the benefit of the poor. This theory legitimated the positions of capitalists and landlords in society, as long as they behaved as "trustees". Therefore, socialists and communists severely condemned it as supportive for the existing regime, while some scholars reevaluated it as consonant with capitalist or mixed economies during the post-Cold War period. However, the theory is observed to have some aspects concessive to socialists, or aspects not really observed in such condemnation or reevaluation. Here I would first introduce evaluations, both positive and negative,

of this theory in the past. I would then trace in what way Gandhi presented the theory in various occasions from the 1920s to the 1940s. Lastly, I would like to indicate the possibility of evaluating the theory as a form of "non-violent" social reform, which was far different from any of existing theories based on capitalism or socialism.

1 Past Evaluations of the Theory

Let us first consider how the theory of trusteeship has been evaluated in general, before investigating how it was displayed in reality. Marxists asserted that the theory aimed to support the existing regime, in consonance with Gandhi's attitude to suddenly stop mass movements based on the spirit of "non-violence", or that the theory at least had an effect of supporting the regime.

First, Jawaharlal Nehru doubted the practicability of this theory, assuming that human nature was fundamentally evil: "Is it reasonable to believe in the theory of trusteeship – to give unchecked power and wealth to an individual and to expect him to use it entirely for the public good?"[2] To his eyes, Gandhi looked to advocate this theory in order to support large land ownership, feudalism and capitalism. Nehru deplored that Gandhi "blesses all the relics of the old order which stand as obstacles in the way of advance – the feudal States, the big *zamindaris* and *taluqadaris*, the present capitalist system"[3]. Nehru could not accept such an attitude as Gandhi's, when he said:

> … why with all his love and solicitude for the underdog he yet supports a system which inevitably produces it and crushes it; why with all his passion for non-violence he is in favour of a political and social structure which is wholly based on violence and coercion?[4]

On the other hand, E. M. S. Namboodiripad wrote *Mahatma and the Ism* in order to prove that "Gandhi was, above all, the astute political leader of a class – the bourgeoisie, in whose class interests he always acted"[5]. To him, Gandhi's trusteeship theory and other tactics "proved in actual practice to be of enormous help to the bourgeoisie in (a) rousing the masses in action against imperialism and in (b) preventing them from resorting to revolutionary mass action"[6].

Marxists thus considered that this theory would sustain the existing class relations and represent the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Such a view of Gandhism as supporting the existing system was widely shared in the former Soviet Union and Japan.

According to Marietta T. Stepaniants, A. M. D'iakov, a Russian authoritative Indologist, at one time considered that "Gandhian ideology, which has emerged on the outdated basis, prevents the

development of the productive forces. It defends the interests of reactionary classes which have no interest in the progress of but, on the contrary, wish to preserve the old social relations"[7]. Tokumatsu Sakamoto also quoted D'iakov as saying, "Gandhism is the most powerful weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie and landlords, who are the leaders of the Natonal Congress, by means of which they could subordinate the masses and utilize their movement for the benefit of their own interests"[8]. D'iakov was further quoted:

> Gandhi took advantage of a religious prejudice of the farming masses, utilized their ignorance, retardation and blind obedience to the Congress and its leaders, in particular Gandhi himself, who was looked up to as a saint-hero, thus suppressed their activeness, corrupted them, and made them into the victims of being betrayed by the bourgeoisie and landlords[9].

Sakamoto resented such condemnation on Gandhi as D'iakov's in 1957: "Could there be any insult as cruel as this against the leader of nationalism and people in India?"[10] However, Sakamoto himself could not avoid incorporating such a Marxist view into his own *Ganji* (*Gandhi*) in 1969, when he said:

> Gandhi as the leader of Indian nationalism did not represent any class position of farmers or labourers.
> This is clear in the fact that Gandhi always took a position to suppress people's movements, whenever they roused their movement to the extent that they were about to explode into revolutionary violence[11].

Here comes Sakamoto's thesis, "Gandhi was sound for the matter of nation, but unsound for that of class"[12].

Yoshiro Royama also stated in his *Mahatoma Ganji* (*Mahatma Gandhi*) in 1950 that "Gandhi preached his doctrine of non-violence as the representative of Indian national capitalists, whose power strongly backed him"[13]. Masao Naito highly valued this view, in conjunction with Royama's assertion that Gandhi contributed to "the growth and development of Indian national capitalists"[14].

Referring to the class conflicts in India doomed to become more violent after the death of Gandhi, Royama also explained that "Gandhi's great fame over the Indian masses veiled class struggle that was making progress underneath of it"[15]. Naito noticed in Royama's argument the "cool eyes of science"[16], based on his own image of Gandhi as conservative regarding any system transformation.

In his book, *Gandi wo meguru Seinen Gunzo* (*Youths around Gandhi*), Naito cautioned us not to consider that "Gandhi and his thought reflected capitalists' interests", but to consider that "the capitalists'

interests needed concepts of Gandhian philosophy, since they were attracted by it"[17]. However, according to Naito, "the fact that Gandhi abnormally evaded or turned against class struggle left a huge problem"[18], and Gandhi's

> peculiar "theory of trusteeship" stipulated it as a duty for them [landlords and capitalists] to distribute their own wealth, or the trust from God, to peasants and labourers, acknowledging the positions of landlords and capitalists in Indian society as what they were. Therefore, it embodies a typical theory of class reconciliation at best. Gandhi was eager to confront peasant and labour movements led by leftists in the 1920s and 1930s by means of this thought as his weapon[19].

The conservative image of Gandhi mainly formed by Marxists was thus widely accepted. Nevertheless, such image was to be largely modified after the Cold War was over.

I would like to introduce several positive evaluations of the trusteeship theory formed during the post-Cold War period. First, Surineni Indira refuted in 1991 Nehru's skepticism about the theory as follows: "Despite its unattainability, when at least if some people earnestly practice, we may eradicate much of exploitation, violence, inequality, unfreedom in the world"[20]. She regarded trusteeship as "a lofty ideal worth striving for", although she knew Gandhi's idea that "Absolute trusteeship is an abstraction like Euclid's definition of a point and is equally unattainable". Indira thus asserted that both capitalism and communism could not solve such problems as hatred, violence, exploitation, class conflict and alienation, and that it would be only way out for an individual and society to practice trusteeship in a more effective way[21].

Second, Ajit K. Dasgupta also positively evaluated the trusteeship theory as an alternative to communism. To him this theory prevented radical land reform in the landlord-tenant relations, but increased productivity in the capital-labour relations as a result of their cooperation:

> Historical experience suggests that as a means of bringing about an end to landlordism this [trusteeship] is unrealistic. For the management of industrial enterprise, trusteeship offers greater scope, and some elements of it are included in the so-called 'Japanese' style of management, with its tradition of life-long employment and emphasis on cooperation, rather than conflict, between labour and capital.[22]

Third, Madhuri Wadhwa placed Gandhi in the camp of liberalism as she thought his fear of state ownership, which had a tendency for

"destroying the individuality", would synchronize with those of "modern libertarians, like Frederich [*sic*] Hayek and Milton Friedman". She also related the trusteeship theory to mixed economies, and argued that economic equality suggested by Gandhi would be possible "through modern welfare states, such as Scandinavia"[23].

In these circumstances Indira considered the trusteeship theory as the third path to overcome the harms of capitalism and communism. Dasgupta understood it as a way of capitalism based on the labour-capital cooperation. Wadhwa seemed to be wavering between libertarianism and the Scandinavian type of welfare statism. They all evaluated the theory positively, unlike Marxists who viewed it as an attempt to support the existing regime.

Among these positive views of the trusteeship theory, Indira's is closest to mine. However, there is still room for us to trace in what way Gandhi displayed this theory in various political circumstances. By doing so, we will see that he endeavoured to prevent class struggle but redress unequal economic distribution among the classes, by means of incorporating some socialist elements into his own theory. It will then become clear that any view of Gandhism as backing the existing structure or consonant with capitalism is not comprehensive enough to understand this theory.

2 Trusteeship and Big Capitalists

Gandhi clearly acquired the knowledge of "trust" when he studied at Inner Temple in Great Britain from 1888 to 1891. According to his *Autobiography*, Snell's *Equity* gave him a big clue to shape his concept of "trust"[24]. In the book Snell defined a "trustee" as "a person capable of taking and of holding the legal estate and possessed of natural capacity and legal ability to execute the trust, and should (for reasons of convenience) be domiciled within the jurisdiction of the English courts of equity"[25]. In that case, "*cestui que trust*" is "not one person having a limited beneficial interest in the trust fund, … but the aggregate body of persons (born and unborn) that make up the entirety of the persons entitled, or who may be or become entitled, to any beneficial interest in the trust property"[26].

Gandhi's legal understanding of "trust" later assisted him to study it from religious viewpoints as well during his stay in South Africa. "My study of English law came to my help. I understood more clearly in the light of *Gita* teaching the implication of the word 'trustee'"[27]. In fact he learned "aparigraha" (non-possession), "samabhava" (equability), "anasakti" (selfless action), and so on from the *Bhagavad Gita*. Incorporating these religious concepts, his idea of "trust" seems to have changed into a form of belief beyond a simple legal concept.

Another clue which helped Gandhi to deepen his insight into "trust" was John Ruskin's economic thought, which he also encountered in South Africa. Gandhi read Ruskin's *Unto this Last*, and noticed the possibility that the master would be "dealing with such subordinate as he would with his own son"[28]. Ruskin's idea of "social affection" of this type seems to underpin Gandhi's trusteeship theory that enjoins the rich to manage their property for the benefit of the poor.

In the *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, the word "trustee" indeed first appears in Gandhi's writings in 1908, when he led the Satyagraha Movement in South Africa. Yet, Gandhi then used the word to mean "British" or the "British Government", in contrast to "British Indian" as a "ward", not to mean a "capitalist" or a "landlord" in the conventional usage found in his writings later:

> What is the duty of a trustee, if not to make his ward fit for everything that the trustee has been doing for the ward? Are the Government fitting us, their wards, for full citizenship?[29]

At that time Gandhi was solely tackling the deprivation of civil rights of Indian people in South Africa. It was after he was back to India in 1915 that he earnestly narrated the theory of trusteeship in a commonly known way.

Since Gandhi was back home, he had met a series of entrepreneurs through a series of events including ashram establishments and labour disputes. These entrepreneurs became the prototypes of "trustees" as capitalists. Here, I would like to refer to Ambalal Sarabhai, Ghanshyam Das Birla and Jamnalal Bajaj in order to analyze their relations with Gandhi.

First, Ambalal Sarabhai was a mill owner in Ahmedabad. According to Gandhi's *Autobiography*, when his ashram fell into financial difficulties, "a Sheth" placed in his hands currency notes to the value of Rs 13,000 and drove away[30]. It is well known that this "Sheth" was Ambalal at the age of twenty-five, that their relationship then started[31].

In a labour dispute in 1918 over the amount of salary increase as compensation for the bonus cut, Ambalal confronted his sister Anasuya Sarabhai, who stood on the side of labourers. Gandhi then suggested that the labourers follow these conditions of a successful strike:

1. Never to resort to violence,
2. Never to molest blacklegs,
3. Never to depend on arms, and
4. To remain firm, no matter how long the strike continued, and to earn bread, during the strike, by any other honest labour[32].

After two weeks, however, some of the labourers resumed their work at the mills, and others started feeling unhappy about that. Having seen their motivations lowered, Gandhi started fasting. This fast "was undertaken not on account of lapse of the mill-owners", but it moved not only the labourers' hearts but also the mill-owners'[33]. When the dispute ended on the twenty-first day, Gandhi referred to Ambalal as follows:

> The mill-owners were represented by Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai who is a gentlemen[*sic*] in every sense of the term. He is a man of culture and equally great abilities. He adds to these qualities a resolute will[34].

According to Chamanlal Revri, the Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association (ATLA) was a labour union that functioned as an arbitration machinery to solve conflicts between the labourers and capitalists[35]. As M. V. Kamath and V. B. Kher explain, it was Ambalal who suggested that this ATLA be established[36]. The mission of this association was thus exactly to have the trusteeship theory function in reality.

On the other hand, Ghanshyam Das Birla provided the greatest financial support for Gandhi's political, social and economic activities. According to Madan Mohan Juneja, Birla met Gandhi in 1915, and started having a deeper association with him around 1924[37]. Birla's *In the Shadow of the Mahatma: A Personal Memoir* indicates that he made donations to Gandhi, more than ten times, to the amount of more than Rs 400,000. The amount was meant to support Gandhi's journals such as *Young India* and *Navajivan*, Aligah Muslim University, Deshbandhu Memorial Fund and his khadi works[38].

Louis Fischer once asked Gandhi, "What proportion of the Congress budget … is covered by rich Indians?", he answered, "Practically all of it"[39]. Fischer furthermore explains that "Most of the money for the maintenance of Gandhi's ashram and of Gandhi's organizations for Harijan and peasant uplift and the teaching of a national language came from G. D. Birla, the millionaire textile manufacturer at whose house in New Delhi the Mahatma sometimes lived[40].

One of the reasons why Birla never ceased supporting Gandhi's works is that he was attracted by Gandhi's personal qualities. Juneja explains that Birla was deeply influenced by Gandhi's tendencies to always listen to his inner-voice, to admit his own mistakes and overlook the mistakes of others, and to maintain the accounts properly and spend the public money economically[41].

However, Birla did not have any sympathy with Gandhi's

economic thought. He wrote in the introduction of *In the Shadow of the Mahatma*:

> His outlook on economics, however, was different. He believed in small-scale industries – *Charkha*, *Ghani* [42]and all that. I, on the other hand, led a fairly comfortable life and believed in the industrialization of the country through large-scale industries[43].

In fact Birla wrote to Gandhi in October 1927, "I wear khadi just for your satisfaction", which indicated his deep skepticism of Gandhi's economic policies[44].

Nevertheless, Birla supported Gandhi's works, because he was not only charmed by his personality, but deeply motivated by his own economic interests as a business person. First, as Juneja explains, Birla counted much on the Indian National Congress to pressure the British government, which was eager to materialize economic interests of its own country. Second, he wanted to strengthen Gandhism as a preventive measure against communism, which had already gained the growing popularity in India[45].

Naturally, Birla could not keep following Gandhi's teachings of khadi, charkha, cottage industries and trusteeship forever. Soon after Gandhi died, he considered most of these teachings outdated, and started advising his friends to adapt their mode of living according to the changed circumstances. For example, he wrote to C. Rajagopalachari on April 16, 1948, emphasizing:

> Some of these associates of Bapu have lived a life which in the absence of Bapu will be a burden on them. I have, therefore, advised Miraben, Sushila and Pyarelal – all to have a change in the fresh atmosphere[46].

This attitude change of Birla's was perhaps well anticipated by Gandhi before he died. Asked who was the closest to the ideal image of "trustee" among "the first Parsi Baronet, the Tatas, the Wadias, the Birlas, Shri Bajaj and the like", Gandhi mentioned the name not of Birla, but of Bajaj[47].

Jamnalal Bajaj influenced Gandhi to form his ideal image of an entrepreneur so decisively that he became to be called a "Gandhian capitalist". According to Bal Ram Nanda, Bajaj contributed Rs 31,000 for construction of the Sabarmati Ashram, and arranged for a car for Gandhi's use at the Bombay Congress session in 1915[48]. In 1921 he donated Rs 100,000 for the support of needy lawyers who had given up their practice to join the non-cooperation movement[49]. He accepted the chairmanship of the Reception Committee for the Nagpur Congress session in 1920, and acted as the treasurer of the Congress and also of

the All India Spinners' Association (AISA) for years[50].

Bajaj was eager to tackle social issues such as child marriage, inter-caste marriage and untouchability, in order to fulfill the "social responsibility of businessmen"[51]. To tackle untouchability in particular, he was involved in the establishment of Harijan Sevak Sangh in 1933[52]. As Gandhi suggested him to deal with the issue of cow protection in 1940, he also started managing Go Seva Sangh in the following year[53].

In 1934 Bajaj thought of buying a cloth mill but gave up the idea when he received the following letter from Gandhi:

> Vallabhbhai tells me that you are thinking of buying a cloth mill. … I was certainly shocked to hear this. I felt that it was wrong for a person like you, who had taken so much interest in khadi, to own a cotton mill; but I could not decide whether I should write to you. Meanwhile, Janakimaiya came here yesterday. … She has been upset since she heard this story.… And the servants say that since you will now have a mill of your own, you will not ask them to wear khadi. Nobody likes your decision. … If you wish to earn more money so that you may spend it for public good, we shall do without such contribution. … If you can, send a wire giving the happy news that you have abandoned the plan[54].

Bajaj in fact was wavering between private business and public service, and struggling to make both compatible with each other. Such conflict inside him was reflected in Gandhi's letter to Bajaj in December 1938:

> You should overcome excessive greed. You should give up private business even if it is intended to help you in public service. If you cannot do that, you must lay down strict limits. You should try to retire from politics. … But your real field is altruistic business. Hence you should again use all your ability for the Charkha Sangh. That activity can make full use of your intellect, your moral qualities and your business acumen[55].

As Juneja explains, this attitude of Gandhi's towards Bajaj was clearly different from that towards Birla: That is, Gandhi forbade Birla from taking part in the Independence Movement urging: "The country needs money. Earn it and send it for the national good"[56]. Under Gandhi's strong guidance, Bajaj had never stopped walking "in Gandhi's footsteps" for the rest of his life. He had remained the most important capitalist who supported Gandhi until he died in 1942. Gandhi then delivered a eulogy as follows:

> In Seth Jamnalal Bajaj, death has taken a mighty man. Whenever I wrote of wealthy men becoming trustees of their wealth for the common good I always had this merchant prince principally in mind. … His contribution

> as a satyagrahi was of the highest order. … He wanted to take up a constructive activity to which he could devote the rest of his life and in which he could use all his abilities. … He threw himself into the work with a single-mindedness and zeal I had never seen surpassed. His generosity knew no distinction of race, creed or colour. … The country has lost one of the bravest of its servants[57].

Gandhi thus maintained good relations with different types of capitalists such as Sarabhai, Birla and Bajai. Whenever Gandhi noticed the shrewdness of capitalists, he also shrewdly extracted financial support from them. That money was largely used to implement the Constructive Programme, which consists of communal harmony, abolishment of untouchability, khadi and others. The Programme was, according to its pamphlet in 1945, "designed to build up the nation from the very bottom upward"[58], and implemented widely for the purpose of enhancing employment opportunities and living standard of the poor.

Gandhi's friendship with the rich provided Marxists with grounds to regard him as supporting the existing regime. While he permitted capitalists to accumulate wealth, it has certainly to be questioned whether this attitude of his was consistent with his other, that the minority exploited the masses through machinery with the motive force of the former being greed and avarice[59]. Yet we also have to take into account that the rich class had to take on a huge burden to support his Constructive Programme. Here, one can clearly observe that one of the important characteristics of Gandhism appeared in its attempt to reallocate resources of the rich to the poor peacefully to make the latter self-reliant.

In any case, big capitalists who supported Gandhi played decisive roles in the formation of the trusteeship theory in the late 1920s. Indeed, the word "trustee" first appeared in his writings in 1927 to signify someone committed to the welfare of the masses, and that was all after Gandhi had met a series of important capitalists. In that year Gandhi requested donations for the khadi movement and appealed to the people:

> We, I who make these collections, traders who trade in khadi, organizers who go out to the villages, all of us have to consider ourselves to be the trustees for the welfare of the spinners for whom and whom alone we exist[60].

At the opening ceremony of a crèche in Ahmedabad in 1928, Gandhi expressed his dissatisfaction concerning the insufficient amelioration for the condition of the labouring class. There he requested mill

owners to "hold all your riches as a trust to be used solely in the interests of those who sweat for you"[61]. In 1931 he appealed to the zamindars in the United Provinces to "take a lively interest in their [tenants'] welfare, provide well-managed schools for their children, night schools for adults, hospitals and dispensaries for the sick, look after sanitation of villages"[62].

Here the basic framework of the trusteeship theory was shaped to stipulate that the rich manage their God-entrusted wealth for the welfare of the poor and accept only a commission for that management. The legal and religious understandings of "trust" that Gandhi acquired in South Africa then came to accompany some economic implications as well. The theory would be more enthusiastically advocated from then on as the means to eradicate "that unbridgeable gulf that today exists between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'"[63], or to bring about "equal distribution"[64] among people.

3 Penetration of Marxism into India

It was during the 1920s and 1930s that Marxism spread widely in India. Manabendra Nath Roy and others established the Communist Party of India in Tashkent, the former Soviet Union in October 1920[65]. The Kanpur Conspiracy Case in 1924[66] and the Meerut Conspiracy Case in 1929[67] symbolized the deep penetration of communism into India. Across the world liberal societies suffered the Great Depression between 1929 and 1933, while the former Soviet Union successfully implemented its First Five-Year Plan. That world situation might have encouraged many young radical Indians to listen to the voice of Marxism as well.

In such a historical context, Gandhi counterposed his theory of trusteeship against the Marxist theory of class struggle. Let us here look at some debates that Gandhi held with people influenced by Marxism, in conjunction with socialists' reactions to Gandhi who stopped the Civil Disobedience Campaign in 1934.

Gandhi suddenly stopped the Civil Disobedience Campaign in April 1934, on the ground that there was an ashram inmate reluctant to go to jail and preferring his private studies. Gandhi's press statement reads:

> This statement owes its inspiration to a personal chat with the inmates and associates of the Satyagraha Ashram who had just come out of prison and whom at Rajendrababu's instance I had sent to Bihar. More especially it is due to a revealing information I got in the course of conversation about a valued companion of long standing who was found reluctant to perform the full prison task and preferring his studies to the

> allotted task. This was undoubtedly contrary to the rules of satyagraha. More than the imperfection of the friend, whom I love more than ever, it brought home to me my own imperfection. … I was blind. Blindness in a leader is unpardonable. I saw at once that I must for the time being remain the sole representative of civil resistance in action[68].

Having heard about the cessation of Civil Disobedience in jail, Nehru felt that "A vast distance seemed to separate him from me. With a stab of pain I felt that the chords of allegiance that had bound me to him for many years had snapped"[69]. According to D. G. Tendulkar, "This was the reaction of many Congressmen" [70]. They established the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) in Patna on May 27[71].

Two days before, Gandhi had an acute debate with two socialists, M. R. Masani and N. R. Malkani, over "coercion" of socialism or state-ownership of industries along the socialist lines: "Your socialistic system is based on coercion"; "Violence is impatience and non-violence is patience"[72]. While Masani and Malkani asserted state-ownership of industries, Gandhi was eager to secure room for entrepreneurs' business based on the trusteeship theory:

> Industries like transport, insurance, exchange must be State-owned. But I would not insist that all large industries should be taken over by the State. Suppose there is an intelligent and expert individual who volunteers to run and direct an industry, without much remuneration and only for the good of society, I would keep the system elastic enough to allow such an individual to organize that industry[73].

Nehru, still in jail, in June started writing his *Autobiography*, in which he severely criticized Gandhi's ideas including the theory of trusteeship. The *Autobiography* was completed by February 1935, and it is not clear exactly when he gave the following account. However, the account is clear enough to express his deep distrust of Gandhi during these months:

> Imperfection or fault, if such it was, of the 'friend' was a very trivial affair. … But even if it was a serious matter, was a vast national movement involving scores of thousands directly and millions indirectly to be thrown out of gear because an individual had erred? This seemed to me a monstrous proposition and an immoral one. … But the reason he had given seemed to me an insult to intelligence and an amazing performance for a leader of a national movement[74].

Gandhi would never know about the manuscript of this *Autobiography* that Nehru was preparing in jail. Probably without being

aware of Nehru's sentiment, he confronted socialist students in July. While they insisted that class struggle would be inevitable, Gandhi endeavoured to persuade them of the possible harmony between the capitalists and the masses, which would be brought about by the theory of trusteeship:

> We must trust them [the capitalists] to the measure of their ability to surrender their gains for the service of the masses. … In India class war is not only not inevitable but it is avoidable if we have understood the message of non-violence. Those who talk about class war as being inevitable have not understood the implications of non-violence or have understood them only skin-deep[75].

Indeed, Gandhi was eager to avoid class conflicts by means of allotting tasks of trustees to landlords and capitalists. Having sympathy with the notion of "equality" that socialists pursued, he wanted to trust and rely upon the goodness of the rich in finding the means to bring about that "equality". At this point he drew a clear line between himself and socialists, who thought class struggle as inevitable: "It is surely wrong to presume that Western socialism or communism is the last word on the question of mass poverty"[76].

Four days later Gandhi thus requested zamindars to behave as "trustees", and promised to protect them decisively from the peril of class struggle: "You may be sure that I shall throw the whole weight of my influence in preventing class war. … But supposing that there is an attempt unjustly to deprive you of your property, you will find me fighting on your side"[77].

As mentioned above, Gandhi's theory of trusteeship functioned to defend the rich class from the threat of revolutionary thought and class struggle on the rise at that time. Such a function of the theory, accompanied by Gandhi's fraternity with the rich, clearly induced one to view him as conservative and supporting the existing regime of Indian society.

4 The Influence of Socialism

However, Gandhi could not totally avoid being influenced by socialism and communism. Nehru expressed the great shock he felt upon hearing the news of the campaign's suspension in his letter to Gandhi of August 13. On the contrary, it seems that this letter shocked Gandhi as well:

> When I heard that you had called off the C. D. movement I felt unhappy. … Much later I read your statement and this gave me one of the biggest shocks I have ever had. … But the reasons you gave for doing so and the suggestions you made for future work astounded me. I had a sudden

> and intense feeling, that something broke inside me, a bond that I had valued very greatly had snapped[78].

This letter must have been a turning point in Gandhi's attitudes towards socialists. In his reply of August 17 to Nehru, one can read his ardent hope that he would never like to part with Nehru in their movements for independence and social reform:

> Your passionate and touching letter deserves a much longer reply than my strength will permit. … But I am quite sure that from our common standpoint a closer study of the written word will show you that there is not enough reason for all the grief and disappointment you have felt. Let me assure you that you have not lost a comrade in me. … I have the same passion that you knew me to possess for the common goal. … But I have found them [socialists] as a body to be in hurry. Why should they not be? Only if I cannot march quite as quick, I must ask them to halt and take me along with them[79].

Gandhi could never ignore Nehru's leadership as a socialist as well as the power of socialism in India. Gandhi commented on this as follows in his letter to Sardar Patel in September: "Then there is the growing group of socialists. Jawaharlal is their undisputed leader.… That group is bound to grow in influence and importance"[80]. In fact, Gandhi is observed to have conceded to socialists to a certain extent in his statement regarding the theory of trusteeship from then on.

In October 1934, Gandhi preferred trusteeship to state-ownership, but admitted that, if the former was impossible, it would be unavoidable for the state to confiscate individual properties along the socialist lines:

> I would be very happy indeed if the people concerned behaved as trustees; but if they fail, I believe we shall have to deprive them of their possessions through the State with the minimum exercise of violence. … What I would personally prefer would be not a centralization of power in the hands of the State, but an extension of the sense of trusteeship; as in my opinion the violence of private ownership is less injurious than the violence of the State. However, if it is unavoidable, I would support a minimum of State-ownership[81].

Gandhi's attitudes also changed after 1934 over the amount of "commission" that a trustee would receive, or the amount of wealth that the trustee would hand over to society. For example, in his interview with Charles Petrasch and others in 1931, he said, "I do not fix a figure for this 'commission', but I ask them [owners of wealth] only to demand what they consider they are entitled to"[82]. On the

other hand, in his letter to Premabhen Kantak in 1935, Gandhi indicated a far bolder demand from trustees: "The owner becoming trustees means their handing over to the poor, that is, to the State or any other public welfare institution, all income in excess of a certain percentage"[83].

Moreover, in 1939 Gandhi insisted that the Princes, millionaires and zamindars should receive the same amount of wages as everyone else, that is, "eight annas a day" and "use the rest of his wealth for the welfare of society"[84]. In 1942 he stated that "In a State built on the basis of non-violence, the commission of trustees will be regulated"[85].

Gandhi's concession for socialists is also found in his speech in 1947: "God who was all-powerful had no need to store. … Hence men also should in theory live from day to day and not stock things. If this was imbibed by the people generally, it would become legalized and trusteeship would become a legalized institution"[86]. Here seems to be assumed a certain form of "coercion" by the state in turning trusteeship into "a legalized institution".

The theory of trusteeship after 1934 thus assumed a kind of "coercion" with regard to trustees' property ownership and wages, as well as the institution itself. This is clearly a sign that Gandhi incorporated socialist elements into his own theory, as he deeply acknowledged the significance of Nehru and his socialist followers in India.

Now what is the meaning for Gandhi to assume "coercion" in his theory of trusteeship? Although it was not particularly clear in his statements before 1934, this theory had an intention, at least in principle, of redressing unfair economic distribution among people. After that year, Gandhi wanted to shorten the distance between himself and socialists by means of admitting "coercion" if it was inevitable, and hence to prove that the theory would actually have the same potential for social reform as theirs.

This point escaped the notice of Marxists, who criticized Gandhi as conservative regarding social transformation. It was also ignored by those who highly evaluated in the post-Cold War period the trusteeship theory as an alternative to communism or as an ethic supportive for capitalist or mixed economies.

Gandhi basically believed that India should not adopt the Russian-style of communism forced on people by means of "violence". It was, therefore, a great deviation from the principle of "non-violence" that he assumed "coercion" in the theory of trusteeship. In that sense, Gandhi's concession to socialism was not small.

Despite such remarkable strides towards socialism, Gandhi did not intend to completely align his theory with those of socialists. The

assumed "coercion" has not completely changed the nature of the trusteeship theory. That is, although he conceived of the possibility for the state to confiscate an individual's property by means of the least violence, to him this must be the last resort only when the theory proved unrealizable. While Gandhi stipulated the commissions for trustees, he wished that any forceful measure be avoided in line with the spirit of "non-violence". Trusteeship as a "legalized institution" also seemed to be conceived as the extreme situation where it would be universally accepted among people.

Having received a critical impact from socialism, the theory of trusteeship maintained itself within its basic framework. While Gandhi wanted to maintain his friendship with wealthy people he considered good-willed, he thought of the abolition of capitalism by means of trusteeship in 1939:

> I am not ashamed to own that many capitalists are friendly towards me and do not fear me. They know that I desire to end capitalism almost, if not quite, as much as the most advanced socialist or communist. … My theory of 'trusteeship' is no makeshift, certainly no camouflage. I am confident that it will survive all other theories[87].

This statement proves that any understanding, either positive or negative, of this theory as supportive for capitalism is insufficient.

Furthermore, Gandhi indicated his unique view of "socialism" towards the end of his life. At the Delhi Provincial Political Conference in July 1947, he stated:

> It has become a fashion these days to call oneself a socialist. It is a mistaken notion that one can serve only if one carries a label of some 'ism'. … I have always considered myself a servant of the workers and peasants but I have never found it necessary to call myself a socialist. … My socialism is of a different kind. … If socialism means turning enemies into friends I should be considered a genuine socialist. … I do not believe in the kind of socialism that the Socialist Party preaches. … When I die you will all admit that Gandhi was a true socialist[88].

As indicated above, Gandhi's theory of trusteeship certainly received critical impact from socialism after 1934, but kept a distance from it in essence until the end. Also drawing a line with thoughts supportive for capitalism in principle, it uniquely evolved within the basic framework shaped during the 1920s and 1930s.

Gandhi indeed preached the theory of trusteeship, in order to bring about class harmony and "equal distribution" among people. In 1944, considering the possible exploitation of peasants by landlords,

he set forth that "Closest co-operation amongst the peasants is absolutely necessary. To this end, special organizing bodies or committees should be formed"[89]. The "organizing bodies or committees" here would mean panchayats. He conceived of solidarity among peasants and of strike in the form of "non-violent non-cooperation", in order for trusteeship to function in reality[90].

In April 1947, Gandhi persuaded peasant and labour leaders to cooperate "with zamindars not by harassing or killing them"[91]. He warned zamindars and capitalists as well: "Zamindars and capitalists will not be able to survive if they continue to suppress peasants and labourers"[92].

Class conflict was one of the greatest issues in India during the last twenty years of Gandhi's life. He demanded that the ruling class behave as "trustees" to tackle this issue. After all, the theory of trusteeship was different from socialism, but not purposed to maintain the existing capitalist system, when it functioned as a means of social reform in Gandhi's unique way.

Conclusion

Now we cannot easily accept the Marxist notion that the theory of trusteeship aimed to maintain the existing capitalist regime. While the theory would legitimate the positions of capitalists and landlords as "trustees", for that legitimacy, they had to take on a huge burden to financially assist Gandhi's works. He conceded to socialists in order to indicate that this theory also had the same vector of social reform as their theories did. This means that the positive understanding of Gandhism in conjunction with capitalism was also one-sided.

With capitalists and landlords on the one hand and socialists on the other, Gandhi did not take any side. Ultimately, the theory of trusteeship was an attempt to shorten its distance with socialism to avoid class struggle, and to reallocate the wealth of the rich to the poor non-violently. With this theory Gandhi dreamt of establishing – to borrow Ivan Illich's terminology – a "convivial"[93] society by means of mobilizing all the classes towards the construction of a politically and socio-economically new India.

Gandhi did not regard capitalists and landlords as his opponents when he advocated the theory of trusteeship. It may be questioned whether this theory was consistent with another position of his, in which he condemned their greed and avarice. Yet only by means of carrying such philosophical contradictions inside himself, could he tackle the contradictions that existed within Indian society itself.

The theory of trusteeship might have benefited capitalists and landlords as a result of its attempt to avoid class struggle. That is,

though, an inevitable consequence due to the fact that Gandhi was not particular about his own principles, and that he remained within modernity in order to renovate it from the inside. By doing so, he endeavoured to redress, instead of veiling, the internal contradictions of Indian society in a peaceful manner, and this aspect of his work should be more highly valued.

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Riots and Resistance: Unarmed Insurrection and Lessons for Nonviolent Struggle

Brian Martin

ABSTRACT

Some activists believe that riots should be included in the repertoire for strategic nonviolent action. Even those who disagree can learn from their arguments. This is illustrated by an analysis of Shon Meckfessel's book Nonviolence Ain't What It Used to Be. This analysis suggests the value of routinely giving examples of violence and nonviolence, of understanding the key characteristics of nonviolent action, and understanding the elements of nonviolent campaigns.

Key words: nonviolence, riots, Shon Meckfessel, property damage, violence

Introduction

SHON MECKFESSEL HAS decades of experience in social movements. Following the emergence of the Occupy movement in 2011, he carried out interviews with many US participants, seeking to understand more about their motivations and understandings. In his 2016 book *Nonviolence Ain't What It Used to Be,* Meckfessel draws on his experience, interviews and wide reading to offer a critical analysis of activism and a vision for the future.[1]

An important part of his book is a critique of nonviolence theory and practice. He questions the validity of the distinction between violence and nonviolence, and thinks that insistence on nonviolence is a divisive and restraining influence on campaigns. He argues in favour of the power of property destruction during riots — as long

as no one is hurt physically — as a means of psychologically challenging the assumed equivalence of lives and property under capitalism. Most of Meckfessel's criticisms are of principled nonviolence, in the Gandhian tradition. He might be considered to be a proponent of strategic or pragmatic nonviolent action, in the tradition of Gene Sharp, with one major exception: he argues that this approach be broadened to include rioting, specifically property damage that does not physically harm people.

Unfortunately, Meckfessel misrepresents some of the writings about nonviolence, ignores the constructive programme, does not look beyond anticapitalist struggles, and fails to provide evidence for the superiority or effectiveness of rioting. Furthermore, his claim that the circumstances in the US that enabled the effectiveness of nonviolence in the past no longer apply is questionable.

Given these shortcomings, nonviolence activists and scholars might well decide to not pay further attention to Meckfessel's ideas. Here, though, I take a different approach, looking at several of Meckfessel's criticisms and misunderstandings as guides to ways that nonviolence advocates might improve their thinking and practice.[2] I look at problems with the term "nonviolence," boundaries between violence and nonviolence, Gene Sharp's dynamics of nonviolent action, key characteristics of nonviolence, and anticapitalist nonviolent action.

The Term "Nonviolence"

Much of Meckfessel's critique depends on a linguistic analysis of the way that the word "nonviolence" derives its meaning and power. Meckfessel claims that "nonviolence" is always posed against "violence," which remains ill-defined, as something bad that must be rejected, as an "Other." He says that whatever nonviolence advocates might say, nonviolence is linked to "its Other in just the manner that its name attests, as a gesture of disavowal of an indefinable 'violence'." (p. 76).

A considerable portion of *Nonviolence Ain't What It Used to Be* is taken up with this sort of linguistic analysis. To add to his argument, Meckfessel notes that violence has many meanings and that many actions called nonviolent involve violence. Most of his book is about protests and riots, with little attention to strikes and boycotts. In one mention of Gene Sharp's classification of methods of nonviolent action, Meckfessel disputes that strikes are nonviolent, quoting from anarchist writer Voltairine De Cleyre who said, over a century ago, that strikes invariably are accompanied by beating of strike-breakers and destruction of property. In this, Meckfessel prefers not to recognise the difference between, on the one hand, a category ("the strike")

and its key characteristic (noncooperation by withdrawal of labour or some other resource) and, on the other hand, activities that combine a number of actions from different categories.

It would be easy to continue to enumerate questionable aspects of Meckfessel's analysis of the terms "violence" and "nonviolence," but it is important to recognise that he has focused on weaknesses and common misunderstandings associated with the term "nonviolence." He states in the introduction,

> My goal in this book in not to advocate violence or to prescribe nonviolence; it is, in fact, to move beyond the politically obstructive dichotomy of such prescriptions. If I am successful, we will learn to hesitate when we use these words, to pause until we actually have some idea what we're talking about — or perhaps until we've managed to come up with more helpful terminology. (p. 7)

Meckfessel's concerns point to a bigger question: if it isn't called nonviolence, what should it be called? It is worth revisiting discussions about the most suitable name.

When in the early 1900s Gandhi became active in resisting injustice in South Africa, the prevailing term was "passive resistance." Gandhi was unhappy with this term because it had a connotation of passivity, and ran a competition for a new name. The result was "satyagraha," literally meaning truth-force. Gandhi always thought of his campaigns as searches for the truth.[3] In translation, as "truth-force," satyagraha is a rather mysterious term that doesn't give much indication of what is involved practically. Nevertheless, an advantage of "satyagraha" is that it avoids the association with passivity.

Outside India, the term satyagraha never caught on. Instead, the most common expression became nonviolence or nonviolent action. The term "nonviolence" is a label that uses a negative, namely not violence, and thus lacks specificity. Here lies a problem that has plagued the area ever since.

Sharp in his classic work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* delineated nonviolent action in two ways.[4] First, it eschews physical violence against opponents. Second, it is a method of political action that is not part of the conventional repertoire accepted in the prevailing political system. In a country like the US, methods of conventional political action include advertising, lobbying, public meetings and voting. Therefore, in Sharp's framework they do not count as nonviolent action.

In what he called methods of protest and persuasion, Sharp included public speeches, petitions, slogans, prayer and worship,

parades, renunciation of honours and quite a few other methods. Consider one of these, petitions. In a dictatorship, a petition is non-standard; it can be deemed subversive and met with sanctions. However, in many countries, petitions are routine. You can sign one every day online without the slightest risk. Therefore, Sharp would say that in these countries, petitions do not count as nonviolent actions.

Meckfessel cites *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* but, like many others, does not note Sharp's distinction between nonviolent action and conventional politics. Some activists read Sharp's list of 198 methods of nonviolent action and assume that every one of them applies anywhere, regardless of how tolerated or routine it might be.

Sharp's other boundary is between nonviolent and violent action. By violence, Sharp refers to physical violence, but not everyone thinks of violence in this way. Even decades ago, a survey of one thousand US men revealed that over half considered burning a draft card as violence. Indeed, "violence" was a label reserved for actions they opposed; over half believed that police shooting looters was not violence.[5] Just referring to "violence" without a qualifier such as "physical" can be a prescription for confusion.

Since Sharp wrote, the concept of violence has been expanded in various ways. Johan Galtung introduced the concepts of structural violence and cultural violence.[6] These concepts have been enormously productive intellectually but have the disadvantage of making the meaning of "violence" less specific. As Galtung's terms have been taken up by social movements, "violence" has become a catch-all term for anything bad. Additional types include verbal violence and emotional violence. In many contexts, "violence" has become a synonym for "harm."

As "violence" has become more ambiguous, this has affected the connotations of "nonviolence," which were diffuse enough already. If "violence" doesn't refer specifically to physical violence, then it isn't obvious that "nonviolence" refers to the absence of physical violence. Perhaps this was never obvious anyway.

One solution to this terminological confusion is to use a different expression than "nonviolence." After the 1986 overthrow of Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos, the term "people power" came into the vocabulary. It is evocative but can be easily misinterpreted. More recently, scholars have adopted "civil resistance." Again, it is open to misinterpretation.

Any single term is almost bound to be inadequate because it attempts to encompass a diverse range of actions. Rather than search for a single term — satyagraha, nonviolent action, people power, civil resistance or whatever — there is a different way to seek clarity: give

examples.

Rather than just using the term "violence" or even "physical violence," examples can be given, such as beatings, shootings, imprisonment, torture, killing and massacres. Similarly, rather than just using the term "nonviolence" — or "civil resistance" or whatever — examples can be given, such as strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, occupations and parallel government. For more precision, specific types could be mentioned, for example religious excommunication, disobedience to social customs, protest emigration, withholding rent, refusal to sell property or pay debts, blacklisting of traders, lightning strike, slowdown strike, calling in sick, election boycotts, civil disobedience, severing diplomatic relations, and disclosing the identities of secret agents.[7] Giving examples has the advantage of making the ideas more vivid. Furthermore, the list of examples can be tailored to the audience and context. In places where petitions and rallies are prohibited, these could be included among the examples, but omitted in places where these are routine methods of political action. The adjective "illegal" can help sometimes, for example in distinguishing illegal rallies from legal ones. Legal rallies, if they are small and frequent, might be considered conventional politics whereas illegal rallies, if police try to shut them down, would be considered non-conventional, and thus in the category of nonviolent action, or whatever term is used.

The point is to clarify the meaning of words. It is still all right to use generic words like nonviolence, as long as audiences know what they refer to.

Boundaries

Meckfessel throws doubt on the distinction between violence and nonviolence by questioning both the theory and practice of nonviolent action. Yet he sets up his own preferred boundary between what is acceptable or effective action and what isn't. He supports "noninjurious" anticapitalist violence, meaning harm to physical objects without physical harm to humans. His support for destroying property is restricted to the property of large corporations, for example smashing windows of banks. The rationale is that this is psychologically liberating for rioters by throwing into question the capitalist equivalence between property and humans.

Meckfessel recognises that harming humans can be counterproductive. He cites an example: in Greece in 2010, three employees died when a bank was set on fire. This consequence of rioting totally discredited the movement, bringing action to a halt. As Meckfessel says, "… the movement of numerous millions effectively demobilized in shame over the deaths, however accidental." (p. 61).

Meckfessel thus seemingly agrees with the activists he criticises about the importance of a boundary between actions that are acceptable or wise and those that are not. The question is where to draw the line.

The important point here is that the line or boundary may be somewhat arbitrary yet quite valuable for ensuring that actions do not become counterproductive. Meckfessel's preferred boundary, between injury-causing and non-injury-causing, is precarious because rioting so easily slips over the boundary, as the Greek example shows. Throwing objects at police is risky if one of them might seriously injure an officer. Even breaking windows has a risk of hurting people. When drawing a boundary, it might be worth thinking in terms of a precautionary principle: make a choice that minimises the risks of people going beyond the line.

Meckfessel does not mention agents provocateurs, who are police or people paid by the police who pretend to be protesters, join action groups and, in many cases, encourage the use of violence. Agents provocateurs have been used by authorities in many countries for a long time.[8] Their aims can include collecting information and sowing discord in group. In some cases, they seek to discredit protesters by encouraging violence. This should be recognised as a warning: whatever infiltrators are recommending is probably a bad idea. There is no known instance in which undercover police agents have advocated that campaigners maintain nonviolent discipline.[9]

In the nonviolence tradition, property destruction has always been at the boundary. This includes sabotage in workplaces: some workers in Nazi factories used low-key destruction of equipment to slow production. Other opponents of the Nazis blew up railway tracks, a much more obvious form of resistance, and one that could possibly harm crew or passengers on trains. In retaliation for such actions, Nazis took severe reprisals against local people.

The implication is that boundaries can be worthwhile even if they are arbitrary to some extent. In choosing actions, it is worth considering the reaction of authorities and the general public.

The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action

In part 3 of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action,* Gene Sharp presents what he calls the "dynamics of nonviolent action." Drawing from his study of numerous campaigns, Sharp inferred a set of stages or facets that commonly occur. Sharp labels these stages laying the groundwork for nonviolent action, challenge brings repression, solidarity and discipline to fight repression, political jiu-jitsu, three ways success may be achieved, and the redistribution of power.[10] For each stage, he provides numerous examples.

One of Sharp's stages is political jiu-jitsu, a process that sometimes occurs when police or troops assault nonviolent protesters. A classic example is when in 1960 South African police opened fire on protesters in the town of Sharpeville, killing perhaps a hundred of them, many shot in the back while running away.[11]

Sharp says that an attack like that in Sharpeville, one that is widely seen as unfair, can potentially trigger changes in thought and action in three groups. First is the grievance group, those people in sympathy with the protesters. In the case of Sharpeville, the grievance group was the black population in South Africa. Second is people not directly involved in the conflict. In relation to Sharpeville, most international audiences were in this category, as were some whites in South Africa. Third is the opponent group. Concerning Sharpeville, the opponents were the South African police and government. Sharp said that in cases of political jiu-jitsu, an act that is seen as unfair can mobilise greater action within the grievance group, trigger concern and involvement among non-involved parties and occasionally even sway some opponents. In the case of Sharpeville, the most important effect was a shift in perception among international audiences. At the time, the South African government was seen as legitimate and democratic, a valued member of the international community. Sharpeville was the trigger for a reassessment that eventually turned South Africa into a pariah state.[12]

Meckfessel comments on political jiu-jitsu. He says it is supposed to happen in every nonviolent campaign, whereas Sharp says it sometimes does and sometimes doesn't. Meckfessel claims that political jiu-jitsu depends on the mass media reporting on events. Sharp never made this claim. The role of the media is worth examining in more detail.

In a number of cases of political jiu-jitsu, the media has played an important role, but not quite in the way Meckfessel suggests. After the Sharpeville massacre, there was no coverage in the South African media. However, there were some foreign journalists present at Sharpeville; their reports and photos made front-page news internationally. In the case of the beating of satyagrahis during the 1930 salt march in India, there was no coverage in India itself because the press was controlled by the British colonial rulers. The beatings became international news due to stories written by western journalist Webb Miller, who was able to get them past British censors. Furthermore, much of the jiu-jitsu effect was due to supporters of the Indian independence movement in Britain, the US and elsewhere who reproduced and distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of Miller's stories.[13]

Meckfessel claims that US mass media are now less receptive to stories that might trigger political jiu-jitsu. It is true that US mass media seldom question fundamental assumptions about the political and economic system, as argued by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, among others.[14] But political jiu-jitsu does not depend on mass media reporting, and social media now provide an alternative. The killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer on 25 May 2020 offers a vivid example. Floyd was not a protester nor part of a campaign, so this was not a case of political jiu-jitsu, but the same processes were involved: public outrage over an injustice leading to a tremendous burst of support for the movement whose grievances were encapsulated by the single event. Outrage was triggered by the posting online of a video of the final minutes of Floyd's life; mass media coverage followed.

One of Meckfessel's main arguments in favour of rioting is that destroying the property of large corporations enables collective empowerment, in other words a process of psychological, social and political liberation. Participation in nonviolent actions can provide the same sort of empowerment.[15] Meckfessel might be said to be arguing that property damage and clashes with police are compatible with Sharp's observations of empowerment.

As noted earlier, supporting property destruction but without physical harm to humans is a precarious boundary, because thrown bricks or burning buildings can so easily hurt people. There are other ways to challenge capitalist property relations with less risk to people's bodies. One option is to challenge so-called intellectual property such as copyright and patents. Several forms of intellectual property are a restraint on trade and thus irrational even within the logic of the market, and so are a prime target for resistance.[16] Whether resistance to intellectual property would be as psychologically liberating as breaking bank windows is unknown, but it would allow greater participation.

Though *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* was published nearly half a century ago, activists can still learn from it. Sharp's "dynamics of nonviolent action" in part three of the book remains valuable for understanding the features of campaigns.[17]

Key Characteristics

Another way to approach nonviolence is to understand and appreciate its key characteristics. It can be asked, what do strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, alternative government and other such methods have in common? Some possible key characteristics include being non-standard methods of political action, causing limited harm, allowing wide participation,

being fair, incorporating ends in means, and requiring skilful use.[18] Compare, for the sake of argument, boycotts and riots by a few of these criteria.

Both boycotts and riots are non-standard forms of political action: unlike voting or lobbying, they are not part of the official repertoire of citizen participation. The issue of harm has already been canvassed: both boycotts and riots (assumed to be noninjurious) avoid physical harm to humans, while they differ in that riots cause damage to physical objects.

Next consider participation. Anyone can participate in a boycott: women, men, children, elderly and people with disabilities. In contrast, rioting requires a certain degree of physical capacity just to break a window. In practice, most of those joining riots seek to avoid arrest, in which case they need to be able to run. Another factor is the level of perceived risk: due to the danger of police aggression, many people avoid participating. The result is pretty much as observed: most members of black blocs that cause property damage seem to be young fit men.[19] Not coincidentally, this demographic is much the same as the police and military. In comparison to boycotting, rioting in practice discourages participation by several segments of the population.

Another feature of effective nonviolent action is skilful use of methods. Prior to the sit-ins at Nashville, Tennessee in 1960, when Blacks sat at lunch counters and, when refused service, remained in their seats despite verbal abuse and physical harassment, they spent months in training. In many nonviolent campaigns, it is considered important that participants gain some knowledge and skills beforehand, in what is called nonviolent action training. Soldiers receive extensive training before entering combat, so it makes sense that activists also undertake training to become more effective.[20] This is especially important when opponents, such as police and government officials, develop more sophisticated methods of quelling protest.

What would training for rioting look like? Might it include practice in throwing stones to cause damage to property while avoiding injury to people? Might it include practice in dealing with tear gas canisters? In hand-to-hand fighting with police? In evading arrest? Training in rioting might sound ridiculous because riots are widely assumed to be spontaneous displays of popular rage yet, to be effective as a means of social change, training is vital, especially considering that police receive training and learn from experience.

In summary, it can be useful to identify the key characteristics of successful nonviolent action — or social action more generally — and then use them to judge particular actions. A task for those who support Meckfessel's view would be to identify the key characteristics of

successful rioting. It is unlikely that widespread participation or prefiguration would be among them.

Nonviolence and Capitalism

Meckfessel's focus is on protest action against capitalism. In the history of nonviolent action, there are plenty of examples of anti-capitalist campaigns. Gandhi's constructive programme, including for example spinning cotton to produce khadi, was in support of a vision of an economic system built around serving human needs rather than driven by profit. Sharp's methods of nonviolent action include dozens of types of economic noncooperation and labour strikes. The labour movement has a long history of workers' action, most of which has relied on methods in the nonviolence repertoire.

In this context, Meckfessel's focus on rioting, in particular on public destruction of corporate property, looks peculiar as a path to challenge capitalism and build alternatives to it. There are other long-established anti-capitalist methods of struggle, including local money systems, community exchange schemes, green bans and workers' control.[21]

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that nonviolence writers and campaigners have given far more attention to challenging political authoritarianism than to challenging oppressive economic systems. In this regard, riots might be a distraction. What is needed is more thought and action to promote alternatives to capitalism.[22]

Conclusion

As nonviolent campaigning becomes more widely used, it is understandable that it is criticised. This was true in the 1920s, when Gandhi's approach attracted fierce criticism from Marxists. It remains true in the 2020s. The question is, what is the best way to respond to criticisms of the standard formulations of nonviolent action?

One option is to counter them, showing why they are wrong or misguided. Another is simply to ignore them and proceed unperturbed. Each of these options may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances. Here I have suggested a different option: examining criticisms and seeking to learn from them how to make nonviolent campaigning more effective. There are quite a few critiques of nonviolence to which this learning approach could be applied.[23]

Shon Meckfessel's book *Nonviolence Ain't What It Used to Be* criticises principled nonviolence, especially that associated with Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., arguing that in the US this century, rioting should be added to the activist repertoire, as long as it only damages property and not people. Whatever judgement is made about his arguments, they can be used to sharpen understanding and presentation of ideas about nonviolence.

One lesson from Meckfessel's treatment is, when referring to violence or nonviolence, it is useful to give examples. In particular, it can be helpful to refer to strikes, boycotts, sit-ins and other methods of noncooperation and nonviolent intervention, to counter the common identification of nonviolent action with rallies. Another thing to be learned by studying Meckfessel's arguments is the value of a greater understanding of the dynamics of nonviolent action, namely the typical features of nonviolent campaigns, including political jiu-jitsu.

Finally, it is possible to agree with Meckfessel that it is important to maintain dialogue with those who disagree with the standard approach to nonviolence. This is in the spirit of Gandhi's quest for the truth. No one yet has the final answer. The implication is that it is worth combining vigorous advocacy for our preferred approaches with a willingness to listen to those with different ideas.

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India-China Relations: Coexistence Through Accommodation

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ABSTRACT

India-China relationship has been on an adversarial disposition, despite the spirit of peaceful coexistence envisaged in the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954. After the 1962 war, the relationship has been one of competitive co-existence marred by a mix of hostility, distrust, border skirmishes and security concerns and intermittent instances of cooperation including efforts at maintaining peace at the disputed border. Among other things one of the key reasons for the scarred relationship has been the failure to accommodate each other in a peaceful manner symbolically, territorially, economically and institutionally. As a result, the relationship has deteriorated into hostile military engagements at the border, unfriendly alignments at regional and global levels against each other and lacklustre economic and trade ties. This paper attempts to analyze the non-accommodative character of India-China relations by drawing inferences from the accommodative frame work in international relations.

Key words: India, China, accommodation, border disputes, peaceful coexistence

Introduction

DESPITE THE SPIRIT of peaceful coexistence envisioned by the 1954 treaty, India and China engaged in militarization at the border and fought a war in the eighth year of the signing of the agreement. Thereafter, the relationship has been competitive co-existence marred by a mix of hostility, distrust, border skirmishes and security concerns and intermittent instances of cooperation including efforts at maintaining peace at the disputed border. In other words, India-china

relationship has been a classic case of simultaneity of coexistence and competence which in the last 70 years failed to realize the huge potential of a mutually beneficial relationship. The sudden deterioration of the relationship caused by the recent (May 2020) border skirmishes underlines the complexity and contradictions of the relationship and the failure of the spirit of the 1954 treaty. The failure of India and China to coexist peacefully and derive mutual benefit assume great significance in the context of the growing influence of these countries in regional and global politics. Among other things one of the key reasons for their scarred relationship has been the failure to accommodate each other in a peaceful manner symbolically, territorially, economically and institutionally and its repercussions in other aspects of the relationship. As a result, the relationship has deteriorated into hostile military engagements at the border, unfriendly alignments at regional and global levels against each other and lacklustre economic and trade ties. The crucial question is could these two rising powers accommodate bilaterally and coexist peacefully against the uncertainties of regional and global politics. This paper attempts to analyze the non-accommodative character of India-China relations by drawing inferences from the accommodative frame work in international relations. The major argument is that the bilateral relationship between India and China did not flourish the way envisaged in the 1954 treaty because they have been unwilling to accommodate each other symbolically, territorially, economically and institutionally. The paper is set in three parts. Part one explains the idea of accommodative relationship. Part two gives an overview of India-China relationship over the last seventy years. The third part examines the nature of symbolic, territorial, economic and institutional non-accommodation and its impact on India-China relationship followed by conclusion.

The accommodative approach

All efforts at peace building in international relations involve some form of accommodation which emphasizes mutual acceptance and substantial reduction of hostility. According to T. V. Paul accommodation in international politics involves mutual adaption and acceptance by established and rising powers and the elimination or substantial reduction of hostility between them. The process of accommodation involves status adjustment, the sharing of leadership roles through the accordance of institutional membership, and privileges, and acceptance of spheres of influence. Accommodation also means one power viewing the other as a legitimate stakeholder and accepting to grant it some status, sphere of influence, even if they

might be rivals and compete at different levels. Bilateral accommodation of rising powers necessarily includes the decision or understanding not to challenge each other militarily. Accommodation is not mere absence of war, it is respecting and understanding each other to avoid situations of conflict. In this sense accommodation is generation of 'deep peace' or 'sustained peace' or 'warm peace'. The spirit of accommodation can mitigate conditions of conflict and ensure peaceful coexistence. If competition ends in conflict, that is not accommodation. In India-China relations there is a need to adjust the relations as per the idea of accommodation to reduce tension to ensure peaceful coexistence and mutual development.

Strategies of Accommodation

T V Paul mentions four propositions as strategies of accommodation-ideological or normative, territorial, economic, institutional. Ideological accommodation takes place when the established powers and the rising powers accept the ideological and normative frameworks of the international as legitimate. Territorially peaceful accommodation is feasible when the powers consider territorial settlements as legitimate, and do not apply force to change the status quo. Territorial settlements are considered legitimate and neither existing nor emerging powers seek to overthrow the territorial status quo by force. It is not related to control of mere territory but control of spheres of influence as well. It is important that the countries involved shall not seek territorial revisions to alter forcefully and respect spheres of influence. In economic accommodation there should be strong economic interdependence and societal interactions which would make violent engagements difficult for both the parties as it is related to their continued economic rise and prosperity. Strong economic connectivity can avoid conflicts to a great extent. In institutional accommodation, peaceful accommodation takes place when the concerned parties are willing to support and coopt in international institutions and other forums. It involves representation and role in decision making in various institutions. In the case of India-China relations symbolic accommodation in terms of mutual recognition and acceptance as great powers is of central importance as both self-perceive them as great powers. This sense of self-accorded civilizational and great power status is inextricably related to territorial disputes between the two. As such, symbolic, territorial, economic and symbolic accommodation is crucial given the nature of the issues and the potential for improving the relationship are taken into consideration. Though the concept of accommodation is primarily framed to analyze accommodation of rising powers in global politics, it is a valuable framework to analyze India-

China bilateral relations as one is a dominant power and the other is an aspiring power.

India China Relations: an Overview

India and China have age old cultural and civilizational connections. Since their independence in the late 1940s India-China relations have been characterized by many ups and downs. The relationship started on a harmonious note with the establishment of early diplomatic relationship in 1950, the signing of the 'Panchsheel' in 1954 and frequent high level visits and mutual appreciation of a new beginning. There existed a sense of shared history in terms of colonial experience, Asianism and the need for rapid economic development. India was the first non-communist country to recognize the People Republic of China. On 26 January 1951, Mao Zedong personally attended India's Republic day celebrations at the Indian embassy in Beijing. The bilateral visits of leaders were greeted by the whole nation with enthusiasm and goodwill. In international forums like the Bandung Conference in 1955, India and China, in general, adopted common positions on imperialism and Afro-Asian unity. It could be rightly assessed that the early 1950s was a period of accommodation at different levels in India-China relations wherein both conducted themselves in a spirit of fraternity.

But the initial spirit of brotherhood came to an end in 1960 when both these countries adopted diametrically opposite positions on the border disputes with serious repercussions. Suddenly good will of the early 1950s spiraled down to discord and armed conflict in 1962. One of the reasons for the sudden spurt of conflict was the failure of both India and China to contain the divergent colonial and cultural history interpretations of border held by each other assuming aggressive postures. According to the Chinese the disputed boundary has been historically and culturally a part of China and India's claims on the territory had been based on the British delineation under the McMohan line of 1914 which the Chinese representative had only initialed and not signed. Whereas Indian position was based on Buddhist influence in Tibet since early times and the legitimacy of the 1914 Shimla agreement. India was of the view that the Building of the Aksai Chin road from Sinkiang to Tibet, clandestine garrisoning of Aksai Chin area in the mid-1950s, designating the entire boundary in the Eastern (McMohan Line) and Western sectors (Kunlun) as disputed in 1959 by China were aggressive and expansionist.

China's conviction that Indian agencies, along with the US, supported the guerrilla war in Tibet from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s, strong Indian reaction to Chinese repression in Tibet, asylum

granted to Dalai Lama in India in 1959, and the forward policy at the border by India in 1961 strengthened Chinese misunderstanding of India's designs in Tibet. The divergent perceptions and narratives related to the border accorded strategic significance to the entire episode which made negotiated settlement almost impossible and the conflict inevitable. A key outcome of the border clash was the burgeoning of a new security scenario marked by the formation and subsequent consolidation of China-Pakistan axis against India which eventually resulted in the ceding of disputed territory known as the karakoram tract of Jammu Kashmir to China by Pakistan bypassing India's objections in 1963. More importantly, it opened up the possibility of India having to fight a two-front war with Pakistan and China.

Though the 1962 conflict was followed by expulsion of diplomats and the representation to each other was limited to Charge d' affairs, the boundary was generally unpatrolled and left to its own devices. But both countries took hostile positions on Taiwan, Tibet and insurgency in North Eastern parts of India. This period of mutual disapproval and indirect aggression was mitigated with the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1979 but the suspicion and distrust created by the 1962 conflict has been lingering. The 1988 visit of Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi to China and reciprocal tour of President Jiang Zemin to India reduced considerably the tensions in the relationship. A major achievement of the new warmth in the relationship was the decision to take necessary measures to improve the relationship and hold talks on the border issue. The end of the cold war and economic globalization also contributed to improvement in relations. The changed context witnessed better connectivity in various fields spanning from economics to culture. An understanding was reached that the border disputes shall not block improvement of relations in other fields. This was flowed by agreements that emphasized maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas. The improvement of relationship continued in the new millennium with high level visits and treaties in various fields which reduced the threat perceptions towards each other and reflected the desire for a mutually beneficial relationship. The relationship further improved with high level visits and informal summits between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping. This period also witnessed improved economic cooperation as trade between the two increased to 100 million dollars in 2018, 40 times increase since 1999. But it was not a smooth going as a number of issues troubled the relations that had carried along a historical baggage of distrust and confrontation at the border. The border skirmishes at the Western sector of the Galwan valley in May

2020 is indicative of the lingering complexities, tensions and contradictions of the relationship.

An overview of the relationship shows that the improvement in the relationship and bonhomie at the leadership level have not fundamentally altered the nature of the relations since the 1960s. These two countries have not conducted their bilateral relations in the spirit of accommodation. Though there are many areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, it is essentially a combative relationship wherein both are unwilling to accommodate each other in territorial, symbolic economic and institutional terms. In other words, they are non-accommodative symbolically, territorially, institutionally and economically and challenge and confront each other in different spheres of influence in South Asia and East Asia. More importantly, this has to be viewed in the context of the rise of India and China and the current uncertainties in world politics.

Symbolic Non-accommodation

As two great civilizations and rising powers, perceptions of prestige and dignity based on nationalism figure prominently in bilateral relations between India and China. Increasing each other's prestige and reasserting their civilizational greatness and pride have been rendered utmost priority by these two countries. In other words, both India and China share the same concept of their own centrality. Nehru, India's first Prime Minster, in the context of growing tensions on the India-China border, stated in the Indian Parliament in September 4, 1959 that it was not a question of two miles of territory in mountains where nobody lives, it is the nation's self-respect and dignity involved. The Chinese consider their nation as great and superior in terms of 'Tian-xia' which means 'all under heaven'. Nehru also referred to the Chinese sense of greatness and superiority that complicate matters in one of the speeches in the Indian parliament on November 25, 1959.

After independence both India and China emphasized their anti-imperialist stance and colonial victimhood and wanted to assume leadership and acceptability of the newly independent world. Gaining control of more territory based on historical and customary claims was one of the ways to regain lost glory of the yester years under colonial and expansionist rule of the Western powers. India's insistence on border lines as drawn by the British was viewed by China as vestiges of British imperialism being advocated by India. India was perceived as a victimizer along with the Britishers when India claimed territory as per the Mc Mohan Line which China considered belonged to it historically.

In the initial years of independence, China, by and large, accepted India's prominence in its immediate neighborhood. There have been occasions of China alerting India on the growing US influence in Nepal. Similarly both China and India were not appreciative of Pakistan getting closer to the US. At the same time India and China competed to assume the leadership of Asia and the Third World which to some extent, they believed, was their rightful claim as two historically great powers. It was more an egoistic battle for leadership which had its deleterious impact on bilateral relations at other levels.

The 1962 war was a big blow to India's dignity and pride. Thereafter territorial security and gaining parity with China have been important objectives of India's foreign policy. Territorial compromise was considered a sign of weakness and loss of pride. The 1974 and 1998 nuclear tests were not on account of security alone but to attain nuclear parity with other nuclear powers especially China which involved perceptions of prestige and civilizational greatness. Scholars like Stephen Cohen and George Perkovich subscribe to the perception of India as a "frustrated great state," which drove it to acquire nuclear weapons. Indian analysts also hold the view that nuclear weapons in addition to boosting overall security capability, added to India's international respect and standing. In the similar vein, India has passively resented the recognition given to China, especially by the United States, and been longing to gain the same stature.

There has been a perception in India that the country is not given due respect by China. As a successful democracy and home to 15 percent of the world's population, India thought of itself as a great power in the making. On a number of occasions China's leadership and analysts were critical of India's ambitions and dismissive of it as a successful democracy and doubted its future as a united nation. Zhou Enlai was critical especially of Nehru's alleged designs of an Indian Empire embodied in his writings and the goals of the 1962 war. In this vein, Zhou Enlai also blamed India for its hegemonic aspirations and big brotherly attitude in its relationship with the South Asian neighbors. In many assessments by Chinese scholars in the 1990s, India was not accorded the status even of a major regional power rather bracketed with Pakistan. In the opinion of Steve Tsang the major problem in India-China relations is that India is not taken seriously and does not consider it a peer competitor or near peer competitor to China by the leadership including by president Xi Jinping.

According to David M. Malone the competition between India and China is not just for capital resources and markets but also for

legitimacy as great powers which involve parallel discourses of historical and contemporary greatness which make peaceful coexistence problematic. It was in this sense, late K. Subramanyan, the foremost strategic thinker of India, opined that the root cause of India-China rivalry is the ambition to restore their former status and China's intention to deny India the same at the global stage. The fact that topmost leaders of India and China who have displayed great personal chemistry in formal and informal meetings, have been unwilling to mitigate tension after the May 2020 border skirmishes in the spirit of accommodation is indicative of the ongoing battle of perceptions of centrality, honor and pride. For they consider accommodation a sign of weakness.

Territorial non-accommodation

Territorial disputes which constitute the litmus test in India-China relations is closely linked to honor and security of the country and therefore is a continuation of symbolic non-accommodation. One reinforces the other and they go in tandem. In the words of Ashely Tellis territorial integrity against China, is a singularly united national venture in India. China is perceived as India's primary threat on account of the disputed territory and the claims and counterclaims about it. The beginning of the deterioration in India-China relationship could be traced back to territorial disputes. In the 1950s they blamed each other for maneuvering to construct the trajectory of Tibet territorially. China blamed Nehru of his imperialist and hegemonic ambitions to turn Tibet into an Indian protectorate in order to control it. India blamed China of expansionist agenda when it occupied Tibet, claimed territory in the Western sector, rejected the Mc Mohan Line and held that the entire border is disputed. They were militarily engaged in the border to assert their claims which culminated in the 1962 conflict. According to John Garver both India and China were responsible for the 1962 debacle-China for misconstruing India's Tibetan policies and India for pursuing a confrontational policy on the border. The impact of the 1962 conflict practically disconnected India and China for almost two decades. In the 1980s the relationship began to improve when the boundary issue was put aside and militaries observed restraint at the border. Economic and political relationships also improved during this period. But border flare ups since 2012 at Depsang in 2013, Chamar in 2014, and Dokhlam in 2017, led to extension of infrastructure facilities on both sides of the border and resultant military confrontations. The declaration of Ladakh as a Union Territory in 2019 by India constituted cartographic aggression in Chinese perception and that further strengthened the recalcitrant

position of the two neighbors on territorial claims. The May-June 2020 bloody engagement between the two militaries on the Western Sector of the border at Galwan valley witnessed further low in the relationship. As a result of the current crisis at the border, the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control, the 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control and the 2014 Development Partnership all have frittered away.

In the opinion of Shiv Shankar Menon, the former foreign secretary of India, Chinese intrusion into Indian territory during the visit of President Xi Jinping to India in September 2014 and Prime Minister Modi's visit to China in April 2015 was to emphasize its military dominance and ability to embarrass India. Similarly the increasing power difference between India and China, has led to change in China's behavior in the border and it has resulted in increasing militarization of the border. China no longer considers it urgent to resolve the border issue and border talks have receded to the background. As such border conflicts have become the new normal in the relations and de-escalation and disengagement seems unlikely as both continue high build up and have started rotation of troops at the flare up points in the Western sector of the border. According to the defense minister of India, in the context of the 2020 border skirmishes, the government has given a free hand to the armed forces to strongly oppose any change on the Line of Actual Control.

As a result of the mutually aggressive postures there is substantial loss of trust and both countries follow completely non-accommodative positions on the territorial dispute oriented by differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control and accentuated militarization of the border. The primary reason for the current crisis at the border is said to be the infrastructural developmental activities engaged by both countries to create their own advantageous terrains militarily. Given the fact that both China and India are unwilling to stop further reinforcement of infrastructure at the border is born out of the classic security dilemma that they are locked in- one sees its own actions as self-defensive which appears threatening to the other. The measures that are counterbalancing in Indian perspective are challenging to China and vice versa. The recalcitrant approach to resolve the border issue is inextricably related to each other's security and status nationally and internationally.

The symbolic and territorially non-accommodative behavior associated with prestige, self-perception of greatness and territorial

claims coupled with contemporary rise of China and India have its rippling impacts on strengthening claims and assertive positions on spheres of influence and in entering into alignments and counter-alignments that go against each other's interest across the region and beyond.

China's growing engagements in the Indian Ocean and in India's neighborhood is perceived as an attempt to encircle India in its own spheres of influence. By investing in the dual-use commercial and military port facilities and critical infrastructure in Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Coco islands and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Bangladesh's Payra deep-sea port (after the Chittagong port did not materialise), Marao Atoll in the Maldives and drawing Nepal into its larger framework of the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network, Beijing aim to create its own spheres of influence in India's neighborhood and adjoining waters.

China-Pakistan relationship which started as an opportunistic-tactical alliance has developed into a strategic and economic partnership. The cementing factor for their all weather friendship has been their commonality of hostility to India. Pakistan is being cultivated by China as an important player in the so-called string of pearls strategy against India with Gwadar port as the focal point. Pakistan as a key factor in India-China border clashes has immense long term strategic and military consequences. Today China is the leading supplier of military equipment to Pakistan which includes support to build nuclear weapons. The China-Pak Economic Corridor, an important component of the BRI, passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir discarding India's sovereignty and security concerns is an intrusion into the Indian sphere of influence. Pakistan's support for China's interest in SAARC is seen suspiciously by India. The abrogation of Kashmir's special status by India in August 2019 and the May 2020 China-India border skirmishes have accentuated Kashmir as a critical common factor in China-Pakistan common friendship. In short, Pakistan has become a key strategic partner of China in South-Asia and in the Indo-Pacific context.

Similarly, India's growing defense and maritime engagements in South East Asia with countries like Vietnam and Taiwan and Act East policy with ASEAN and the anti-China triad constituted of the US, Australia and japan through the QUAD and Malabar exercises in the Indo-pacific are perceived as designs to cut into Chinese spheres of influence. These acts of engaging and promoting alignments and counter-alignments against each other reflect the refusal to accept each other's spheres of influence and accommodate their interests. This violates accommodative behavior and peaceful conduct of

relations. It means that symbolic and territorial non-accommodation have transformed relationship into an adversarial mode.

Institutional Non-accommodation

In the initial years of their independence both India and China, in general, were accommodative of each other in various international forums and institutions. India was one of the first countries to recognize PRC immediately after its formation and proactively welcomed it in regional and international forums. India was very supportive of China's admission into the UN Security Council. India and China shared common views on the unrepresentative character of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and demanded reforms of these institutions for a just international economic order. But of late they have been non-accommodative in these institutions as India-China bilateral relations are characterized by confrontation rather than cooperation. This happened at a time when India and China together formed the BRICS New Development Bank and India joined the China initiated Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. China blocking India's entry into NSG in the pretext of India's non-compliance with NPT, opposition to an Indian project in the Asian Development Bank in Arunachal Pradesh and its reluctance to support India's entry into the UNSC are instances of denying India its legitimate space in global politics. China's opposition to India's entry into the UN is particularly representative of the current non-accommodative nature of the relationship as India was one of the strongest advocates of China's admission into the world body. Subsequent to the Indian decision to change the status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, China on behalf of Pakistan arranged a closed door meeting of the UNSC on the situation in Kashmir. And, China continues to raise the Kashmir issue in the UN General Assembly under one or the other account. Similarly China has opposed sanctions against Masood Azhar, the founder of Pakistan-based terror group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, for over a decade. India and China engage in hedging and status seeking in organizations like BRICS and G-20 are indicative of the non-accommodative inclinations even in organizations that are symbolic of the solidarity and shared interests of newly emerging countries. Again China was not particularly appreciative of India's growing relationship with ASEAN and its 'Act East Policy'. At one stage China pushed for an ASEAN plus three free trade agreement minus India. Recently India has joined the Western countries in chastising China for its attitude towards freedom of navigation and non-compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

This is contrary to the spirit of common positions India and China adopted at various international forums on imperialism, colonialism and a just international economic order in the second half of the 20th century. This non-accommodative postures would adversely affect India-China cooperation globally on climate change, fight against terrorism, cooperation in the BRICS, AIIB, SCO, and above all bilateral relations.

Economic non-accommodation

Despite high geographical proximity and scope for cooperation, economic and trade ties between India and China have been moderate and below potential. Because of poor economic connectivity with neighbors especially China, India's exports travel l6387 km. on average against the world mean of 4862 km. India-China bilateral trade which reached US$ 92.89 billion in the year 2019 decreased by 2.93% year on year. India's exports to China and India's imports from China decreased by 4.55% and 2.54% respectively in 2019. Though India was the 7th largest export destination for Chinese products, its export to India declined for the first time in 2019 in the last 10 years. In 2019, India was the 12th largest trading partner of China and India the 26th largest exporter to China. Even very small countries like Vietnam and South Korea have greater economic connectivity with China than India. China's economic presence in India is insignificant compared to South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

India has a huge balance of trade deficit with China which accounts for about 50 percent of the country's total trade deficit. China has been reluctant to address the huge trade deficit of over 50 billion US dollars despite repeated efforts by India. China's exports to India are more than four times what it imports from India. India's strong sectors such as IT and pharmaceuticals and agri-products have no presence in China and Chinese protectionist policies hinder their entry into Chinese markets. Top Indian IT companies such as TCS, Wipro, Infosys, Tech Mahindra and HCL find their operations in China hamstrung by market access restrictions and non-tariff barriers. Chinese investments also raise concerns over the protection of intellectual property rights, data privacy, and national security and there is a perception that economic dependence on China is not in India's long-term interests. This is one of the reasons why India has not joined China's Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, India did not join the RCEP on account of fear of Chinese products getting free access to Indian markets, huge trade deficit with China and poor accessibility to Chinese markets for India Products. It should also be noted that in the BRICS grouping India and China are the least connected. The economic potential of

tourism between the two countries are hugely underutilized. For Chinese Nationals who constitute a large chunk of outbound tourists globally, India is not a favorite destination. India tourists to China number less than 6,00,000 per year, while Chinese tourists to India are only about 1,00,000. People to people contact between India and China are also negligible.

Consequent to the recent military engagement at the border, India imposed a ban on popular Chinese apps and their clones, including Tik-tok, Weibo, CamScanner, SHAREit and UC Browser, on grounds of safeguarding valuable data. Indian PM deleted his account on China's twitter-like website Weibo. Indian Railways cancelled the contract with Beijing National Railway Research & Design Institute of Signal & Communication Company for a signaling and telecommunication project for freight corridors. Steps are initiated to prevent e-commerce companies, such as Amazon and Walmart's Flipkart, to prevent Chinese origin goods in India. In April 2020, India put restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) making it mandatory for investment from any country that shares a land border with India to go through a government approval process which practically restricts share-based investments from China. Chinese FDI to India declined by 28.48 per cent year-on-year to $163.77 million in the financial year 2019-20 and there is a resultant fall in investor confidence. The fund inflows from Chinese companies in India have declined on an annual basis from $350.22 million in 2017-18 to $229 million in 2018-19.

This decline in economic and trade relationship happened despite the fact that it is hugely mutually beneficial to India and China. India is the biggest foreign market for Chinese mobile phones over the past five years. Chinese smartphone brands sold more than $16 billion in 2019 in India, and most of them were manufactured in India. This accentuates India's Make India project and provides employment to a large number of Indians. Chinese tech investors have put an estimated $4 billion into Indian start-ups. Such is their success that over the five years ending March 2020, 18 of India's 30 unicorns are now Chinese-funded. India's manufacturing sector would also be adversely affected as it depends on products imported from China. Furthermore increasing economic decoupling and rising economic nationalism in both the countries would increase chances of border conflict.

Conclusion

The initial optimism and brotherhood in India-China relationship was replaced by a lingering sense of betrayal and mistrust since the 1962 border conflict. The conflict violated the spirit of the 1954 treaty in

toto. This happened because maximizing honor and dignity through territorial integrity and acquisition of great power status based on national sentiments have been important foreign policy objectives of India and China. The misperceptions generated by their positions on the border and ideas about their own greatness sowed seeds of suspicion about their intentions. Both India and China have been insensitive to each other's perception and refused to look at the problem from others perspective. This resulted in the cardinal non-accommodative act of use force which made peace elusive at the border and reduced the scope of using the provisions of the 1954 treaty for mutual benefit. The treaties signed and high-level visits between the two could not overcome the irrationality of their erroneous positions. This contributed immensely to misunderstanding and worked as a permanent bloc to accommodative behavior. The relationship has been persistently guided by power politics in the realist frame in a non-accommodative manner wherein India and China failed to synchronize peaceful strategies of conducting bilateral relations. As a result mutually beneficial economic and trade ties have been far below potential. Institutional accommodation in relation to UNSC, NSW and SAARC and willingness to accept as legitimate stakeholders have been lacking particularly from the part of China towards India. Instead they collaborated with unfriendly alignments and counter alignments to encircle and contain each other that shrunk the space for region specific accommodation. India's association with the US and the QUAD and China's growing presence in South Asia and Indian Ocean thorough Pakistan and CPEC are indicative of region specific non-accommodation. This is further implicated by escalated militarization of the border and recurring skirmishes at the border. Below potential economic cooperation and brief interludes of restraint at the border were insufficient to arrest the hostile undercurrents of the relationship.

The 2020 flareup at Western sector of the border at Galwan valley and Aksai Chin further underlines the failure to peacefully accommodate each other territorially and symbolically. Recurrence of such non-accommodative acts would make it tougher to facilitate status adjustment, respect each other's spheres of influence and accept as legitimate stakeholders regionally and globally in the context of the complexities of bilateral relations and uncertainties of the changing world order. Since India and China are rising powers, an accommodative strategy is imperative for peaceful coexistence to ameliorate conditions of conflict and to eschew coercive engagement. Both India and China will have to accommodate their power bilaterally and globally for mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Therefore, India and China should work for symbolic, territorial, institutional

and economic accommodation based on the ideas of the five principles of coexistence to attain peace and prosperity while remaining competitive as rising powers.

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GANDHI PEACE FOUNDATION

The Gandhi Peace Foundation (G.P.F.) was born in the late 1950s when an escalating nuclear arms race threatened human civilisation. Never before, or after, did peace seem so precarious or so elusive. Though time passed, the threat continues.

For Gandhi, peace in the ordinary sense was never the first imperative. As a relentless fighter for truth and justice his actions often brought suffering and sacrifice, although he always fought without violence.

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'Combating' Women in the Armed Forces: Negotiating Inclusion/Exclusion, Gender, Militarism and Security

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ABSTRACT

Recent decades have witnessed the increasing global trend towards a policy of including women in the armed forces. However, most countries continue to exclude women from combat roles, while in others initiatives for inclusion are being taken albeit hesitantly. While the inclusion of women in any sphere of activity in which they had been excluded is laudable, integration in the armed forces raises a number of questions. Within the larger framework of issues of nationalism, militarism and the socialisation processes in the armed forces, this paper examines the question of inclusion/exclusion of women in the armed forces, especially in combat roles and its implications for gender justice, peace, and security. Drawing from the experiences of integration in various countries, the paper takes special cognizance of the case of India. It emphasises the need for a departure from the gendered, militarised state security framework towards alternative conceptualisations of peace and security.

Key words: gender, military, militarism, peace, security

THE STATUS OF women in any society is dependent on numerous factors, with socially assigned gender roles being of crucial importance. Challenging conventional notions of gender roles as well as the inclusion of women in any sphere of activity from which they had been previously excluded is clearly of significance. In this context, the inclusion of women in state armed forces can be perceived as helping

to break gender stereotypes and being a step towards women's liberation from patriarchal traditions, besides helping to build more peace-oriented communities. However, the larger implications of inclusion on the status of women, as well as on the armed forces or the war machine need to be examined, together with the question of why there is so much resistance to women in combat.

Taking the armed forces as a constituent of the larger social structure, this article examines the question of the inclusion as well as exclusion of women in the armed forces, especially in combat, and its implications for gender justice, peace and security, and the construction of gender identities.

The issue also needs to be viewed in the larger context of the diverse notions of security. While the traditional Realist state-centric, militaristic, territorial notions of security continues to dominate, reconceptualizations of 'security' have increasingly coming to the fore from diverse theoretical perspectives. This growing alternative security discourse is centred on concepts of common security, human security, comprehensive security, global security, democratic security, societal security and so on. Feminist scholars have added to the critiques of traditional security doctrines, questioning the basic values that are generally taken for granted in understanding security. Analysing security from a gender perspective, the traditional notions of security are deconstructed and redefined as it is understood by individuals in general and women in particular. Feminist approaches have attempted to redefine security in multidimensional terms. Feminist scholars examine how oppressive gender hierarchies, which decrease the security of individuals, are constructed and maintained. Many contend that the notion of 'human security' has evolved from the comprehensive approach adopted by peace researchers, particularly those who identify themselves as feminist peace researches. Women's movements are seen to have had a major influence on the redefinition of security and the notion that real human security lies in the meeting of basic needs, the fulfilment of human rights and a healthy natural environment.[1] At the same time, the need to address the deficiency of gender sensitivity in narratives of human security have given rise to increasing calls for gendering human security.

Gender, Nation and Militarisation

Identities, including that of gender are constructed and located in specific social practices, discourses and institutions.[2] Militarism, militarisation and the armed forces can be seen as some such examples. In all societies and cultures there are certain roles or characteristics which are perceived to be essentially 'male' or 'female', and

individuals often find themselves under social pressure to conform to gender-stereotypical behaviour. The patriarchal construction of the role of women in most societies leads to such gender stereotyping. States also tend to make use of gender roles as the basis for political identity, particularly in processes of nation-state building and militarism. As Tickner argues, the construction of patriotic and protective masculinity and of nurturing and apolitical women has strengthened ideologies of nationalism and militarism for centuries.[3] Women are often constructed as cultural symbols – as signifying the 'honour' of their community, family and nation or stereotyped as the feminine 'other'. In other words, they are portrayed as weak subjects to be protected and confined to the private sphere, or violated as symbols of the enemy 'other'. War can therefore be seen as dependent on myths of protection for its legitimacy. Furthermore, 'protection' is seen as a 'masculinising performance'. Militaries often require men and women to behave like binaries, i.e. women need men to protect them and men go to war to protect women. By linking manhood with combat and militarism, violence is glorified as a 'natural' expression of masculinity and nation-state identity. Gender identities are thus constructed to intersect with the needs of militarised nationalism and become a tool with which societies induce men to fight. Based on the interconnections between patriarchy and militarism there is a critical link between constructions of masculinity/feminity and the making of war.[4]

Processes of militarisation also reveal gendered discourses. Weapons of war are often represented as symbols of masculinity.[5] Metaphors often tend to equate military power with sexual potency and masculinity. Nations without nuclear weapons are considered less masculine and less powerful, thereby motivating states towards proliferation. For instance, leaders of India and Pakistan have over the years alleged that the other lacked masculinity. Such metaphorical usage was explicitly evident during the testing of nuclear weapons by both countries in 1998. Images of manhood, war and power were interlinked and invoked by chauvinist forces.[6]

The question of inclusion of women in the armed forces further needs to be understood in the context of the socialisation processes therein. Soldiers require intense socialisation and training to prepare for warfare. This is often perceived to be socialisation into an extreme kind of masculinity. The military challenges recruits (who are still predominantly male) to act like 'real' men. The use of epithets such as faggot, pussy or simply 'woman' during training procedures reflects the perspective that not being up to the mark meant not being a man.[7] Pettman raises an important question that needs to be asked in this

context – if the armed forces are supposed to 'make a man' of you, what kind of man is being 'made'? [8] Young soldiers are taught to cultivate violent or aggressive characteristics. Being a soldier means – masculinity – i.e. doing away with the so-called feminine characteristics. They must prove that they are neither girls, nor gay to be a real man, and a good soldier.[9] This has serious implications for women as well as sexual-minority men.

It is within this larger framework of questions of nationalism, and the construction of gender identities through the institutions and practices of the military, militarism and militarisation, that the issue of inclusion and exclusion of women in the armed forces and particularly in combat roles need to be examined.

Women in Combat

History shows several instances where women have played various roles in combat operations – in female combat units, gender integrated units, as individual fighters and as military leaders. They have fought not only as regular combatants in liberation movements but also in state militaries. By the time of the First World War, although their role had become institutionalised, with uniforms and military ranks, they were given only support roles rather than combat. A number of women served in women's auxiliaries in British, US, German and Russian militaries. The Second World War saw the increased participation of women in the military. But again, this was largely in non-combat roles – as technical and support staff consisting of nurses and drivers. About 800,000 to a million women constituting eight per cent of the Soviet forces participated directly in the war. While most were medical workers, a few thousands were combatants. By this time women had become active warriors for the state in several countries. Nazi women were infamous for their torture and abuse of Jewish concentration camp prisoners. During the Vietnam War, women from the United States and Australia went to Vietnam in support roles as nurses, clerical workers and entertainers.[10]

From the 1970s onwards women joined Western state militaries in increasing numbers. But their access to combat roles remained restricted. They have however gradually come to be increasingly integrated into different roles in the armed forces. Almost 40,000 US servicewomen participated in the First Gulf War (constituting six per cent of the total forces). This was considered a major victory for liberal feminism.[11] In Pakistan where women were largely kept out of the country's powerful military, combat roles were opened up to women in 2003. Prior to this they had been recruited only in administrative roles.

In the case of India, history is replete with examples of women in armed combat whether it was in their individual capacity or as part of movements and struggles. However, they were legally excluded from being recruited into the armed forces, unless specifically notified by the government. Section 12 of the Army Act 1950 clearly stipulated that "No female shall be eligible for enrolment or employment in the regular Army, except in such corps, department, branch or other body forming part of, or attached to any portion of, the regular Army as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf." Similar stipulations are found in Section 9 of the Navy Act of 1957.

As times changed and demands increased, the Government of India issued a notification in January 1992, making women eligible for appointment as officers in certain specific branches/cadres of the army. These were the (i) Army Postal Service (ii) Judge Advocate General's Department (iii) Army Education Corps (iv) Army Ordinance Corps (Central Ammunition Depots and Material Management) and (v) Army Service Corps (Food Scientists and Catering Officers). Furthermore, on the basis of a notification in December 1992, women became eligible for enrolment in the following corps/departments of the regular Army: (i) Corps of Signals (ii) Intelligence Corps (iii) Corps of Engineers (iv) Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (v) Regiment of Artillery.[12] In other words, while services in the Indian army can be broadly classified into the following categories: (i) Combat Arms (ii) Combat Support Arms and (iii) Services; entry to women is permitted only in Combat Support Arms and Services. They are excluded from Combat Arms.

Women began to be recruited to the above positions in the army from 1993, but only as Short Service Commission (SSC) officers for a period of five years. This was incrementally increased to fourteen years. While these women were removed from service on completion of fourteen years, men were given extensions and were also offered Permanent Commissions. Accordingly, they could serve in the same position in the armed forces until retirement at the age of 60. Furthermore, women could not rise above the rank of Lt. Colonel. These factors led to a spate of petitions in 2003 for Permanent Commission for women and equality of opportunity. The Delhi High Court as well as the Supreme Court conceded to this in 2010, 2014 and 2015. However, appeals were filed by the Ministry of Defence, Government of India before the Supreme Court. These appeals were finally disposed by the Supreme Court in February 2020,[13] which declared that SSC women officers are eligible for Permanent Commission and command posts in the army irrespective of years of

service.

In the case of the navy, women were eligible for appointment as officers of the Indian Navy in three cadres/branches which were: (i) Logistics (ii) Law and (iii) Education. The question of granting Permanent Commission to them followed a similar trajectory as that of the army, with the Supreme Court judgement ruling in favour of them in March 2020, a month after that of the army.[14]

However, the issue of inclusion of women in combat roles in the army had not been raised by the petitioners and was not taken up by the Court. The judgements of the Supreme Court and High Court in 2014 and 2015 had in fact made all three services reflect on the future role of women in the armed forces. In 2015 combat roles were opened to women in the Indian Air Force as fighter pilots with flying and ground duties, adding to their role as helicopter pilots.[15] The Indian Navy opened its doors to women as maritime reconnaisance pilots and in various other segments including legal, logistics, naval architecture and engineering departments.[16] Despite all these developments, integration in combat roles in the army continues to be a matter of debate.

At the international level, several reasons have been cited as to why many state armed forces are now more open to the idea of or actually seeking to recruit women. Human resources are a major concern, especially due to falling birth rates and lack of suitable recruits. Legal, social and institutional pressures have also led to increased equal employment legislation. With the continued development of military technology, engaging in face-to-face combat has become a less significant part of military action. Consequently, gender differences in physical strength have become less important in excluding women from participating in the military on an equal footing.[17]

Not all militaries followed the same trajectory in incorporating women. Each case is often situation specific. Women were generally allowed into military service in significant numbers only in times of extreme need in war. A major reason for the induction of women in the Soviet armed forces during World War II was the colossal loss of Soviet soldiers in the initial period of war and the invasion of Nazi Germany in 1941, as well as the unprecedented feeling of patriotism that motivated many women to enlist. The Soviet case clearly reveals that it is often in times of extreme threat to a state that women are included in combat roles.[18] Women in Vietnam apparently participated in the war not only because of the demand for labour power, but also because they felt the need to fulfil their obligations to the state and family.[19] In the United States, women began to be encouraged to enter the military in large numbers when the conscription was stopped and

the military became completely professional. According to Yuval-Davis one of the most important reasons for the decision to mass recruit women into the US military was in order to keep it voluntary rather than one based on the draft, so as to prevent a recurrence of the popular revolt against the Vietnam War. It is also alleged that an important consideration was to avoid 'flooding' the military with African Americans.[20]

In India, the ban on the recruitment of women in non-combat jobs in 1992 was reportedly lifted at a time when the country's gender record was being scrutinised by the United Nations. The shortfall of officers is ostensibly one of the reasons that also led to the increase in the period of service in the Short Service Commission from five years to seven and then up to fourteen.[21]

Ramifications of Inclusion

Given the larger context of the diverse reasons for inclusion and the socialisation processes in the armed forces, the implications of policies of inclusion need to be examined. On the upside, the American experience indicated the capability of women to participate in the kind of actions and operations required for combat.[22] It has also been pointed out that participation in the armed forces has a positive impact on the social and economic position of women in society albeit being dependent on various other inter-related factors. Similarly, nationality, ethnicity, caste, race, class, region, age and ability factors have their impact on the position of women in militaries and wars. However, several problematic areas have been highlighted.

Sexual Division of Labour, Power and Social Status

It has been pointed out that the entry of women into the armed forces labour market (as is the case of their entry into the civil labour market), has not helped to remove the sexual divisions of labour and power. Only its context has been changed.[23] The nature of the service that women often perform in the armed forces, especially where excluded from combat, only reinforces traditional female roles of nurturer and supporter, or in short, being service providers for men.

In the First Gulf War of 1991, more than half of the 375 American women who were killed were support personnel, not combatants. The Department of Defence followed the rule that if a soldier was female, she could not have been in combat and could not receive combat medals, which are highly valued in military culture.[24] Although Israeli women are legally required to serve in the military, the support, educative, clerical and nursing responsibilities that they perform only reinforce traditional female roles and reflect the division of labour

outside the military. As Levy argues media fascination with women who perform pseudo-male jobs in the military is an indication of the extent to which such images do not fit social and cultural expectations.[25] These images are newsworthy because they break gender stereotypes and are interesting because of the shock value. Yet, Steans points out that the participation of women in both the world wars did not see any corresponding changes in the economic status of women or their social role.[26]

In India, the removal from service on completion of fourteen years of service not only resulted in unemployment for women (most of whom were only in their thirties), but was also a denial of pension and medical benefits which were available only for those who completed twenty years of service. Their records of service were excellent and there was no reason to deny them the same opportunities of Permanent Commission in combat roles that were given to men.[27] Interestingly, the government stance before the Supreme Court of India in February 2020 contradicted its own policy statement that was issued in February 2019. It had then announced that Permanent Commission would be granted to women in the SSC. The Supreme Court accepted the policy document that endorsed Permanent Commission for SSC women in ten streams of the 'Combat Support Arms' and 'Services'.[28] Permanent Commission for women was heretofore restricted to only two departments – Army Education Corps and Judge Accountant General's Branch.

The manner in which the officers of the Military Nursing Service (MNS) in India have been discriminated against further reflects the sexual division of labour and power. The Indian Military Nursing Service was formed in 1888 and nurses fought in both the First and Second World Wars. With the Army Act, 1950, military nurses were granted regular commissions and ranked from lieutenant (formerly sister) to colonel (formerly chief principal matron). They were to be treated as officers of the regular army and were administered an oath of allegiance to serve in the regular army. The 1962 regulations had specified that the MNS officers would be of equal rank with male officers of the same rank in the regular army. They were required to be saluted. They had the same privileges, entitlements and retirement benefits. They wore the same uniform and were entitled to the same kind of accommodation. In other words, they were in every respect on par with the regular army. However, the discrimination against the military nurses began from 1996. Their weapons and arms training were discontinued although they are required to go to the battle fronts if the situation demands. They are required to report for field service at any station in or out of India. They have served in conflict zones in

Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, North-East India, Sudan, Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In legal proceedings, they have been considered as combatants. Marking the first step towards downgrading their status was the change in their uniforms in 2000. In 2003, orders were given not to salute the MNS officers. The following year the MNS officers of the rank of General were restricted from using flags and stars on their cars. Membership to institutes and clubs for officers of the armed forces were also denied. Accommodation was refused in the command as well as officers' mess. Concessional travel in the railways was discontinued. From the Sixth Pay Commission onwards, discrimination began in pay, entitlements and promotions.[29]

While exclusion reflects discrimination against women, integrating women into the existing structures of the armed forces without actually changing these structures only contribute to the war system. Others argue that the inclusion of women in equal numbers and status could change the military, making it lose some of its coercive power while at the same time not infusing it with feminist values. However, the reality is that as long as they remain a minority of the total force, which is likely to be the situation well into the near future, there is a limitation to the changes that women can bring in the armed forces. So also, experiences of integration reveal that it has not fundamentally altered the value system of the armed forces.

On the other hand, integrating women will further reinforce the increasing militarisation of society. Patriarchy and militarism are mutually reinforcing ideologies, with social constructions of gender and security sustaining and legitimizing each other. Women's identities are constructed to intersect with the needs of militarist nationalism. So also, militarisation serves to construct an aggressive and homogenised form of masculinity and power that spills over into public spaces and social relations. War and the war machine tend to magnify the already existing gender inequalities in society.[30]

Patterns of Regression: Inclusion in Conflict/Exclusion in Peace

Narratives of different revolutionary and nationalist struggles suggest a widespread pattern of regression in terms of women's participation after the revolution or the state had been won. Women who participated in combat during guerrilla wars apparently added to the strength of their units. However, although this was glorified during the conflict, it was downplayed and largely forgotten thereafter. Similarly, most often whenever their forces seized power and became regular armies, women were excluded from combat roles. As Pettman argues, 'peace' seems to see enormous pressure on women to return

'home', and also to give up their jobs and political representation, in favour of men.[31]

Jewish women fought for the establishment of Israel, but with the formation of that state they were excluded from combat roles. In South Africa, before the end of apartheid, women constituted about fifteen per cent of the South African Defence Force (SADF). Although there was a rigid sexual division of labour and strong support for both male and white supremacy in the SADF, the African National Congress (ANC) was committed to women's emancipation and trained men and women together, although women remained excluded from formal combat roles. But with liberation, women were relegated to the role of the 'protected' and once again the soldier was male.[32] During the Vietnam war a large number of women in North Vietnam were involved in the militia and formed the core of self-defence teams. Legislation was also passed to ensure that wherever women were the majority of the workforce, they must be represented at top management levels. While women held senior management positions during the war, they had to return to more traditional occupations with the demobilisation of a large number of troops after the war.[33]

Although over 800,000 women in the former Soviet Union participated directly in the Second World War, the women's units were disbanded as soon as peace was restored, and the Red Army returned to being 'all-male' combat units.[34] Women were virtually excluded from all significant positions which had been open to them during the war. The same was the case in Nepal and Sri Lanka. Parasher writes that the rehabilitation and reintegration of the women combatants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a slow process marked by stigmatisation and hardship.[35]

Sexual Harassment and the "Masking of Feminity"

Sexual harassment is well known to advance broader interests and to enforce power relations. In the armed forces it is often used as an instrument of gender regulation which feminises women as sexual objects and masculinises men as sexual subjects. It reinforces the cultural power of supremacy of both men and masculinity, while reinforcing the cultural subordination and inferiority of women and femininity. The armed forces are also well known for their male bonding which builds a strong sense of group culture that is prone to sexual banter and humour. This actively excludes women and treats them as sexual objects.[36]

Goldstein argues that the belief that more women in the armed forces could make it more sensitive to women is empirically unsubstantiated. Sexual harassment is an on-going problem within

many state militaries.[37] In the United States, despite early reluctance and pressure to remain silent and preserve the Gulf War as a 'good war', servicewomen began to speak out about rapes in the Gulf by their own men.[38]

Women officers in India point out that facing sexual harassment and molestation in the army are common. Not all women complain officially but those who do, find that their cases are forwarded to courts of inquiry, but the perpetrators usually remain unpunished. In fact, in a sexual harassment case in 2009, the Supreme Court of India censured the army for not following its landmark judgment mandating setting up of committees at work places to look into complaints of sexual harrasment by women employees. Chowdhry writes that many officers of the Indian armed forces recall that when they were first recruited, they were astonished by the focus on the subject of women as a topic of conversation. Women officers revealed that they had to listen to endless references to sex in both formal and informal situations and felt (sexually) harassed on account of it.[39]

Rape has long been a weapon of war and conflict. Women's bodies are often treated as territories to be conquered or claimed. The ultimate defeat that can be inflicted on the enemy is to 'pollute' its race through collective rape.[40] As Tickner points out "often rape is not just an 'accident' of war but a deliberate military strategy."[41] During the 1930s as well as during the Second World War, the Japanese military was involved in the rape of thousands of women from Korea. So also, many German women were raped by the occupying Russian troops towards the end of the war, and Greek Cypriot women were raped by Turkish soldiers. Thousands of Bangladeshi women were raped by Pakistani soldiers in the war of 1971. Similarly the UNHCR in its report *The State of World's Refugees. The Challenge of Protection* reveals the systematic use of rape by the army in Myanmar in 1992 as part of its campaign to force 250,000 Rohingya Muslims to move into Bangladesh. Reports estimate the numbers of women subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be between 20,000 and 35,000. Rape was closely associated with the policy of 'ethnic cleansing'.[42] The story continues.

Female sexuality and the presence of women are also made use of by the armed forces as an interrogation tactic. Women's 'sexuality' and its purported effect on men, has resulted in the former becoming instruments for sexual and physical abuse, as well as for the abuse of religious and cultural beliefs. Some of the reported instances in the prisons of Abu Ghraib in Baghdad during the Iraq war and in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, included male prisoners having to feign sexual acts, parade naked before women, and being subjected to

provocative touching and dressing. In his book, *Inside the Wire*, army sergeant Erik Saar who worked as a translator in Guantanamo Bay prison, describes various 'interrogation' techniques that according to him compromise the Geneva Convention.[43] The case of Lyndie England, a United States Army Reserve soldier at Abu Ghraib during the Iraq war caught worldwide attention. She was found guilty of sexual, physical and psychological torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners of war. Feminist analysts see such abuse by women soldiers in Abu Ghraib as reflecting women's marginal place in a male dominated military. This makes it more likely that they will only follow orders and try to fit in. Given the fact that the armed forces are male oriented, with a masculine culture, women are co-opted to adopt masculine ways, as they have been included without challenging the ideology of gender roles in the system.[44] As Kannabiran points out, for women in combat, the test is inevitably about how well they are able to mask feminity and master masculinist discourses. Consequently, warring does not seem to have become any less violent with the inclusion of women.[45]

Understanding Exclusion

Despite the gradual increase in the inclusion of women in the armed forces in a large number of countries, they continue to be excluded from combat and combat-related duties in many of them. Some of the popular "objective difficulties" put forth as justification for the exclusion of women include arguments such as that they are unsuitable for combat or the rigours of life in the armed forces, "operational concerns" and "logistic issues".[46] Based on research of the policies of the United States, United Kingdom and other NATO countries, Goldstein argues that opposition to the inclusion of women particularly in combat roles is based on preserving access to power and proving masculinity. The reasons given for the exclusion of women from combat in Israel revolved around the impact that they could have on male soldiers rather than their own combat abilities.[47]

In the case of India, Brinda Karat, Politburo member of the CPI (M) and former member of the Rajya Sabha points out that the reason put forth by the service chiefs before the Parliamentary Committee on Women Empowerment (2014) was that in case women were captured by the enemy, the troops would be demoralised. In other words, it was not women's safety which was the concern, but that male morale would be affected if 'their' women were captured. Women were seen as trophies for the enemy or as symbols of the nation, ignoring the sovereign rights of women themselves.[48] In a study based on interactions with Indian army officials, Chowdhry points out that there is a strong belief that the army is a male space

and combat a male occupation, being the most masculine of all aspects of war. The resist-ance to the inclusion of women in this space needs to be seen as a desire to preserve the fun-damental aspect of this identity, i.e. the army as a male domain. As the inclusion of women is seen to challenge the familiar gender roles in society, the dominant opinion in the army is against the inclusion of women especially in combat positions. Most of the men asserted that fighting is a "man's job" and should remain so.[49] The oft raised objections ranged from the need to lower physical standards, adjustments of work culture norms to suit women, refusal to take orders from female officers, restrictions on a soldier's freedom, tensions, courtships, jealousies, favouritisms, disintegration of hierar-chies, and unenforceable codes of conduct leading to resentment and scandals. In November 2018, Indian army chief Gen. Bipin Rawat stated that the army was not yet ready for women in combat roles as facilities had to be created and women need to be prepared for that kind of hardships. He further added that they were looking for women as "interpreters".[50]

Interestingly, the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India, in its submission before the Supreme Court in February 2020 argued that the Indian army troops were not yet mentally schooled to accept women officers in command of units since they are predominantly drawn from a rural background. It also argued that isolation and hardships would affect them, besides pregnancy, child birth and family responsibilities. Moreover, women ran the risk of being captured by the enemy and being taken prisoners-of-war, and there were only minimum facilities available for habitat and hygiene in conflict zones. The Supreme Court dismissed the Government's submissions as being a 'sex stereotype'. It pointed out that the government submission screamed of age-old patriarchal notions that domestic obligations rested only with women. The remarks in the submission of the Government were not only constitutionally invalid but also discriminatory, affecting the dignity of women officers. It is interesting to note that at the time of the court hearings there was a shortage of 9441 officers in the army, as submitted by the Government.[51]

Similarly, in the case of granting Permanent Commission to women in the Navy, the Government submitted before the Supreme Court of India in March 2020 that there were "practical difficulties in allowing the induction of women SSC officers on PCs: the Indian Navy substantially operates on vessels of a Russian origin in which there is an absence of toilet facilities for women."[52] In its judgement, the Supreme Court pointed out that the submissions of the Government in the case of granting Permanent Commission in the army found an echo in this appeal.

The gendered nature of the armed forces clearly explains the specific resistance to the inclusion of women in combat roles It can be argued that the exclusion of women is largely the result of social construction of the roles of men and women, as well as the stereotyping of men as 'protectors' and women as the 'protected'. This protector/protected dichotomy represents war as masculine, and combat as a contest between men. As a result, war is clearly about masculinity and heroism.[53] Combat is considered the most masculine of all aspects of war and combat roles occupy a defining space in the highly masculinised institution of the armed forces. Although the work of non-combatants is vital to logistical functions and therefore the success of the army itself, they have a far lower status than that of combatants.[54] The idea of soldiers in the battlefront defending their nation is interconnected with notions of masculine strength and sexual aggression as well as feminine weakness and service to men. Any digression from this framework – such as male soldier homosexuality or women fighting on the battlefield – would threaten the symbolic order of gender and nation.[55]

If combat is uniquely male, sharing this role with women would challenge the identity of the soldier as a masculine being and the army as a male domain. By constructing a non-combat role for women, their necessary labour is utilised, while at the same time containing them within a space in the army that is acceptable. This prevents the essential "male character" of the army which lies in the combat role itself, from being diluted. The exclusion of women from combat thus serves to reinforce the gender division that exists in the civilian society.[56]

Moving Beyond the Gendered, Militarised State Security Framework

Debates among feminists on the question of inclusion of women in the armed forces, range inter alia from calls to support the demand for inclusion on an equal footing as that of men, to the endorsement of women volunteering for the armed forces in order to restrain it from being overly militaristic, or to influencing the community and state against militarism and war.

A look at the larger picture reveals that women's insecurity during armed conflicts is different from that of men. Eighty to ninety per cent of casualties due to conflict since the Second World War have been civilians and a majority of them women and children. There are instances of increased patriarchal controls, wartime violence, rape as reprisal, prostitution, refugee crises, domestic violence, and so on. So also, violence against women is higher in militarised societies. Such

evidence suggests that women are particularly vulnerable to militarism and war. Hence, as Tickner argues, the myth that women and children are protected by male soldiers needs to be re-examined.[57]

The enhanced amount on military spending in the United States during the 1980s at the peak of the Cold War had a major impact on welfare and social spending. Domestic social programmes, which provided support to low-income families were drastically cut. Feminist scholars reveal how low paid women workers and single mothers were less likely than working class men to derive any benefit from increased military spending.[58]

The Indian defence budget for 2019-20 was Rupees 4.31 lakh crore. This accounted for 15.47% of the total central government expenditure for that year.[59] However, the budget for the same year allocated only Rupees 4178 crore for the social services sector which includes nutrition, social security and welfare.[60] In 2020-21 the defence budget saw a total allocation of Rupees 4.71 lakh crore, while for 2021-22 it is Rupees 4.78 lakh crore. The allocation for 2021-22 accounts for 14% of the total budget expenditure, with the highest allocation for any Ministry continuing to be that for the Ministry of Defence. For a broader perspective, the expenditure for education is only Rupees 93,224 crore and that for health and family welfare is Rupees 73,932 crore. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute India is the world's third highest military spender after the United States and China.[61]

As long as war continues to be rationalised as a legitimate instrument of national security policy, and preparation for war consumes resources that could be directed toward other essential needs of humanity, human security cannot be achieved.[62] From a long-term perspective there is clearly a need to move away from the gendered, militarised, state security framework towards a gender sensitive human security policy perspective with alternatives to war and militarisation, and alternative conceptualisations of peace and security. However, in the existing scenario, the fact that the armed forces and militarisation processes serve as important sites for the creation and maintenance of gender identities in society, cannot be ignored. As Tickner contends, "if women become warriors, it reinforces the war system. If women are seen only as peacemakers, it reinforces both militarised masculinity and women's marginality with respect to the national security functions of the state."[63] Acknowledging women's rights to make their own career choices, the right to equal opportunity in any workplace, and the significance of challenging gender stereotypes, the question of inclusion of women in the armed forces and combat roles in particular certainly needs to be addressed.

However, given the complex inter-linkages between militarism, war and gender identities, there is a need to also challenge and address the "gendered dichotomies that support militarism and war"[64] failing which, questions of inclusion would only be counter-productive for the armed forces, peace and gender justice.

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Notes & Comments

Maoist Strategy and the Problematics of (State) Power

Chris D. Brown

A PRIMARY FEATURE OF the Indian Maoists' revolutionary strategy is the "area-wise seizure of power".[1] This, as the Maoists explain, is a strategy designed "to confront an enemy who is far more superior in strength", and which requires the selection of "areas in which the enemy is relatively weaker and which are favourable to the revolutionary forces".[2] These areas, often referred to as liberated areas or guerrilla zones, then "act as the lever or fulcrum for coordinating and advancing the people's war in the country and for seizing political power countrywide".[3]

This is, of course, a replication of one of Mao's most distinctive and enduring contributions to military/revolutionary strategy. This process, in contrast to the urban and proletariat-based revolutionary designs of Marx, Lenin and Engels, highlighted the agricultural/village-based character of Chinese society, and therefore, the strategic necessity of a peasant-based struggle. Unlike that seen in the Russian experience, Mao did not attempt the direct capture of the urban centre of administrative power and then use such power to establish control over the rest of the country. Instead, he crafted a strategy which concentrated on the patient mobilisation of small and remote villages

which demanded the ongoing resources and lives of enemy forces.[4] These continually increasing bases of support worked to erode the enemy's destructive capacity, and eventually gained enough strength and momentum to encircle and capture Peking.

This revolutionary strategy of seizing 'area-wise' power can be thought of as involving two components. The first, the localised and remote area-based action, has been employed to great effect by the Indian Maoists. In concentrating their efforts in regions geographically removed and protected from government control, and where inequality is at its most acute, they have afforded themselves the opportunity of moving within and influencing an exploited and frustrated local population. This had led to the establishment of a 'guerrilla zone' in Dandakaranya which has provided a base for their 'protracted people's war', and moreover, has facilitated the institution of a localised alternative government¯the Janata Sarkar.[5] In this sense, the Maoists have, to some degree, employed an anarchistic mode of struggle commonly referred to as prefigurative action. Here, the core idea is that revolutionary change is not something to be achieved or secured at some point in the future pending conducive circumstances or the acquisition of state power. Rather, revolutionary change is thought of as a direct process of enacting, at least on a small scale, the kind of society desired.[6]

Importantly, though, the prefigurative component of the Maoists' strategy is coupled with, and often subsumed by, the second component of this strategy¯the seizing of power, particularly at the national level.[7] The 'liberated zones', whilst representing a kind of microcosm of the Maoist vision, represent not so much an inspirational modelling/enactment through which socio-political goals might be achieved. Rather, they represent, through their purported ability to politically mobilise/indoctrinate local populations and provide protective bases for the waging of guerrilla warfare, tactical steps to the capturing of national power. Only through the violent capturing and exercising of state power, not just through the gradual development of these localised forms of alternative governance, do the Maoists believe a new social and political order can be introduced.

What is interesting, though, is that the Maoists' strategy of using state power as a necessary vehicle for revolution is paired with a broader revolutionary vision in which the state ceases to exist. Once in control of the state, the Maoists argue, they will "move towards the elimination of class society and, thereby, the withering away of the state, ie, towards communism on a world scale".[8] This idea that the abolition of the state is best, and only, pursued through its initial capturing and strengthening¯a primary point of disagreement between

Marx (and his followers) and early anarchists[9]—was advanced by Lenin in his *State and Revolution*. He quotes Engels in explaining it:

> The proletariat seizes state power and to begin with transforms the means of production into state property. But it thus puts an end to itself as proletariat, it thus puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, and thus also to the state as state. Moving in class antagonisms, society up to now had need of the state, that is, an organization of the exploiting class … When ultimately it becomes the-real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself superfluous. As soon as there is no social class to be held in subjection any longer, as soon as class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the anarchy of production existing up to now are eliminated together with the collisions and excesses arising from them, there is nothing more to repress, nothing necessitating a special repressive force, a state. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of the whole of society—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then dies away of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it withers away.[10]

Lenin did "not at all disagree with the anarchists on the question of the abolition of the state as the aim", but he thought the anarchists failed to adequately understand the complex workings of power and authority when they made what he saw as their simplistic, misguided and un-detailed exhortations to 'abolish the state'.[11] Such an aim, Lenin consistently reiterated, "must temporarily make use of the instruments, resources and methods of the state power against the exploiters".[12]

Anarchist thought, by contrast, challenges this position, citing a problematic contradiction between the means of acquiring and exercising state power, and the ends of its elimination or withering away. The Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, labelled Marx's approach "authoritarian communism"[13] and argued that any attempt to utilise the state structure for social emancipation was essentially self-defeating and historically ill-informed.[14] His view was that states are ruthlessly and inevitably self-securing and pursue their own survival and prosperity regardless of the victims along the way, including their own citizens. Moreover, he argued that the very exercising of power, or 'command' as he labelled it, brings with it an inevitable corruption which renders it an impossible instrument for revolutionary change. Indeed, he accurately predicted the emergence

of a brutal bureaucracy as was seen in the Soviet Union.

More recently, Richard J. F. Day, in his study of "the newest social movements",[15] also challenges the dominant idea that only through the acquiring, exercising or using of state power can social change occur. Indeed, he labels this view of, and approach to, social change as "the hegemony of hegemony",[16] noting a paradox in the "belief that state domination is necessary to achieve 'freedom'".[17]

Whilst Lenin (and co) suggest that state power can be acquired/exercised in a way that results in its socially productive evaporation, anarchists see the capture/use of state power as a distortion and compromise of genuinely revolutionary potential. Indeed, Lenin (and co) acknowledge themselves that the process of using the state to usher in a new era of so-called revolutionary democracy involves a certain centralisation and limitation of democracy. "In the course of our fierce struggle against the whole world of imperialism", stated a resolution from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "our country had to make some limitations of democracy, which were justified by the logic of our people's struggle for socialism in conditions of the capitalist encirclement".[18] These limitations, though, are seen only as a temporary feature which can be reversed, indeed eliminated, once the revolutionary state is secure. "Even at the time", the resolution continues, "these limitations were already regarded by the party and the people as being temporary, and as being subject to elimination as the Soviet state was consolidated and the forces of democracy and socialism throughout the world developed".[19]

This centralisation, though, marks not just a temporary and easily transcended moment/process which is necessarily required in order to secure the 'democratic' revolution against a hostile and surrounding group of 'capitalist reactionaries'. Rather, it pervades and defines, and therefore corrupts and distorts, the very struggle. Indeed, the rather contradictory notion of democratic centralism lies at the core of Leninist and Maoist thinking. Mao, for example, highlighted the importance of building "a political situation in which we have both centralism and democracy", which he thought of as "both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness".[20] Further, he writes:

> without democracy there can't be correct centralism because centralism can't be established when people have divergent views and don't have unity of understanding. What is meant by centralism? First, there must be concentration of correct ideas. Unity of understanding, of policy, plan, command and action is attained on the basis of concentrating correct ideas. This is unity through centralism.[21]

The early Naxalite leader Charu Mazumdar also endorsed democratic centralism. He viewed it as a process in which "the Party directive coming from higher leadership must be carried out" and defended this position by arguing that it is "the Party's leader … who has firmly established himself as a Marxist through a long period of movements and theoretical debates".[22] Whilst Mazumdar's views have been subject to Maoist consideration and critique, he remains revered within the Party, and democratic centralism remains one of the key features of the contemporary Communist Party of India (Maoist). Their constitution states:

> The organizational principle of the party is democratic centralism … Democratic centralism means centralism based on inner party democracy and inner party democracy under centralized leadership. While discussing open heartedly and being united in party work, such a political atmosphere has to be created where centralism as well as democracy, discipline as well as freedom, unity of will as well as personal ease of mind and liveliness – all these will be present.[23]

Moreover, the constitution explains:

> Essentially the whole party shall follow the principle that the individual is subordinate to the organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level is subordinate to the higher level, and *the entire party is subordinate to the Central Committee* [emphasis added].[24]

But in establishing, indeed celebrating, a superior leadership vanguard that perceives itself as knowing better than those it supposedly represents, this revolutionary approach asserts a hierarchical power which, as social psychologists have shown, corrupts those who sit high in social hierarchies.[25] Blaug's "provisional symptomology for corruption by power", for example, suggests four ways in which power manifests in the perspectives, attitudes and actions of those who sit high in organisational hierarchies: "self-inflation, devaluation of subordinates, separation and invisibility".[26] Such tendencies, one might argue, are evident in this so-called democratic theory and the way it constricts, controls and threatens those who dissent. "Once a decision has been taken", Mazumdar states, "if any one criticizes it without implementing it, or obstructs work, or hesitates to implement it, he will be guilty of the serious offence of violating Party discipline.[27]

Further, the ability for these corrupting tendencies of hierarchical power to simply evaporate as the revolutionary state develops is limited, perhaps impossible. That is, even if the judicious application

of democratic centralism supports the successful capture of state power, the process leading up to the capture, and the ensuing processes which inevitably follow, do not provide the kind of secure platform in which the Maoists will be presumably comfortable in relinquishing the coercive power of the state. Indeed, such power must be maintained because any apparent victory will remain vulnerable due to the hostility and opposition created during the violent overthrow. The supposedly temporary and benevolently-wielded power, then, is unable to be lifted because, as the Maoists themselves recognise, elites will never voluntarily acquiesce and assist the revolution, not during, nor after, the initial struggle.[28]

In the Indian context this problematic dynamic is particularly acute. Whilst the Maoists talk of 'smashing' the 'small minority of exploiters', the contemporary social fabric of India is such that there are a great many people who feel themselves threatened by the ideas of the Maoist party. In perceiving the Maoists as their enemy, these people (including a huge middle class) present the Maoists with a much greater grouping of people who are, in the first instance, not so easily 'smashed', and even if they were, not so easily and sustainably held down in a subordinate position. Should only a small percentage of those 'smashed' mount a 'reactionary' challenge, the purported democratic development will, according to the strategic orthodoxy, necessarily be suspended in order to address the assault. And whilst such assaults, with the might of the state machinery behind them, might indeed be warded off, the warding off will not provide the clear consolidation of the revolutionary state required in order for it to wither away. Rather, it supports an ongoing and cyclical re-assertion of might and power that serves only to reinforce the concentration of, and reliance upon, the distorting power of the state.

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Globalizing our Hearts and A New *Yatra* for Justice, Peace and Solidarity[1]

Ananta Kumar Giri

> You cannot have globalisation of the market unless you have globalisation of your heart or we will run into more problems than we solve. That is why Vinoba spoke about Jai Jagat.[2] (P.V. Rajagopal)

ON THE FLIGHT to Mumbai I opened the Bhagavad Gita at random and found the verse: "*Sages look equally on a Brahmana adorned with learning and humility, a cow, an elephant, and even a dog and an outcaste*[3]. I interpreted the verse for my own use: "Impartially observe whatever comes your way without judging."[4]

Of what is great one must either be silent or speak with greatness. With greatness—that means cynically and with innocence. [..]

The Kingdom of Heaven is a condition of the heart [..] Not something 'above the earth.' The 'Kingdom of God' does not 'come' chronologically—historically, on a certain day in the calendar, something that might be here one day but not the day before; 'it is an inward change in the individual,' something that comes at every moment and at every moment has not yet arrived.[5]

Benedict Spinoza has spoken about *potestas* and *potential*—words that in Latin mean power. They are different in their import because they point to different connotations. The former is functionally the urge to possess by bossing it over others, and the latter reminds us about the potentials inherent in every human being, the many possibilities of flowering up and upholding, if freedom is the climate in which it develops. According to Spinoza, love is the mediating link between knowledge and power. Love of humanity, love of the world, a deep faith in the unending possibilities of individuals as well as the collectives. This calls for a higher consciousness that all knowledge should congenially aim at. To Sri Aurobindo, a higher consciousness, as a rule, has to prove itself in the world. It never runs away and can afford to prove itself to be an asset of the world.

But the change over is not that easy as the wonderful words and references may suggest. There will be many-a-restraint, obstacles and oppositions, both from without and within. Hence, those who have chosen love have been men of protest.[6]

Life is a journey, a *yatra* for self-realization and solidarity, and struggle for freedom, justice and peace. In *Struggles for Peace and Justice: India, Ekta Parishad and the Globalization of Solidarity,* Karl-Julius Reubke, an inspiring *yatree*—a traveler, seeker and adventurer— from Germany presents us story of India's struggle for freedom and continued struggle for peace, justice and dignity after India's attainment of political freedom. Reubke presents us the life, vision, *sadhana* and struggles of PV Rajagopal known popularly as Rajaji and many creative efforts he has been part of including Ekta Parishad which he founded in 1990. Ekta Parishad has been fighting for justice and dignity of excluded Indians especially the landless and the Adivasis. It has been organizing many *padayatras*—foot marches—for mobilizing the landless and for fighting against State and for generating people's power. It had been doing this in Madhya Pradesh, Chatisgarh, Odisha and many parts of India. Ekta Parishad came to national limelight when it organized Janadesh in 2007 where 25, 000 people from all across India and many from around the world like Reubke took part in it and walked from Gwalior to Delhi. Ekta Parishad had also organized *Jan Satyagraha* (People's Satyagraha) in 2012 where more than 50, 000 people from all across India and supporters from around the world assembled in Gwalior on 2nd October 2012 and marched to Delhi. The marchers walked on the road, slept on the road side and had only one meal a day. An agreement was signed between Ekta Parishad and Jairam Ramesh, then Minister of Rural Development in Agra, after a week's march leading to the calling off further march to Delhi. But nothing came out from this agreement.

Reubke presents the story of this Satyagraha as well as the story of Janadesh and many *yatras* of Ekta Parishad with love, respect and careful details. He weaves the personal, social and historical in a creative and inspiring manner. He presents the life and vision of P.V. Rajagopal with care and love but not with blind praise or adulation. He engages with the Mahatma, Rajaji's source of inspiration, with remarkable sense of co-travelling. He travels with the Mahatma with care and questioning and does not mince his words when he writes such sentences as the Mahatma sometimes related to women who followed him as "decorative flowers." He also critically discusses the label of Father of the Nation stuck to the Mahatma and suggests that Gandhi might not have been at ease with it and he may also not liked the singularity associated with such a labeling.

Reubke's discussion of Gandhi, Jinnah, Ambedkar, Nehru, Subash Chandra Bose, Vionba Bhave, Jai Prakash Narayan, Verrier Elwin, J.C. Kumarappa are deeply insightful and presents new ways of looking at some of these makers of modern India. Reubke also presents his story of modern India in the civilizational backdrop of India and the world and his discussion of Ashoka and his emphasis on yatra on the part of State officials to meet with people is a deep inspiration for all of us to undertake our own *yatras* in meeting not only with other people but also our own selves. He hopes that Gandhi's grandsons can fulfill the unfinished task of Gandhi as he writes:

> Looking at Indian history [..] and focussing only on some highlights, we have twice found a grandson completing the great work started by his grandfather. Ashoka created the first great peace-based empire not only in India but probably in the whole world which his grandfather Chandragupta had started to build from all the many kingdoms he conquered. Babur had come as the cruel invader to India and had started to organise the vast subcontinent in its natural boundaries. His grandson, Akbar the Great by his understanding and tolerance, created a new kind of empire for which there had not been a model. In our time Gandhi again started to create a completely new India. His *children* didn't fully understand him in his endeavour and were unable to complete his vision. Maybe the *grandchildren* will finally go ahead and establish a community struggling peacefully as a *unity in diversity*.

Reubke brings many aspects of our human journey together in this epic work which is a new epic for realization of justice, peace and solidarity in our contemporary times of ugliness, violence and destruction of life and possibilities. Very rarely one is blessed to read works like this which is a spontaneous overflow of biographies, histories, philosophies and deep critiques and reflections of life. Reading this itself is an experience of the vastness of human spirit, an experience one gets reading biographies of Swami Vivekananda and Ramakrishna by Romain Rolland, the great seeker and creative soul of humanity.

Reubke's own *yatra* of life with a series of resonances, not just superficial coincidences, brought him to a social project in India in 1996. He first met with Rajagopal in Dornach, Switzerland in 2001. The spiritual quest of this great seeker met with the continued quest and struggle of another indomitable spirit and the book is a gift of this early and continued evolving meeting and friendship to all of us concerned. The book is about India, Ekta Parishad and P.V. Rajagopal and at the same time, is much more than this. At one level, it is about each one of us with our own struggles and failures to come to terms

with the challenge of living with our hearts in a practice of wholeness and not with fragmentation. It is about realization of active non-violence in a world full of violence where all of us including the States and Non-State actors can not only learn the language of non-violence (*Ahimsa*) but also live with it. It is about creative power and creating power—inner as well as collaborative—to confront power, especially State power, and to transform it. It is about taking part in the unfolding evolution of self, society and the world where we strive to transform democracy as mere electoral machination to realization Sarvodaya—well being of all. Sarvodaya as well-being of all includes not only humans but also all beings realizing what political philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2006) calls 'cross-species dignity." In the book Rajagopal urges us not to be engaged in killing—both humans and animals. Reubke's description and presentation of lives of Rajagopal and his co-travelers such as his dear, energizing and activist wife Jill (Jill Carr Harris) whom one fellow marcher during the march in Jan Satyagraha 2012 described as a *Shakti*—shows us how each one of us can do to minimize harm, hurt and injustice in our lives as well as struggle for justice, peace, love and solidarity.

As I write these lines after being with this book for the last five years, tears come rolling in eyes recalling my first meeting with Julius in his lovely home in Koln, Germany fourteen years ago in 2006. I was visiting Jelle, a friend from Amsterdam living in Koln in June 2006 and his wife Vanda. Both Vanda and Jelle are friends of Julius as they are also active participants in the Steiner movement in Koln, Germany and Europe. Before this meeting I had seen Julius's book in German on India and Ekta Parishad called *Indien im Afbruch* (India Rising) in a book store in Uberlingen, Germany. I was happy to meet with the author and was greatly touched by his kindness, conviviality, love of learning, and wisdom. Ever since, it has been my blessing to be with this great seeker of humanity on many an occasion including staying with him and his dear wife Susanne in their home which one can call *Vishwaneedam*, a nest for the world. Called by Julius, I had taken part in the Janadesh Yatra in 2007 in the last two days and as I was sleeping on the street I also found Rajagopal and his wife Jill sleeping on the street like all walkers. I had taken part in the Jan Satyagraha in 2012 and one night I slept in a police station and drafted a letter to then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and emailed to Aditya Bhai, a leading Gandhian from Odisha, who was in negotiation with the Government of India about making an agreement with Ekta Parishad. Nothing came out of this agreement in Agra but this is not the end of the Yatra. Those in power who did not hear the people's call then are now biting their own dust of ego and lack of respect and

solidarity with struggling millions of India. Etka Parishad is now part of another year long yatra on October 2, 2019 from Rajghat, Delhi to Geneva as a global march for justice and peace (see *www.jaijagat2020.org*) . Here the yardstick is not the conventional grammar of success and failure but the continued struggle and *sadhana* in spite of and irrespective of their known and visible outcomes. As Reubke writes in his epilogue to his book:

> To assess the experiments of Ekta Parishad objectively, I asked Rajagopal whenever I met him about the successes of all the many years of struggle and specifically about some of the struggles I had witnessed. Here are some less spectacular examples:
> What has become of the village where they dug the well? The well still exists and is in use [..]
> What has become of the struggle in Chilka Lake region? When I asked about the opening of the new mouth, Rajaji simply said: "It is closed now." I was baffled but he confirmed that the sea had closed it. [..]
> How to attest these and many other developments? With great reluctance, I learned two things. Rajagopal does everything to keep track of people involved in the struggles and of the results and on the other hand he dislikes to judge the outcome. He reacts to an obvious situation aware of his responsibility so that the action need not be justified by its result. The actions bringing people together and giving a chance for self-development make the important change. He has dedicated his life to this mission.

In the book Julius presents us many visions of Rajagopal. One of the most animating aspect of his living and inspiring philosophy of life is stress on inner journey as well as relational journey and *yatra* for dignity and justice. Reubke presents Rajagopal's thought:

> Yes. But you cannot evolve by sitting only. The more you think about it the more you understand that society should evolve more internally now. There must be this balance. You cannot have a one-way development.

Reubke presents summary of a lecture of Rajagopal at Goetheannum, Dornach, Switzerland where Rajagopal and Nicanor Perlas from Philippines and a great people's leader and thinker and a spiritual brother of Rajagopal, were part of a seminar. Here Rajapgopal presents ten points of his learning from his life and movements for land and other dignity struggles he has been part of:

> (1) the universe is a family, (2) land belongs to the Almighty, (3) the earth is our mother, (4) patience is required for alliances to become reliable, (5)

leadership has to be created at the bottom, (6) we are fighting strong forces and need to combine our forces, (7) we find together on generally accepted laws and conventions, (8) we use the political space available, (9) intellectual interest is not translated into action, and (10) we achieve nothing with intellectual understanding alone.

We can realize these ten points not as ten commandments but as ten sutras, as part of a new *Advaita* (non-duality) of life and the world where we overcome the dualism between the self and the other and embrace each other and the third and beyond with our finitude as well as infinite power of love, *karuna* as well as rage for justice. In this book Reubke discusses Rudolf Steiner's pathway of threefolding consisting of economic, cultural and social creativity, autonomy and interdependence and Rajagopal's own creative interpretation of this in his own life's struggles consisting of struggle, dialogue and constructive work.[7] Reubke himself links Advaita to going beyond the dualism between the self and the other and opening ourselves to a third in our lives. Global solidarity calls for cultivation of such a creative three folding and multi-folding Advaita at personal, social, global and cosmic levels which can be called a planetary Advaita. Such an Advaita— a moving non-dual— brings people together from many backgrounds leading to their well-being and flourishing which can be called *Lokasagmgraha.* Rajagopal, Reubke and Etka Parishad are striving to create a new planetary Advaita and *Lokasamgraha* for peace, justice and solidarity. This book presents us invitation for weaving such new sutras and Advaita and *Lokasamgraha* of *sadhana*, struggle and life and constitutes an epic song of struggle for beauty, dignity, dialogue, responsibility and solidarity.

On this year of 150 years of birth Mohandas Karamchand and Kasturba Gandhi, it is our joy to nurture this from our *Creative Horizons* book series and thank Mr. Akshya Jain of Studera Press for his kind interest and encouragement. I thank my friend Professor John Clammer of Jindal Global University for writing an Afterword to this book. Finally, I hope this new epic Gita of Yatra inspires all of us to come out and join the inner as well as our many relational yatras, *sadhana* and struggles for peace, justice and solidarity and sing with Sri Aurobindo (1972):

A lonely freedom cannot
Satisfy a heart that has grown with every other heart
I am a deputy of an aspiring world
My spirit's liberty
I ask for all.

Notes and References

1. This is based upon the Foreword to the book, Karl-Julius Reubke, *Struggles for Peace and Justice: India, Ekta Parishad and Globalization of Solidarity*(Delhi: Studera Press, 2020,) forthcoming
2. We can understand this as celebrating the world and brining victory to our world.
3. The Bhagavad Gita, Text and Translation by Annie Besant, Theosophical publishing house, Adyar (2002) V, 18
4. Karl-Julius Reubke (2020), op.cit
5. Friedrich Nietzche, *The Will to Power* (New York: Vintage), pp. 3, 98-99.
6. Chitta Ranjan Das, "Afterword," *The Modern Prince and the Modern Sage: Transforming Power and Freedom* (Delhi: Sage, 2009), pp. 580-581.
7. Reubke draws inspiration from Steiner and Gandhi. In a personal communication, he tells me that not only Steiner knew about Gandhi and was full of praise for the Mahatma, Gandhi also knew about Steiner. In Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, there is a diary entry: Birmingham, October 18, Sunday ..."the Steiner school;" ...and in Young India Nr.45, November 5, 1931 there is an account of the Mahatma's visit at "Sunfield" School.

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Ambidextrous Gandhi

Hari Nair
Swaha Das

IF THERE IS one piece of writing that reflects Gandhian Thoughts – from the 98 volumes of the *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (*CWMG*) - it is the *Hind Swaraj*. The original manuscript had 275 pages. Of these 40 were written by Gandhi with his left hand while returning from England to South Africa on board a ship. Why did he write with his left hand? Was he in a rush? There might be a story to tell.



This is a digital facsimile of pages 62 and 63 of the *Hind Swaraj* manuscript (Navjivan 1923 edition). In these pages, Gandhi has written with both his right and left hands. The original 1910 edition of the *Hind Swaraj* carried the disclaimer "no rights reserved". A digital copy of the manuscript facsimile of the *Hind Swaraj* is also available at the Gandhi Heritage Portal, which is maintained by the Sabarmati Ashram Preservation and Memorial Trust, Ahmedabad.
https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org/mahatma-gandhi-books/hind-swaraj-indian-opinion-gujarati#page/90/mode/2up

Gandhi visited London five times: first, as a student between 1888 and1891; his second visit was in 1906; third, in 1909; fourth, in 1914; and the last one in 1931. During the second and third visits, he engaged with a number of individuals, who belonged to the Indian School of Anarchists. Many of those anarchists rationalized and justified violence against British imperialists – including Shyamji Krishna Varma and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. Varma, who was trained in Sanskrit and Law, founded the India House in London as a residence for young Indian students. Those students received fellowships from him for studying in England under the condition that they would never accept an office under the British government. But India House was also a hostel, where young Indians were radicalized towards the path of terror. Gandhi feared the outcome of such mentoring of young adults by these Indian anarchists.

That fear was realized during Gandhi's third visit to London in July, 1909. Ten days prior to Gandhi's arrival, a young Punjabi student named Madan Lal Dhingra with connections to the India House assassinated Sir William Curzon-Wylie – an aide to the Secretary of State for India. Dr Cowasji Lalcaca, who tried to save Sir William, was caught in the line of fire and succumbed to his injuries. The two assassinations took place at a reception of the National Indian Association being held at the Imperial Institute. Varma justified the assassination in his journal *The Indian Sociologist* arguing that political assassination was not murder. Savarkar, who was also a fellow at India House, glorified his act and martyrdom. Dhingra was tried and sent to the gallows in September 1909. Soon, Martyr Dhingra scholarships were instituted

Gandhi was deeply affected by these murders. In a letter to his friend Henry Polak, Gandhi wrote that those who incited Dhingra deserved to be punished more than the young man himself. In his notes written thereafter, Gandhi emphasized that such acts of terrorism were not only acts of cowardice but that these could never profit India. Even if India were liberated from British rule through violence and murders, independent India would then be ruled by these murderers. White murderers would be substituted by Black ones – he concluded (*CWMG* 9:428-9). In the months preceding the assassinations in London, similar acts of terror were being carried out in India against both Indian and British officials. Reflecting on these multiple murders and other acts of revolutionary terrorism, Gandhi had a train of thought that he would set down in the *Hind Swaraj* hurriedly using the stationery of the ship SS Kildonan Castle on which he was travelling from Southampton to Durban. Perhaps, this explains why he partly wrote the *Hind Swaraj* with his left hand.

Gandhi's views on ahimsa were pragmatic. He was opposed to the cult of martyrdom because it not only incentivized dying but also encouraged killing - including killing oneself. Martyrdom fed into the cycle of violence and more violence. Even the famous self-immolation of the Buddhist monk Thích Qu ng Đ c on 11 June 1963 in Vietnam against the regime of President Ngô Đình Di m can hardly be viewed as one individual harming oneself alone. A few months later, Vietnam witnessed a coup and the President was assassinated. Wars raged for years in Vietnam thereafter.

In May 1931, when the American journalist J A Mills asked Gandhi whether he was willing to die for the cause of Indian independence, he chuckled, smiled and famously responded that it was a bad question (available on youtube as Gandhi's first motion picture interview). Gandhi was influenced by many doctrines of ahimsa, especially from Jainism, through Raychandbhai, who was born into a mixed family of Vaishnavites and Jains. Gandhi's faith in ahimsa compelled him to reinterpret the *Gita* - a text that rationalized just war. In his lectures on the *Gita* at Sabarmati Ashram in 1926, he wondered how much better it would have been if Vyasa had not opted for war to illustrate the significance of duty. During those lectures, he was reminded of his discussions with Varma and Savarkar twenty years earlier in London. Both of them had told him that the *Gita* preached the opposite of Gandhi's own interpretation. But the Buddhist scholar Dharmanand Kosambi opened a window for Gandhi. He advised him to leave textual interpretation to scholars and instead urged Gandhi to demonstrate through action the significance of ahimsa. The Mahatma seems to have done just that.

A hundred years ago, all Indian revolutionaries based in London believed that India could not be liberated from English rule except through violence. Gandhi's arrival on the political scene became a turning point. His influence upon the Indian National Movement altered the nature of the freedom struggle. It became a substantially non-violent people's movement. The practice of non-violence gained greater traction when it was successfully employed by the Danes against the occupying Nazi forces between 1940 and 1944. Even the Germans successfully employed non-violent resistance against the Nazi regime on Rose Street in Berlin (1943). Gandhi's ahimsa also offered hope to Gustav Kleinmann, a Jewish upholsterer from Vienna who was incarcerated by the Nazis. During the five years of starvation that he endured inside the concentration camp, his inspiration was Gandhi. Jeremy Dronfield cites Kleinmann in *The boy who followed his father into Auschwitz* : "I take Gandhi, the Indian freedom fighter, as my model. He is so thin and yet lives."

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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Significant Step Forward

Siby K. Joseph

NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL enter into the category of those banned lethal weapons like biological weapons, chemical weapons, land mines and cluster bombs by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021. After 75 years of waiting, peace lovers and activists all over the world began the 90 days countdown for this day on October 24, 2020 with the ratification of the treaty by Honduras. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons were known to the humanity from the very day of its first usage. The use of nuclear weapons in the Second World War for the first time was a dark day in the history of human civilization. Many treaties and agreements were signed including the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after the dropping of Nuclear Bombs in Japan in 1945. But the prohibition of the nuclear weapons remained as a distant dream in all these years. A concrete step in this regard was taken only in the year 2017. On 20th September 2017 more than 50 countries had signed the landmark Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in New York on the eve of annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly. In that high-level ceremony at the United Nations headquarters, the document was first signed by President of Brazil, Michel Temer. The ceremony was attended by several heads of State and dozens of foreign ministers, including Austria, Ireland and Cuba. Prior to that on 7 July 2017, 122 nations, comprising almost two-thirds of the total UN membership voted to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It was a landmark agreement aimed at the prohibition of the weapons of mass destruction, which will ultimately pave the way for their total elimination. The treaty was approved by the 193-members of United Nations General Assembly. The Netherlands was the only country that voted against its adoption. It claimed that the United States nuclear weapons were essential for its security. Singapore abstained from the voting. Iran was also among countries voting in

favour of it. Japan, the only victim of atomic bombings, took the decision not to sign the treaty in consideration of its security ties with the United States. The five nuclear powers viz. United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China and four other countries possessing nuclear weapons — India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — boycotted the negotiations and the vote on the treaty, along with many of their allies.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any kind of nuclear weapon activities directly or indirectly. "These include undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and the provision of assistance to any State in the conduct of prohibited activities. States parties will be obliged to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. The Treaty also obliges States parties to provide adequate assistance to individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take necessary and appropriate measure of environmental remediation in areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons." This historic treaty took more than three years to get it ratified by the required 50 countries. The 50th ratification came on October 24, 2020 coinciding with the 75th anniversary of the ratification of the U.N. Charter, which officially established the United Nations and is celebrated as U.N. Day. The ratification of this U.N. treaty to ban nuclear weapons will enter into force in 90 days as per the provisions of the treaty. This move was hailed by peace lovers and opposed by nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons were the only weapons of mass destruction without a prohibition treaty. All other lethal weapons were banned from time to time. Biological weapons were banned in 1972, chemical weapons in 1993, Land mines in 1997, and cluster bombs in 2008.

The development of nuclear weapons has a history of almost 75 years. The discovery of nuclear fission by German physicists on the eve of Christmas in 1938 happened just before the Second World War. It opened up the possibility of nuclear technologies, including the atom bomb. Taking advantage of the situation, the Manhattan Project was started by the United States of America fearing the development of nuclear weapons by German scientists. On December 28, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the formation of the secret Manhattan Project by bringing together various scientists and military officials. This project helped America to develop a functional atomic

bomb in the midst of the war. The Project was mainly operated in Los Alamos, New Mexico, under the direction of theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, who is known as the "father of the atomic bomb." On July 16, 1945, in a remote desert location near Alamogordo, New Mexico, the first atomic bomb was successfully detonated. Thereafter the US developed two distinct types of atomic bombs —a uranium-based design viz." the Little Boy" and a plutonium-based weapon viz. "the Fat Man." It marked the beginning of the Atomic Arms race.

In fact, the Second World War in Europe had ended in April. However, the fighting in the Pacific continued between Japanese forces and U.S. troops. By the end of July, American President Harry Truman called for Japan's surrender with the Potsdam Declaration. The declaration warned "prompt and utter destruction" if Japan did not surrender. America was looking for an opportunity to use the new deadly weapons it developed under the aegis of the Manhattan Project. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped its first atomic bomb called "Little Boy" from a B-29 bomber plane "Enola Gay" over the city of Hiroshima. The "Little Boy" exploded with about 13 kilotons of force, leveling five square miles of the city and killing 80,000 people instantly. When Japan was not ready for immediate surrender, the United States dropped another atomic bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" three days later on the city of Nagasaki killing 70,000 people. Japanese Emperor Hirohito citing the devastating power of "a new and most cruel bomb," announced his country's surrender on August 15 resulting in the end of the World War II.

The United Nations was born in the midst of war replacing League of Nations. The opening sentence of the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations makes the goal of the organization in explicit terms, that is, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind". It is pertinent to note that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted its very first resolution on January 24, 1946, which established a commission of the UN Security Council to ensure '*the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.*' Thus it is befitting that ratification of the treaty by 50 countries took place on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the ratification of the U.N. Charter. The data base of the United Nations office of Disarmament affairs shows the list of 84 signatory states and 50 state parties. Among the 50 State parties we can see countries like South Africa and Kazakhstan which had earlier possessed nuclear weapons. South Africa formerly possessed an arsenal of six nuclear weapons. They were dismantled prior to

acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991. At the time of break-up with the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited approximately 1,400 Soviet nuclear warheads, which it subsequently relinquished, recognizing that its security could be best achieved through disarmament. In Kazakhstan, from 1949 to 1989, an estimated 456 Soviet nuclear tests, including 116 atmospheric tests, were carried out at the Semipalatinsk test site, with devastating long-term consequences for human health and the environment. Another State party is Kiribati. At Malden and Kiritimati islands in Kiribati, between 1957 and 1962, the United Kingdom and the United States had tested 33 nuclear weapons. Thus the message is clear that they no longer want protection of their territories through nuclear weapons.

In South Asia, Bangladesh is the only country that has signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Nepal had signed the treaty way back in 2017and is yet to ratify it. The stand taken by India and Pakistan on the treaty is almost similar. Both did not participate in the negotiations and voted against the UN General Assembly resolution in 2019 urging "all states that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the treaty at the earliest possible date". The data on defence spending of the year 2019 to build and maintain nuclear weapons of Pakistan is estimated at $1 billion and that of India, $2.3 billion.

The major share of nuclear warheads is in the possession of Russia and the United States - 6,375 and 5800 warheads respectively(See the Table- 1). The US made it clear from the very beginning that it never intends to join the treaty and thereby failed to fulfill its legally binding disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a joint statement issued immediately after the adoption of the treaty in 2017, the U.S., France and the U.K. had expressed their strong opposition to the treaty. According to them, it disregards the realities of the international security environment and nuclear deterrence is essential for maintaining peace.

In the month of October, 2020, fearing the danger of becoming TPNW a reality in the near future, the United States urged the countries that had ratified the U.N. treaty to ban nuclear weapons to withdraw their ratification. It says the treaty "turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous" to the half-century-old Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty considered the cornerstone of global nonproliferation efforts."Although we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession," the letter says.

Table -1
Nuclear Arsenal possessed by the Countries

Country	Size of Arsenal (warheads)
Russia	6375
United States	5800
China	320
France	290
United Kingdom	215
Pakistan	160
India	150
Israel	90
North Korea	30-40

Source: SIPRI Year Book, 2020 Federation of American Scientists

Despite the opposition from nuclear powers the UN Secretary General António Guterres, in his speech on the launch of the UN's new Disarmament Agenda "Securing Our Future"in May 2018 praised the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). However, he failed to condemn possession of nuclear weapons, or call on all States to join the treaty. He said the TPNW "will form an important component of the nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation regime when it enters into force, and enable States that so choose to subscribe to some of the highest available multilateral norms against nuclear weapons." Later, Guterres described the TPNW as an affirmation of the "enormous frustration and enormous will of a large -and growing – number of countries that say 'That's enough!' "

On the occasion of the 50th ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, wrote: "Today, the conditions for the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons were met further to the deposit with the Secretary-General of the 50th instrument of ratification or accession of the Treaty. In accordance with its article 15 (1), the Treaty shall enter into force on 22 January 2021". The Secretary-General expressed his appreciation for the states that ratified the Treaty and the civil society groups who facilitated the negotiation and ratification of the Treaty. Entry-into-force is the culmination of a worldwide movement to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons

and a pathway to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, an objective of high priority for the United Nations.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) headed by Beatrice Fihn played an important role in making the Treaty and was rightfully awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017. She led ICAN since 2013 and incessantly worked to mobilize civil society throughout the development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. She, along with Setsuko Thurlow, the hibakusha (Japanese word for the bomb survivor) from Japan, accepted the Nobel Peace Prize and delivered their Nobel Lecture in Oslo on behalf of the campaign. In her Nobel lecture Beatrice Fihn said:

> Nuclear weapons, like chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions and land mines before them, are now illegal. Their existence is immoral. Their abolishment is in our hands.The end is inevitable. But will that end be the end of nuclear weapons or the end of us? We must choose one. We are a movement for rationality. For democracy. For freedom from fear. We are campaigners from 468 organisations who are working to safeguard the future, and we are representative of the moral majority: the billions of people who choose life over death, who together will see the end of nuclear weapons.

Setsuko Thurlow's Nobel lecture is soul touching. She said:

> When I was a 13-year-old girl, trapped in the smouldering rubble, I kept pushing. I kept moving toward the light. And I survived. Our light now is the ban treaty. To all in this hall and all listening around the world, I repeat those words that I heard called to me in the ruins of Hiroshima: "Don't give up! Keep pushing! See the light? Crawl towards it.

The crawling journey towards their goal ended on October 24, 2020. 0n the very day ICAN's Executive Director Beatrice Fihn wrote to the supporters of the campaign across the globe including India welcoming the historic moment:

> The big moment is finally here: the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) just reached the 50 ratifications needed for entry into force! Just now, Honduras ratified the treaty - only one day after Jamaica and Nauru submitted their ratifications - bringing about a historic milestone. In 90 days the TPNW will enter into force and become binding international law! This is not just our victory. We congratulate and thank each and every one of you who stood with us to help make this moment happen. This is an incredible moment for our movement and we are so unbelievably proud of what we've all achieved together.

> And we hope you will continue to support our work as we go into the next phase.
> With the treaty now ready to enter into force, everything will change, but our work is not done. We are going to need to get even louder to make sure the treaty lives up to its full potential. Once the treaty has taken full legal effect, countries that have joined it will need to comply with all of its obligations. In countries that have not joined, it is up to us to make sure that companies, governments and people know that nuclear weapons are illegal and that they need to stand on the right side of history.

She further added : "The 50 countries that ratify this Treaty are showing true leadership in setting a new international norm that nuclear weapons are not just immoral but illegal." Once the treaty has entered into force, more nations can join it at any stage. It is to be noted that even nations in possession of nuclear weapons can join the Treaty, so long as they agree to dismantle them including delivery systems in a time- bound manner. Disputes between countries arising from the Treaty are to be resolved through negotiation or other peaceful means.

Table -2
Countries Hosting US Nuclear weapons

Countries Hosting the US Nuclear weapons	Size of Arsenal
Turkey	50
Italy	40
Belgium	20
Germany	20
Netherlands	20

Source: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 2020

In addition to the major nuclear powers there are countries hosting nuclear weapons or are part of nuclear alliance. Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey are the nations host the US nuclear weapons. Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain (plus the five host nations) are in the nuclear alliance. The rest of the world is almost nuclear

weapon free but not from its effects.

The Treaty is not binding on those nations that refuse to sign it. What is important is that a powerful country like the US failed to reverse the growing strength of the movement in the last three years. It gives the nuclear powers a strong message that people want peace and not war. The deterrence theory has become almost outdated and is no longer valid in the current scenario.

As on October 24, 2020, governments of 84 countries have signed the treaty, and the legislatures of 50 of such countries have ratified it. More countries joined the fray and by 11 December 2020, the signatories increased to 86, and one more ratification was added to the tally. There will be more peer pressure when more countries come forward to sign and ratify the Treaty. It is hoped that this treaty will permanently avert the possibility of a nuclear war, which hung like the sword of Damocles over humanity.

With the spread of the Corona pandemic all over the world we have entered a new era. We have to change the old ways of thinking. No country can afford to spend more and more on deadly weapons. They should focus on providing basic necessities of life including proper medical facilities. Many so- called powerful nuclear weapons States found themselves wanting in the midst of the pandemic. Our enemy is not our neighbour, but the deadly virus. When **hundreds of millions of people across the globe are starving, the nuclear-armed nations are spending US$300 million a day on their nuclear forces.** It is right time to stop this madness and join hands in the fight against the pandemic. It is time for India to demonstrate its commitment to a nuclear free world by signing and ratifying the TPNW.

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The Impact of Indian Traditions on Gandhi

B Sambasiva Prasad

Introduction

THE OBJECTIVE OF this paper[1] is to analyze the impact of Indian philosophical tradition on the thinking and practices of Mahatma Gandhi and discuss their relevance to the contemporary world.

No doubt Gandhi was influenced by Western thinkers like Tolstoy, Ruskin and Thoreau; however, Indian philosophy and its values too made a profound influence on his thinking and practices. Gandhi was influenced by the Vedas, which are the source of Indian philosophy. He remarked that for him "the Vedas are divine and unwritten… the spirit of the Vedas is purity, truth, innocence, chastity, humility, simplicity, forgiveness, godliness, and all that makes a man or woman noble and brave."[2] He was also influenced by *Bhagavad Gita*. The philosophical insights of Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga and Vedanta made a profound impact on the thinking of Gandhi. In his writings and speeches, he often quotes the values, embedded in these systems. Gandhi was not only influenced by the moral and spiritual values of Indian philosophical thought, but also he had reformulated them to suit the social, political and religious situation of his time. Let me discuss these aspects in detail.

Gandhi and the Gita[3]

Gandhi was influenced by the values found in *Bhagavad Gita*. He said at a meeting in July 28, 1925: " ...When doubts haunt me, when disappointments stare me in the face, and when I see not one ray of light on the horizon, I turn to the *Bhagavad Gita*, and find a verse to comfort me; and I immediately begin to smile in the midst of overwhelming sorrow."[4]

In his *Autobiography*, Gandhi wrote that it was in 1890 when he was about 21 years old, while studying in England, he was invited by two theosophist brothers to read the *Gita* in original with them. He started reading Sir Edwin Arnold's translation of the *Gita, The Song Celestial*. Gandhi said that its verses 62 and 63 of chapter two made a

deep impression on his mind.[5] The *Gita* struck him as priceless. Gandhi said: "... to me the *Gita* became an infallible guide of conduct. It became my dictionary of daily reference. Just as I turned to the English dictionary for the meanings of English words that I did not understand, I turned to this dictionary of conduct for a ready solution of all my troubles and trials. Words like *aparigraha* (non-possession) and *samabhava* (equanmity) gripped me. ...."[6] Gandhi also advocated the significance of bread-labour through his study of the *Gita*, where it is told that he who eats without "sacrifice" eats stolen food. In this context, Gandhi had construed the word 'sacrifice' as 'bread-labour'. When Gandhi was jailed in South Africa on October 14, 1908, to undergo two months rigorous imprisonment, he read the *Bhagavad Gita,* which he had carried with him. All this reading had the effect of confirming his belief in "satyagraha".

In his speeches, writings and interviews Gandhi referred to the *Gita* as "the book par excellence for the knowledge of Truth"[7] and the "staff of life".[8] He called it "Mother *Gita*".[9] He considered it as his "spiritual dictionary", [10] "spiritual treasury",[11] and "lexicon of the soul". [12] He also called it "the Divine song"[13] and the "Book of Life".[14]

In spite of his hectic activities, Gandhi took some time to place before us the teachings of the *Gita* through the following works:

(1) Gitapadharthakosha (1923/1936)- a concordance–cum-dictionary of all Sanskrit words and terms in the *Gita*, with their translation into Gujarati.

(2) Gitashikshan (1926)- covering the full *Gita* in 218 discourses delivered by him in Gujarati.

(3) Anasaktiyoga (1930)- a translation of the *Gita* into Gujarati.

(4) Gitabodh (1930-32)- letters written in Gujarati from jail, explaining the essence of each of the 18 chapters of the *Gita*; published as 'Discourse' in English translation.

(5) Gitapraveshika (1934)- selection of 41 verses of the *Gita*, for his son Ramdas.

Gandhi and Jainism

Gandhi was not a Jain by birth, but was influenced by the Jain tradition. He was a Jain in spirit because of his ideals and philosophy. Like a Jain, he was also a vegetarian. Another great influence of Jainism on Gandhi was simplicity. In his later life, he wore only bare minmum clothes made of cotton, that too of white colour. Gandhi's greatest contribution to Jainism was that he made Jain principles practical by applying them on a large scale involving masses. He was the first man to apply Jain principle of *ahimsa* to solve social and political problems of his time.

While discussing the influence of Jainism on Gandhi, it is pertinent to discuss the impact of Rajchandrabhai, who was a Jain by birth. Gandhi was introduced to him by Dr. Pranjivan Mehta. Rajchandra led his life in a spirit of highest detachment. Gandhi said that he had learnt much from the lives of many persons. He remarked that three persons had left a deep impression on his life and captivated him. They are Raychadrabahi, Tolstoy and Ruskin- "Raychandbhai by his living contact; Tolstoy by his book *The Kingdom of God Is Within You*; and Ruskin by his *Unto This Last*".[15]

There is no doubt that Jainism has contributed richly in the areas of epistemology and metaphysics, but its chief contribution is in ethics. Its ethics is centred round the principle of *ahimsa* (nonviolence). Gandhi drew on Jainism in developing his philosophy of *ahimsa*, which informs his social philosophy, political philosophy, economic and religious philosophy. To Gandhi, *satya* and *ahimsa* (truth and nonviolence) are inter-related. Wherever there is truth, there is nonviolence and wherever there is nonviolence, there is truth. They are inseparable as two sides of the same coin. To Gandhi, while truth is the end or goal, nonviolence is the means. The means, he said, should be as pure as the end. Truth cannot be realized through violence.

Though Gandhi was influenced by the Jain principle of 'ahimsa', his interpretation of 'ahimsa' is unique. Unlike in Jainism, it is relative in nature. For Jains, to pluck a flower or a leaf is a kind of violence; they consider killing of micro-organism as violence. This is the reason why they suggest wearing a face mask while breathing and walking with utmost care to avoid killing micro-organisms. The Jain monks have to follow the principle of *ahimsa* to its minute detail. They call it as a *mahavrata*. Unlike in Jainism, Gandhi's notion of *ahimsa* is relative in nature. He said that a human being cannot sustain his body without killing some form of life for his food, and such destruction of life is therefore justified. Gandhi allowed the destruction of some lower species for health and hygiene. The destruction of animal life that causes injury to human life is also, according to Gandhi, permissible in certain contexts. Therefore, he supported the killing of monkeys (which destroyed food-crops and fruits), carnivorous animals, poisonous snakes and rabid dogs. In his *ashram*, Gandhi recommended killing of an ailing calf, which was suffering with acute pain. Even killing of a man, considered Gandhi, may be needed in certain cases. Suppose a lunatic kills indiscriminately everyone at his sight. Under these circumstances, said Gandhi, it is our duty to catch that person and even to end his life. He observed:

> Taking life may be a duty. We do destroy as much life as we think necessary for sustaining our body. Thus for food we take life, vegetable and other, and for health we destroy mosquitoes and the like by the use of disinfectants, etc., and we do not think that we are guilty of irreligion in doing so...for the benefit of the species, we kill carnivorous beasts.... Even man slaughter may be necessary in certain cases. Suppose a man runs amuck and goes furiously about, sword in hand, and killing anyone that comes in his way, and no one dares to capture him alive. Anyone who despatches this lunatic will earn the gratitude of the community and be regarded as a benevolent man.[16]

Therefore, to Gandhi "ahimsa does not simply mean non-killing. *Himsa* means causing pain to or killing any life out of anger, or for selfish purpose, or with the intention of injuring it. Refraining from so doing is *ahimsa*." [17] According to him, the motive behind the act is the basic consideration in deciding whether a particular act of killing amounts to violence or not.

Gandhi not only considered the Jain principle of "ahimsa" as an ethical value, but also applied it as a political value in getting India freedom (*Swaraj*) from the British yoke. He led several *satyagraha* movements which are based on the principle of non-violence. Soon after Gandhi returned to India from South Africa, he undertook Champaran *satyagraha* (1917) and ended the century old *tinkathia* system and the planters Raj, that exploited the poor indigo farmers of Champaran. The next *satyagraha* that Gandhi experimented upon was to address the grievances of the Kheda farmers (1918). So also Gandhi undertook the epic march from Sabarmati to Dandi (a distance of 241 miles) on foot and broke the salt law, imposed by the British rule on the poor salt makers from sea water (1930). On similar grounds, Gandhi resorted to fasts against untouchability and against communal riots in India.

The Jain doctrines of *syadvada* and *anekantavada* influenced Gandhi deeply. *Syadvada* or the *saptabhangi* holds that all knowledge to be only probable; every proposition gives us only a perhaps, a may be (*syad*). We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object. It holds that there are seven different ways of expressing a thing or its attributes. Its logical corollary is *anekantavada,* the doctrine of manyness of reality. Both *syadvada* and *anekantavada* are two aspects of the same teaching - realistic and relativistic pluralism. They are like two sides of the same coin. The metaphysical side that reality has innumerable aspects is called *anekantavada*, while its epistemological and logical side that we know only some aspects of reality and that therefore all our judgements are necessarily relative, is called *syadvada*. Gandhi remarked that he was influenced by both *syadvada* and *anekantavada*.

Referring to the latter, he said: "I very much like this doctrine of manyness of reality. It is this doctrine that has taught me to judge a Musalman from his own standpoint and a Christian from his own."[18]

Being influenced by the Jain doctrine of *syadvada*, Gandhi said that religion is one; different men put it in different ways. We cannot say that one interpretation is correct and the other is false. Every body is right from one's own perspective but it is impossible that every person is wrong. Therefore, "the necessity of tolerance, which does not mean indifference to one's own faith, but a more intelligent and purer love for it."[19] Gandhi further opined that we should not merely tolerate but also respect the other faiths as our own. He preferred the term *ahimsa* to the term 'tolerance' because tolerance may imply an assumption of the inferiority of other's faiths to one's own, but *ahimsa* teaches the same respect for other religious faiths as we accord to our own. Gandhi remarked : "Various religions were like leaves on a tree. No two leaves were alike, yet there was no antagonism between them or between the branches on which they grew. Even so, there is an underlying unity in the variety which we see in God's creation."[20]

From the above discussion, it is obvious that Gandhi was influenced by Jainism and its doctrines of *ahimsa*, *syadvada* and *anekantavada*. However, he had modulated them to suit his times and age.

Gandhi and Buddhism

Buddhism too made a profound impact on Gandhi's thinking. Its philosophy of "ahimsa" captivated him. So also its notion that "desire (*thrisna*) is the root cause of misery (*dukha*)", enthralled Gandhi's thinking. Like Buddha, Gandhi believed that multiplication of wants is the root cause of all misery. Therefore, he advocated the philosophy of "wantlessness". Gandhi felt that civilization consists not in the multiplication of wants, but in their voluntary reduction.

Gandhi distinguishes between "needs", "wants" and "greed". "Needs" are the basic necessities for human living -- nutritious food, simple house to live in, minimum dress, and hygiene. But human being increases his wants out of greed. He multiplies his wants beyond necessity. Therefore, Gandhi preached the philosophy of *aparigraha* (non-possession) or voluntary poverty or wantlessness. Wants go beyond needs and when we do not meet them we enter into sorrow, and this leads to anger and depression. Gandhi's philosophy of wantlessness is based upon his conception that individual good consists in social good. If one reduces his wants, he will procure less and makes others happy in sharing surplus goods. This amounts to

participation in social good. Gandhi advocated voluntary poverty, which means limiting one's needs to the minimum level. We must think of necessities and avoid luxuries. Gandhi said, "There should be no wasteful expenditure. Money is not the only wealth for us. Every useful commodity is real wealth. We may not throw away even water. If one glass of water would do, why take two? … We may not overeat a delicious dish. If we do, we cannot practice truth and ahimsa."[21] Gandhi opined that greed was also the root cause of war and economic crisis. He said, "man's avarice reaches up to the highest heavens and down to the lowest regions of the earth. Hence it should be controlled."[22]

Gandhi observed that man procures more and more out of fear for his future. "Perfect fulfilment of the ideal of Non-possession requires that man should, like the birds, have no roof over his head, no clothing and no stock of food for the morrow. He will indeed, need his daily bread, but it will be God's business, and not his to provide for it."[23] He added: "If we will take care of today, God will take care of tomorrow."[24] Referring to the distinction between needs, wants and greed, captivatingly Gandhi remarked: "Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need but not for every man's greed."[25]

Gandhi and Yoga

Gandhi was also influenced by Patanjali's philosophy of Yoga. Especially he was attracted towards ethical observances laid down in "yama" that constitutes the founding step to *astanga-yoga*. According to Patanjali, *yama* is the ethical preparation necessary for the practice of yoga. The *yama* consists of five principles namely *satya* (truth), *ahimsa* (nonviolence), *asteya* (non-stealing), *brahmacharaya* (celibacy) and *aparigraha* (non-possession). Gandhi called these five principles as the Cardinal Virtues. He added to this list another six principles. Together, they constitute the "eleven vows", that he prescribed to his *ashramites*. The six additional principles that Gandhi prescribed are *sarira-shrama* (bread-labour), *asvadha* (control of the palate), *abhaya* (fearlessness), *sarvadharma samabhava* (equal respect to all religions), *swadeshi* (use of locally made goods) and *sparsa-bhavana* (removal of untouchability). These eleven vows that Gandhi prescribed to his *ashramites* were originally introduced by him in South Africa but were formulated in India when he set up the Satyagraha Ashram in 1915 (later known as Sabarmati Ashram) at Ahmedabad. Gandhi "reviewed and updated these observances from time and time based on his experiences and formalized them in his book *From Yeravada Mandir*, published in 1932."[26]

Gandhi and Vedanta

Gandhi was also influenced by the seminal teachings of Vedanta. Accepting the oneness of Reality as advocated by Sankara, Gandhi remarked:

"I believe in advaita. I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore I believe that if one man gains spirituality, the whole world gains with him and, if one man falls, the whole world falls to that extent."[27]

Equally, Gandhi accepted the manyness of Reality of Ramanuja. He said: "I believe God to be creative as well as non-creative. This too is the result of my acceptance of the doctrine of the manyness of reality. From the platform of the Jains I prove the non-creative aspect of God, and from that of Ramanuja the creative aspect."[28]

Gandhi was thus equally influenced by the philosophy of advaitism and dvaitism. He said:

> I am *Advaitist* and yet I can support *Dvaitism* (dualism). The world is changing every moment, and is therefore unreal, it has no permanent existence. But though it is constantly changing, it has something about it which persists and it is therefore to that extent real. I have therefore no objection to calling it real and unreal, and thus being called an *Anekantivadi* or a *Syadvadi*.[29]

The above passages indicate that Gandhi was influenced by different schools of Vedanta.

Conclusion

In this paper, I made an attempt to show how Gandhi was influenced by the Indian philosophical tradition and its values. I began my essay by showing how he was influenced by the Vedic literature. Subsequently, I explained how Gandhi was influenced by the teachings of the *Gita*, Jainism and Buddhism. I have also illustrated the influence of Yoga and Vedanta on Gandhi. But it should be remembered that Gandhi did not simply copy the ethical and spiritual values embedded in these systems, but modulated and interpreted them to suit his times and age. This is the originality we find in Gandhi.

Gandhi's conception of ethical and spiritual values is more relevant now than ever. In the name of modern civilization, man is forgetting his cultural and philosophical roots. He is content with material and bodily comforts alone, and overlooks moral and spiritual dimensions of life. To put it in the language of Bertrand Russell, the modern man concentrates only on the "goods of the body" and ignores the "goods of the mind". Under these conditions, "Gandhian philosophy and

practices could be the soothing syrup to the congested minds coughing abuse and conflict and spitting terror and violence."[30]

Notes and References

1. This is the modified version of my paper, submitted for the Teachers' Meet on "Revitalizing Indian Philosophy In 21st Century ", held at Chennai on 5-7th December 2019.
2. *Young India*, 19-1-1921: 22.
3. While understanding *Bhagavad Gita*'s influence upon Gandhi, I am deeply benefitted by reading Y.P.Anand's compilation on "*M.K.Gandhi on the Bhagavad Gita*", published in *GITAM Journal of Gandhian Studies*, Vol.1, No.2.
4. *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* in 100 Vols. (hereafter CWMG), (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India) Vol. 27: p. 435.
5. The English translation of the verses 62 & 63 of the GITA (Chapter II)
   Verse 62: "Pondering over objects, one gets attached to them. Attachment breeds desire, from desire anger is born".
   Verse 63: "Anger leads to delusion, from delusion memory gets clouded, from clouding of memory the intellect gets destroyed, when the intellect goes one is ruined.
6. CWMG, 39: 211-12.
7. Ibid., 39: 60-61.
8. Ibid. , 61:63.
9. Ibid. , 49: 291-92.
10. Ibid., 47: 367; 63: 310-12 & 80: 210.
11. Ibid., 82: 152.
12. Ibid., 80: 186-87.
13. Ibid., 55: 41.
14. Ibid., 47: 204 & 51: 344-45.
15. M.K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth,* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1927/2000), p. 75.
16. M.K. Gandhi, *All Men are Brothers* (Calcutta: UNESCO & Orient Longman, 1959), p.92.
17. *Young India*, 4-11-1926, p.385.
18. Ibid., 21-1-1926, p. 30.
19. M.K. Gandhi, *From Yeravada Mandir,* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1932/2016), p.31.
20. *Harijan*, 26-5-1946, p.154.
21. CWMG, 71:240.
22. Ibid., 79:437.
23. M.K.Gandhi, *From Yeravada Mandir*, Op.cit., p. 22.
24. *Young India*, 13-10-1921, p. 326.
25. Pyarelal, Nayyar, *Mahatma Gandhi* (10 vols.) (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1958), Vol. 10: p. 552.

26. Shugan, C. Jain *Gandhi & Jainism,* (New Delhi: International School for Jain Studies, 2017), p.153.
27. *Young India*, 4-12-1924, p.398.
28. Ibid., 21-1-1926, p.30.
29. Ibid., 21-1-1926, p.30.
30. K.R. Rao, *Gandhirama 2012: A Feast of Ideas and a Festival of Art*. (New Delhi: ICPR., 2012), p.vii.

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Book Reviews

Sanjeev Kumar (Ed.), Gandhi and the Contemporary World, London & New York: South Asia edition, 2020 ISBN978-0-367-47918-3 HB. pp.234. Price Rs. 995.

This book is seemingly part of a series brought out by Routledge recently, possibly in the context of the 150th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi in 2019. The forward to the book is written by none other than Lord Bhikhu Parekh, who says that the volume explores Gandhi's "strengths and limitations and helps us form a balanced estimate of his achievements". The book is dedicated to late Antony Copley (who is also a contributor to this volume), and has blurbs by Anthony Parel and Thomas Pantham. It is divided into four parts titled Gandhian Philosophy, Gandhi and Swaraj, Gandhi and social justice, and Post- Gandhian legacy: issues and challenges. In his introduction subtitled 'Understanding Gandhi- Why Gandhi matters today', Sanjeev Kumar provides a brief survey of the major works on Gandhi highlighting aspects that fit in with the central theme of the volume, lays out the plan of the volume and summarises the individual chapters.

Douglas Allen admits in the second chapter that "Gandhi does not have all the answers or simple solutions". He adds: "some of what Gandhi wrote was inadequate during his lifetime, sometimes lacking truth and even at times blatantly immoral". Yet like Socrates he challenges us "to examine and rethink our dominant philosophy and practices" (p.40). In the third chapter, Nishikant Kolge discusses the conceptual evolution of Satyagraha. He tells us that the emergence of the creed of nonviolence as an integral element of Satyagraha took place only as late as 1915, after Gandhi's return to India. In South Africa, he had merely emphasized Satyagraha as a strategy of avoiding violence. In 1909, he wrote about the qualities needed by a person to offer Satyagraha, but did not mention nonviolence as one of them. He concludes that Gandhi's Satyagraha was a combination of spiritual

and political elements, a blend of principled and pragmatic nonviolence. The fourth chapter by Sangamitra Sadhu is primarily centred around the debates that Gandhi had with his colleagues, collaborators and detractors. The debates include the one on nonviolence with Aurobindo, Tilak and Savarkar, on untouchability with Ambedkar, on Swadeshi with Tagore and on modernity with Nehru. There is a second part to the essay, which is a brief discussion on some biographers of Gandhi who were critical of him on various counts.

Chapters five, six and seven of the book deal with the different aspects of Gandhi's idea of Swaraj. Ram Chandra Pradhan states that Gandhi's concept of Swaraj "successfully avoids both the extremes of localism on the one hand and total homogenization in the name of liberalization and globalization" (p.79). According to Kumar Rahul, the pursuit of Swaraj starts with 'self-examination', which in turn enlightens one with 'self-knowledge', leading to 'self-transformation'. It is this transformed self, which can experience Swaraj. Biswanath Banerjee looks at the differing meanings of Swaraj in the thinking of Gandhi, P C Ray and Tagore. He found P C Ray subscribing to a notion of Swaraj free from British imperialism and economic hegemony. Gandhi went beyond that to de-emphasize its materialist culture. Tagore emphasized true bonding of the Indians as the means to Swaraj.

In chapter eight of the third section, Vidhu Verma looks at the interconnection between modernity, colonial justice and individual responsibility by taking up the cases of Gandhi and Ambedkar. Their understanding of the emancipatory possibilities of modernity differed with Ambedkar going whole hog for it including subscribing to conversion and Gandhi vehemently opposing Western modernity altogether. The chapter by Bindu Puri continues the debate between Gandhi and Ambedkar by taking up the themes of memory and identity. The author argues that Ambedkar was prone to forgetting a painful past to create a new identity while Gandhi believed that the past was relevant to the constitution of one's self and identity. The same theme is elaborated in a different light by Mustakim Ansary by revisiting the controversy created by Arundhati Roy in her introduction to the new edition of Ambedkar's *Annihilation of Caste.* Roy had alleged that Gandhi was a racist in South Africa. Ansary argues that "Roy's diatribe against Gandhi failed to elevate itself to a healthy debate, but rather it degenerated into personal attacks, and Gandhi emerged more glorious as the real social crusader" (p.155). This section also has a chapter on Gandhi and the race question by Hari Nair, Swaha Das and K.A.K Adavi. The authors argue that Gandhi's favourable description of Africans at a later stage in his life was not aimed at correcting some of his own earlier statements, but

were a natural corollary of corresponding changes in the very discourse on race globally following the exposure of the pseudo-science behind racial superiority.

Antony Copley explores what India can learn from Gandhi. The whole tenour of his piece is a visceral hatred for what India is becoming, and a longing for the India of the past, for instance, the 1970s. A close follower of events in the subcontinent, his analysis is centred on three themes – the politics of violence, the politics of social protest and the politics of identity. Mahendra Pratap Singh discusses the legacy of the India Against Corruption movement and the promise of transparency and participatory democracy that it offered, eventually leading to a breakup of the movement with one faction forming the Aam Aadmi Party, which contested the elections successfully. Although the party has gone back on many of its promises, it still retains some elements that are at odds with conventional political parties, which is quite reassuring according to the author. The chapter by J Gray Cox discusses three existential problems, namely climate change, armament and artificial intelligence that can surpass human intelligence, and how measures to address them are embedded in the economic, realpolitik and instrumental rationality. In their place he suggests Satyagraha based on dialogue and compassion as an alternative model of rational inquiry. The final chapter by Anandita Biswas on the humanism of Gandhi, which has an initial overdose of grandiloquent style, concludes that India is now witnessing a struggle between Gandhian and Savarkarite Hinduisms.

Sanjeev Kumar deserves appreciation for bringing together a number of young scholars to reflect on Gandhi and his continued relevance in the contemporary world. This offers a ray of hope for many of us concerned with the absence of a new generation of Gandhian scholars. Although the book has an attractive title, the contents are slightly lopsided. One cannot blame the editor for that, particularly if seminar papers are converted into volumes. The book is elegantly brought out and has a very useful index. I strongly recommend this book to students and scholars in political science, Gandhian studies, peace studies and philosophy. Even general readers will be enthused by the line-up of articles.

John S Moolakkattu
Editor, Gandhi Marg

Michael W. Sonnleitner, Gandhi & King: Soul Force & Social Change, Beau Bassin, Mauritius: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2019. ISBN 978-620-0-31418-5, pp. 469, Price unavailable.

This book is a replica of a Ph.D dissertation submitted by the author to the University of Minnesota in 1979. The book deals with the ideational elements of Gandhi and King, which he thinks did not get the attention they deserve due to the general focus of many studies on their biographical aspects. The author is concerned with the role of law and coercion in social change. Both Gandhi and King formulated their theories in their struggle against racial discrimination. The book is divided into three sections , namely, Gandhian nonviolence, Kingian nonviolence and Personal reflections. The main body of the work is in two parts, with seven chapters on Gandhi in the first part, and six chapters on King in the second, making up a total of 13 chapters. Sonnleitner has used both published and unpublished materials available until 1979 to prepare the book. Further, they were supplemented with interviews with Gandhian and KIngian experts and followers.

Sonnleitner first looks at Gandhian Satyagraha as a technique. He says that Gandhi believed in the notion of anekantavada or the many-sidededness of truth assuming also the idea that all human truths are relative. At another level, Satyagraha is an act of love , and at this level it involves the act of suffering. Sonnleitner says that "Gandhi demands that we grant to our opponents the same freedom to hold their truths - and act on them- as we would have respect in us"(pp. 44-45). Gandhi's ability to suffer pain and death would appear to an American audience as "reflecting a latent masochism"(p.46). The author thinks that "Gandhi came to rely upon self-suffering as the most ideal basis for social change movements described as nonviolent" (p.48). A just cause , capacity for suffering and avoidance of violence in a spirit of universal love can make Satyagraha successful. In chapter four, the author elaborates the guidelines for Satyagraha.

Gandhi believed that progress is inevitable. In order to progress, one's conduct of actions must be without secrecy, original demands may be revised only if the opponent raised new issues during the course of a campaign , original demands may be lowered only when we know that we are wrong in making them and be prepared to make compromises on nonessentials without engaging in bargaining. In Gandhi's approach to social change, there is continuity between individuals and nations, and no disjunction exists between these two levels.

The author then proceeds to discuss the ideas of King. King's militant nonviolence is a blending of love and power with a view to attaining justice. It was "fundamental to the building of the kingdom of God on earth"(p.298). He was for radical changes in the structure of society. King had a strong antipathy towards capitalism. Unlike Gandhi, King " did not consider the intentional use of the coercive powers of the state as either essentially immoral or necessarily non-peaceful" (p.296). King had no difficulty in accepting the use of children as participants in a campaign. He also was open to exploit the weaknesses of the opponent. Sonnleitner says that Gandhi was always aware of the quality of the participants in nonviolent campaigns than mere quantity. Gandhi actually dreaded the crowd while King was a crowd puller. The also had some reservations about what he considered unnecessary suffering in the Gandhian line. Gandhi wanted the affected people alone to participate in campaigns. It was in line with his idea of self-reliance. King actually did not care for that.

The author also says that King was willing to accommodate a certain degree of coercion and defensive violence and had no affectionate concern for the opponent as a person. This makes him different from Gandhi on that count. The author places King's central ideas within a two-stage theory in which, although there is a long-term commitment to moral means , there is also equal concern with short-term results. The notion of swaraj as internal self-rule at the individual level is to King is primarily a case of group self-rule. In sum, unlike Gandhi, King was prepared to use nonviolence quite opportunistically even as he was committed to it. The author calls Gandhi a 'pragmatic idealist' and King an 'idealistic pragmatist'.

This is an excellent study of the two nonviolent leaders and their methods of bringing about nonviolent social change. The author also brings out the subtle differences between them. He has used interviews with experts and activists to bolster his arguments, which cast the book in a unique mould. That Sonnleitner has taken this long to publish it is certainly a loss to the academic community. The publisher merely inserted a cover page and reproduced the thesis with its small font size, which is certainly an injustice to the richness of its contents. It requires robust eye sight and persistence to read the text without a magnifying glass. It is an exact copy of the thesis, and has not witnessed the necessary transition to a book format. If that transition followed by a little bit of updating had taken place, the book would have caught greater attention of the academic community as a solid piece of

work. There is also no index, which would have added to the accessibility of the book. Notwithstanding these pitfalls, I strongly recommend the book to the academic community, especially those from the fields of Gandhian studies , peace studies, sociology, and general readers.

John S Moolakkattu
Editor, Gandhi Marg

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Information for Authors

Gandhi Marg is the premier quarterly journal of the Gandhi Peace Foundation having a standing of more than half a century published from New Delhi in the months of March, June, September and December every year. Original contributions on themes of national and international importance falling under the broad area of Gandhian Studies are invited from scholars and practitioners. Articles submitted to Gandhi Marg are refereed. It is presumed that an article submitted to Gandhi Marg is original, and has not been under the consideration of any other journal. In general, the articles should not exceed 8000 words including notes and references. Periodically, we also bring out special issues on selected themes.

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Examples

Books: Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p.23.

Articles: Ramashray Roy, "Parameters of Participation", *Gandhi Marg*, 12, 3(October-December 1990), p.276.

Chapters within Books: Pearl S. Buck, "A Way of Living", in S. Radhakrishnan, ed., *Mahatma Gandhi: Essays* and Reflections (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1956), p.51.

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